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Abstract 
 General Dwight D. Eisenhower used the Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur to 
conduct a guerilla war against German forces during the Allied campaigns in France.  
The study below examines the Allied politics, the nature and the development of the 
French Résistance, and the actions of the German forces in France to evaluate how 
useful the deployment of 93 JEDBURGH teams were in their role to conduct an 
effective guerilla war aiding Allied military objectives.  Disagreements between 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and resistance leader General Charles de Gaulle led 
to Eisenhower's inability to get the most out of the effort.  Under certain conditions, 
Eisenhower and the French with British and American support achieved limited 
success.  Eisenhower's recognition of de Gaulle's authority over the Résistance and 
his insistence on placing a French commander in charge of the effort proved to be the 
single greatest factor in the successes gained with the JEDBURGHs. 
 
 
 
"The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or 
the U.S. Government." 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 There is more to war than fighting.  What follows is a description of the battle 
for France in the summer of 1944.   The French, British, Americans, and Germans 
involved in that battle either understood that there was more to war than fighting or 
suffered the consequences.  If the battle for France can be viewed as a self-contained 
matter, that is to say the nature of the fighting would be defined by its own 
characteristics and distinct from the war in Italy, North Africa, the Mediterranean, the 
Soviet Union, Atlantic sea lanes, or the strategic bombing campaigns, then it should 
be viewed with a understanding and appreciation of those characteristics that made it 
unique.  The complicated nature of the partisan warfare that occurred alongside the 
conventional invasions and air operations do not make it unique, however the planned 
use of partisan activity to support the conventional forces during their progress 
through France provide an opportunity to examine the impact of guerrilla style 
warfare; its successes and failures; and its utility as well as its thorny ethical 
dilemmas.  WWII Allied commanders and the French Résistance agreed upon use of 
Special Force teams, code-named JEDBURGHs, to exploit French guerrilla warfare 
to support their conventional operations.  But these three-man teams found 
themselves doing far more than combat tasks, and as some Allied planners had 
originally hoped, their cumulative effect was greater than the sum of their parts.  
Their role was more than fighting, but still inside of the realm of war. 
The British and American political and military leaders viewed France as 
more of a military operation than a political one.  It was, after all, on the way to 
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Berlin and furthermore, because the Germans had placed a large amount of their 
nations’ forces there it also served as a place to engage the enemy and destroy those 
forces.  The Germans had 60 Wehrmacht and SS combat divisions in France, 
approximately 40 U-Boots in French ports, over 5,000 aircraft attempting to protect 
occupied French airspace in addition to an occupation civil-military force protecting 
and exploiting what were key war making resources.1  If both that military power and 
those resources were reduced, German war making would be substantially weakened.  
The German Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine based in France were therefore 
targets the Allies sought to destroy while at the same time denying Germany valuable 
French labor, mineral, and manufacturing resources required to wage industrial age 
war.  With this in mind, the battle for France from the British and American point of 
view was largely a military problem that often obscured issues believed to be so 
pressing to their French allies.   
The French viewed this battle as far more than simple geography and the 
enemy’s presence.  For them this battle meant everything:  their liberty, their 
independence as a nation, and so the French Résistance sought to define a new France 
that would achieve the lofty ideals of Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité expressed in 
their 1789 Revolution.  From their point of view, the very nature of the battle for 
France was political with the military issues supporting those fundamental political 
                                                
1 Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the 
West and East Asia 1943-1944/5 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 
2006).  The number of Divisions comes from their chart on page 474, the number of aircraft comes 
from their estimate in footnote 109 on page 528.  The number of Submarines is based on the 
number given in German message traffic on the 5th of August, 1944 and decrypted by the British.  
See HW 1/3158, page 11 at the British National Archives.   
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goals that continued after the combat.  As the novelist and résistant Albert Camus put 
it in the underground newspaper Combat in March of 1944, “… our common hope is 
that when that day comes, it [the Résistance] will retain enough momentum to inspire 
a new truth and a new France.”2  The French certainly agreed with the Atlantic 
Charter’s goal of self-determination as well as the American and British aim of 
“unconditional surrender,” but the Résistance had the added desire to re-achieve their 
own liberty, instead of the liberties of others as the British and Americans sought.  
Therefore, they sought the political goals of ending collaboration with Germany and 
making sure the Allies did not occupy them after combat had ejected the Germans.  
Such political aims, in addition to the tremendous wound the 1940 defeat struck in 
French pride, set the scene for several fundamental disagreements and much 
misunderstanding between the three parties.   
The British had seriously contemplated many of these issues themselves in the 
summer and fall of 1940 when they greatly feared an invasion.  They drew up 
contingency plans to fight “on the beaches, ….,”3  in Winston Churchill’s famous 
speech, but they did more than talk and plan for it.  The Royal Air Force fought a 
brave and fierce battle against the Luftwaffe, while the Royal Navy defended the sea 
approaches.  The army, what there was of it after escaping destruction in Northern 
France, also reorganized a Home Guard that included a closely guarded secret of what 
                                                
2 Albert Camus and Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, Camus at Combat:  Writing 1944-1947, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). p. 3. Lévi-Valensi can not be 
certain that Camus penned these words, but available evidence points to him as their author.   
3 Winston Churchill, We Shall Fight on the Beaches.... Speech to the House of Commons, 4 June (1940 
[cited 5 November 2007]); available from 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=393. 
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they called Auxiliary Units.   Should the Germans defeat and occupy Britain, these 
Auxiliary Units would then continue the fight using guerilla warfare inside Britain.4   
As it happened the thinking and planning for these Auxiliary Units later led to the 
idea of doing that elsewhere in German occupied areas once invasion fears receded 
for Britain.  Such an idea had great appeal due to the problem of coordinating the 
various resistance movements in occupied nations, and the British believed it would 
provide the needed training and more importantly, control of, irregular partisan bands 
of small resistance units scattered about occupied nations behind German main 
armies.  What came to be known as JEDBURGH teams could be used, British 
planners believed, to maintain control over myriad resistance movements and harass 
German lines and conduct guerilla warfare that supported the Allied military 
leadership’s wishes.   In other words, it provided a measure of control of these very 
uncontrollable and distrusted groups who often sought their own political and military 
aims.   
The United States, after a brief and unfounded fear of Japanese invasion, 
never seriously grappled with what should be done if the calamity of invasion and 
defeat occurred to it.  Therefore, the American people and their political leaders never 
faced such defining political issues as intimately as circumstances forced upon the 
French.  Indeed when it came to establishing national political aims, such as defeating 
Germany first or the profound political aim of unconditional surrender, there was no 
constructive national discussion.  The American President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
                                                
4 William Mackenzie, The Secret History of S. O. E.:  Special Operations Executive 1940-1945 
(London: St. Ermin's Press, 2002). 51 – 55. 
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simply broached the topic of unconditional surrender with British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill and then, with the somewhat surprised Churchill sitting next to 
him, made it a fait accompli by announcing it at a press conference at the Casablanca 
conference in January of 1943.5   Clearly the manner in which President Roosevelt 
decided issues, even the grandest issues of them all such as unlimited war, and then 
forged ahead with them, often left his political allies both foreign and domestic in the 
lurch.  Such resolution is often admired as being an essential element of statesmanlike 
leadership.  However if it fails to keep pace with reality, the only term for it is 
stubbornness.  Neither Roosevelt nor the Free French leader Charles de Gaulle ever 
managed to bridge this difference which arose due to the Anglo-American aim of 
defeating Germany by traveling through France.  Free French goals were far grander 
than the Anglo-American ones.  The French Résistance spoke in language of 
revolution and renewal and political aim while the Americans and British merely 
viewed France as a geographic waypoint on the road to Berlin.  The gap then between 
each nation’s aims translated into tactical difficulties for the JEDBURGH teams as 
they attempted to work with the resistance groups in 93 different localities throughout 
France in the summer and fall of 1944.   
Certainly political decisions have military and tactical consequences for 
troops in the field.  The disagreement and misunderstanding between President 
Roosevelt and General de Gaulle, with Churchill usually backing the President, 
fomented false notions of who might be a legitimate leader of the French Résistance, 
                                                
5 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War 
(London; New York: Allen Lane, 2004). p. 324. 
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especially when the United States promoted a French General of its preference over 
the preferences of thousands of French men and women risking their lives in its 
various resistance movements.  While one may have a constructive debate about the 
legitimacy various Résistance movements possessed in order to select a leader for all 
of France, one can conclude by Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s own words in the 
Atlantic Charter that they had no standing in the matter.  FDR and Churchill were 
many things, but they were not French.  Their persistence in pressuring the Free 
French as to who would be their leaders led to distrust, deep suspicions, and 
exasperation.  Indeed, a great number of people in the various resistance groups often 
found the lack of American support alarming.  The British sent numerous agents into 
France, tons of weapons, explosives, ammunition, and cash to various groups.  The 
United States did this as well, but since its efforts only gained traction in 1944, 
suspicions persisted.  The JEDBURGHs then, found themselves literally parachuting 
into the gap created by the top-level political misunderstanding and lack of 
appreciation of the other Ally’s war aims.  Indeed, Roosevelt and de Gaulle never had 
a constructive meeting where each man could explain face to face to the other their 
nation’s concerns and goals.  The two meetings they did have were largely staged 
press events with the private discussions obscured by each man’s obdurate views on 
the other’s role.  Under certain conditions described below, the JEDBURGHs might 
provide the locality where they operated a measure of political unity needed to 
achieve their military mission.  Many times, this pair of junior officers teamed with a 
Non-Commissioned officer who served as the radio operator, could not bridge that 
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gap for reasons beyond their control.  But nevertheless, the gap caused by 
disagreements between French resistance groups was often bridged with or without 
the aid of the Allied JEDBURGH units.  For in the end, the French united themselves, 
on their own terms, and in ways reflecting their own history and culture.   
Few were more grateful for that event than the man the Allies placed in charge 
of their military efforts in France, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.  For him, it meant 
he would not have to become the military governor of France and could focus on 
organizing the American, British, French, Canadian, Polish, and other allied military 
forces to defeat Germany.  When he took command at his Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Forces  (SHAEF), in January of 1944, Eisenhower understood 
two key issues regarding France.  The first was that he would need the help of the 
Résistance to place pressure on the interior German lines of communications – their 
troops moving on roads and railroads would need to be impeded as they made their 
way to the invasion area, their communications would need to be interrupted as much 
as possible to keep the Germans from being able to organize an effective counter 
attack.  Additionally, and perhaps the greatest thing the Résistance could provide, 
would be to perform local government functions, relieving Allied armies of this 
manpower intensive task.  Eisenhower and de Gaulle had a frank and positive 
discussion just prior to Eisenhower taking up his new command.  Eisenhower began 
planning with the French on all of the various matters involved and sought proper 
authority from the President and Prime Minister to do so more deeply.  But Churchill 
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quickly stopped him, and Roosevelt’s approval did not come until well after the 
Allied invasion of France.    
Nevertheless, from January of 1944 until D-Day on 6 June, despite the 
political difficulties, liaison and work with the French Résistance continued, if 
haltingly and inefficiently.  Both the British and the Americans had organizations 
charged with guerilla warfare and these became the entities that brought about most 
of the constructive relations with the French and hazardous action against the 
Germans.  The British organization charged with supporting, equipping, and training 
resistance groups in German occupied areas was the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE).  Begun in the desperate clamor of June 1940 when Britain faced few options 
that would put it on the offensive, the SOE began to set up a worldwide network of 
clandestine agents and training schools.  Eventually placed under the Political 
Warfare Executive (PWE), the SOE was led by a Scottish Major General Sir Colin 
Gubbins.  Under Gubbin’s imaginative leadership, the SOE conducted sabotage and 
intelligence operations in every theater, while supplying indigenous resistance groups 
with weapons, training, and other resources.  For operations in France, SOE created 
the “F Section” and gave it the charter to work independently of de Gaulle’s France 
Libre organization while the “RF Section” cooperated with de Gaulle’s Bureau 
Central Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA) or in English, the Central office of 
intelligence and action.  Alternatively, “DF Section” set up myriad escape and 
evasion networks in order to spirit downed airmen out of enemy occupied France.6   
                                                
6 Mackenzie, The Secret History of S. O. E.:  Special Operations Executive 1940-1945. 
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Many British political and military leaders had grave doubts about SOE and this kind 
of warfare.  Churchill did not.   
Winston Churchill had seen this kind of warfare personally when he 
experienced irregular warfare as a junior officer and newspaper reporter in Cuba, the 
Boer War, and subsequently as a cabinet member wrestling with the Irish question 
and the methods of the Irish Republican Army.7  These experiences placed solidly in 
Churchill’s mind the offensive role and power such irregular forces could have.  As 
one of Churchill’s contemporary military strategists defined it, “Guerrilla warfare 
must always be dynamic and must maintain momentum.”8   Basing these opinions 
largely on the writings and experiences of T. E. Lawrence in the Arab Revolt against 
the Turks during the First World War, Basil H. Liddell Hart went on to say, “Static 
defense has no part in guerrilla action….” In other words, the nature of guerrilla 
warfare is inherently offensive.  That attribute combined with the specter still resident 
in British memory of WWI casualties despite monumental national efforts made its 
political leaders loath, throughout the entirety of the Second World War to open up 
another western front.  Therefore, to the British, in the dark days of 1940, and indeed 
even after America’s entry into WWII when hopes of victory brightened, the indirect 
quality of partisan warfare seemed a method Britain could use, along with strategic 
bombing, as they both offered an offensive action against the enemy while avoiding 
their fears of WWI-like stagnation and death. 
                                                
7 David Stafford, Churchill and the Secret Service, 1st ed. (Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 1998).  
For further evidence of Churchill’s own romantic views of the matter see, Winston Churchill, The 
River War, an Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan (London,: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951). 
8 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (New York,: Meridian, 1991.)  2nd Revised edition. pp. 365. 
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 The United States found itself unprepared for combat as the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor threw it into the Second World War.  Among the capabilities it 
lacked was a centralized intelligence organization.  Moreover, it had no one, with the 
exception of certain people in the Army and Marine Corps, who understood irregular 
warfare.  Oddly enough every war in U. S. military history involved irregular warfare, 
but it was always over shadowed by what the regular forces had done in large unit 
actions.  Only recently, among some historians has this kind of warfare begun to be 
noticed as a part of America’s history.  So despite its experience fighting with and 
against Native American tribes since 1607, various guerrilla-style actions during the 
Civil War, the long running conflict that the United States conducted in the 
Philippines from 1899 to the 1930s, and numerous engagements in Asia, Latin 
America, and North Africa it has finally been recognized as America’s “First Way of 
War.”9   
 The rare exception to this national amnesia was William J. Donovan.  A 
Medal of Honor winner from the First World War and New York attorney, Donovan 
re-initiated an old school friendship with Democrat Party President Roosevelt despite 
being a solid Republican.  After serving in President Coolidge’s Justice Department 
he started a New York City law firm specializing in Anti-Trust actions.  He got into 
elective politics, which only led to a bitter and unsuccessful bid to succeed Roosevelt 
as New York’s governor in 1932.  Afterward, he continued running his New York 
                                                
9 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge, 
UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  In 2007, the Society of Military History 
awarded this work a co-winner of its Annual Book of the Year Award.  Such accolades by 
professional military historians indicate the subject may now be more accepted and appreciated 
than before. 
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City law firm and became a wealthy man in the depression era world of corporate 
litigation.10  When rumors circulated that the President wanted to appoint a 
Republican to become his Secretary of War, Donovan believed he would be the man 
chosen.  But despite initial positive indications from the President, and persistent 
lobbying by his co-Republican and even closer friend Navy Secretary Frank Knox, 
FDR nominated the venerable Henry L. Stimson for that post.  Undeterred, Knox 
continued to push his friend to FDR and that resulted in sending Donovan to Britain 
to assess British fighting spirit and ability after France fell in 1940.  Dispatched by 
Roosevelt on a globe trotting intelligence and fact finding mission in 1940, Donovan 
returned to provide FDR an impressive assessment of issues in the Mediterranean, 
Balkans, and British efforts to combat Hitler’s war efforts.11  Afterward, Donovan 
and journalist Edgar Mowrer, who had also been in London and seen, as Knox put it,  
“the French debacle” first hand authored a series of articles entitled “Fifth Column 
Lessons for America.”   With these, they sought to enlighten Americans as to the 
methods used by Germany to weaken “the resistance of possible enemies and 
undermine the morale of countries they proposed to attack.”12  The articles may have 
served Roosevelt’s overall purpose of domestic propaganda in warning Americans of 
the real and not so real rising threats, but it and other discussions with Donovan 
                                                
10 Edwin “Ned” Putzell interview with author, 9 June 2002.  Putzell served as William J. Donovan’s 
executive officer at OSS throughout the war. 
11 William J. Casey, The Secret War against Hitler (Washington, DC; New York, NY: Regnery 
Gateway; Distributed to the trade by Kampmann, 1988). 
12 Col. William J. Donovan and Edgar Mowrer, “Fifth Column Lessons for America” with an 
introduction by Frank Knox, American Council on Public Affairs, 1941.  The term “Fifth Column” 
comes from General Emile Mola’s radio broadcast in the Spanish Civil War.  He had four columns 
of troops marching on Madrid and spoke of a “Fifth Column” in Madrid ready to rise to support 
him.  The term then became synonomous with enemy groups inside one’s borders.  See David 
Stafford’s Chruchill and Secret Service, p. 175. 
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fostered Roosevelt’s belief that he needed one centralized organization for 
intelligence.13  Convinced, Roosevelt made Donovan his Director of the newly 
established Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941, before the Japanese attacked.  
When war declarations followed the attack on Pearl Harbor, Donovan convinced the 
President he needed more authority and again Roosevelt agreed this time making 
Donovan the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in June of 1942.  
Roosevelt’s support did not guarantee smooth sailing for the new organization 
however.  Donovan’s appointment as a Brigadier General with an independent budget 
and a direct line to the President did not sit well with many Generals and Admirals in 
Washington or, and more importantly, with the various theater commanders.  But by 
establishing a network of spies and contacts in North Africa, before the theater 
commander was ever named to the post, Donovan earned the respect of that theater’s 
commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.  He proved to be an exception among 
General officers protecting their command prerogatives.  When Eisenhower arrived in 
London to take over the command of OVERLORD and the effort to invade France, 
he was willing to support what the OSS and SOE had spent months planning.   Fresh 
from a frank and constructive conversation with General de Gaulle, Eisenhower must 
have been pleased by the agents in France, the British efforts to airlift arms to them, 
and the cooperation with the French BCRA for the invasion of France then scheduled 
for May of 1944, just five months away.  As he told de Gaulle, he needed the support 
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House, 2001). pp. 110 – 118.  
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of the French people and the OSS/SOE operations were going to be the means to 
communicate and exploit whatever the Résistance could accomplish.   
While Eisenhower worked to get approval from Roosevelt for a fuller 
relationship with de Gaulle’s Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, (FFI) French planning 
continued, led by French Army officers in the BCRA.  André Dewavrin, who used 
the pseudonym Colonel Passy, served as de Gaulle’s Director of the BCRA since its 
inception.  He was an odd choice for such a role.  In June of 1940 as Germany was 
defeating the French Army, Dewavrin was a young officer fresh off the boat from the 
failed British and French effort against the German army in Norway.  Contemplating 
the national disaster of his nation occupied by the Germans and the new French 
government ordering officers to stand down in order to maintain neutrality, Dewavrin 
asked his commanding General if he should proceed on to North Africa with his unit 
or remain in the United Kingdom and join de Gaulle’s nascent, and at that point, still 
nameless effort.  Encouraged to throw in with de Gaulle, Dewavrin appeared where 
the British had placed de Gaulle’s offices in London and reported for duty.  De Gaulle 
looked over the 29-year-old and asked him the nature of his officer’s commission, 
what was he doing when the war broke out, what his degree was in, if he spoke 
English, and what he had just been doing in the Army up until that moment.  It was a 
short and brief grilling with Dewavrin answering just as briefly.  “Are you an active 
officer or reserve?  Active.  Brevet rank or permanent?  Permanent.  Where did you 
get your commission?  Ecole Polytechnique.  What degrees and qualifications do you 
have?  Engineering and Law.  What were you doing before mobilization?  Teaching 
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at St. Cyr.  Do you speak English?  I have some conversational skills.”  Finished with 
the interview and liking the answers de Gaulle replied, “Good.  You are to be the 
chief of my 2nd and 3rd Bureaus in my headquarters.”  In an instant, de Gaulle made 
Dewavrin his director of intelligence and operations.14  Thus the BCRA was born.  
Such is the state of affairs when beginning with nothing.   
By the spring of 1944 and in cooperation with the SOE’s RF Section, the 
BCRA had sixty agents in France, serving as regional or national military delegates or 
assistants, beginning the final steps of asserting the French Provisional Government’s 
authority at the regional, departmental, and local level.15  The events of how the 
Résistance developed in this manner are covered in chapter two.  However anyone 
who tries to convince an American audience of the courage, ingenuity, 
resourcefulness, and fortitude of the French during WWII is faced with a daunting 
challenge and people arguing the other side.  Historian Douglas Porch’s articles and 
books on de Gaulle, the BCRA, and the Résistance all center around dispelling myths 
about their effectiveness.16   He catalogues their failures, mistakes, and missteps but 
more importantly persists with an underlying tone that de Gaulle was only in it for his 
own power and self-aggrandizement.  At one point, he writes that the “Resistance had 
been created by spontaneous combustion in France, stoked by Churchill’s desire to 
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“set Europe ablaze” and de Gaulle’s search for legitimization.”17   While de Gaulle 
was certainly an arrogant man, arrogance in a nation’s leader is not uncommon nor 
should it be the sum of history’s judgment.  Furthermore, he did not provoke the 
Résistance or work for its creation; it came about due to Germany’s actions in France 
and the hard work of others who sought liberation.  De Gaulle started with nothing 
more than his determination to maintain the fight against Germany.  Moreover, he did 
not start out with the aim of becoming France’s political or Résistance leader, but 
over the course of the war, took on the role when others would not and achieved his 
nation’s independence from the Germans and the Allies while largely succeeding at 
keeping the armed irregular resistance forces from running amok in liberated 
France.18   
France’s Second World War experience has persistently suffered from 
interpretations at odds with reality for a wide variety of reasons that will be more 
fully described below.  But some of the more influential Journalists such as Alistair 
Horne and William L. Shirer and the highly regarded French historian Marc Bloch, 
pointed to deep societal weaknesses within French society as the cause of the 
disaster.19   Bloch’s book Strange Defeat:  A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 
proved to be very influential due to his reputation as an historian, personal participant 
in the events described, and his later death at the hands of a firing squad for his 
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activities in the Résistance.  Many post-war French politicians used his book to 
demonstrate the weaknesses in French society they sought to alter or abolish.  In other 
words, much of the post-war French memory of 1940 was used to demonstrate the 
aspects of French society they had sought to destroy even before the German 
invasion.  Afterwards, viewing their own nation through the same lens, they loaded 
the defeat of 1940 as new ammunition for their old arguments.  However, others, 
most notably Robert Young with his book In Command of France:  French Foreign 
Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940 and Robert Doughty and his book The 
Breaking Point related how the military was simply defeated at the Battle of Sedan in 
June of 1940 due to doctrinal choices within the Defense Ministry and Army and that 
was a sufficient explanation for France’s loss.  Many other things about the chaotic 
French government’s inability to manage their nation’s affairs may or may not be 
true, but they did not affect the outcome of Sedan.20   
Whichever side one may come down on about France’s defeat in 1940, what 
is demonstrated below is that de Gaulle’s ability to unify Frenchmen of all political 
backgrounds was real, and that French unity is what enabled it to achieve its Second 
World War political and military goals to become the largest winner in the Battle for 
France.  Such a reality is often far from the discussion, even among many historians.   
Any historian who argues otherwise is certainly swimming against the tide of public 
opinion on the issue.  Most Americans now believe that the French soldiers were 
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poorly equipped and led and that they were and continue to be, at their very core, 
cowardly.  Or as the popular American television show, The Simpsons, infamously 
put it, the French are “cheese-eating-surrender-monkeys.”21   Certainly, General 
Charles de Gaulle and those who chose to follow him could not be described in such 
ludicrous terms, nor could the two million French soldiers whose collaborationist 
government ordered them to surrender in June of 1940 be described with such an 
undeserving sobriquet.  My own experience with French troops during an evacuation 
of American embassy staff and Peace Corps personnel on 10 June 1997 runs in 
glaring contrast to the belief that the French soldier lacks courage and ability 
compared to what the United States was willing to devote to that effort.22  
Nevertheless, there is enough evidence for any observer to pick and choose 
what they wish to argue given the complicated nature of wartime France.  After all, 
French historians and philosophers, journalists, and politicians still struggle with how 
to describe the Résistance and after the war ended all of them developed meanings for 
the Résistance that served their post-war political purposes.23  Given that a wide 
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variety of people served in various capacities in the Résistance, and given the 
differing beginnings of these Résistance movements, it can be incredibly difficult to 
accurately describe its nature.  Leading the confusion was de Gaulle himself, France’s 
“First Resister.”  During and after the war he was on various sides of the issue 
describing the Résistance as a threat, then perpetuating the belief that France was a 
nation of resisters, and then later claiming that, “The Résistance was a bluff that came 
off.”24  Certainly de Gaulle’s beliefs and comments of 1940, 1944, and 1958 came 
from different vantage points and by a man who saw things from different 
perspectives as he attempted to achieve different things.  In 1940 he first wanted to 
rally regular French forces as a demonstration of the ability of a sovereign authority’s 
role in war.  In 1944 and 1945 he sought to unify France and advanced a popular 
notion that the nation had resisted collaboration and German occupation.  And finally, 
as French President during a new national crisis over the Algerian war, he wished to 
play down the role of the Résistance and the political traction the communists and 
others were getting out of their version of what the Résistance meant in order to 
diminish their importance as political rivals in 1958.   Certainly one needs to be 
careful and understand the context in order to take the word of any of the participants 
at face value.   
The rank and file of the Résistance further confuses the issue, and historians 
who have looked at those who were in the Résistance and why they joined have found 
all kinds of people in movements, groups, and units that are surprising.  It would 
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often be true that non-communists were in the communist movements and vice versa.  
The leadership of many Maquis or partisan units included “Vichyites” from the 
armistice army.  And making the milieu even more complicated, a meaningful 
amount of the Résistance were immigrants from Spain, Italy, and Poland and 
deserters from German forces meaning that large parts of the French Résistance were 
not even French.  The scholarship on this matter started slowly in the 1960s by mostly 
British and American scholars such as Peter Novick, H. R. Kedward, and John F. 
Sweets.  And later, “Syndrome” or not, French scholarly work began in the late 1980s 
on the Résistance and now makes healthy and productive progress and is widely read 
by the French public.  Their work attempts to describe more of the detail and the who, 
what, when, and where of the Résistance.  So while the first works by the American 
and British historians, such as The Résistance versus Vichy, In Search of the Maquis, 
The Politics of the Résistance in France, and Choices in Vichy France began the 
process, the French historians along with British, French, and German historians have 
worked to further contextualized the Résistance, greatly clarifying my efforts to 
understand the Allied attempts to use the Résistance to support OVERLORD, 
ANVIL, and subsequent operations in France.  The French historians efforts tend to 
fall along two major lines.  First are regional histories, such as François Marcot’s, 
describing the Résistance efforts in various regions around France that have been 
incredibly useful and explain local issues, politics, and personalities allowing greater 
clarity with their decoding of many complex local issues.  Along other lines, French 
Historians such as Laurent Douzou and his book on the resistance movement 
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Libération-Sud have allowed me to see what motivated certain resistance movements 
and gain insight into how they organized, how they were led, and what they sought to 
achieve.25   
Some of the most intriguing issues on the Résistance lay within the topic of 
the relations between the Résistance in France, suffering under occupation, and the 
Résistance outside of France, residing in its colonies, Britain, or elsewhere.  The 
relationship and tensions often define the nature of how the Résistance developed and 
matured and that impacted what the Résistance in France could do and for whom they 
would do it.  But the two sides were of the same coin and they certainly realized they 
needed each other for various reasons, but due to their vastly different circumstances 
often failed to understand one another leading to rivalry, jealousy, and contempt.  
Often the greatest challenge then became smoothing over these issues in order to do 
what nearly all of the various leaders in the Résistance wished to do.  Specifically, 
unite in order to fight the Germans and the collaborationist French government in 
Vichy in order to produce the France of their hopes, not the one that ended in 
calamity and defeat at the hands of German tanks.    
Now that we have an understanding of the tensions involved in the vitally 
important relationship between the exterior Résistance, such as de Gaulle’s France 
Libre and the internal Résistance movements such as Henri Frenay’s Combat we can 
                                                
25 Peter Novick, The Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France 
(London,: Chatto & Windus, 1968).; H. R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis:  Rural Resistance in 
Southern France, 1942-1944 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 
1993).; John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986).; François Marcot and Angèle Baud, La Résistance Dans Le Jura 
(Besançon: Cêtre, 1985).; Laurent Douzou, La Désobéissance:  Histoire D'un Mouvement Et D'un 
Journal Clandestins, Libération-Sud, 1940-1944 (Paris: O. Jacob, 1995). 
 21 
begin to appreciate the complexities of governing the Résistance. Not only Sweets’ 
and Novick’s works, but also more recently two other former résistants from France 
Libre have completed impressive historical projects detailing this relationship.  Jean 
Louis Crémieux-Brilhac’s work La France Libre:  de l'appel du 18 juin á la 
Libération provides a comprehensive description of the establishment of what became 
France’s Provisional Government and how the interior movements came to join up 
with de Gaulle’s exterior efforts and formed a united Résistance.  He describes how it 
coalesced and matured as well as how it governed North Africa and its relations with 
other nations, most notably the United States and Great Britain.  For some of the 
more intriguing insights on the manner in which de Gaulle’s France Libre 
communicated with the interior Résistance, Daniel Cordier’s works on France’s most 
mysterious, mythologized, and romantic résistant, Jean Moulin has proved essential.  
He demonstrated the form in which the exterior and interior efforts first linked up and 
how they became more closely aligned, while never fully dispelling all the tensions.   
Understanding the Résistance allows a greater clarity regarding the matter of 
why some JEDBURGH teams succeeded and others failed.  Generally, as I will show 
below, if the local Résistance was well organized, successful at eluding the occupiers, 
and politically grounded locally as well as firmly linked with France Libre, the 
JEDBURGH team in such regions tended to succeed.  If not, then their work became 
far more difficult.  It is in this regard that this dissertation attempts to distinguish 
itself from other histories of Special Operations in France and especially other work 
on the JEDBURGHs.  Dr. Samuel Lewis, a former professor of history at the Army 
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Command and Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, started work on the JEDBURGHs in 
the 1980s when the first of their reports were declassified.  Subsequently, U. S. Army 
officers who spent time at the school produced Masters Theses on various aspects of 
the JEDBURGHs.   Additionally, Arthur L. Funk, a Professor of History at the 
University of Florida has written books on Charles de Gaulle, Allied operations in 
North Africa, and in 1992 came out with, Hidden Ally: The French Résistance, Special 
Operations, and the Landings in Southern France, 1944.  Many of the JEDBURGH 
teams that operated in support of ANVIL are discussed in those pages.  But Lewis 
and Funk, while first rate historians, were handicapped to a meaningful degree by the 
paucity of works on specific issues regarding the Résistance, as well as the 
unavailability of classified material that has only become available in the late 1990s 
and the first part of this decade.  Since the British were the founders of the 
JEDBURGH plan, the opening of the SOE records, along with the released German 
coded messages or “ULTRA” decrypts, and the release of SOE agents’ personnel 
files in the custody of the Her Majesty’s Government has aided my efforts 
tremendously.  In France the BCRA records are open, but with few exceptions, they 
have remained largely ignored.  My own time with the BCRA records in Paris and the 
headquarters of the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur records in the French Army 
Archives proved very valuable.  More recently one of Lewis’ (and Sweets’) former 
students wrote a book on the JEDBURGHs that appeared in 2006 followed a few 
months later by writer Colin Beavan’s book.  However, neither of these give any 
meaningful treatment of the nature of the Résistance nor do they provide context to 
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the issue due to the lack of research or discussion on the Germans and how they 
managed the Wehrmacht’s situation.  They infer that Maquis action resulted from 
Allied and specifically, JEDBURGH team presence.  I do not assume such a strong 
connection.  In fact, the questions that animate my work are:  how well did 
Eisenhower, via the JEDBURGH teams, control the French Résistance?  To what 
extent did he have any control at all?  When he did succeed, why, and under what 
conditions?  Therefore, instead of assuming that everything the French accomplished 
toward their liberation was directly due to British and American support, I assume no 
such connection and seek to find the solid links and then test their utility against the 
backdrop of German operational goals. 
As to the JEDBURGHs, the participants themselves, time has taken many 
from us.  When I started research on them in 1997, there were few with whom I could 
speak, however persistence and some good fortune helped me locate, speak to, and 
write several of them.  The former French JEDBURGH Joe de Francesco, who by 
that time had become an American citizen living in South Carolina, proved a great 
source.  He had organized several reunions and provided me with recent addresses 
and phone numbers.  In the end, I was fortunate to glean evidence from 13 American, 
French, and British JEDBURGHs.   In 1943 and 1944 they had all taken oaths and 
signed promises not to talk for “50 years” according to one of them, but despite this, 
various things started leaking out.26  Sub Rosa by Thomas Braden and Stewart Alsop 
                                                
26 Michel de Bourbon-Parme, Interview with Author, 22 September 2007. 
 24 
appeared in 1946 and discussed the OSS operations in WWII.27  Alsop had been a 
JEDBURGH and wrote vividly about a generic team and what the experience was 
like without using specifics.  Another JEDBURGH, William Dreux published his 
account in 1971.  No Bridges Blown related his recruitment into the OSS, his training, 
his experiences in France and his overall frustration with the circumstances there.28  
The title is telling for he expected to go into France and perform commando style 
work blowing up bridges but did none of that.   
The British Jeds have also, for the most part, kept their silence.  However 
Lieutenant Colonel Sir James Hutchison published his account That Drug Danger in 
1977.29  He was no run of the mill JEDBURGH as he ran SOE’s RF section before 
deploying to France and therefore had much more intimate knowledge of the French 
Underground.  Another former JEDBURGH whose full and swashbuckling life can 
crowd out his JEDBURGH experiences was M. G. M. “Bing” Crosby.  His book, 
Irregular Soldier appeared in 1991.30  The French, with one notable exception, have 
kept their silence.31  Perhaps their silence hints at some of the differences between the 
Americans and British on one side and their French comrades on the other.  With 
France moving directly from WWII into the brutal wars in Indo-China and Algeria, 
the French officers and NCOs maintained more of a wartime attitude about the nature 
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of their work.  While there were 104 French JEDBURGHs, more than any other 
nation, they have kept their silence better (or worse if you wish to know their story) 
than the others.     
 But the men who knew the most about the program took what they knew 
about it to their graves.  Leaving only the barest of descriptions in the Liddell Hart 
Centre at Kings College, London, Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman served as the 
SOE’s Chief of Western Europe and also as the British senior officer in the British-
American amalgamated Headquarters called Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ).  He 
gave a few speeches after the war and may have written an unpublished memoir for 
his family, but in the end left few details about the utility and the wisdom of the 
JEDBURGH Plan.  He passed away in 1978.  His American counter part, Colonel 
Joseph F. Haskell, never spoke publicly about his role as the American Co-director of 
SFHQ, or about his time as Director of OSS London, Special Operations office.  He 
did speak to some historians and authors, but provided only outlines of his work.  He 
died in 1982 seemingly prouder of his time in the normal army and his service in the 
Battle of the Bulge.  However, he did history one favor.  He kept his papers, maps, 
photographs, and other items.  After he passed away his daughters often wondered 
who might find them worthy of keeping.  I did, and they rounded out other things I 
found in archives in the United States, Britain, and France.  Mockler-Ferryman’s and 
Haskell’s French commander, General Pierre Koenig, also kept this effort secret.  He 
was far more famous in France for other battles and actions in WWII and most of the 
French public preferred to hear about those activities and experiences, but had they 
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known how he fought the bureaucracy, with few but Eisenhower on his side, they 
may appreciate him all the more.  General Koenig passed away in 1970 leaving very 
little behind about this matter, but a mound of his official papers that today are in the 
French Army Archives in Vincennes, France.   
 However, General Koenig, and his Chief of Staff, participated in a post-war 
U. S. Army History Office project to detail the role of the French Résistance in the 
Libération of France.  The British also participated, but all three countries classified 
the result, a work of some 1600 pages of narrative, maps, and their original 
documents.  Unfortunately, it has languished in the French Army Archives, in the US 
Army History Center at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and in the SOE archives nearly 
completely ignored ever since its declassification in the 1970s.32  But it is very 
revealing, and has, perhaps better than most other histories on the topic, laid out how 
the participants themselves viewed the role of the Résistance and how well the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces had exploited its ability toward 
Allied ends.  For instance, it discusses the regional differences and how different 
Résistance groups operated throughout the country.  It takes into account the various 
military and political roles the Résistance could and did play.  And furthermore, it 
understands the overall strategic aims and the various phases of combat in France 
during 1944.  Below, this work largely follows their lead, but enjoys the perspective 
                                                
32 European Theater of Operations United States Army Historical Division, The French Forces of the 
Interior:  Their Organization and Their Participation in the Liberation of France, 1944 
(Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, 1945), Microfilm.  The British 
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France. 
 27 
of more than 60 years, the fruit of numerous historians, and a great deal of German 
Army contemporaneous evidence.   
 Their history described eight operational phases regarding the involvement of 
the Résistance supporting overall Allied efforts in France.  The first phase involved 
the actions supporting the Normandy invasion and that is chapter five below.  The 
second phase was the liberation of Brittany to the west of the main Allied force and 
the effort to secure the ports and their right flank.  I will discuss this aspect in chapter 
six.  The third phase was the advance of the US 3rd Army along the Seine River 
towards the east.  The forth phase was the actions to support the southern invasion 
operation.  The fifth phase was the liberation of Paris.  The sixth phase was the 
harassment of the enemy troops in their retreat from France’s southwest and south. I 
will use chapter seven to discuss these phases and the relevant actions of the 
JEDBURGHs.  The seventh phase were the actions in the Vosges, Alsace, and 
Lorraine in eastern France, which will be chapter eight.  The last phase was the 
actions in the Atlantic zone to keep pressure on the German forces in their positions 
around the French western ports.33  The pull of events and SHAEF’s demands 
alongside Hitler’s decisions drove these phases and their timing and the strategic 
nature and shape of the warfare in France.  The phases, and thus the chapters often 
overlap chronologically, but for the sake of clarity, will be separated in the narrative 
below.  
                                                
33 United States Army Europe Theater of Operations, Historical Section.  The French Forces of the 
Interior:  Their Organization and Their Participation in the Liberation of France, 1944.  
Washington, D. C.:  Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, 1977, pp. 533 – 1273. 
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Their study concluded, in November 1945, that “the effort of the ‘Resistants’ 
is not capable of analysis in the form of a Balance Sheet.  …. Clandestine and 
guerrilla warfare does not lend itself to an exact account of captives and materiel 
taken, such as would enable a figure to be given to the support provided by the FFI.  
The essential thing is that the importance of their contribution to the operations for 
the Liberation of FRANCE did not escape their Allies.  The praise….which American 
Generals, and particularly General Eisenhower, have rendered to the FFI, handsomely 
takes the place of missing statistics.”  The authors go on to state that better liaison 
methods should have been developed and better training provided to the Maquis. 
Then, piling on the opinions on the matter from the enemy as solid evidence, it 
quoted high-ranking German officers who also buttress the argument that the 
Résistance had a meaningful and important effect on the battle.34   
But the story does not begin on 6 June with Operation OVERLORD.  The 
idea of irregular warfare animates my study as much as the question of Eisenhower’s 
ability to control it.  Therefore, the first four chapters of my study will discuss the 
creation of Allied Special Operations and how the Allies endeavored to use that 
capability with the French Résistance.  Chapter one will show how the Allies created 
the capability to communicate with, train, and equip the resistance movements 
throughout German occupied territories, but specifically in France.  British, and later 
American innovations in technology, specifically portable radios and heavy aircraft 
were key to the entire effort.  Without such equipment, and the skilled military and 
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in the Liberation of France, 1944., pp. 1585-1599. 
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civilian people that operated and maintained them, the means to train, equip, and 
direct the French Résistance simply would not have materialized.  The Second World 
War saw the first large-scale use of aircraft and radios to execute a guerilla war 
behind the enemy’s lines and therefore it is a useful forum to examine its successes 
and failures.  The second chapter will discuss how the French Résistance began, 
developed, and matured into a Provisional Government that gave political meaning to 
France’s wartime efforts.  The third and forth chapters will discuss Eisenhower’s 
efforts to integrate the SOE/OSS/BCRA capability under the Résistance’s leadership 
and the political headwinds he encountered from Roosevelt and Churchill.  
Eisenhower, Koenig, Mockler-Ferryman, and Haskell certainly knew of all this at the 
time, but their history does not explain these issues and much more has become clear 
due to the fullness of time and the opening of all the nations’ records spread across 
the relative military, civilian, and private archives. 
But sixty-four years later, what have we learned about this issue that the 
participants did not fully realize?  How sincere or accurate were the Allied and 
German comments immediately following the war?  Is it really impossible to, as they 
say above, produce a “Balance Sheet” to determine the effect of the Résistance?  
What were the ill effects of histories written with ideological justifications or 
motivated by revenge?  Would it have been possible to better train and liaise with the 
Résistance?  Did Churchill, Roosevelt, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, Gubbins, Donovan, 
Dewavrin and Koenig accurately assess the capabilities of the Résistance?  Was the 
JEDBURGH Plan adequate to the task?  Why did events transpire differently in the 
 30 
different regions?  Or in sum, what was the nature of the partisan warfare and how 
well did the Allies work with the Résistance to achieve the aim of expelling the 
German Army?  
As the novelist and Second World War SOE commando, Evelyn Waugh 
repeatedly wrote in his semi-autobiographical Sword of Honour trilogy, “quantitative 
judgments don’t apply.”35  Indeed, how can one measure results of the Battle of 
France when the United Kingdom, the United States, and France defined success so 
differently?  Perhaps Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian and late Enlightenment 
thinker may prove helpful.  In particular his thoughts regarding how a nation’s 
internal forces determine its wartime conduct are helpful.  Clausewitz, having 
experienced war at the beginning of the Enlightenment era, his learning and thoughts 
on war were deeply influenced by Hegelian thought as well as patterned on the 
methods of Montesquieu.  Not content with brief maxims and principles that sought, 
in an incomplete way, to describe warfare and provide a recipe for victory, 
Clausewitz endeavored to apply Enlightenment style methods and thinking to the 
problem of war and believed it could be better understood if issues that governed war, 
but lay beyond the battlefield, were rigorously explored.36  He also saw, as Peter Peret 
instructs us in his introductory essay in Clausewitz’s On War, that theory is best used 
as a way to seek understanding by providing a framework for asking questions and 
testing principles.   
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As Peret illustrated, Clausewitz did not think his theory should be viewed as 
the way things work universally, but rather as a means to generate the best questions 
in order to understand war.  To this end, and with this realization in mind, Clausewitz 
asserted that war was governed by policy and therefore, due to human nature and the 
modern nation state, “when whole communities go to war – whole peoples, and 
especially civilized peoples – the reason always lies in some political situation, and 
the occasion is always due to some political object.  War, therefore, is an act of 
policy.”37  He went on to warn that if war governed policy, or if war were a means in 
and of itself, it would quickly spiral out of control due to human emotions, frailties, 
and passions.  “War is a pulsation of violence,” he wrote in his scientifically inspired 
prose, “variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes 
and discharges energy.”38  Having seen war’s worst aspects personally in the 
Napoleonic wars and studying the bloody One Hundred Years War in Germany and 
then comparing them to the heavily stylized wars of that early Enlightenment, 
Clausewitz gained an insight illuminated by history.  Noting the changes with the 
previous eras, specifically, the differences between how an aristocratic state conducts 
war and how a popular Republic may do so, he maintained that both kinds of polities 
remained governed by political aims in conducting their wars.  There was no 
meaningful difference.  But still wars, and even combatants in the same war, have 
their own unique character that “discharge energy” in their own way.  Conducting a 
war with allies further complicates the matter as an Allied strategy is the fruit of their 
                                                
37 Ibid., pp. 86 and 87.   
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relationship and where there are gaps, there is a constant effort to sew the gaps 
together in order to conduct unified action against the common enemy.  But the seams 
these Allies constantly had to sew together in order to unify their three sovereign 
authorities into coherent actions were often frayed and torn.  My inquiry demonstrates 
that more often than not, the French, led by de Gaulle, were the most successful at 
knitting the seams of Allied policy together, while President Roosevelt was usually 
attempting to stitch into the fabric of French sovereignty his choice for who would 
lead France. 
For the purposes of the events described below it may then be helpful to think 
of the American, British, French, and German “Paradoxical Trinity,” as Clausewitz 
referred to it, and the forces that governed how each nation’s trinity defined their 
unique war aims, how they hoped to achieve them, and the extent to which it endured 
hardships in order to create the capability required for victory on its terms.  Or as he 
stated, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means 
can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”39  Defining the “Paradoxical 
Trinity,” Clausewitz assigned to the government the aspect of “reason” and that it 
must govern the violence, the passion, and elicit the required endurance of the people 
commiserate with the war’s aims.  The population, both in an aristocracy and in the 
liberal democratic states that would later emerge in Europe, was the source of the 
war’s passion and would define the extent to which violence could be used in the war.  
If the people could not endure, nor wished to respond with high levels of violence, it 
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would impact the nature of the war and the extent to which arms and weapons could 
be employed against the enemy.  To the army, and more pointedly, to the commander 
of that army, Clausewitz assigned the element of chance.  “The scope which the play 
of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the 
particular character of the commander and the army,” wrote Clausewitz and he and 
subsequent military professionals, have labored long and hard to devise methods for 
educating and training commanders attempting to reproduce Napoleon’s genius, in 
order to limit chance, unpredictability, the “fog of war,” or as it is often simply put, 
“bad luck.”   But to further complicate matters, each one of the three “tendencies” of 
reason, (the government), violence (the people), and chance (the commander and 
army), are in an ever-changing relationship with the other two.   Re-emphasizing that 
his thoughts were the basis of a theory, “Our task therefore is to develop a theory that 
maintains a balance between these three tendencies,” that would be useful for 
examining war’s nature.  For the author, as well as for you the reader, these 
tendencies and the relationship between them may prove useful as we move between 
each of the four different combatants’ “Paradoxical Trinities” to understand the 
nature of the Battle for France.  Clausewitz’s discussion of politics and war is useful 
because the four different combatants’ political aims were different, therefore how 
each one fought would be defined by what they sought.   
The JEDBURGHs, the tool the Allies and the exterior FFI created to control 
the interior Résistance, often found themselves trying to tamp down local Maquis 
groups rather than incite them.  Maquis passion sprang from significantly greater 
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French passion for achieving their more profound war aims relative to the interests of 
the U.S. and U.K. that regarded France as merely a military objective on the way to 
defeating Germany.   For the French Résistance, freeing France demanded far more 
fundamental action.  Controlling and focusing Maquis violence demanded that the 
JEDBURGHs understand that there was more to their war than fighting. 
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Chapter One   
How the British and Americans designed and developed the 
JEDBURGHs 
 
 
 
 Partisan warfare’s roots reach back to ancient days, but it has changed in 
important ways.  In the 6th Century B.C. Herodotus wrote of the Scythians and how 
they, unfettered by any link to specific territory could strike hard and then melt away 
just as quickly.  In his terse reply back to Persian King Darius, the Scythian leader 
Idanthyrsus explained, “We Scythians have neither towns nor cultivated lands, which 
might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to be in any hurry to 
fight with you.”1  Unable to make the Scythians stand and fight, afraid of being cut 
off, fearing cryptic threats, weary of constant nightly ambushes, and running low on 
supplies, Herodotus wrote that Darius retreated.  Herodotus’ fascination with what 
today is often called culture is central to understanding how any polity waged its 
wars.   The nature of a culture’s structure defines what it believes worthy of risking 
defeat and death for while also determining how it will resist or if it will resist at all.  
For the ancient Scythians, they were deft enough to make their nomadic culture an 
advantage and managed to defeat a greater power.  But it is important to note that 
neither they, nor almost any other partisan warfare leader, chooses the method today 
we would call unconventional warfare.*  They use it because that is their only option. 
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In the early and mid-20th century, the British had experiences, and a few 
heroes, who had fought in guerrilla or partisan campaigns in order to defend and 
maintain their expansive empire.2  But British tactical employment of offensive 
partisan warfare often masked the overall British strategic aim to maintain and defend 
what they had in India, east and southern Africa.  It also, of course, had been carried 
out abroad giving it a romantic and exotic sense, the stuff of high adventure and allure 
that it would not have had if they had to soberly face the prospect of such things 
within Great Britain.  Of course the Irish Question, the birth of the Irish Republican 
Army and their use of violence, terrorism, threats, brought guerrilla warfare to the 
forefront and the British government found itself having to contend with it and 
contrive a way to counter and defeat the IRA.  Concurrently, T. E. Lawrence, one of 
the heroes and leading theorists of partisan warfare published articles and later his 
book, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, explaining the power of guerilla warfare and his 
experiences in the Arab Revolt.  During the First World War, the British encouraged 
the Arabs to revolt against the Ottomans, forcing the Ottomans to have to worry about 
their rear areas in addition to fighting along a conventional front as the British Army 
attempted its drive out of Egypt into Palestine.  Playing upon latent anti-Ottoman 
sentiment, and succeeding in uniting the Arabs just enough to enable them to work 
together, “Lawrence of Arabia” offered an influential and guiding theory for how and 
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why such efforts succeeded.  One of his most avid followers and enthusiastic 
disciples was Winston S. Churchill. 
Churchill often over-emphasized the effectiveness of partisans fighting on 
their own while failing to fully recognize the required relationship between 
conventional units and partisan bands working together to fight a common enemy.  
His personal experience with guerrilla warfare, intelligence, spies, and espionage 
appealed to his imaginative and wide ranging intellect.  As a young army officer and 
war correspondent, he had fought in Africa against the Sudanese tribes and the Boers.  
He covered actions in Cuba, Afghanistan, Egypt, and again back in Africa.  He honed 
his writing skills on these experiences, publishing articles and books including the 
still highly regarded The River War.  In politics he grew especially concerned about 
Bolshevik movements in Britain and developed his own intelligence apparatus to 
keep tabs on them.  As a more senior member of parliament with portfolios of War 
and later Colonial Minister he worked hard to come to terms with the Irish 
Republican Army.  After the spectacular and violent effects of the Easter Uprising 
and the “Bloody Sunday” assassinations, organized by the IRA Intelligence Chief 
Michael Collins, he proved a key negotiator in David Lloyd George’s government 
that granted some concessions for Irish Home Rule.  In the 1930s while out of the 
government, Churchill developed a reliable intelligence network that kept him 
apprised of the growing German military capability.  Whether in or out of 
government, he had a thirst and a love for all aspects of such partisan warfare, 
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intelligence, revolution, and revolt.   It served as a driving force for much that he did 
as Prime Minister as the Second World War began.3 
Germany’s invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, provoked the British 
government to declare war and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to ask Churchill 
to leave the backbenches of Parliament and join the government.  Now Churchill was 
in his element.  The British Army had forces dispatched to Poland and with them 
some intelligence service operatives.  Their presence was indeed fortunate, for while 
the Polish and the British Expeditionary Force were quickly defeated, they managed 
to spirit out of Poland the German Army’s encryption and cipher device known as the 
ENIGMA machine.  Back in England, they began to use it to decrypt German army 
dispatches and, as the war progressed, other kinds of coded radio traffic as well.  
Miraculously, the Germans maintained their belief in their secure radio 
communications during the entire war giving the Allies no end of extremely useful 
intelligence and Churchill proved to be the kind of leader who delighted in what he 
called, his “golden eggs.”4 
One of the British Army’s intelligence officers in the Polish expedition was 
Colonel Colin Gubbins.  A WWI veteran who had served in Ireland as well where he 
soon found that he was “being shot at from behind hedges by men in trilbys and 
mackintoshes and not allowed to shoot back!”5  Additionally he served in the British 
Expeditionary forces in Murmansk that had attempted to fight the Bolsheviks during 
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the Russian Revolution.  A man of great intellect who handled new languages easily, 
the Army asked him to help author their 1939 instruction on subversive warfare.  The 
effort resulted in the Partisan Leaders’ Handbook which emphasized tactical issues 
such as ambushes and killing enemy informers.  But the next year, Gubbin’s thoughts 
matured and he now believed “if guerrilla warfare is coordinated and also related to 
main operations, it should, in favourable circumstances, cause such a diversion of 
enemy strength as eventually to present decisive opportunities to the main forces.”  
Historian David Stafford asserted “Knowingly or not, they [the British] were often 
following techniques that had been pioneered in Ireland by Michael Collins.”6  But 
certainly Gubbins and other British Army officers who read or knew Lawrence 
personally, fought against Collins and the IRA, and observed and pondered the 
meaning of the “Fifth Column” activities in the Spanish Civil War, realized this was a 
different method that might prove useful for the British to implement.  Reflecting on 
their experiences they realized that partisan warfare was inherently offensive in 
nature and would be its most useful when coordinated with conventional land forces.   
Gubbins and the rest of his unit, known as No. 4 Military Mission, escaped 
from Poland via Romania and then via sea.  Also with him was Captain Peter 
Wilkinson.  Wilkinson was a regular army officer, Cambridge graduate, and son of an 
Indian Army officer who had not survived WWI.  Gubbins thought enough of 
Wilkinson to ask that he be in his liaison office back in London while Gubbins took 
No. 4 Military Mission to Paris, attempting to do better than they had done in Poland.  
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Their mission was to liaise and cooperate with the preparation of French defenses 
while maintaining their links inside Poland and in the Balkans.  Wilkinson greatly 
admired Gubbins and was relieved to be working with him again.   However, their 
efforts in France ended when the Germans invaded France in May 1940.  French 
forces had to fall back and the British Expeditionary Force found itself evacuating 
across the English Channel in a pell-mell flurry of activity from the end of May until 
the early June.  Wilkinson had flown across from Paris and Gubbins found him in 
London and asked him to come to work with him on another assignment.  Gubbins 
wanted Wilkinson to help set up a resistance movement inside Britain “in the event, 
which now seemed likely, that the Germans invaded the British Isles.”7  It appears 
Gubbins and many in the British Army would press the fight, as Churchill now 
exhorted all the British to do, but with any available means.  Now they began the 
planning to resist using their methods learned from Michael Collins, the Soviets, the 
Spanish, and T. E. Lawrence.  
Churchill, who became Prime Minister when the Germans invaded France, 
now faced the daunting challenge of defending Britain against an attack but governed 
a demoralized nation and an army in a state of great confusion.   Even more 
catastrophic to Britain, France’s capitulation left it with no solid ally on the European 
continent.  British policy had assumed France would maintain its own defense and 
provide a bulwark for Britain that could effectively prevent the German Wehrmacht 
from reaching the English Channel.  One can see Churchill’s predicament in a sober 
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note to President Roosevelt late in the evening of 12 June 1940.  He attempted to help 
French leaders maintain the fighting spirit by encouraging them and noting to 
Roosevelt that the new Undersecretary of State for National Defense, “a young 
General de Gaulle” was for fighting on but feared that “the aged Marshal Pétain who 
was none too good in April and July of 1918 is I fear ready to lend his name and 
prestige to a treaty of peace for France.”  Churchill pressed Roosevelt to help stiffen 
French resolve, related that he had emphasized to the French that Germany would 
ultimately lose the war and Britain would continue to fight on, alone, if necessary.  
But then fearing imminent invasion he begged U. S. Ambassador Joseph Kennedy for 
more aircraft and destroyers as the Royal Navy had lost two the previous day.8   
Churchill’s cable to Roosevelt frames the issues as well as the people involved over 
the course of the war until the liberation of France.  Both Britain and France had 
leaders who believed in the possibility of defeating Germany, but Britain’s greatest 
believer was able to maintain British will to fight, while General Charles de Gaulle 
was a junior general and according to his memoirs, unwilling to think of things 
outside his military role, despite his new position in France’s government.  His 
entreaties to senior French generals fell on deaf ears or were met with scorn.9   
 But what tools would the British have?  Pondering their fate, and infused with 
Churchill’s determination to fight on, the British believed that subversive warfare and 
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fomenting their own Fifth Columns within Occupied Europe was something they 
must begin to do.  Furthermore, they had to create the capability within Britain to 
wage an insurgency should the Germans defeat and occupy them.  The difficulty lay 
in how to organize such an office, should it be military or civilian?  Should it report to 
the Cabinet or be represented itself there?  And who should lead it?  Furthermore, 
what would its overall objective be?  The resulting deliberations, estimates, and 
discussions determined that the office should be headed by a civilian, it would report 
to the cabinet through the Minister for Economic Warfare, and its leader would be 
Hugh Dalton.  Churchill appointed Dalton, a veteran of WWI’s French and Italian 
theaters and a well respected Labour MP, to be Minister of Economic Warfare 
overseeing all efforts to strangle Germany’s economy.  The newly formed Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) would secretly reside inside the Ministry.  In June and 
July of 1940, while Pétain was establishing his armistice with the Germans and his 
government in the spa town of Vichy, Churchill approved Dalton’s proposal that gave 
him pieces of intelligence organizations from the War Office, the Foreign Office, and 
the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).  But more importantly, Churchill approved 
Dalton’s authority to create his own staff and add new capabilities as he saw fit.10  
Such authority proved valuable to Dalton as the politics in establishing a new 
organization and taking pieces out of other well-established parts of the government 
were bruising.   
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 But Dalton proved up to the task.  He believed subversion and sabotage had to 
be linked clearly to political wartime aims.  His successor, the conservative MP 
Rondell Cecil Palmer, Third Earl of Selbourne, became head of SOE on 22 February 
1942 and successfully maintained SOE’s existence by working diligently to keep his 
agents’ actions within the bounds of British policy so as not to be at cross purposes 
with the Foreign Office and theater commanders.  Colin Gubbins had been brought 
into SOE at its inception and at first placed in charge of organizing the Auxiliary 
Units for conducting resistance against the Germans should they succeed in their 
invasion.11  Later, he took on training, linking SOE efforts with the Joint Planning 
Staff, and ensuring SOE procedures linked smoothly with the RAF and Navy.  He 
performed these functions exceedingly well.  He organized the establishment of over 
fifty secret training facilities and his reputation at working with other parts of the 
government enabled him to be named as the Executive of SOE in September of 1943 
when a severe row occurred.12  SOE operations in the Balkans and Greece caused the 
theater commander to complain, forcing the issue to Churchill.  Selbourne fired the 
Executive in charge of SOE, Charles Hambro, and promoted Gubbins, now a Major 
General to the position.  Thus Selbourne maintained his position as Cabinet Member 
responsible for Political Warfare while Gubbins directed SOE.  Further solidifying 
SOE’s stature in the war effort, the American-British planning staff responsible for 
designing the invasion of Northwest Europe assumed control of SOE for the purposes 
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of linking partisan action with their conventional efforts on 30 September 1943.13  As 
the author of the official history of SOE noted, a military man running SOE at the 
very time the Allied level of effort began to be concentrated more on the invasion of 
Europe proved to further legitimate SOE’s role.14  Dalton’s views on sabotage and 
subversion were often animated by his left-wing views, but Gubbin’s belief 
emphasizing coordination with conventional forces now nicely matched Allied needs.  
In other words, SOE was now led by a man believing the best way to use a fifth 
column centered on participating with the other “four columns” of conventional 
forces in a highly coordinated way.  
 However there are great difficulties of both military technique, coordination 
with partisan forces, defining strategic aims, and just as importantly, morality.  Of the 
latter kind, Gubbin’s leading planner for the Auxiliary Units encountered resistance 
that he, almost glibly believed to be centered on defeatism.  As Peter Wilkinson 
traveled about in the summer of 1940 organizing and preparing the Auxiliary Units to 
fight a German invasion he briefed senior Home Guard leaders letting them in on the 
very secret preparations and soliciting their advice on how local efforts could best be 
coordinated to Britain’s national defense.  In what he called an “awkward interview” 
with Sir Will Spens, Regional Commissioner for East Anglia, he found himself 
unable to answer to his objections.  Before the war Spens had been a Master at 
Cambridge and Wilkinson knew him from his days there as a student.  He greatly 
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admired him and briefed him in detail about the Auxiliary Units and their role in 
Spens’ area of responsibility.  “He listened attentively,” Wilkinson later wrote, 
“while I described what Auxiliary Units hoped to achieve.  After a moment’s 
thought, he replied that he was not convinced that clandestine resistance of 
this sort could serve any useful purpose.  It was moreover, bound to provoke 
severe reprisals against innocent civilians whom it was his first duty to 
protect.  He felt obliged, therefore, to warn me in no uncertain terms that if 
any member of Auxiliary Units was found acting illegally in his region, either 
before or after a German occupation, he would be arrested and severely 
punished.  This remark was in stark contrast to Mr. Churchill’s exhortations to 
fight on to the bitter end, but its logic was unanswerable and I walked sadly 
away for I had great respect for my Master’s intellectual integrity.  It was my 
first encounter with the Pétainiste argument against which SOE was to strive, 
so often in vain, while trying to fan the sparks of French Résistance.”15     
 
Wilkinson’s inability to answer Spens’ objection reveals an important issue 
that remained unanswered during the entire war:  Specifically, the western tradition of 
the use of armed forces as the right of the state, only.  Spen’s concern is an age old 
one that was largely solved with the consolidation of state authority around a central 
government and its prerogative to be the sole authority over armed forces.  Irregulars 
conducting combat operations and supporting conventional military forces were 
outside the tradition and as Spens believed, they were also outside the law.  
Wilkinson’s unfortunate use of the pejorative “Pétainiste” however, masked the 
issue.   Who had the legitimate authority to use partisan forces and how would they 
be controlled?  How would they be punished for excess and abuse when they went 
too far?  The answers would determine how the British government, according to its 
constitution, laws, and tradition, could deal with the matter.  Since the Germans never 
invaded, the British avoided the issue for their own nation.  But as the British sought 
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to use irregular warfare against the Germans in occupied nations, with irregular forces 
comprised of people from other nations, under whose authority would they fall?  As 
we will see, the issue remained a vital one for the French and will be discussed more 
in chapter two and aspects of it will play out throughout the remainder of this study. 
 By the fall of 1942, German invasion no longer seemed a realistic threat.  
Now the Soviet Union, which had signed a treaty of Non-Aggression with Germany 
in 1939, had been completely blindsided when Hitler launched Operation 
BARBAROSSA and invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941.  But by the fall of 
1942 Germany’s efforts there were stalling.   Proving equally beneficial for the 
British was the Japanese attack on the American Pacific naval base at Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941.  That event brought the United States formally into the war with 
declarations of war from Germany and Italy upon the United States.  Upon hearing 
the news that the United States was declaring war on Japan and would be openly 
joining the Second World War, Churchill reportedly slept soundly for the first time in 
months.  However, new Allies drove shifting war aims and as Churchill later 
remarked, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, that is fighting 
without them!”16  So while having the Soviets and Americans as allies in the war 
against Germany, Italy, and Japan was beneficial, it now meant grander objectives 
were possible.  No longer was air, naval, and irregular warfare around the periphery 
of occupied Europe the only option.  Large-scale offensive operations and invasion of 
the European continent could be conducted, and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin 
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demanded it.  President Roosevelt and his generals developed a series of plans that 
never saw implementation and produced little but animosity between the three allied 
nations.17    
Wilkinson, now responsible for SOE’s contribution to the overall plan for 
what became SLEDGEHAMMER, put his fertile mind to work.  In the fall of 1942 he 
and a colleague worked under the assumption that the Allies would invade Europe 
during the following summer and this “would trigger a wave of spontaneous 
insurgency in occupied Europe.”18  They also knew of large number of young men 
joining the Résistance in France, often described with the term Maquis,* to avoid the 
Vichy and German draft labor programs.  Rather than be deported to Germany to 
work, many young men were living in the hills and woods of southern France or left 
their current home to hide with friends of family.19  Wilkinson and many SOE 
planners believed the unpopular labor draft programs would provide the Résistance 
army its manpower.  But how could they be trained and equipped to act according to 
Allied plans?  Over the course of that fall and winter, they conceived of the idea of 
small parties of British soldiers, three men to be exact, who would parachute in to 
pre-identified Maquis bands and direct them in the accomplishment of tactical 
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objectives.  Thinking they had only six months before the Allies would invade 
France, Wilkinson, wrote, “The problem seemed to me to be two-fold.  First, how to 
harness this considerable Résistance potential so as to support the regular invasion 
forces; and secondly, and no less important, how to prevent these volunteers getting 
in the way both of the regular operations and of SOE’s clandestine actions.”20  He 
proposed that an officer, a demolitions expert, and a radio operator be parachuted in 
uniform behind enemy lines at the time of the invasion.  They would coordinate the 
actions of the Résistance with the nearest British or American Corps commander who 
would have assigned to him a special force detachment with his operations staff.  
Gubbins directed Wilkinson and others to start serious planning and develop the idea 
more fully.21    
 While Wilkinson and SOE Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rowlandson worked 
on the details, Gubbins started the approval process and began discussions with the 
Americans.  In July of 1942, Gubbins or his representatives had won approval for the 
continued planning on the concept from the General Headquarters of the Home 
Forces to continue planning and to come up with schemes for exercising the concept.  
Also, the Americans agreed to contribute 50% of the men necessary to put the 
JEDBURGHs in the field.  On 22 July, the British and Americans agreed on a 
planning number of 70 teams.  Over the course of August and September, SOE and 
members of the American delegation discussed the challenges of recruiting the right 
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kind of men for the operation and what kind of Résistance they might find in 
France.22   
The earliest surviving planning document on the JEDBURGHs described the 
JEDBURGH mission as one of solving the dilemma of how to link the “Resistance 
Groups (“Secret Armies”) with conventional forces on the day major combat 
operations commenced.”  They were to conduct operations that furthered military 
aims when neither the SOE agent, nor the Résistance Group was believed to be 
capable of conducting them.   Needing at least 72 hours to establish conduct and 
organize an operation, the authors of the paper believed JEDBURGHs should not be 
asked to undertake their task immediately upon arrival.  Moreover, the paper stressed 
that JEDBURGHs should not be deployed too near the front or their work will be 
given “short shrift,” as SOE planners believed the Germans would have policed up all 
local Résistance near their front leaving few Maquis to direct.  Wilkinson emphasized 
operations would concentrate on harassing or destroying aspects of the enemy’s line 
of communications, enemy railways, enemy aircraft, enemy commands and staff, 
vehicles and ammunition, supplies, and other opportunities that may present 
themselves.  For friendly troops, JEDBURGHs would pass along intelligence on 
enemy movements, act as guides, or prevent the destruction of valuable resources the 
Allied command believed it may soon need.23  The focus of the paper is very tactical 
in that its tasks link the command of the JEDBURGHs to the closest Corps or 
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Division and therefore JEDBURGH objectives focused on aiding that commander’s 
goals.  However, the result of their exercise would alter the initial thinking on 
JEDBURGH employment. 
Approved by Home Forces to participate in the Exercise SPARTAN, a 
training exercise carried out in March 1943, Wilkinson and other SOE and OSS 
officers brought 11 teams of JEDBURGHs to run operations against the Canadian 
army units.  SOE’s teams of partisans and JEDBURGHs were integrated into the 
exercise and immediately their benefits came to the fore.  The results however, “did 
not in all cases correspond with preconceived ideas on their employment.”24  The 
JEDBURGH teams consisted of a British officer, a second in command, and a 
wireless radio operator.  They linked up with resistance groups, code named 
“Boykins” after the American hunting dog, and focused their efforts on 
reconnaissance and scouting duties for the main forces.  They discovered that the 
Army headquarters staff needed more people to work the link with the Résistance and 
suggested specific functions and roles for those personnel.  They also confirmed that 
the resistance tasks should not be too close to the front due to the time lag it takes to 
organize a Maquis group to strike a target.  The exercise planners suggested a time 
allotment of at least 48 hours.  Such a delay then forced the recognition that 
JEDBURGHs and resistance groups could be best used on Strategic targets instead of 
tactical targets benefiting one battalion or similar sized unit.  Wilkinson and his 
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fellow planners then believed that the idea would be best employed if linked at the 
Army H. Q. level and that it should be properly staffed.25  
The last major lesson learned from SPARTAN was also a fundamental one 
fraught with implications.  Rather than simply putting an officer on the team who 
spoke the language of the country in which they operated, SOE now believed it 
should have an indigenous officer as a team member.  Requiring this necessitated the 
recruitment of French, Dutch, and Belgians.  Furthermore, they were to operate in 
uniform, be given a set of tasks to accomplish prior to their deployment, and be 
received by SOE agents already operating in the area.  For these reasons as well as 
the reasons noted in the exercise report, the teams were considered as more strategic.  
That is to say the cumulative effect of many teams would be greater than the sum of 
each team.  Moreover, they hoped that seeing a uniformed officer from their own 
nation on the team would have a positive effect on local morale and Résistance.26     
 The exercise had another important effect; it sold the Americans on the plan 
and solidified their participation.  Early in 1942, the Office of Strategic Services 
began appearing in London in as a result of the first British/US cooperative efforts 
begun between William J. Donovan and William Stephenson.  Stephenson was the 
man the British sent to New York to run intelligence for their operations in North 
America and his mission was two fold.  First, to ingratiate British special operations 
and intelligence with the American counterparts, who were just now standing up their 
organization, and two to develop Canadian resources for such missions as SOE would 
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need from them.  Donovan also welcomed the coterie of people Stephenson arranged 
to train Americans in intelligence and covert operations.  OSS then found various 
people to learn from them and acquired training facilities around Washington, D.C.   
(The current Camp David was one of them and became a site for JEDBURGH 
training.)  The OSS and Donovan became dependent upon this British connection for 
expertise and sought to locate an office in London for work with the expected 
invasion of Europe.  However, the British did not want the OSS, an organization that 
did both intelligence work and covert operations, in London so an agreement was 
reached that the OSS would not conduct unilateral operations.  The agreement 
allowed the OSS to get into the game, so to speak, by putting an office in what was 
going to be a major theater of operations.  However, living under the promise made 
between Donovan and the British chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 
Stewart Menzies in early 1942, grew more and more difficult by the beginning of 
1944 when OSS in London believed they were able to go it alone outside their British 
tutors.27   
 Donovan sent David K. E. Bruce to London to run Secret Intelligence for the 
Western European Theater.  Bruce was a Virginian and an accomplished lawyer, state 
legislator, and publisher who told Donovan he did not know anything about running 
an intelligence organization.  Not dissuaded, Donovan, who had long ago earned the 
nickname “Wild Bill”, told him not to worry.  “Nobody else does,” he replied.  “And 
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I’ve already provided for that.”  He directed Bruce to see Stephenson in New York.  
After some schooling from the British in the United States and some time in 
Washington as OSS got its feet under it, Donovan sent Bruce to London to replace his 
initial man there who, apparently had not been very well received.  The British 
immediately viewed Bruce as a man they could work with and he kept his promise to 
run covert operations only in conjunction with the British.28   OSS needed to show 
results back in Washington as Donovan fought bureaucratic battles daily against those 
who did not understand or did not know what OSS could do for the war.  Perhaps in 
this light OSS greatest strength, was also its greatest weakness.  While its birth can be 
attributed to FDR’s friendship and belief in Donovan, that friendship and belief 
during the rest of Roosevelt’s life proved to be barely enough to maintain the OSS 
against its detractors.  And when Roosevelt died, his successor closed it down. 
Without Congressional approval, which would have given it a budget line and a 
measure of independence, FDR merely funded OSS out of his own wartime 
emergency funds.29  Furthermore, he subordinated OSS to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Therefore, OSS in Washington had to show tangible results that benefited the Army 
and Navy but the deal they made with the British, while getting them in the European 
theater, hobbled their ability to conduct operations for which they could claim sole 
credit. Therefore, when the OSS London observer, Captain Franklin Canfield 
watched exercise SPARTAN in March of 1943 he realized the JEDBURGH plan 
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provided a golden opportunity.30  The OSS could meaningfully participate in 
operations that supported the invasion while doing it with the British.  So while the 
OSS got participation, the SOE and the British received the greatest attribute the 
United States was expected to contribute:  men and materiel.   
 
Enter the Americans 
 “Wild Bill” Donovan believed that one of America’s greatest strengths was its 
many ethnic groups.   He intended for his Office of Strategic Services to tap into that 
knowledge of world cultures, language, and cultural savvy resident in the United 
States.  He began the search for Americans of all ethnic groups in order to conduct 
intelligence and unconventional warfare around the world.  But OSS organized itself 
along with the major divisions such as Secret Intelligence, Special Operations, 
Research and Analysis, and Morale Operations.  The Research and Analysis Branch, 
for instance, recruited many academics from college campuses around the country, 
and men with backgrounds in European history, such as Crane Brinton, came to work 
for the OSS in that capacity.  For the JEDBURGH plan, OSS London’s Frank 
Canfield needed to find approximately 100 French speakers, something that would 
not be difficult in and of itself, but the other qualifications made his job very difficult.  
The prospective JEDBURGHs had to be in the Army, Marines, or Navy, they had to 
be parachute qualified, they had to be willing to volunteer for duty behind the lines, 
and the Non-commissioned officers had to be highly proficient radio operators.  
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Canfield and the OSS put out the call in Army posts around the country and 
sometimes would draw large crowds only to see them dissipate when all the 
requirements were listed.  But the men Canfield and others found started to appear at 
the OSS in Washington beginning that fall, some of them interviewing with Donovan 
personally in November and then reporting for training at what they called Area B-1, 
or the weekend retreat FDR referred to as “Shangri-La” and what is now Camp 
David.31  Donovan’s relationship with William Stephenson and the British made 
British instruction available and some of the JEDBURGH trainees received 
instruction from William Fairburn, the famous British commando instructor and 
former Hong Kong Policeman.  They learned about lock picking, plastic explosives, 
foreign weapons, how to use a knife on an enemy soldier, and other things that 
focused on the micro-level of guerrilla warfare.32  But when it came to pondering 
guerrilla warfare, its strategies, or its efficacy, the OSS seemed to be largely content 
with letting British lead. 
 It is not as if the United States had no experience with such matters, but 
perhaps it did not put that experience down on paper to ponder what it meant.  
Perhaps the lone exception to the American lack of thinking on irregular or guerilla 
warfare could be found in the United States Marine Corps.  For the United States 
Marines, “Small Wars,” as they called them, had been their experience in the 
Philippines, China, and even more profoundly in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 
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Nicaragua.  Spurred on by the debate about the Marine Corps mission and what it 
should be, Marine officers debated their role and whether they needed to think about 
formulating doctrine and principles of warfare.  The debate became centered around 
definitions and methods and fed off the same debates that occurred in the Army.  The 
Marine Corps finally pursued two doctrinal missions with Amphibious Warfare 
becoming the dominant one, but the USMC’s repeated Caribbean missions in the 
1920s and 1930s prompted the drafting of their Small Wars Manual in 1940 with the 
hope that they would no longer have to “re-invent the wheel” upon being ordered to 
their next Small War.33  The Manual itself is a very well thought out attempt and 
recognizes the relationship between political aim and combat by starting out defining 
Small Wars as, “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military 
force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of 
another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the 
preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of 
our nation.”34  Furthermore, the manual’s authors anticipated Marine operations in 
foreign countries that fell outside legally declared war realizing that, “This 
government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable 
regularity” and there was no reason to believe that would cease in the future.35   
While the manual discusses all kinds of practical applications regarding mules, setting 
up camps, and sanitation concerns, it also gives the nod to the understanding that the 
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politics and the “decisions of statesmen” will require a smaller kind of combat to 
achieve something of far less concern to the United States than the effort it put forth 
in the First World War.  It also provides for what today military planners call a 
“Stability Phase” in which political power and authority is handed back in phases to 
the locally constituted government when necessary.   
 When President Roosevelt created the OSS on 13 June 1942, he signed a brief 
directive that described its duties to “collect and analyze such strategic information as 
may be required” by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and to “Plan and operate such 
special services as may be directed” by the Joint Chiefs.  In it he also appointed 
Donovan to be its Director.  Such vague language allowed Donovan to then pursue 
nearly any effort he thought worth pursuing.  In a meeting of the JCS on 19 August 
the functions of the OSS regarding “Organized Sabotage and Guerrilla Warfare” were 
approved.  The JCS approved sabotage actions and delineated six functions:  organize 
and incite native groups in occupied territories, arrange for arms and equipment, 
provide training, direct or conduct sabotage activities, and set up reception 
committees “to meet and aid our armed forces” all in an effort to prepare the area for 
“offensive operations by our armed forces.”  Guerrilla warfare would be conducted 
by groups comprised of foreign-born people loyal the United States and currently in 
the American military who met the physical and loyalty requirements.  They were to 
be given at least three months training and would then participate in the theater 
commander’s main invasion force or operate behind the lines to perform sabotage of 
key targets, reconnaissance, and support resistance groups of that country.  If there 
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was no theater commander for the area of operations the Joint Chiefs of Staff would 
retain control of the OSS efforts.  The Army and Navy were to provide the personnel, 
training facilities, and trainers for these tasks.  Noting that there had already been 
calls from the theaters for such people and support, the directive affirmed the JCS’s 
intent to meet the requests.36  One can also see Donovan’s influence regarding the use 
of foreign-born Americans or resident aliens to enable guerrilla warfare.   
 But when David K. E. Bruce arrived to lead OSS efforts in London he had to 
get its intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special operations up and running and he 
had to abide by agreements made with the British that proscribed unilateral American 
operations.  As stated above, having little to work with at the beginning made the 
agreement feasible, but as American capability grew, the OSS chaffed under the 
requirement.  However, the JEDBURGH plan, while not specifically designed as 
something the JCS had authorized it to do with an Ally like the British, allowed 
American participation in what was, in spirit something very much along the JCS’s 
outline.  To make it happen, Bruce sent Canfield back to the United States on a 
recruiting drive to find French speaking soldiers, sailors, or Marines willing to 
volunteer for such duty.  But he also had to staff up his operation in London and by 
the January of 1943, OSS Washington sent him personnel to conduct operations in 
support of what became Operation OVERLORD.  Arriving to help in the effort was a 
former New York attorney, Paul van der Stricht, along with several others, who began 
to work side by side with the British to run agents into France.  They also began 
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planning with the British-American military organization created to conduct detailed 
planning for re-entering the continent of Europe.  The Chief of Staff to the Supreme 
Allied Commander (COSSAC) had received the task to plan the invasion at the 
American-British July 1943 Quebec planning conference.  COSSAC’s relationship 
with the SOE and OSS was a good one and they relied on them for ideas and 
information on the kind of help they could expect from the French Résistance.  
Apparently, COSSAC’s lead planner, Major General Harold Bull always thought 
whatever the Résistance could pull off would be a bonus and the Allies should not 
count on them for must do missions.37  Such a belief set in early and provoked 
arguments within the OSS London, the SOE Sections responsible for France, the 
Allied Staffs, between the Allies and the Free French, and as we will see, would only 
resolve themselves at the time of the invasion.  But that sentiment became a key 
planning factor driving much of the resources the Allies were willing to devote to 
SOE and OSS efforts in France.   
 If done up to the hilt, such efforts could require a great deal of resources.  Not 
only would one need officers and NCOs to implement the JEDBURGH Plan, but 
deploying them required dozens of aircraft, airfields, thousands of rifles, pistols, 
hundreds of thousands of ammunition rounds and explosives, marshaling and packing 
facilities, hundreds of portable radios, dedicated radio frequencies, and people to 
monitor transmissions from France and encode and decode the messages and dispatch 
them to the correct place.  In short, the OSS-SOE effort needed a grand capability 
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beyond several staff officers in London, and it had less than a year to assemble, beg, 
borrow, buy, construct, train, and get it organized.  That very challenging task largely 
fell to two incredibly talented men:  British Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman and 
American Colonel Joseph F. Haskell. 
 Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman had experience with Allied intelligence and issues 
involving France.  He was introduced to an American “no one had ever heard of,” 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in August of 1942 soon after the American’s arrival 
in the United Kingdom.  Eisenhower was then putting together the Allied staff in 
order to conduct what became Operation TORCH and the invasion of North Africa. 
The British put Mockler-Ferryman’s nomination in to Eisenhower to set up his 
intelligence staff and Eisenhower impressed him with his affability and acumen at not 
caring “which uniform an officer was wearing.”38  However, when German forces 
smashed the American units at Kasserine Pass, inflicting over 6,000 casualties and 
claiming 4026 prisoners, Mockler-Ferryman lost his job.39  Under pressure from 
Washington, Eisenhower fired him along with the American Corps Commander 
Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall.  However, Mockler-Ferryman’s reputation 
seemed to be undiminished inside British Army circles, and Eisenhower decorated 
him for his service.  All of it gave him the impression that his reassignment may have 
had little to do with any negative performance on his part.  After the war, an unnamed 
but evidently reliable source who knew about the incident informed him that his 
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belief was correct and that the American government had insisted on a scapegoat 
from each country.40   
However, before any of that was ever confirmed to him he remained 
professional enough to hold no ill will toward Eisenhower and was certainly not 
cynical about cooperating with the Americans on major efforts.  Gubbins snapped 
him up and made Mockler-Ferryman head of SOE’s Western European Section.  
Three months later Gubbins referred to him as an officer who, “quickly grasped a 
most intricate method of warfare.”41  As the head of SOE operations in Western 
Europe, his duties were twofold.  First he was to control the Résistance in Western 
Europe and second he “was to prepare with OVERLORD planning staff a scheme to 
dovetail the action of Résistance with the strategic bombing plan….”42 Certainly 
SOE’s relations with COSSAC became close and the Western European Section 
formed what was informally called, “The London Group” with their American 
counterparts from the American OSS/Special Operations (OSS/SO) section in 
London. 
 The same month that Mockler-Ferryman became head of SOE operations in 
Western Europe, Colonel Joseph F. Haskell joined OSS London.  A West Point 
graduate of the Class of 1930 and the son of an Army General, Haskell had been 
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serving as an Intelligence officer on the COSSAC staff since his arrival in the theater 
in March of 1943.  He arrived just as Wilkinson, Canfield, and others began to press 
their JEDBURGH plan to COSSAC as a means to control the Résistance.43  Haskell 
quickly became a believer in the operation and recommended it to COSSAC for 
acceptance.  So when Bruce needed an officer to run his Special Operations section, 
Canfield suggested Haskell and this gained quick acceptance all the way up the OSS 
chain of command.44   Haskell’s father, who was at that time running as the 
Democratic candidate for New York’s Lieutenant Governor’s, had been one of 
Donovan’s WWI commanders.  Furthermore, Joseph Haskell’s older brother John 
was already in OSS and would later be OSS London’s head of the Secret Intelligence 
branch, or SI.45  Donovan and Major General Bull, the chief of COSSAC Plans and 
later Eisenhower’s Director of Operations for OVERLORD, both liked the idea as 
they had a military officer they could trust in that key position.  Haskell was urbane 
and handsome, a Cavalry officer who had gone from post to post prior to the war 
competing on Army polo teams.  He was able to speak French, and possessed the tact 
to work coalition and allied issues in an organization largely comprised of non-career 
officers.46  Requesting his assignment to OSS, Bruce wrote to COSSAC that “no 
other officer” could undertake this work due to the short time before the invasion and 
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all the work Haskell had already done on the plan made him able to come to the job 
without missing a beat.  COSSAC approved Haskell’s transfer to OSS London on 23 
August 1943 at the same time it approved the JEDBURGH Plan and the London 
Group’s efforts to control the Résistance.47   
With the plan approved and the British and American leadership falling into 
place, now the resources had to be created and organized in order to enable the plan 
to come to fruition.  The staff functions had to be thought out, the process designed 
and decided upon, training facilities and instruction provided for, supplies and 
equipment for the JEDBURGHs and the Résistance groups procured, organized, and 
maintained.  Furthermore, it was one thing to have the agreement with COSSAC, but 
COSSAC would change when the commander for OVERLORD was named and his 
ideas might shift procedures dramatically.  The London Group would have to come to 
an agreement with the new commander about the role the Résistance would play and 
how they would control it.   
By December 1943, the London Group established the role of the 
JEDBURGH Plan in support of the overall effort.  The JEDBURGH teams would be 
sent into the field based upon the need of the Supreme Allied Commander and his 
desire to control the Résistance in order to support the main armies.  They would be 
sent to a known resistance group and be given at least 72 hours to organize the initial 
effort.  The teams needed to be briefed on their mission and the local resistance in the 
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area, conducted from their holding area to their briefing and isolation area in London 
and then on to one of the special duty airfields.  At the airfield they would receive a 
meal, their equipment, and the aircraft would be filled with their gear tailored for their 
tasks.  Their radios would each have unique encoding crystals determined by the 
communications plan created for that team.  The British would supply 50 officers, the 
Americans 50, the French 92, the Dutch 9, and the Belgians 9.   The British would 
provide 35 W/T operators, the Americans 50, and the French 15.  Furthermore, the 
Special Force Detachments with each of the main Allied Armies had to be 
constituted, organized, and trained.  These SF Detachments would serve as the means 
to call the JEDBURGHs into the field based on how the situation developed after the 
initial invasion.   
However it must be understood, that organizing all the support machinery did 
not start from scratch at the end of 1943.  The British had been conducting operations 
in occupied Europe since 1940 and since 1941 had maintained networks of agents in 
France.48  The British had also learned from their mistakes and these experiences 
shaped their understanding of the Résistance and German efforts to thwart Allied 
efforts, and had taught them valuable lessons about how to run operations behind 
German lines.  In fact, their efforts with agents and German successes at catching 
them and rolling up networks, was the SOE’s biggest reason for wanting the 
JEDBURGH program in the first place.  They believed they needed a strategic 
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reserve of agents to operate after the invasion when all indications pointed to 
Germany rounding up large resistance groups and their associated networks.  In other 
words, they realized their agent networks were always on the knife’s edge of survival 
and would not be able to last long due to the fundamental changes they expected to 
occur after the Allies invaded France.  The Germans and Vichy would step up their 
anti-partisan efforts and the JEDBURGHs then would be the strategic reserve 
replacing all the SOE and OSS agents expected to be arrested, tortured, and killed.49   
The JEDBURGHs could still use much of the infrastructure built to support their 
current operations, but they would need a far greater support base.  Moreover, the 
French had to be brought into the planning in a more robust way than they had been 
up to that point.  The details of the French efforts and how the SOE and OSS 
coordinated with them will be discussed in the next chapter. 
  
 Communications 
With agents going in and out of France, aircraft dropping supplies, and 
intelligence to send London, reliable communications had to be established.  The 
technology was limited, but the Allies found two different communications means to 
overcome the challenge.  The first being the radio or wireless transmitter (W/T), and 
the second method was the British Broadcasting Company.  The key person in any 
circuit was the radio operator and his or her ability to communicate meant the 
difference between life and death.  News of a circuit being discovered, a traitor agent, 
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or an incoming parachutages, were key, and if the agents were incommunicado, 
things went terribly wrong.  Secure communications were more critical for the 
JEDBURGH teams as they had direct military responsibilities regarding 
OVERLORD.   
Unfortunately, the Germans quickly realized they could triangulate the signal 
and locate the radio.  The German intelligence and police units used Directional 
Finding vans to locate illegal transmitters aided by a special military police (or 
Feldgendarmes) ready to arrest whoever sent the signal.  In large cities finding the 
exact room radio signals emanated from was more difficult.  To help them hone in, 
they would switch the power off in the city section by section and when the signal 
stopped they knew where the radio was.  Radio operators soon learned broadcasting 
short messages meant better security and made it more difficult for the Germans to 
discover their location.50 
However, even short messages sooner or later gave away their location and it 
often became impossible or impractical to send and receive on a dedicated radio set. 
To alleviate the amount of messages to send or receive, SOE’s first successful agent, 
Georges Begué, came up with the idea of messages personnels over the BBC.  The 
Allies broadcast pre-arranged phrases, poems, or sentences meaning something only 
to the person receiving the message.  Thus began the nightly broadcast by BBC 
announcers with their seemingly endless nonsense, but to resistance cells they became 
orders or news of friends and comrades.  To the circuit leaders it could be 
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confirmation of an incoming flight of weapons or the orders to start an agreed upon 
operation.51 
To further aid aircraft in getting to their drop zones, the Allies developed and  
parachuted in S-phones to the Résistance.  An S-phone could transmit voice radio 
signals in a secure way from the operator to the airplane.  But with a range of only 
eight to ten miles, and special training required, the Maquis rarely used the device.  
The French Résistance had little interest in such an odd contraption and went for the 
rifles, ammunition, and money instead, leaving the strange radio idle.  If the Maquis 
were properly trained, the device may have prevented many agents and materials 
from being parachuted miles off target.  Instead, guiding aircraft to a drop zone could 
range from the primitive to a more intricately scripted operation depending upon the 
skill and experience of the resistance group working the drop zone.  In the most basic 
of receptions, four men used electric torches, formed a large “L” and signaled when 
they heard the sound of the aircraft.  The reception party signaled a previously agreed 
upon Morse letter, and the aircraft dropped the load over the “L” and flew on to 
another location to drop leaflets elsewhere in an effort to make the Germans believe 
propaganda was the plane’s only mission.52 
Realizing that the JEDBURGHs needed a well-made W/T able to meet their 
task, SOE and OSS set to work to develop a proper one.  Their efforts resulted in a 
small suit case sized radio powered by a six-volt battery that could reach London.  All 
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the team members trained in Morse code, in case the W/T operator was killed or 
captured.  However, the W/T required a high level of skill when operating under 
combat conditions.  Not only did one need to be an expert at Morse code, but also be 
deft with coding and decoding.  To quickly code Morse messages the JEDBURGHs 
used a process known as “one time pads.”  A “one time pad” had a set of letters five 
across and five down so the operator could overlay the normal alphabet on the pad, 
giving him a new order of letters.  Discarded after one use, the operator would then 
use the next code sheet.  The person receiving the messages would have the same 
series of pages in order to unscramble the letters just as the sender had scrambled 
them.  A simple code for the Germans to break, but only if used twice.21   
 
Air Support 
Modern war also brought a new tool for reaching partisans behind the lines - 
the airplane.  But airpower thinkers focused on strategic bombing, not sneaking 
behind enemy lines and parachuting men and supplies.  Initial efforts to convert 
bombers for special operations ran up against many challenges, not the least of which 
was the unwillingness of the Royal Air Force to provide aircraft.  By August 1941, 
SOE operated sixteen aircraft from Newmarket Racecourse.  The British used 
Halifaxes, Whitleys, and single engine Lysanders, with the Lysander being the only 
aircraft truly designed for SOE.  A high-wing monoplane, stripped of arms and 
equipped with an auxiliary fuel tank, the plane could fly 450 miles and carry four 
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passengers.  It proved extremely valuable due to its ability to land in short, 
unimproved fields, and provided the required flexibility, but could not be used for 
parachute operations.  Lysanders were used to pick up and drop off passengers and 
equipment, and with the engine running, take on passengers and cargo for the trip 
home.53 
Flying special operations missions required very different tactics and 
procedures from massed strategic bombing.  Flying massed formations would not 
suffice when clandestinely parachuting people and equipment.  A single aircraft 
flying a low altitude mission at night was necessary, requiring re-fitting aircraft and 
different training for aircrews.  Initial mission success rate was a disappointing 45%.  
The problems stemmed from poor navigation, weather, low fog, and/or no reception 
committee near the drop zone.23  Of course the air crews contended with Luftwaffe 
night fighters as well, and endeavored to fool German radar by flying with bombing 
formations until required to break off to their target area.  And according to one SOE 
officer, the “moon was a goddess,” as the moon’s phases directed air operations.  
Aircraft could not land without some moon and parachuting operations were best 
when the moon was at half or better, so with the moon down, the Résistance could not 
expect any parachutages.24 
Despite the obstacles, the RAF pressed ahead and developed its capabilities. 
By November 1942, SOE operated twenty-seven aircraft and accomplished ninety-
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three sorties.  Delivered to France were agents or “Joes,” and twenty-three tons of 
weapons and supplies.  Operations stepped up considerably during 1943 and by flying 
615 sorties they delivered 214 “Joes” and 578 tons of weapons and supplies.  
American efforts from the United Kingdom were still nil.  However, from the 
Mediterranean theater, the United States flew ten sorties delivering nine “Joes” and 
eight tons.25  The US Army Air Force’s 122nd Air Liaison Squadron attempted to 
deliver arms and parachutists to France and elsewhere in the theater but initially was 
disorganized and poorly equipped. 
 
Conclusion 
 The JEDBURGH plan became a coalition project due to both nations needing 
the other, while having little to do with the utility that an Allied team would prove 
more effective than a normal team.  While the Allied aspect of the teams was thought 
to be a bonus, the OSS joined in the project in order to get into the theater.  The 
agreement they made with their British counterparts early in 1942, began to be a 
source of tension, and the JEDBURGH plan offered Donovan the opportunity to 
support the invasion of Europe and demonstrate to detractors back home that the OSS 
was participating and useful.  The British needed what is often needed from American 
capacity:  soldiers.   These would have to be very well trained and specialized men 
who were hard to find in Britain, but with America contributing to the effort, 100 
teams now seemed a realistic goal.  Moreover, the American contribution in aircraft 
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and crews also helped solve much of the shortage of capability for night flying and 
aerial re-supply of the networks in France.  Nevertheless, relations between the 
British and United States would prove somewhat challenging.  However, from the 
British point of view, they must have looked much more inviting than relations with 
the Free French and de Gaulle. 
 
 
 
 72 
Chapter Two 
Recreating France and the Rise of the Résistance 
 
 
 Germany’s diplomatic and military successes in 1939 and 1940 were 
stunning.  After their loss in the First World War and their bitter resentment over the 
humiliating Versailles Peace Treaty, the Germans were devastated by the Great 
Depression.  In these circumstances they had turned to Adolph Hitler’s 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (the Nazi Party), voting the Nazis into 
power in Germany in January 1933.1  Hitler began reorganizing the German Army or 
Wehrmacht and due to many factors beyond the scope of this study, the revitalized 
Wehrmacht became not only a source of his political power, but also developed 
doctrine emphasizing the offensive and exploitation of maneuver through the 
combined use of tanks, infantry, and aircraft all directed with coded radio 
communications.2   France’s doctrine of defense proved to be no match against the 
Wehrmacht’s doctrine of innovation and mobility led by aggressive German officers.  
After the 1938 Munich agreement with Hitler, the French and British suffered months 
of successive and embarrassing setbacks.  From conceding Germany’s right to the 
Czechoslovakian territory to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, the loss of 
Poland, the Soviet – Finnish War, the German defeat of Denmark, Norway, and 
Yugoslavia that culminated in Britain’s loss of Crete, the British and French 
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governments seemed at a complete loss as to how to resist German and Italian armed 
actions.   
Germany quickly followed their remarkable successes by invading Belgium 
on 10 May 1940.  While their tanks and aircraft were of similar quality to the French, 
the German use of surprise organized around their offensive and mobility focused 
doctrine, led by officers encouraged to take the initiative, the Wehrmacht burst 
through Belgian and French defenses.  The French attempted a gamble in order to 
shore up the Belgian defenses, but they failed largely due to their army’s inability to 
maneuver effectively following years of preparation to fight a defensive war.  From 
the 13 to 17 May the Germans succeeded at breaking through the French defenses at 
Sedan, Monthermé, and Houx on the River Meuse and wisely exploited their early 
successes by cutting off the British and French Armies in northern France from 
French forces to the south.3  By racing to the English Channel the Germans dislocated 
Allied efforts to defend France leading the French Army Commander Weygand to 
admit to Churchill on 12 June that the French army could no longer conduct 
“coordinated war.”4 
Indeed a complete lack of coordination and effective governance racked 
France, its relations with the Belgians and the British, as well as its Army.  Belgian 
King Leopold began armistice negotiations with the Germans on the 28th.  Fearing his 
army was going to be completely destroyed, the British commander began an 
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evacuation at Dunkirk on 29 May and by 1 June 350,000 troops including 60,000 
French, had escaped across the English Channel.  Moreover, Britain refused to 
employ Fighter Command’s aircraft to defend French airspace.5  German troops had 
made it to the English Channel and other large formations were slicing southward 
getting behind the Maginot line cutting off French forces on the east side of the 
country.  And to add to the consternation, Mussolini joined in with his Fascist ally 
and declared war on France on 10 June.  “It’s only fair, don’t you see?” Churchill 
quipped upon hearing the news, “They were on our side the last time.”6  But France 
needed more than pithy remarks and cheerleading.  When General Weygand spoke to 
the British delegation two days later, Churchill’s cajoling and threatening of the 
French government to remain in the fight must have seemed obscenely incongruent 
with Britain’s own actions.   
France was now besieged with confusion.  Parts of its army continued fighting 
in piecemeal and un-coordinated actions while others, some 2 million men, were 
captured and eventually shipped off to POW camps in Germany.  The members of 
France’s parliament scattered on the road to Bordeaux or southern ports.  People in 
Paris and eastern cities were evacuating and choking the roads the army needed to try 
to assemble its defenses.7  For many, such disorder and chaos were a greater threat 
than the Germans.  On 16 June, Pétain did as Churchill feared and accepted the post 
as the head of the French government.  The crafting of this 84 year-old national hero 
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into anyone could see what they wished to see, was largely the work of Pierre Laval.  
Laval was a politician who had been in and out of French governments during the 
proceeding decade.  Fervently anti-communist, contemptuous of the socialists, the 
free masons, and the unions, he took the opportunity to make France into what he had 
long desired.  In Pétain, he found a man he could use to renew France and who could 
symbolize justice and French national pride.  Although Pétain did not trust him 
completely, he shared in the notion that an armistice with Germany should be sought. 
But the cause for the rise of Pétain and Laval and their Vichy government 
cannot be placed entirely with these two men.  As Robert Paxton wrote, “In truth, 
there was rather an instinctive shrinking from chaos that made war to the end against 
Germany simply unthinkable.  The final weapon of a people whose conventional 
army has disintegrated is chaos.”8  Pétain was old enough to remember the last time 
the German army had conquered France in 1871.  He could recall the subsequent 
chaos, revolution, and the installation of the constitution he now viewed as weak and 
fundamentally flawed.  He and many others had a reason to fear the very real threat of 
what continuing the war would mean:  Guerilla warfare, roving criminals, answered 
by German reprisals.   
But while the authority of the state is a long and deeply held tradition in 
France, there was another way to maintain the state while avoiding chaos.  The most 
junior general in the French army took a plane from Bordeaux to England the day 
after Pétain became President of the Council of Ministers.  The next day, Charles de 
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Gaulle got permission from the British government to broadcast a message on the 
British Broadcasting Company’s programming where he, perhaps nervously and 
beginning in a shaky voice called for, “French officers and soldiers on British 
territory. . . to join forces with me.”  He explicitly stated his intent to use a “superior 
mechanized force” to ultimately defeat Germany and insisted the war was not lost.9   
In a very real way, this call was not the beginning of de Gaulle as a political leader of 
any future French Résistance movement, but rather the culmination of his army career 
in which he had persistently advocated for tanks and aircraft and the doctrine to 
exploit mechanized warfare.10   At that time and in the bleak days that followed, de 
Gaulle sought to organize such a French force.  He hoped to use weapons salvaged 
from France and purchased from the United Kingdom and the United States in order 
to enter France again alongside Allied armies.   
However, when no political party or leader emerged from the ruin of France’s 
pre-war political class, de Gaulle picked up the baton.  As historian Arthur L. Funk 
demonstrated, de Gaulle was poorly prepared and had never shown any inclination 
for national level political leadership.  Just days before the French government 
collapsed, Premier Paul Reynaud named him to a junior cabinet position as he was 
impressed with de Gaulle’s ideas on how to organize an offensive minded army.  But 
a few days as Assistant Secretary of State for War was nothing compared to the 
experiences of others in national politics, others he believed would step forward to 
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lead while he re-constituted something on the order of an Brigade or Division to 
operate alongside the British.  But later in 1940 when other parts of the French 
Empire began to support him, he was forced to think about political aspects as well as 
military ones.  When no political leader outside of France, took up the mantle of 
leadership, de Gaulle seemed the sole person for people to rally behind, even if they 
were civilians.  When Pétain met with Hitler, de Gaulle and his burgeoning Free 
French organization issued a Manifesto in Brazzaville, Congo, where they claimed to 
speak for France as Pétain’s government was subject to the will of an invader and 
therefore illegal.11  The government at Vichy returned the favor and issued charges 
against de Gaulle condemning him to death.12   
Claiming sovereign authority had substantial consequences and forced other 
governments to choose sides.  Speaking to de Gaulle on the evening of 27 June before 
the Brazzaville declaration, Churchill decided to “recognize you alone” as he could 
not surmount the Foreign Office’s reservations in recognizing de Gaulle as someone 
who spoke for France.   The following day, the British government announced that 
they recognized de Gaulle to be the, “leader of all the Free French, wherever they 
may be found, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause.”13   But later when de 
Gaulle’s group claimed the authority to speak for France, the Free France-British 
relationship began a long and stormy relationship as it careened from one point of 
contention to another over the next five years.  That relationship found its first test 
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with the incident at Mers-el-Kébir.  When Pétain refused to order all French naval 
ships to sail to England or neutral ports, Churchill believed he had to order the Royal 
Navy to seize or destroy them.  When they did so at Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran, 
Algeria, on 3 July killing nearly 1300 French sailors, de Gaulle reacted with his 
furious temper, at first.  After some time to collect his thoughts, Churchill was struck 
with de Gaulle’s understanding and his explanation to the French people regarding 
the matter.  As de Gaulle stated bluntly, “No Frenchman worthy of the name can for a 
moment doubt that a British defeat would seal for ever his country’s bondage.”14  De 
Gaulle made clear that France’s future was heavily invested in British fortunes.  And 
when, as explained in the previous chapter, a few weeks later the British created the 
SOE, that organization proved to be the best vehicle for de Gaulle’s links with the 
independently developing resistance movements inside France.   
But interior movements had to have an animating idea that would motivate 
their inception and birth.  As long as the shock of defeat continued and the Pétain 
government presented itself to the French as its savior from chaos, few movements 
had the animus to begin.  Pétain’s meeting with Hitler at Montoire in late October and 
his subsequent pursuit of a policy of collaboration provoked a tiny few toward 
opposing him.  However the vast majority of Frenchmen believed Pétain, and his 
ministers such as Laval and Admiral François Darlan, were doing their best to defend 
France, maintain order, and negotiate the release of French POWs.  As historian 
Julian Jackson accurately wrote, “Before it could be joined, the Résistance had to be 
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invented.”15  Therefore, animating ideas that appeared in the form of newspapers and 
posters extolling political goals were France’s first forms of resistance.  The first of 
the newspapers began to appear in the Fall of 1940 while the more enduring and 
influential underground newspapers such as Libération and Combat saw their first 
editions roll off the clandestine presses in the summer of 1941.16  The driving force 
inside the early papers were complaints about how Pétain’s government was not the 
protector of France, as it claimed to be, but more and more showing itself as a vehicle 
for Germany’s abuse of France.   
Pétain may have realized this himself when in December 1940 he arrested 
Laval and reshuffled his cabinet and placed Admiral Darlan in charge of his 
government.  While the drastic nature of Pétain’s move has been ascribed various 
dramatic meanings, the result was not dramatic at all.  Over the course of the next 
year, Darlan accumulated more and more government posts and by August of 1941 
was the Vice President of the Council while also holding the Foreign, Interior, Naval, 
Information, and the Defense Ministry posts.  But despite all these responsibilities he 
was unable to repair the damage done to relations with Germany when Laval was 
arrested.  Furthermore, he supervised a deteriorating relationship with the British and 
a puzzling one with the Americans.  To Darlan fell the dubious task of convincing the 
Germans to collaborate with France in its recasting of Europe under Nazism, but 
under a more subtle guise.  He sought to go beyond the Armistice agreement of 1940 
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and formalize a relationship with Germany that would grant France a more 
respectable status.  He persisted in this until replaced by Laval who had convinced 
Pétain he could do better.  After Darlan failed to win any improvement in France’s 
standing with Germany, Pétain submitted a list of replacement candidates to the 
German AND the United States Ambassadors.  Both disapproved of the list and Laval 
used the consternation to emerge from the political doldrums of house arrest to 
become Prime Minister for a second time.17  Pétain had hoped Darlan would get the 
agreements he sought.  But such agreement was not forthcoming from the German 
government, as was bluntly stated by the German State Secretary at the Foreign 
Ministry, “Squeeze the country dry,” but give nothing to them in return.18  Darlan 
retained his Defense and Navy posts however and remained a power in the Vichy 
until the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942. 
One can quickly see Hitler’s war aim for France by the map the Germans 
drew defining occupied and un-occupied territory.  The occupied zone gave the 
Germans full control over the industrial north, Paris, and French ports on the North 
Sea, English Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean.  Hitler’s modern industrial warfare 
now had more factories, workers, and mineral resources and the German Navy and 
Luftwaffe now had the facilities they would need to conduct operations against 
Britain.  Alsace and Lorraine were incorporated officially into the German Reich and 
the Italians got an occupation zone in the south along their border with France.  The 
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Line of Demarcation between occupied and un-occupied France became a “virtual 
border” requiring identification cards, permission to cross, and restrictions on the 
amount of mail and goods allowed to cross.  Running from central eastern France, 
south of Paris, and taking a southerly turn at Tours, it terminated at Spanish border 
east of Hendaye.  Those living along that line now underwent the curious change in 
life of becoming citizens near a border town where wartime want and rationing made 
smuggling an underground industry.19  But as German aims shifted from defeating 
Britain towards operations in the east against the Soviet Union, its focus on France 
became more ambivalent and clear direction for the MBF in governing France was 
often absent. 
Germany needed France’s resources, and Hitler still viewed France as a 
mortal enemy due to the France’s victory in the First World War but the German need 
for first-rate troops in the east had an effect on how it could operate in France.  Hitler, 
as in other areas, failed to govern or provide his commanders in France a coherent or 
unifying idea for occupation.  He wanted racial cleansing, but the Army commander 
for the occupation, the MilitärBefehlshaber im Frankreich (MBF), General Otto von 
Stülpnagel did not enforce or follow up in such efforts.  He was not a NAZI 
ideologue but instead a traditional Prussian officer who believed such activities were 
unprofessional and dangerous. Von Stülpnagel had within his command 
FeldKommandanturn, an organization similar to Military Police that he stationed 
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throughout France, even in the Un-occupied Zone where they were coyly called 
Liaison offices.  MBF also had an office that focused on extracting economic and 
material wealth from France.  Lastly MBF possessed a staff element that produced 
intelligence, propaganda, and maintained a Secret Police.  His attitude toward the 
treatment of the French people was one of severity for Germans who broke the law or 
murdered Frenchmen.  Punishments against German soldiers acting illegally were 
severe.  However, von Stüpnagel’s days were numbered in that position as he was 
finally ousted on 16 February 1942, by the political maneuvering of the other 
powerful people in the German occupation of France.20 
In addition to the MBF, the German Foreign Office, Reichmarschall Hermann 
Göring, and the SS all believed they had an interest in how Germany governed 
France.  The Foreign Office dispatched Otto Abetz to France to see to its concerns.  
In his two meetings with Hitler, Abetz was told to work toward collaboration with 
Pétain.  But most evidence suggests Hitler was merely attempting to play Abetz, as it 
was not what he really sought from France.  He did not trust Abetz since he was 
married to a French woman, but he believed Abetz could play a useful role if 
manipulated well.   Abetz worked to encourage the anti-Jewish laws Vichy passed 
while urging his superiors in Berlin to collaborate with the Vichy Regime.  He also 
furthered Vichy’s aims of their anti-Jewish laws and assisted with the process of 
deporting French Jews to Germany.  While Göring had considerable sway with Hitler, 
commanded the Luftwaffe, and controlled a great deal of the economic effort to 
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support the war, his interests in France came down to his personal interests in fine art 
and other French goods.  His tirades about matters often left Stülpnagel confused and 
angry.   
Another German entity and powerful player, the SS led by Heinrich Himmler, 
arrived in France without the knowledge or permission of the MBF authorities and 
overtime developed a working relationship with Abetz.  Both organizations sought 
French collaboration and both supported the elements in the Vichy government that 
were pro-Fascist and pro-German.  Overtime, the SS would become a powerful force 
in the radicalization of the war in France and become an influential player regarding 
security, police, intelligence, propaganda and education.  But as Thomas Laub 
concluded, the Army’s MBF had been better prepared for occupying a nation while 
the Foreign Office, Göring, and the SS all sought to advance their own agendas which 
were often counter to MBF’s aims.  The dysfunctional relationship within the German 
hierarchy contributed to Germany’s confused efforts to occupy and govern France.21 
In important ways, the MBF found itself somewhat lulled into complacency 
by the slow development of any widespread and well-organized resistance.  Their 
complacency, coupled with the overall German occupation comprised of competing 
Army and other NAZI organizations made governing France incoherent on many 
issues.  But the Germans did not really have to go up against a Résistance resembling 
a military organization until the summer and fall of 1943.   By that time Germany’s 
strategic situation had shifted.  Its invasion of the Soviet Union had stalled and its 
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forces were defeated at Stalingrad in a long and protracted mauling.  The Americans, 
British, and Free French had gained control of North Africa, Sicily, and had launched 
operations on the Italian peninsula.  Due to these realities Hitler issued strategic 
guidance on 3 November 1943, communicating his views regarding the west as “the 
crucial scene of the war due to the expected Allied invasion of France.”22  These two 
events changed the nature of the MBF’s mission but found it wanting for the forces 
that could defend France from the Allies and deal with a rapidly growing, reckless, 
and sometimes fierce, resistance. 
The Résistance however needed to grow beyond newspapers for it to be 
effective.  While this occurred, it proved to be a very slow process hampered by an 
incoherent animating aim and the development of effective German methods for 
arresting resistance leadership.  The reasons for its slow development can be 
attributed to the shock of the 1940 defeat, the popular belief that Pétain and his 
government were working toward what was best for the country, and a lack of an 
underground society or culture able to sustain the long struggle of the Résistance.  
Such a society would eventually be built, but it took time and whenever it got to a 
point where it could claim some kind of organization and sense of itself, a wave of 
arrests would deal it severe blows.  Due to the nature of clandestine living comprised 
of pseudonyms, illegal identification cards, thieving money and weapons, passing of 
coded messages, and the fear of arrest and death, it is not hard to see why those who 
                                                
22 Peter Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder Ns-Weltanschauungskrieg?:  Kriegführung Und 
Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943-44, 1st ed. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007). p. 
3. 
 85 
remained inside France took umbrage with those who attempted to direct resistance 
activities from abroad.  There is a pride in living, and surviving under such conditions 
that encourages the belief that because one is bravely suffering under occupation, 
one’s actions are more legitimate than those who do not undergo such traumatizing 
experiences.   Tapping into that legitimacy proved to be the desire of de Gaulle’s Free 
French organization, for while he could get war fighting resources through foreign 
backing, political power would have to come from France.      
The Occupied and Unoccupied Zones also provided another political dividing 
line.  Therefore, with ineffective political parties and the different circumstances of 
occupation, the Résistance became the purview of those with no political party 
record, who conducted themselves differently in the north than in the south.   With 
German troops, barracks, parades, and aircraft flying overhead, the Résistance in the 
north had the more immediate aim of fighting the Germans, but in the south, 
resistance movements took a more political approach and the groups often argued 
with one another for members, influence, and resources.  The difference became a 
source of conflict between southern and northern groups.  After traveling around the 
unoccupied zone, a northern movement’s member acidly remarked, “What they lack 
is a few Germans on the street.”23  As John Sweets points out, southern movements 
had far more political rhetoric on their newspapers while northern movements tended 
to focus on organizing military action.24 
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The three main non-communist southern movements, Libération, Combat, and 
Franc-Tireur came from, in a very real way, the work of each of their leaders’ 
enthusiasm, stubbornness, charisma, and ability to survive the clandestine life.   
Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie began organizing the movement that eventually 
used the name Libération in the late summer of 1940, almost immediately after the 
defeat.25  French Army Captain Henri Frenay started his group in mid-1941 after 
realizing that Pétain and his mid-level intelligence and security officers were not 
interested in resisting occupation.  He merged with another group whose focus was 
more on politics while he still retained his desire for armed action and so he named 
the paper, and later their group Combat.26  Jean-Pierre Lévy joined a group of 
philosophical and more politically experienced people than in most movements.  
Urbane and charismatic, he became the head of Franc-Tireur after the arrest of its 
previous leader in March of 1942.27  There were other movements, but these three 
became the largest and most influential in the Unoccupied Zone. 
In northern France the German presence governed the groups’ development.  
Many of their newspapers failed to maintain any publication continuity and many of 
them pursued assassination or sabotage against German and Vichy targets from early 
in the Occupation.  These attacks, mostly in Paris, provoked severe German reprisals.  
Hitler and the German authorities viewed such acts as illegal violations of the 
armistice and international law.  Under this kind of attitude, acts of Résistance were 
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viewed as simply terrorism and punishable by death.28  But when the Germans began 
to be assassinated in Paris, this was not enough for Hitler.  He wanted the clear signal 
sent to the wider French population and sought 100 French Jews to be executed 
and1000 Jews and 500 communists to be deported in reprisals for the continued 
attacks on Germans in France.29   
The Communist participation is perhaps the most complicated aspect of the 
interior movements but they serve to demonstrate how unified the Résistance became 
by the time the Allies invaded.  The Parti Communiste français (PCF) or French 
Communist Party was a presence, with waxing and waning Parliamentary 
membership in French politics from the 1920s to the present day.  However, they 
have traditionally maintained two key characteristics:  their independence and their 
views on action.  The PCF eschews forming or participating in coalition governments 
as they regard the purity of their cause to be more important than the price they would 
inevitably pay by participating in a coalition government that would insist on 
bargaining away certain communist aims in unavoidable political horse trading.  
Therefore, before the Second World War, they had supported various left wing 
governments but did not join them in a formal sense.  They believed doing so sent the 
wrong signal to the French people that the PCF maintained an independence that it 
would not have if it joined a coalition government.  Even during the Popular Front 
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government of Leon Blum in the mid-1930s, the PCF supported the government 
while not joining it.30   
The second aspect of the communists in the Résistance was how they had to 
navigate the PCF’s reputation both before the war and in the early stage of the 
Occupation.  The PCF’s leadership supported and participated in the international 
communist organization, the COMINTERN and took direction from it.  In the 1930s, 
that meant taking their cues from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.  When Stalin’s foreign 
minister signed the non-aggression pact with Hitler, the PCF was obliged to 
propagandize, as Stalin directed them to do, that the Germans were not the enemy but 
rather capitalist nations such as Britain and the United States continued to be.  When 
Germany invaded Poland, officially beginning the Second World War in September 
of 1939, it forced the PCF into attempting to hold to that party line, but the reality of 
it led many to believe that by doing so, they were indeed supporting German 
capitalists in a war on Poland. But the logic became even harder to maintain when 
Germany invaded France before it invaded the Soviet Union, and the PCF maintained 
their advocacy of an alliance with Germany while the German Army invaded and 
occupied France.   Such advocacy laid bare the bankruptcy of PCF’s position.  Such a 
situation forced considerable defections from the party resulting in a split.31  Maurice 
Thorez, the head of the PCF went into exile in the Soviet Union for the duration of 
the war, while a new communist organization formed, taking the name the Front 
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National (FN).  While the communists directed the FN, it sought to maintain a non-
political image and sought to fight German occupation and the Vichy collaborationist 
policies. Therefore, the FN dropped the international aspect of communist ideology 
from its cause, while it held firmly onto the central tenet of communist ideology 
calling for armed action to force the revolutionary change.  Its desire to fight attracted 
many adherents, whether they were communist or not into its armed Résistance 
organization, the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans Français (FTPF or often simply the 
FTP).32  For the Front National, and later the PCF, Résistance meant violence, not 
simply printing underground newspapers or spiriting downed Allied airmen back into 
Allied hands.  They wanted to kill Germans and Vichy officials despite the very real 
threat of reprisals.  Action was more important and worth the price.33 
Their assassination of various German officers or Vichy officials played into 
the occupation authority’s propaganda.  The Germans and Vichy could then claim 
that the Résistance was a fringe movement of communists and Jews in an excuse to 
arrest any they found and label its efforts as a part of the global communist/Jewish 
movement the Nazi’s had portrayed as a great threat.  When the Germans enacted 
counter-terrorist policies in Paris focusing on communists and Jews, it ironically 
furthered the Front National’s and later the PCF’s own propaganda attempting to 
convince the French people of their status as the leading way to resist occupation and 
collaboration.  The belief, or myth, that the communists were more active, violent, 
                                                
32 Ibid., pp. 120 – 121.  The FN’s FTP should not be confused with the Résistance movement Franc-
Tireurs, largely affiliated with a centrist ideology. 
33 Jackson, France:  The Dark Years, 1940-1944. P. 423 – 425.  
 90 
and effective than all other resistance movements persists due to effective NAZI, 
Front National, and PCF propaganda during and immediately following the war.34 
But things changed again when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 21 
June 1941.  Now Stalin directed the PCF to resist Germany.  Moreover, when 
Germany declared war on the United States on 8 December 1941, Stalin eventually 
directed Thorez and his PCF back in France to support the Allies and fight against the 
German occupation.  With Stalin’s backing, communist participation in de Gaulle’s 
Free French movement was just a matter of working out the details with the 
politically feeble PCF.35  But the Front National’s leadership had more to bargain 
with and signing on under de Gaulle’s banner was not a foregone conclusion.  
Nevertheless, their FTP units, mostly in southern France, proved to be a popular 
alternative when Vichy persisted in making one very particular policy that directly 
affected men in their 20s and 30s.  
In February of 1943, Laval and the German labor minister agreed to institute a 
labor draft to man factories in Germany.  Numbers of people involved in the 
Résistance increased as a result.  Popular reaction to the Service du Travail 
Obligatoire (STO) was the single greatest cause for young men to join the Résistance.  
The German Labor Minister, Fritz Sauckel came to be known at the time the 
“recruiter, par excellence, for the army of the Maquis.”36 
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But how many people were in such movements?  Or more important for this 
work, how many Frenchmen were willing to pick up arms to fight under the Allied 
Command?  Membership numbers in all of these groups is very difficult thing 
establish with certainty.  Libération had told de Gaulle’s BCRA Chief Dewavrin in 
January of 1943 they had 23,000 members to be armed while Franc-Tireur claimed 
16,000.37  It appears Combat had 70,000 – 75,000 total active members in its 
organization by the end of 1942.38  When a document from the Résistance to the OSS 
requesting arms, ammunition, and funds fell into the hands of the Vichy police during 
the winter of 1943, it estimated the national total, including the communists, to be at 
241,350 men.39  Such numbers may be high due to a group’s exaggerations and or 
double counting, and certainly they are off considerably if a SHAEF intelligence 
report is correct.  Completed in November 1944, as the combat in France shifted from 
guerrilla action to static fronts in the east and west of the nation, SHAEF’s 
intelligence analysts took numbers from the JEDBURGHs and the reconstituted 
French Army headquarters.  It explained that the armed FFI numbered 91,500 during 
the summer months and that the numbers in the French Army by October, which had 
mustered in FFI units swelled the regular forces to approximately 300,000 men.40  
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The unifying of the interior groups and Jean Moulin 
While the interior groups created themselves according to the needs of their 
conditions and actions and re-actions of the occupying Germans and the Vichy 
Regime, de Gaulle’s understanding of them was slight.  His BCRA chief André 
Dewavrin had, with the help of the British SOE RF Section, sent agents into France 
but had gleaned no useful insight into how the movements worked, who they were led 
by, and suffered from a complete lack of appreciation for their circumstances and the 
factors that created them.  The position of the Free French relative to the Allies 
continued to be a tenuous one, as discussed in the next chapter, de Gaulle had 
persistently poor relations with the British and Americans.  Their fortune changed 
however when Jean Moulin found his way to London and met General de Gaulle on 
25 October 1941. 
Before the war Jean Moulin had been a Department Prefect, roughly 
comparable to an American Governor, for the Departments of l’Aveyron and was 
serving as Prefect of the d’Eure-et-Loire Department when the war began.  He had 
been educated to be in the French national bureaucratic manner, but was not the 
typical government manager.  After he had served as an aide to the Air Minister, he 
supported the Spanish Republicans by smuggling arms across the Pyrenees 
Mountains during their Civil War despite the French government’s embargo.  His 
energy and skill impressed the government, which lead to his appointment as the 
youngest Prefect in France.  When the government signed the armistice with 
Germany he attempted to work with the Germans for the good of his department, but 
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when it seemed too much to bear attempted suicide.  Denounced by Vichy for his 
reluctance to accuse the French Senegalese Army unit of war crimes, he went into the 
Résistance in November 1940.41   
He then made good use of his time in the wilderness before boarding a British 
plane from Lisbon.  Before leaving France, his activities are not precisely known, but 
he tried to meet and ingratiate himself into various resistance groups with modest 
success so that when he spoke to the BCRA and SOE de-briefers upon his arrival he 
impressed them with his understanding of matters inside France.  Of course when 
they knew next to nothing of them, increasing their understanding would not be 
difficult.  Moulin had met Henri Frenay, for instance, and knew something of the 
emerging Combat movement.  But during his private meeting with de Gaulle, he 
made such an impression, as de Gaulle did with Moulin, that the two men decided 
they needed each other and that Moulin should return to France as de Gaulle’s 
representative in an effort to unite the movements.42  De Gaulle provided him with 
money and arranged with the British to parachute him back into France via an SOE 
operated aircraft.  Moulin’s letter and directive from de Gaulle was written in a tone 
of equals and stated that military actions and political actions should be separated.  It 
left open the option of political leadership and encouraged the movements to intensify 
their propaganda efforts.  He also sent some money to be split among the movements 
with a promise of more funds to follow.  De Gaulle also asked for regular reports on 
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their progress and setbacks.  The only thing he demanded was that all military action 
should be coordinated through him in London.  Moulin returned to France on New 
Year’s Day, 1942.43 
1942 was a turning point year for the Résistance.  Certainly the entry of the 
United States into the war, it was hoped, would be a boon to a Free France and the 
defeat of Germany.  But due to an incidents over French colonial possessions, 
especially in the Caribbean and off the Canadian coast, President Roosevelt now 
forced issues with de Gaulle while at the same time losing faith thta Vichy would 
ever resist German aims.  Moreover Vichy cost itself dearly in public support when it 
conducted trials against those in the government of France in the 1930s attempting to 
prove that they were the ones culpable for France’s defeat due to mismanagement and 
bankrupt ideologies.  The trials quickly demonstrated no such thing and Darlan had to 
abandon the effort.  This embarrassing event, plus Darlan’s failure to gain German 
agreement for collaboration, forced Pétain to return Laval to the government in April.  
On 10 June, General Koenig, a French commander of an armored division scored a 
victory against the Germans at Bir Hacheim in North Africa.  The morale boost this 
provided cannot be underestimated, as it became the rallying cry for Frenchmen 
everywhere and proof that the French Army could defeat the Germans on the 
battlefield.  General Koenig became famous and the battle became a rallying cry for 
Résistance movements, including several Maquis group that called themselves Bir 
Hacheim.   
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On 8 November, the Allies invaded French North Africa in a move that caught 
Vichy, de Gaulle, and most especially the Germans by surprise.  General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower commanded the Allied forces landing in Morocco and Algeria with the 
goal of seizing ports along North Africa’s coast, picking up French support, and 
getting into action against German and Italian troops in Tunisia and Libya.   
However, since it violated Vichy’s neutrality, Eisenhower had been secretly working 
with the senior French General Henri Giraud in the hope the landings would be 
unopposed.  Giraud, the intrepid General who had been a prisoner of the Germans and 
then managed to escape, had an arrogance that the affable Kansan Eisenhower could 
not take in large doses.  But there was another surprise, and this one was for 
Eisenhower.  Admiral Darlan, who still retained control of the Navy after Laval 
returned as Prime Minister, surprised the American negotiators when they were 
informed that he was in North Africa to see his polio-stricken son.  The French 
Generals advised the American State Department envoy, Robert Murphy that Darlan 
was the senior Vichy official and the one person he should deal with.  Murphy and 
Eisenhower did so and the sporadic firefights that did take place ended when Darlan 
ordered a cease-fire.44  Germany could not allow this to happen, threatening as it did 
their forces in Libya attempting to press toward Cairo and control the Suez Canal.  
Hitler’s reaction made it clear to all who was really in charge in France when he 
directed his forces to rush across the Demarcation Line and occupy all of France.  
Now Germany possessed the deep-water port of Marseilles as a point of control on 
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the Mediterranean Sea.  Apparently realizing Vichy’s complete impotence in the 
matter when told that Hitler was going to occupy the entirety of France, Laval’s only 
comment was, “Those Jews on the Riviera are in for a nasty surprise.”45   
The effect this event had created a precipitous drop in the support for Pétain 
by the people inside France.  As John Sweets points out, “the most dramatic and 
definitive loss of prestige for the Marshal accompanied the Anglo-American invasion 
of North Africa and the occupation of southern France in November of 1942.”46   
Events such as this drove more people into the Maquis and the southern resistance 
movements for they now had, “Germans on the street,” and combined with the STO 
which came the following February, much of Vichy’s legitimacy vanished.  But while 
Allied intentions were seen to be finally coming through to meaningful action, the 
Free French could not have been more disgusted with the Darlan-Eisenhower 
agreement.  De Gaulle and the movements greeted this news with a white-hot rage.  
Writing to American Admiral Stark, the American de facto representative to the Free 
French, de Gaulle’s remarked caustically, “I understand that the United States buys 
the treachery of traitors, if this appears profitable, but payment must not be made 
against the honor of France.”47  While Stark chose to ignore the letter, and de Gaulle 
apologized, Stark got the point again when the gist of the letter appeared in the 
London press.  But the discomfiture and embarrassment that Churchill, Roosevelt, 
and Eisenhower was suddenly alleviated when a twenty-year old Royalist named 
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Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle walked up to Admiral Darlan in a hallway near his 
office and shot two bullets in his chest.  The short stout former head of the Vichy 
government died instantly.  As the next in line, General Giraud took charge and had 
Bonnier de la Chapelle executed the next morning.  The motive of who was behind 
the assassination or how large the conspiracy was remains unknown, but certainly 
Churchill, FDR, de Gaulle and Giraud in their own way all benefited by it.  FDR 
wished now to advance Giraud and make him the head of the French in North Africa 
while maintaining Eisenhower as the overall governor of the French territory.48 The 
French saw FDR as having no right to make such decisions.  And as time progressed 
the next expected Allied action, their invasion of France, or lack of, forced the Free 
French and the resistance movements along two lines of thought that would animate 
their hopes:  inevitable German defeat brought about largely by an Allied invasion.  
As 1942 ended, German defeat seemed all the more certain.  
But the greatest proof that the Germans would lose the war came when the 
Soviet Red Army successfully held out and then annihilated an entire German Army 
at Stalingrad at the end of 1942.  Certainly the belief of German invincibility was 
collapsing.  The communist underground newspapers especially extolled this victory 
while nearly all the underground newspapers in early 1943 showed their great 
anticipation about when the Allies may land in France and begin the final push to 
defeat Germany.  As their expectation continued unrequited for the next year and a 
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half, their sentiments toward Britain and the United States turned more and more 
harsh.49  Living under occupation was long past tolerable for the committed resister.   
In January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met for a conference near 
Casablanca, Morocco, and discussed Allied strategy for the coming year.  Starting on 
the 14th and continuing on for 10 days, the British prevailed in convincing the 
Americans that the conditions were not yet favorable for landings in France and to 
continue operations in the Mediterranean theater.50  FDR also sought to merge the 
two senior representatives of France, Giraud, who was largely his man, and de Gaulle 
whom he distrusted. 
Roosevelt and de Gaulle had planned to meet in Washington in early January.  
In preparation for the visit, de Gaulle had spoken to Admiral Stark and stated that the 
governing class of France had found itself lacking in French history, but leadership 
talent was so diffuse within the population that a new class of leaders could always be 
found.  De Gaulle impressed Stark with his description of how Joan of Arc and 
Clemenceau appeared in French history from different parts of the population to 
successfully save the country and thoughtfully expressed to Stark that, “perhaps at 
this time I am one of those thrust into leadership by circumstances, and by the failure 
of other leaders.”51  Stark believed de Gaulle could make a useful and positive 
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impression upon FDR and encouraged the trip.  But when Darlan’s assassination 
occurred, events overcame the meeting and de Gaulle never left for the United States.     
When de Gaulle and Roosevelt did finally meet during the Casablanca 
Conference the tone had shifted a great deal.  When it was apparent to de Gaulle that 
Roosevelt and Churchill believed they had the right to name the leadership of France, 
de Gaulle became very defensive and wary.  He was also upset that Churchill had 
threatened to cut off his funds if he did not attend the meeting at Casablanca.  FDR’s 
continued pressing of Churchill to produce the “unwilling bride” (de Gaulle) for the 
“bridegroom” (Giraud) only rankled Churchill on the matter.  When they finally did 
meet, after the swelling of all these tensions, things got even worse.  After some 
polite discussions between the two French Generals, the two shook hands for the 
press’ cameras, but both left completely unsatisfied.  De Gaulle had attempted his 
historical illusions that had worked so well with Admiral Stark.  But perhaps due to a 
muddle of translations, FDR understood de Gaulle to be saying that de Gaulle was 
indeed Joan of Arc.  The event became the signal event in FDR’s subsequent 
discussions about de Gaulle to others and often embellished it to make de Gaulle 
seem outlandish.52   
Seeing how FDR and Churchill tried to govern affairs for the French, “de 
Gaulle tried to coordinate, with even greater focus, all the efforts of metropolitan 
France.”53  Legitimacy had to be expressed and de Gaulle began pursuing that 
expression via two paths.  The first involved getting the interior resistance 
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movements to unite behind him and the second path was to create a governing entity 
that they could join.  These efforts would consume him and the Résistance for the 
next year and a half.  Nevertheless, looking back at this time, de Gaulle wrote that he 
was full of hope for, “The die was cast; the scales began to tip the other way.  The 
huge resources of the United States were transformed into means of battle; Russia had 
made a recovery, as we were to see at Stalingrad; the British managed to re-establish 
themselves in Egypt; Fighting France was growing… An operation of major scope 
was under way in the west.”54    
But he was beginning to realize that the Allied landings he was referring to 
required successful linkage with the Résistance’s actions.  Such conditions required 
unity of action and that meant constituting a provisional government that would be 
widely recognized in North Africa and the interior of France.  How could it be 
constituted in such a way that all the movements and groups recognized it sufficiently 
enough to follow its orders?  A normal course of action in a Republic would be for 
the political parties to participate, but their stock was gone and most of the more 
powerful movements wanted nothing to do with pre-war political parties that they 
believed had so disastrously let their nation down.   Moulin who had returned from 
France with news of the movements, and the BCRA’s chief Dewavrin had to impress 
upon the movements that only de Gaulle’s political leadership could unify France and 
provide the necessary legitimacy.  Both men would go into France in an effort to do 
                                                
54 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle, 1st Carroll & Graf ed. (New 
York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1998). p. 305. 
 101 
so, and provide the necessary plans of what to do when asked by that legitimate and 
unified political leader. 
Dewavrin parachuted into France in February of 1943 with Pierre Brossolette 
with a mix of things to accomplish.   Planning had been done in London on what they 
wanted their Secret Army to do, and to begin their preparations, they carried with 
them the microfilmed versions of Plan Vert, the effort to cut rail way lines in certain 
key locations around France.  They also brought more funds and attempted to pull the 
northern resistance movements together and under de Gaulle’s banner.55  Moulin, 
operating somewhat independently of Dewavrin and Brossolette sought to get the 
southern movements in order and working together.  His efforts reached dramatic 
success four months after his re-entry into France.   
The Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) was formed and on 27 May 
1943, and its first major decision promised to follow General de Gaulle.  The Conseil 
was a mix of compromises and nearly did not happen due to Frenay’s independent 
dealings with the American OSS.  For months Frenay’s delegate had correspondence 
and meetings with the OSS Station chief in Bern, Switzerland, Allen Dulles.  Dulles 
had been taking information and giving Frenay’s Combat financial support.  
Realizing that this meant the Americans had independent power directly into one of 
the movements, Moulin became furious.  It demonstrated further proof of de Gaulle’s 
point of view that the United States meant to control the governing of France.  But the 
issue was smoothed over.  Largely because of reservations about Frenay by leaders of 
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movements that had recently joined Combat, allowing Moulin to skillfully manage 
the rivalries within them to work out the agreement he sought.  The seats on the 
council were divided up among northern and southern movements and some of 
political parties, including the communists.56  While the unification was tenuous, de 
Gaulle announced it as proof he was more in tune with and more legitimate than 
Giraud.   
With Moulin’s mission enjoying success, de Gaulle left London for Algiers in 
order to work on the political unification of the exterior Résistance.  Now firmly in 
the belief that he would have to be a political leader after some thoughtful 
communication from Léon Blum and other French politicians, de Gaulle arrived with 
an aim.  The organization he sought to create was a committee that could govern 
French interests in the colonies, but de Gaulle worked to make sure it could develop 
as a French provisional government and be recognized as such by foreign powers.  As 
both John Sweets and Peter Novick have observed, de Gaulle was far shrewder than 
Giraud.  Each of the two Generals got to name members of the committee and de 
Gaulle’s members were more politically skilled while Giraud’s were more technically 
oriented, and over time, they were turned or removed from the committee.  As 
Novick stated, “When subsequent appointments were made, de Gaulle’s nominees 
formed a solid bloc of able politicians, while Giraud’s – mostly technicians – were 
not equally loyal to their sponsor and voted individually according to the issue under 
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discussion.”57  De Gaulle and Giraud constituted The Comité Français de la 
Liberation Nationale (CFLN) on 3 June 1943, but over the course of the rest of the 
year, de Gaulle’s political skill compared to Giraud’s complete lack thereof, began to 
emerge.  By November 1943, they had also constituted a legislative assembly called 
the Assemblée Consultative Provisoire and a few days after its constitution, the 
CFLN members voted de Gaulle their sole head and Giraud left the committee. 
Churchill and Roosevelt quickly realized how Giraud was being maneuvered 
aside and feared their waning influence.  In a memorandum to the SOE chief Lord 
Selborne regarding funds to the Résistance in France, Churchill instructed him, “to 
take care that the direction of the movement of Résistance does not fall under control 
of de Gaulle or his satellites in England; if not, he will use of this enormous capacity 
at its own political ends in France and not in the interest of the allied effort of war.”58  
Roosevelt also feared de Gaulle’s efforts to decrease American control over affairs in 
France and became furious when French officials in North Africa had been removed 
and some were arrested.  FDR had General Marshall send Eisenhower the terse note, 
“Please inform the French committee as follows:., you are directed to take no action 
against them at this time.”  Continuing, FDR told Eisenhower and Churchill that, “It 
seems to me that this is the proper time effectively to eliminate the JEANNE D’ARC 
complex and to return to realism.”59  However, he gave no means or suggested no 
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method to do so.  FDR did not because, short of assassination, or some ham handed 
attempt to arrest de Gaulle, it seemed apparent to all that de Gaulle was the person 
with whom the Allies would have to deal on matters regarding France. 
But while de Gaulle struggled to make the American President have to deal 
with reality, the Free French did not use their time idly.  Dewavrin and his colleagues 
in London were busy planning on how they could make Plan Vert better and came up 
with other plans to enhance the Allied invasion when it occurred.  Their effort was 
known as “Bloc Planning.”   Roughly translated into English it means Unit or Group 
planning.  Created in December 1943, the Bloc Planning group designed detailed 
plans to cripple the Railroads (Plan Vert), sabotage of the underground long distance 
telephone system (Plan Violet), and the sabotage of electrical installations (Plan 
Bleu).  These plans had been roughed out from an early planning group, and due to 
reorganizations the continuation of these efforts fell to the BCRA office in London on 
Duke Street, about a 15-minute walk from the SOE’s main office on Baker Street.  
General François d’Astier de la Vigerie led the effort in his position as the 
commander of the French Forces in the United Kingdom.  In late 1943 and January of 
1944 they conducted two staff studies to assess the best use of the Maquis in France 
and how they could assist in the Allied landings.  When they shared the results of 
these plans with their SOE and OSS counterparts, they were greeted with great 
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interest.  For not only did they have plans on what to do, but they began to see that 
the French had an organization in France more and more able to carry them out.60 
The leadership of the interior Résistance had worked out many command and 
control arrangements with the Free French via their contacts and by working with 
Dewavrin during his visits to France.  They agreed that France would be divided into 
regions, largely along historical lines, and led by a political head, but he would also 
have a Délégué Militaire Régional (DMR) or a Regional Military Delegate who 
spoke for de Gaulle.  In all practicality that meant he worked for the senior general in 
London or Algiers, depending upon what part of France fell under those two Allied 
spheres of operation.  Northern France would fall under SHAEF in London and 
southern France would fall under Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in the 
Mediterranean commanded by the British General Maitland Wilson.  That meant that 
General d’Astier de la Vigerie would command the Résistance in the north while 
General Gabriel Cochet, whom the CFLN had appointed as their representative to 
AFHQ, would command the southern Maquis.   After deciding upon this basic 
regional organization, the interior and BCRA would have to agree upon leadership of 
them, from the pool available for work in France.  While beginning the appointment 
and training of some of them in September of 1943, the effort of inserting them began 
in January of 1944 and continued on as necessary through the spring.   The BCRA 
and the SOE’s RF section selected, trained, and deployed men to be de Gaulle’s 
DMR’s in France and supplied them with funds, radio sets, radio operators, weapons, 
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and assistants to prepare for the Allied landings.61  But much of their planning 
continued separately, causing problems in meshing the JEDBURGH and other Allied 
plans.  The issue had to be solved at a higher level and involved the political concerns 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and CFLN. 
As the resistance movements inside France came together and organized with 
de Gaulle’s France Libre organization, pressure continued to build upon Pétain due to 
the lack of Germany’s interest in collaboration and the loss of North Africa.   The 
interior movements had been born, matured, coalesced, and with Moulin, Dewavrin, 
and Brossolette’s effective negotiations and courage, merged with General de 
Gaulle’s France Libre.  De Gaulle managed to assert French rights on the 
international scene and never failed to maintain the notion of French sovereignty as 
an idea that still existed despite Vichy, the Occupation, and lack of diplomatic 
recognition.  The communist Front National’s agreement to join in should have 
demonstrated to all that those who sought to defeat Germany and Vichy all followed 
de Gaulle.  The United States, with the exception of the OSS, made no material 
support to the movements, even when they clearly announced their unified support of 
de Gaulle.  In fact, Roosevelt hindered the resistance movements’ wishes by 
supporting Giraud, a man the movements saw as far too close to Vichy.  As 1942 
wore on, it became evident that Giraud’s sole source of power came almost 
exclusively from the White House.  American support was not worthless as it meant 
materiel for rebuilding the French Army and re-entering the war with forces equipped 
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to fight alongside the Allies.   But it did not mean recognition from Roosevelt, nor did 
it gain the internal resistance movement’s approval of Giraud.  In fact, it weakened 
him when compared to de Gaulle who railed about the United State’s insisting on 
how the French handled their affairs.  Roosevelt kept recognition off the table, to be 
used as a bargaining chip when the time was right. 
While recognition is somewhat of a diplomatic exercise, it meant the 
OVERLORD commander could not relate operational details regarding the landings 
to the French.  That forced the SFHQ and BCRA planning staffs, some of whom had 
become good colleagues and friends, to keep secrets from each other.  With the row 
continuing between FDR and Churchill on one side and de Gaulle on the other, it 
remained to be seen how the soon to be named commander of Operation 
OVERLORD would approach the effort. 
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Chapter Three 
Eisenhower and Controlling the French Résistance 
 
 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized de Gaulle’s success and sought to 
exploit the Résistance for Allied purposes.  As the commander who led Operation 
TORCH and the Allies into North Africa, he had halting success negotiating with 
French leaders while also making successful progress against Axis forces.  
Undoubtedly, the experience taught Eisenhower a great deal.  Specifically regarding 
matters with the French, he learned more about how to conduct the necessary 
diplomacy in his role as the Supreme Allied Commander.  Second, he learned what 
decisions were his, and what President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill would 
allow him to make on his own.  Thirdly, he had grown to trust General Donovon’s 
OSS and evidently had no prejudice against British intelligence or the SOE.  Lastly, 
and just as importantly, he learned critical lessons about Intra-French politics, the 
emerging leaders, and what motivated their aims. FDR and Churchill could not have 
chosen a man better suited to work with de Gaulle or who understood the utility of 
French legitimacy, despite their efforts that ignored it.  Ironically, his experience 
working with the French appeared to have no bearing on his selection.  Nevertheless, 
Eisenhower made considerable effort to reach out to General de Gaulle, create a 
capability to organize and train the Résistance, and provide a command and control 
organization that would support his mission to “enter the continent of Europe and, in 
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conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of 
Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.”1    
 
Eisenhower’s North African Rehearsal 
 
“They shot the little fellow!” exclaimed Robert Murphy, the senior American 
diplomat in North Africa, as he burst into General Mark Clark’s office.2  Clark served 
as Eisenhower’s deputy and had been conducting the secret negotiations with the 
French in the days prior to Operation TORCH and the Allied landings in French 
North Africa. The assassinated man Murphy referred to was Admiral Jean-Louis 
Darlan.  Darlan came to Algiers just prior to the Allied invasion in November 1942 to 
visit his Polio-stricken son but in his capacity as the senior French official in Algiers, 
found himself dealing with Eisenhower, Clark, and Murphy.  His death threatened to 
derail Eisenhower’s plans, but in the end proved to resolve a problem between 
Eisenhower and nearly everyone else.   
The British and American landings in Morocco and Algeria had gone as well 
as the Allies might expect, with some French troops resisting, but most, after Darlan’s 
orders went out to the French units, joined with the Allies.  The agreement meant that 
American and British soldiers could then begin their attempt to push east into Tunisia 
putting pressure on the German and Italian forces there.  Their work negotiating with 
                                                
1 "CAB 79/70," Item 2., Minutes of Meetings, Nos. 31 - 60., BNA, Kew, UK. 
2 Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950)., p. 
128. 
 110 
Generals Giraud, Alphonse Juin, and other senior French Army commanders had 
proved frustrating, and at moments embarrassing, especially when Giraud met 
Eisenhower and asked when command of TORCH would pass from Eisenhower to 
him.  The misunderstanding probably resulted from Murphy and Clark’s cagey 
discussions with Giraud’s supporters in Algiers as they were not able to reveal the 
when and where of Allied plans.  But their work proved not to be a total loss.  
Murphy had been working in North Africa from summer of 1940 negotiating trade 
and other agreements with French officials and before that had served in the 
American Embassy in Paris.  His efforts had paid off in many ways and seemed 
prescient when FDR and Churchill agreed to invade North Africa as the State 
Department and Donovan’s OSS knowledge of the area did much to enable the 
landings.   Murphy laid the groundwork for re-armament agreements, mineral trade 
agreements and had learned how to ingratiate himself to the senior French authorities 
in North Africa.3   With the decision to invade North Africa, Eisenhower needed 
French support to stall Axis efforts at the front and govern French territory in his rear 
areas, as well as not engage in combat with American and British soldiers.  But the 
effort was not without gaffs or out right mistakes intolerable at the political level. 
Eisenhower set up his command center on the island of Gibraltar, as the 
invasion forces positioned themselves secretly off the coast.  From there he hoped to 
maintain secure communications with the landing forces, London, Washington, and 
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to maintain contact with Murphy and Clark working with the French in Algiers.  As 
the invasion began, Eisenhower however felt anything but informed of what was 
occurring.  Nervous and unsure of himself in his first major operation, the chain-
smoking Kansan found himself in the dark about how the landings were proceeding 
and anxious to smooth out matters with the French.4   
Murphy had made arrangements for Giraud to go to Gibraltar and meet with 
Eisenhower.  When the two met, the senior French Commander was under the 
impression that he would be named the Allied Commander of TORCH, once the 
landings began.  When he met Eisenhower on Gibraltar, just as the invasion was 
beginning he asked when the command would be transferred to him and Eisenhower 
had to disabuse him of this misunderstanding.  But it had to be done gently as Ike 
might lose the support of the French commander in doing so and the whole effort 
could become a disaster.  The first conversation did not impress Eisenhower at all.  
He believed Giraud to be arrogant, “difficult to deal with-wants much in power, 
equipment, etc. but seems little disposed to do his part to stop the fighting.”5  Giraud 
sought the Allied command, but Eisenhower who reported to the Allied Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, could not grant that request but the next day, they worked out their 
differences and Giraud began to cooperate. 
When the message arrived from Murphy that Admiral Darlan was in Algiers 
and he had begun negotiations with the former Vichy Prime Minister, Ike took the 
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surprising opportunity to deal at an even higher level and perhaps skip Giraud’s ego 
for a more effective deal.  If the French would negotiate a cease-fire that would stop 
the fighting and bring the French forces over to the Allied side, he would seize it.  But 
while Roosevelt and Churchill were aware of the negotiations with Giraud and some 
of the other French generals, they were shocked to discover a deal was in the works 
with Darlan, a man too closely linked with collaboration and Germany.  So while he 
did not have authorization to negotiate with Darlan, Eisenhower took advantage of 
the unexpected presence of the senior Vichy official, hoping to pull the French forces 
over to the Allied side.  While this made sense at the military level, his political 
masters found it a loathsome move and when it became public, the British and 
American people and press were shocked. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
had been eager to work with French General Henri Giraud, a leader who they 
believed would provide unity to the French in North Africa while not being seen as 
linked with Vichy.  Giraud had been captured by the Germans in 1940 and made an 
escape from his German prison camp.  And as discussed above, his proclivity to 
disregard politics made him the perfect choice from Roosevelt’s point of view as he 
could be asked to do what Roosevelt wanted.  But when Darlan appeared on the scene 
they found the more senior Vichy official willing to discuss matters and more able to 
deliver for the Allies from his more senior position and could bring the French Navy 
along in the deal.  Over the next six weeks, Eisenhower and Darlan attempted to 
hammer out various civil and military details while Roosevelt and Churchill 
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persistently thundered out their disapproval of the arrangement in messages to Ike and 
expressed their displeasure in the press.  Darlan could see that he would not prove to 
be lasting part of any agreement with the Allies.  Writing to Eisenhower he lamented, 
“I did what I did only because the American Government took the solemn 
engagement to restore French sovereignty in its integrity as it existed in 1939 and 
because the armistice between Axis Powers and France was broken by the occupation 
of the whole of French Metropolitan territory….” He went on to complain about the 
Allies implying Roosevelt and Churchill were “spreading doubts” about his work to 
unite Frenchmen.6  But when Bonnier de la Chapelle shot the Admiral on Christmas 
Eve, Eisenhower feared his tenuous deal would evaporate.  Eisenhower was several 
hours away by car when he got the news and raced back to Algiers immediately.7  
Over the course of the next two days, Ike listened to the French Generals in North 
Africa regarding who they thought should be the civil and military leader, received 
telegrams from de Gaulle in London expressing his alarm about the assassination, and 
received messages from Roosevelt and Churchill.  All the input pointed to Giraud 
replacing Darlan as such an arrangement would quiet down fears of internal disorder 
within the French population in North Africa, make Churchill and Roosevelt happy, 
and those loyal to de Gaulle also seemed to approve.8 
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  But Eisenhower asked for input from more than just high ranking officials 
and his superiors.  French Lieutenant Joseph de Francesco served in the Allied HQ 
doing odd jobs and helping the American staff find its way in Algiers.  From time to 
time he drove senior officers.  De Francesco, who had been captured in 1940, escaped 
and made his way to North Africa, believed Darlan deserved what he got for 
collaborating with Germany.  At some point shortly after Admiral Darlan’s 
assassination, Ike got into the staff car driven by de Francesco and asked the French 
lieutenant what he thought they should do with the assassin evidently unaware that 
Giraud was deciding to have him executed.  De Francesco bluntly replied, “They 
ought to give the guy a medal.”9  Ike sat in the backseat checking his temper, but he 
was beginning to learn that French politics would be an ever-present concern.   
 Their short conversation in the staff car serves as metaphor for Eisenhower’s 
learning and negotiating his way through French politics.  Fourteen months after his 
short conversation with Eisenhower in the staff car, de Francesco joined the Allied 
Special Forces and parachuted into German held territory near Calmar, France on 10 
September 1944.  But in December 1942, serving as his driver, and his future 
commander, he registered his visceral disgust with collaboration.   More importantly, 
as discussed above, such beliefs were widely held among the French in North Africa 
while inside metropolitan France, sentiments were shifting from Vichy and toward 
Résistance while the French underground groups evolved and merged under the 
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leadership of Charles de Gaulle.  To Eisenhower, Darlan’s assassination appeared to 
be symptomatic of French chaos, but to de Francesco, it was justice.   
Immersed in military operations and the diplomacy required to support them, 
Eisenhower wanted nothing to do with French politics.  For him, the military 
objective was paramount but nevertheless he could not escape political issues as they 
defined his military aims.  But Eisenhower learned from Darlan’s assassination and 
several other disagreements with the French over the course of the next year.  He 
determined that the French Résistance would follow the Supreme Allied Commander, 
if led by a man chosen by the Résistance itself, not by the governments in London or 
Washington.   
Eisenhower’s journal and other personal correspondence demonstrate his 
persistent frustration with those detached from his situation, holding views, and 
persisting in policies he believed were unworkable.  Perhaps he realized that those 
comprising the resistance movements should determine its leadership.  Those 
resistance movements would confer upon a national leader the authority to deal with 
the Allies as well as organize a government able to take over from Vichy after the 
Allied invasion.   Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on Eisenhower taking command of 
the Allied Expeditionary Forces in December 1943 and charged him with leading the 
Allied forces in entering northwest Europe and destroying the German forces.  Doing 
this task meant going through France and this necessitated support from the French 
people.  But if Eisenhower could get active resistance cooperation to support 
Operation OVERLORD, it could constitute a severe challenge to the German army’s 
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rear areas by wrecking havoc on communications, transport, and ambushing German 
combat units.  The Résistance could also provide vast quantities of tactical 
intelligence for more effective operational use of Allied forces.  They could also, if 
armed and organized for it, comprise a guerilla force that might prove useful under 
the right circumstances.  But even more importantly, a provisional government would 
relieve the Allies of the troublesome and manifestly complex task of setting up an 
interim civil government. 
Realizing what the CFLN meant to his efforts for OVERLORD, Eisenhower 
made a point to see de Gaulle before he left the Mediterranean theater for his new 
command in London.  He had corresponded and met with de Gaulle on other 
occasions over the past year and a half.  When Darlan was assassinated, Ike attempted 
to get Giraud to meet with de Gaulle in order to help unite the French and passed 
messages between them over his cipher communications.  One message portended de 
Gaulle’s achievement with the CFLN.  After receiving a rebuff from Giraud on 29 
December 1942 that they meet, de Gaulle persisted and in his second request de 
Gaulle was clear in what he wanted the two to achieve.  He wrote, “only a provisional 
central French authority, based on a national association for the prosecution of the 
war is capable of guaranteeing direction of French effort, the maintenance intact of 
French sovereignty and the just representation of France in foreign lands.”10  De 
Gaulle understood the difficulty and uncertainty in Algiers and offered to meet in 
                                                
10 Butcher Diary Series, November 7, 1942 to January 30, 1943, Pre-Presidential:  1916 – 1952, 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.  The translation was done by Eisenhower’s staff and the 
messages are appended to the diary on page a-132. 
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Brazzaville, Beirut, or wherever the senior ranking Giraud chose to meet.  However 
his second request failed to change Giraud’s mind. The two would not meet until 
Roosevelt and Churchill awkwardly forced them to shake hands at Casablanca as 
described in the previous chapter.   
FDR made it clear to Eisenhower and to Churchill in various messages in 
early January of 1943 that North Africa was under Eisenhower’s military occupation.  
However, having to deal with the reality of Giraud and governing the French 
demonstrated to Eisenhower that things were not that simple.  He did not want to be 
in the position of telling Giraud to do something and then have the awkward silence 
that would follow if Giraud should refuse.  Eisenhower and Giraud had worked out 
how to get French forces in the action against the Germans at the front and if Giraud 
were to cause problems, those valuable troops would have to be pulled out of the line 
and the French forces covering Allied lines of communications could not be trusted 
with this key task.11  The Allies needed a sovereign authority de Gaulle described 
above to cover those issues and support Allied military efforts.  And when it emerged 
in June of 1943 in the form of the CFLN, Eisenhower cautiously recognized its utility 
to him and his military operations. 
 Nevertheless, Roosevelt and Churchill did not.  In a message dated 8 July, 
FDR directed Eisenhower and Robert Murphy to stop contemplating offering official 
recognition to the CFLN.  “Under no condition are you to recognize the Committee 
                                                
11 Ibid., January 4, 1943 p. a-138 and a-139. 
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without the full consultation and approval of The President.”12   As President FDR 
certainly had the authority to direct his Generals on matters, especially ones of a 
political and diplomatic nature, but he never worked to resolve issues with de Gaulle 
at his level.  FDR pressed this position and restated it whenever he felt necessary over 
the course of the next year.  De Gaulle on the other hand apparently got along well 
with General Eisenhower and the two men’s correspondence provides evidence of 
their mutual respect and cordiality.  In a congratulatory note soon after Eisenhower’s 
selection to command the OVERLORD, de Gaulle graciously declared that the CFLN 
had “full confidence in you for employing French forces under your command for the 
next Allied operation.”13  So while de Gaulle and the CFLN granted Eisenhower the 
authority to command its forces, FDR and Churchill, denied de Gaulle the authority 
to make such a grant.  But if the French Résistance groups were now united behind de 
Gaulle, the people in those groups and movements might consider Roosevelt and 
Churchill as much of a threat to French sovereignty as Germany. 
For the President and the Prime Minister the issue revolved around their 
suspicion of de Gaulle and the fact that French people had no opportunity to express 
their approval of the CFLN.  Of course, while the Germans occupied France, a vote 
was impossible.  Nevertheless, there was overwhelming evidence that de Gaulle and 
the CFLN were viewed as the sole leadership of the Résistance.  Paradoxically, the 
                                                
12 “Message from AGWAR, 8 July 1943.  No. 2016,” Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers:  Pre-
Presidential, 1916-52, Principle File, Box 100, FDR Correspondence.," Eisenhower Library,  
Abilene, KS. 
13 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-1951, Principal File, Box 34, 
Charles De Gaulle Folder, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. 
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only other source of authority in France was Pétain’s collaborators.  But how 
legitimate was the CFLN and de Gaulle’s leadership of France?  The American 
Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Division produced a detailed and 
revealing seventy-page report on the various Résistance movements and their 
political, trade union, and religious sub-groups.  In the first sentence it answered the 
President’s unfounded belief with the blunt assessment of, “The French underground 
enjoys the support of the vast majority of Frenchmen.”  The report continued on, 
“Since 1942 the underground has recognized the leadership of de Gaulle.”14  
Furthermore, as I’ve described in Chapter 2 above, post-WWII scholarship has 
demonstrated this to be true.  De Gaulle was the undisputed leader of the unified 
Résistance movements.15 
 So if the underground enjoyed the support of a majority of Frenchmen who 
recognized de Gaulle’s leadership why would the President insist on resolving the 
matter with a post-war election?  What could make him go against his commanders 
and his chief of intelligence?  The reason may be in the influence of one particularly 
well-placed French émigré who had arrived in Washington, D. C. just after France’s 
defeat in 1940.  Alexis Léger was an accomplished poet and an experienced diplomat 
who could command attention within the State Department and the White House due 
                                                
14 Paul Kesaris, United States. Office of Strategic Services., and United States. Dept. of 
State., Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War Ii Microfilm, 
O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports ; Pt. 4 (Washington: 
University Publications of America, 1977).  Reel 8.  “Survey of French Underground 
Movements,” 28 January 1944. 
15 See Julian Jackson’s work France:  The Dark Years for a synthetic account of France 
during the war.  The list of scholars who agree on this point begins with Sweets, Paxton, 
Michel, Kedward, Funk, and Novick whose works are all listed in the bibliography. 
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to his reputation and ingratiating style.  Soon after his arrival he began a connection 
with the U. S. State Department with several descriptions and his opinions on 
European events.  President Roosevelt came to hold Léger in “high esteem.”  Léger 
had been fired from Paul Reynaud’s government just before de Gaulle was brought 
into it.  This may have been the source of his hatred and distrust of de Gaulle, a man 
he never met, but nevertheless persisted in denouncing de Gaulle to Roosevelt and 
State Department officials.16  It is certain that FDR sought Léger’s advice often and 
always received words back that de Gaulle’s efforts were illegal and that de Gaulle 
would prove to be dictatorial.17  Hearing anti-de Gaulle beliefs come repeatedly from 
such a qualified source bolstered advice he was getting from the former ambassador 
to France. After de Gaulle visited Stalin and brought the communist resistance under 
his umbrella, William Bullitt misinterpreted what was happening and told FDR that 
de Gaulle was in the pockets of the Communists.  Furthermore, Bullitt theorized that 
Stalin and de Gaulle had an agreement on post-war France.  Bullitt feared an alliance 
of the political right and the Communists would team up and “crush democratic 
elements.”18  Such an event would defy imagination however, as de Gaulle’s 
conservative politics and devout Catholicism would never allow him to team up with 
left wing atheists to do anything but to save France.  After the war, such a political 
alliance seems exceedingly fanciful. 
                                                
16 Aglion, Roosevelt and De Gaulle:  Allies in Conflict:  A Personal Memoir. pp. 184 – 187. 
17 David G. Haglund, "Roosevelt As "Friend of France" - but Which One?," Diplomatic History 31, no. 
5 (2007). pp. 895 – 898.  Haglund attributes FDR’s anti-Imperialism as the source of his zeal to 
ensure de Gaulle remained unrecognized.    
18 Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, For the President, Personal and Secret; 
Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston,: Houghton Mifflin, 
1972). p. 581. 
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 If de Gaulle did not want an Allied Military government administrating 
France, neither did Eisenhower.  After leading successful combat operations against 
the Germans and Italians in Algeria, Tunisia, and Sicily, Eisenhower now prepared to 
do so in France on the Allies’ way to Germany.   However he had more than good 
experience as an allied combat commander.  Before his departure from the 
Mediterranean theater, Eisenhower requested an appointment with de Gaulle.  De 
Gaulle had sent him a note congratulations and Christmas note on 23 December 
declaring that he had, “full confidence in” Eisenhower and furthermore would place 
French forces under his command “for the next inter-allied operation.”19  Eisenhower 
then visited de Gaulle and as de Gaulle recounted later, their conversation was vital 
for both men to initiate the kind of relationship and support they needed from the 
other. Eisenhower reportedly told de Gaulle, “`You were originally described to me’, 
he said, `in an unfavorable sense.  Today, I realize that that judgment was in error.”  
Ike went on to say, according to de Gaulle, that a successful invasion required the 
participation and coordination of de Gaulle’s forces and the “moral support of the 
French people.”  De Gaulle reportedly responded, “`Splendid! … You are a man!  For 
you know how to say, I was wrong.’”20  
 Whether he had ever been wrong or not, Eisenhower seemed convinced at 
least by January of 1944, soon after arriving in his new position, that to avoid 
“political and civil confusion and excessive commitments in personnel and supply 
                                                
19 Letter to General Eisenhower from General De Gaulle, 28 December 1943, Box 100, 
Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers:  1916-1952, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. 
20 Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle.  p. 545. 
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after the invasion that he must be in a position to deal with a government of France.  
Eisenhower recognized the situation and laid his cards on the table.  The CFLN 
would have to serve as that government.  Stating in a telegram to General Marshall on 
the 19th he dictated that, “the French National Committee, whatever its faults might 
be, represented the beginnings of civil government in France.”  Furthermore, he 
believed the President, and the War and State Departments largely concurred.21  
Pressing this policy, he met with the senior French military representative General 
d’Astier de la Vigerie on the 22nd of January where they discussed several issues.  
During the conversation that ranged from the desire for liaison officers in 
Eisenhower’s staff to a role for medical supplies of recaptured French territory, they 
also discussed the role of the Résistance.  Ike told d’Astier that he had spoken with 
“de Gaulle and Giraud [about] the role of the Résistance and the problems involved in 
combining their action with allied forces.”22   
 Unfortunately indications that Ike was going to treat the CFLN as an entity 
possessing some authority caused the Darlan episode to play out again.  In a Minute 
dated 25 January, Churchill rebuked Eisenhower by stating he did not think Roosevelt 
would be “prepared to trust to the French Liberation Committee as the dominant 
authority.”  Furthermore, he intimated that the Allies agree to the selection of those 
who represented the French Committee, and that Eisenhower should not simply 
                                                
21 SHAEF SGS Records, 381 France:  French Participation in OVERLORD, Microfilm, Box 
6, Reel 52, Frame 248, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.  
22 Ibid., Roll 52, Frame 1242. 
 123 
accept whomever they sent.23  Carrying on the attitude exhibited regarding earlier 
disagreements with the CFLN, Churchill and Roosevelt pressed their right to select 
who the French could have in key roles.  When Churchill met with de Gaulle in 
London five days later, he highlighted the British and American long list of 
complaints, and related to de Gaulle that he and FDR had little confidence in the 
CFLN, “nor by implication, in its head.”  Churchill dryly commented to FDR that de 
Gaulle, “seemed upset by this.”24    
 But Roosevelt’s arrogance outmatched Churchill’s.  In early February of  
1944 the Prime Minister and the President conducted a debate via message, 
concerning who should have which parts of Europe as their sphere of influence.  
Previous conferences had determined the general guidance, but now the War 
Department was cueing up OVERLORD planning, and post war occupation duties 
requiring decisions from Roosevelt.  In setting up the nature of the issue with the 
British he baldly told Churchill, “France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in 
order to bring it to the point of walking alone.  It would be very difficult for me to 
keep in France my military force or management for any length of time.”25  So while 
he insisted on setting up, as the Allies had in Italy, an Allied Military Government of 
Occupied Territory (AMGOT), over Eisenhower’s request not to, he knew he could 
not commit the forces required and was going to lean on the British to do so.   
                                                
23 Ibid., Frame 240.   
24 Paul Kesaris et al., Map Room Messages of President Roosevelt, 1939-1945 Microform (Frederick, 
Md.: University Publications of America, 1981). 9 Microfilm Reels, Reel 3, Frame 831. 
25 Ibid,. Reel 3, Frame 852. 
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When the Combined Chiefs of Staff formalized Eisenhower’s mission in a 
directive on 12 February 1944, it not only told him what to do, but made provisions 
about his task, logistics, forces, and other broad brush issues.  It also gave him the use 
of agencies that conducted sabotage, subversion, and propaganda.  However, the last 
paragraph of the order concerning relations with liberated Allied Territories conveyed 
to Eisenhower that, “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a 
later date.”26  With the invasion scheduled for May, just four months away, he needed 
to make arrangements with France but Roosevelt and Churchill refused to grant 
political recognition.  De Gaulle later referred to this entire episode in his memoirs 
and observed that FDR’s similar attempt in North Africa had come to naught, and yet 
he attempted it again in metropolitan France.  The French leader wrote “the 
President’s intentions seemed to me on the same order as Alice’s adventures in 
Wonderland.”27  The Free French had always wished to accomplish two major goals.  
The first was the defeat of Germany, the second was the purge of the Vichy 
government.  But a new one developed around the fear of an AMGOT, and it was 
largely fueled by FDR’s actions.  De Gaulle and the CFLN were prepared to press 
this matter like a game of chicken, and it seemed FDR’s obstinacy was prepared to 
crash OVERLORD’s success over the issue.  Exasperated, Eisenhower wrote in his 
private journal on 22 March, that the President “has thrown back in my lap” the 
Résistance issue, telling him to work with anyone “capable of assisting us.”  He 
                                                
26 Paragraph 8, CAB 79/70. BNA, Kew, UK. 
27 de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle.  (New York:  Carroll & Graf 
Publishers,) 1998, p. 546. 
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desired to work with de Gaulle, but not singularly, and de Gaulle would not work 
with SHAEF unless the Allies recognized him as the sole political authority.28 
 
OVERLORD and Allied Planning to use the Résistance 
  Shortly after the creation of Anglo-American SOE/SO, or the London Group, 
COSSAC Published on 20 December 1943, the “Basic Directive” on JEDBURGHs 
that defined objectives, roles, team composition, tasks, and other details.  The teams 
were to support the invasion of Europe and consist of “three men, of whom at least 
one will be a native of the country in which the team is to operate.  Teams will consist 
of a leader, a second-in-command, both of whom will normally be officers, and one 
wireless operator.”  Functioning as a liaison with any Maquis in their area, 
JEDBURGHs were not to command the Résistance, “but it is felt that the arrival of 
Allied soldiers, in uniform, behind the enemy lines, will have a marked effect on 
patriotic morale and that these teams, representing as they do the Allied High 
Command, will act as a focus for local Résistance.”  Sent to areas with known 
resistance elements, the teams would communicate the Allied Command’s orders to 
the local groups.  The team would then train the résistants on sabotage, organize 
guerrilla operations, arrange for arms to be delivered via nighttime parachute drops, 
and coordinate the Maquis group’s operations with OVERLORD objectives.  
Surprisingly, the directive contained no guidance on how to coordinate JEDBURGH 
                                                
28 Dwight D. Eisenhower and Robert H. Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981). p. 
118. 
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operations with conventional units, despite the British long held belief that the 
JEDBURGH teams would be called into the field by the nearest Allied land force.29   
 COSSAC’s work on the possible use of the Résistance had been informed by 
SOE, OSS, and other intelligence agencies.  Its director had the staff finalize a 
detailed planning document in July 1943.  It was lengthy and attempted to cover 
every scenario.  “Annex P” of the Plan, “Support of Military Operations By 
Résistance Groups in France” defined Allied assumptions and potential missions for 
the resistance groups.  It assumed four things about the situation that COSSAC would 
not be able to control.  First that the “general situation in France will be substantially 
the same as that of 1st June, 1943.”  Second, that the resistance groups would maintain 
themselves until the invasion date and the “labour draft will be successfully 
countered.”  Third, they would not be called upon, other than various and directed 
sabotage activities, to take action prior to D-Day.  Their last assumption was that the 
required material would be made available for them to carry out their plan of action.30  
 COSSAC got the second and third assumptions correct.  However, adequate 
weapons and materials would not be made available to the Maquis, due to an 
argument over resources and Allied senior leaders who believed it would be a waste 
of resources and valuable airlift missions with little to gain.  Furthermore, this lack of 
capability was exacerbated when the landings occurred due to the larger than believed 
numbers of Maquis needing weapons and ammunition.  Thinking conventionally, 
                                                
29 Kimball, p. 231. 
30 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and Chief of Staff, Surpreme Allied Command, 
Office of G-3:  Records, 1943 – 1946 (Harold R. Bull), Box 1, Reel 2, Frame 1238.  Eisenhower 
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most army leaders did not support the idea of using scarce bomber sorties to arm 
thousands of civilians in the hope of coordinated military action.31  Furthermore, pre-
invasion estimates on what would be required to equip the Résistance were woefully 
short.32 
 While the Résistance was united at the senior levels the local resistance 
groups presented another reality.  The typical Maquis member was a runaway, hiding 
out from the German labor draft.  Indeed the unpopular Vichy policies, which 
attempted to extract concessions from Germany on various key issues, only served to 
fuel popular French discontent with Vichy and drive the discontented workers into the 
Résistance.  Groups of Maquis began to form in early 1942 and by 1943, especially in 
southern France, they began to set up localities where they were the actual power.  
Vichy authorities and the German army and Gestapo continually worked to eradicate 
their growth, but it was a futile cause.  By 1944 many of them were linked with the 
CFLN or groups outside of France via networks of spies and underground 
newspapers.  They maintained a political culture seeking the twin goal of toppling 
Vichy and ejecting the Germans.  The groups emerged whose desire for liberation 
exceeded their belief in Pétain and collaboration.  These groups often took on the 
mold of the French pre-war political groups, but with one difference: whatever pre-
war goals their political party or group may have advanced, they now all had the twin 
                                                
31 Vigneras, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies:  Rearming the French.  p. 
300. 
32 After action Jedburgh team reports universally complained of the lack of weapons due to 
the greater than expected number of Maquis.  See OSS/London War Dairy Vol. 8. 
Microfilm. 
 128 
goals of overthrowing Pétain and removing the invader.33  Nevertheless, while those 
goals united, they often had no firm agreement among themselves as to local roles 
and responsibilities. 
 As the groups matured no national leader could claim to exercise firm control 
at the local level, in many locales until after D-Day.  Local leaders were independent 
and conducted themselves in ways garnering the local assistance necessary for 
survival.  Their activities were often centered on local political or military necessity 
and they often felt detached from their national level leaders in London or Algiers.  
Nearby inhabitants required the Résistance demonstrate its usefulness by carrying out 
local aims, not necessarily those desired by de Gaulle or the British government.  
Toward this goal, Maquis attacked targets supplying themselves with clothes, arms, 
or other equipment or vandalized property symbolizing Vichy or Germany, 
demonstrating how the Résistance played on local resentment against Germany.34 
 British and American knowledge and understanding about the interior 
Résistance groups and how they worked at the local and regional level could only be 
described as vague.  Britain confronted the challenge of supporting them, but without 
knowing how, or whether it should support de Gaulle, General Giraud, or any other 
French personality.  Indeed, the British were not above working with even the most 
ideologically motivated Communists, as their open alliance with the Soviets 
                                                
33 This paragraph is based on the works of Kedward, In Search of the Maquis:  Rural 
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demonstrated.  Furthermore, they supported Josip Broz Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia 
in order to fight the Nazis.  Indeed, could putting British efforts behind one man who 
failed be too much of a setback to overcome?  France was not the only country with 
an active Résistance and the British learned a lesson from supporting the wrong 
Yugoslav group when they backed the Royalists and then found out about the 
Yugoslav King’s people and their double-dealing.  When they were found 
collaborating with Germany, Britain shifted and backed the communists, siding with 
their ideological enemies to combat the Germans.35 
 
SFHQ Planning with the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur 
 When SOE first organized to conduct operations in France its leaders did not 
wish to throw all their bets on de Gaulle’s ability to become the political leader he 
later became, nor could they risk trusting him with their secrets.  Such distrust is not 
necessarily or only a distrust of him, per se, but also a pragmatic concern about de 
Gaulle’s and the Free French being able to keep secrets, codes, and communications 
out of the hands of an extremely tenacious and effective German intelligence 
operation.  Therefore, SOE established two offices to work in France.  Unknown to 
the French, “F Section” was for unilateral British activity while “RF Section” 
coordinated activities with the BCRA.  However, RF Section and BCRA relations are 
complex and in many ways it is inaccurate to conceive of them as two operations or 
separate entities who happened to talk to each other and share the results of their 
                                                
35 Stafford, Churchill and the Secret Service. pp. 300-302. 
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independent labor.  Instead their operations were largely co-conceived and planned 
while the agents saw themselves as French who merely used British resources.  
Furthermore, the secret nature of F Section lost its secret status from the Free French 
when de Gaulle found out about its existence by November 1941.36   
  The typical way in which the RF/BCRA agent became an operative occurred 
something along the following lines.  A French man or woman would find his or her 
own way out of France to London and attempt to contact the Free French.  But British 
authorities normally detained them before they could speak to Free French 
representatives.  The British Secret Intelligence Service questioned them to ensure 
they were not an enemy agent.  If the SIS approved of them, they would be conveyed 
to BCRA headquarters and would undergo something of an acculturation process at 
the “Patriotic School” run by the BCRA in southern England.  If they made it out of 
that with their loyalty affirmed and expressed an interest in going back to Occupied 
France, the BCRA would devise a mission for them based on its needs and an 
assessment of what kind of mission would fit the skills of the agent.  Then the BCRA 
would arrange with RF section for the agent’s training and clandestine insertion back 
into France.  Training consisted of parachute jumps, small arms skills and 
maintenance, using explosives, codes and radio equipment, and any special training 
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an agent may need for special tasks pertaining to the mission at hand.  Jean Moulin’s 
path back into France mirrors what is described above.37   
 The system largely worked with modest success considering all the 
bureaucracies involved and their secretive and conspiratorial nature.  The SOE, SIS, 
and BCRA had hammered out this process over the course of their early relations and 
if one of the organizations broke the agreement, nasty letters from senior 
administrators quickly attempted to correct the matter.  The letters, files, and records 
in British and French archives affirm a level of consternation at the time that would 
rise again over the course of the war when someone misbehaved.  The bureaucracies 
operated along a seam of sovereignty creating a vagueness of loyalties for the 
bureaucracy, but the individual agent grasped his individual loyalty very clearly.  
Navigating through the archives makes that apparent, especially when one sees 
dozens of dedicated French patriots like Jean Moulin listed as “British agents.”  It is 
hard to believe that Jean Moulin would have thought of himself in those terms.   
Nevertheless, the F and RF Sections were distinctions with a difference due to the 
type of agent that might gravitate toward and be useful to one section or another.38  
Of course, de Gaulle and the BCRA could not stop the British from running their own 
operations in France in full ignorance of the BCRA.  From an operational standpoint 
this lead to duplicative efforts while from a political and sovereign point of view, it 
empowered local groups to assert their own independence from a Résistance uniting 
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38 Ibid., pp. 257 – 261. 
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around de Gaulle when it could be resourced from Britain via F Section.  As will be 
described in the following chapters, various FTP Maquis groups asserted their power 
with money and weapons from F Section agents who did not care as to the political 
leanings of the group they armed, nor did they always understand the local politics 
and how it would affect national political formations after the war.  When everyone 
sought the defeat of Germany, this point may seem petty, but when de Gaulle and the 
French would have to assert civil control and order in the confusion of 1944 France, 
their work was made far more difficult due to F Section activities. 
 RF and BCRA cooperation had become well rehearsed by the beginning of 
1944, but nevertheless, the JEDBURGH plan seemed to have to catch up to much of 
their efforts.  As the head of RF section, Lt Col James Hutchison wrote that “there 
was continuous consultation” with Dewavrin and others of the BCRA.39  That may 
have been, but with the standing up of SHEAF and the arrival of Eisenhower, the 
planning for D-Day began to push their cooperation in different ways.  The French 
had begun to be briefed on the JEDBURGH plan and enthusiastically grasped the 
opportunity it provided them; but not without shifting it to meet their needs.  In Bloc 
Planning’s staff estimate dated 4 January 1944, they believed that, “It was not a 
question of creating a new doctrine of employment for the JEDBURGHs, but of 
adapting their employment to the doctrine of the l’Armée Intérieure defined in our 
proceeding projects.”40 In other words, the JEDBURGH Plan could best be 
implemented in ways that furthered their current planning with the interior resistance   
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groups and the AS.  The document discouraged its leadership from attempting to get 
the Allies to change their current plans for the use of the JEDBURGHs, but advocates 
the creation of a French military command to direct the JEDBURGHs and to look 
after the interests of the l’Armée Intérieure.  Within this context, the JEDBURGHs 
would be an operational reserve.  These words are eerily similar to the two year old 
SOE thinking that the JEDBURGHs would be a reserve of agents that would replace 
their pre D-Day agents that would presumably be arrested soon after OVERLORD 
began.  Both the British and the French assumed they would lose their networks of 
agents currently operating in France and see the JEDBURGHs as the means to 
overcome that loss.  But Bloc Planning realized that the JEDBURGHs provided 
another means for the assertion of authority.  The French understood that if F Section 
ran the JEDBURGHs, this would bring another source of consternation and political 
illegitimacy into France at the very moment of its liberation. 
 The French seized on the opportunity presented by the JEDBURGHs and 
began recruiting French officers and radio operators in order to participate.  The 
requirement levied on the French was high considering the paucity of qualified 
officers in the French Army for such work.  Since every team would have a French 
officer that meant having around a hundred such officers. They set up a JEDBURGH 
Planning section and appointed officers to flesh out the details from their point of 
view.  Realizing that their desires exceeded the availability, one of the planners still 
believed that 200 teams would be a minimum of what they would need and advocated 
recruiting in the U. K. among their airborne units and staff elements.  Knowing that 
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they only had 11 such candidates in the U. K., General d’Astier de la Vigerie 
telegrammed Algiers on 11 January emphasizing that it was “absolutely necessary 
that you send to me 80 officers of the first rank.”41  Recruiting even the London 
Group’s request of 82 officers and 15 radio operators would be an amazing feat given 
their late start.  It had taken the United States nearly a year to find, recruit and train 
their promised JEDBURGHs numbering 50 officers and 50 radio operators.  When 
d’Astier met with Eisenhower on the 22nd, there is no record of them discussing the 
specifics of the JEDBURGH Plan, but it is clear d’Astier and his staff in Bloc 
Planning were attempting to use the JEDBURGHs as a link to the Armée Secrète.   
 Colonel Dewavrin discussed the JEDBURGHs with the SHAEF and SOE 
liaison officer Lt Col Robin Brooke during various meetings from the 14th to the 20th 
of January.  Noting that it was useless to discuss changing the doctrine the British had 
so far devised for the JEDBURGHs, internally the French decided to press the issues 
of how to best use them given the current status of the Résistance.  The BCRA was 
very concerned about the confused command arrangement that would ensue if the 
JEDBURGHs reported to the SOE while the Résistance reported to General d’Astier.  
With no command relationship for the French forces established within SHAEF, such 
a situation was bound to create consternation in the field at the time of the invasion.42  
The fact that some Maquis groups would follow SOE as they had been doing for 
months, drove the BCRA to wonder if they and the CFLN could quickly assert its 
authority.  Also, how would the Military Delegates they were sending into France 
                                                
41 BCRA Planning Documents. "3 AJ 2 462," . AN, Paris, France. 
42 BCRA Planning Documents. "3 AJ 2 462,"., pp. 1-4. 
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resolve conflicts with SOE controlled JEDBURGH teams even when it had a BCRA 
approved officer on it?  Who would decide the priorities for air re-supply?  How 
could they maintain effective coordination with the nearest conventional force 
commander?  Myriad issues could arise causing consternation if they could not 
achieve a unified command arrangement integrated into the Allied organization for 
their Armée Secrète, the DMRs, and the JEDBURGHs.   
 Bloc Planning also recommended sending Capitaine William Jean Savy, a.k.a. 
Jean Millet, on a mission to reconnoiter drop zones and areas for JEDBURGH 
operations.  Savy and his small team were directed to find 100 safe houses for 
JEDBURGH teams and to find sufficient drop zones and reception committees for the 
JEDBURGH teams’ initial arrival in France.43  Such an effort demonstrates the 
BCRA’s suspicion of British led JEDBURGH planning as the documents demonstrate 
that SOE F Section would be calling the teams into the field.  BCRA planners feared 
a loss of control, duplicative efforts, and political intrigue if F Section ran the 
JEDBURGH Plan unilaterally.  Afraid of losing the argument with them, BCRA 
apparently sought to deploy Millet to France to set up circuits independent of F 
Section circuits in existence in order to maintain some shared control over 
JEDBURGH operations.    
 Millet’s mission earned the code name ECLAIREUR, which is French for 
“SCOUT” and departed for France on 2 March with two radio operators.44  The 
mission is an oddity for many reasons.  First, it is the only JEDBURGH mission that 
                                                
43 Ibid. pp. 3-4. 
44 Page 1, ECLAIREUR Team Report, HS 6/504, BNA, Kew, UK. 
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deployed prior to D-Day.  Second, the team commander, did not train at Milton Hall, 
but appeared to have been selected unilaterally by BCRA, but agreed upon by F 
Section and the OSS.  Third, there seems to be some internal subterfuge occurring 
between BCRA and perhaps RF Section and F Section.  The American OSS liaison 
officer to the French, Paul van der Stricht recalled that Millet “was a real eminance 
grise to General de Gaulle.”45  His distrust of the English evidently led them to 
conduct their mission under another guise.  M. R. D. Foot’s work The SOE in France 
lists Savy as the head of the WIZARD Circuit that was active in France the same time 
as the ECLAIREUR Mission and with the same radio operator.  He also reports that 
the WIZARD circuit discovered the location of 1000 V-1 Rockets in a depot near 
Creil and that Bomber Command attacked the site in July.46  The details about the V-
1 rockets were explained in Churchill’s memoirs, but frustratingly there is no mention 
of them in the ECLAIREUR report.  No report for a WIZARD mission exists in SOE 
files.  Was the BCRA hiding the true nature of their mission from F Section and then 
throwing them a bone of prized intelligence so F Section officers would not ask any 
questions about what Savy had been up to in France?  It seems very possible, but until 
further information comes to light, it is unknown what may have provoked the double 
game. 
 But Savy’s real mission is more interesting than finding a large number of V-1 
rockets.  Done when the BCRA and perhaps the British still planned on using 
                                                
45 Letter to William Casey, 23 December 1977. Paul van der Strict Papers, Folder 1, Hoover Insitution, 
Stanford, CA. 
46 Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 
1940-1944, pp. 369 – 370. 
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JEDBURGH Teams relatively near the front, Savy parachuted far from the planned 
invasion area, as he was most certainly not privy to D-Day planning, he landed near 
Châteauroux and eventually met with General Dejussieu, the current commander of 
the Armée Secrète.  He and Dejussieu traveled around and gathered information on 
Maquis strengths by region, their weapons requirements, and located possible drop 
zones.  In total, it was quite a very large and successful fact finding mission that did 
far more than find safe houses and drop zones.  Meeting in Paris with many of the 
regional leaders and national ones as well, Savy and Dejussieu, “made a detailed and 
impartial examination of the situation of each region and tasks were assigned to all.”47  
The senior FFI planners now knew the latest planning regarding the use of the teams 
and began working them into their planning of sabotage and guerilla warfare.  But 
more importantly, it armed the French JEDBURGH planners in the BCRA with up to 
date information they could trust from one of their own sources.  But catastrophe 
stuck when the Gestapo arrested General Dejussieu in Paris on 5 May, two months 
after Savy returned to the UK.  For Dejussieu, the rest of the war meant concentration 
camps with a final release coming as the war ended.  Additionally, Savy’s radio 
operator, Eileen Nearne who had stayed on in France to serve with another circuit 
organizer, was also arrested in July and spent the rest of the war in German forced 
labor camps.48  Furthermore, the SOE F Section Circuit organizer into whose region 
Savy parachuted, was arrested just a few days before Dejussieu.  Maurice Southgate’s 
                                                
47 Henri Noguères, Marcel Degliame-Fouché, and Jean Louis Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En 
France, De 1940 Á 1945, I - V vols., vol. V (Paris,: R. Laffont, 1981). p. 567. 
48 Sarah Helm, A Life in Secrets:  Vera Atkins and the Missing Agents of WWII, Paperback ed. 
(London: Abacus, 2006), pp. 101-103. 
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circuit then was split between his second in command, Rene Maingard and his radio 
operator Pearl Witherington.  Southgate also survived the war, but endured the camp 
at Buchenwald.49  Did the Gestapo learn anything regarding the JEDBURGH 
operations from Southgate and Nairne, who Savy may have kept in the dark?  Or did 
they learn anything from Dejussieu, with whom Savy discussed the details of the 
JEDBURGH plan with?  It is unknown.   
 Nevertheless, the ECLAIREUR mission results, as useful as they were for 
planning, were toned down in the report currently in the British archives while the 
same details are expounded upon in BCRA documents.  But now that BCRA had run 
a “Scout” mission into France, determined a great deal about the lay of the land and 
had accurate information on Maquis units throughout the country, it still could not 
prevail upon the British or Americans to allow them into the command organization 
which for the French rendered “execution impractical” and “unacceptable.”50  That 
issue still lay churning at the highest levels. 
 
Conclusion 
 Eisenhower’s work to integrate de Gaulle’s military representative into 
SHAEF was blocked by Roosevelt and de Gaulle.  Learning from his experiences in 
North Africa about crossing the two, he chose to let General Marshall and others who 
may influence the President to work out the issue hoping to receive the clearance to 
                                                
49 Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 
1940-1944. p. 329. 
50 "3 AJ 2 462," BCRA Planning Documents., p. 11. 
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work with de Gaulle.  But while he had to wait, the staff planning began and the SOE 
and OSS planners let the BCRA planners in on the general context of the 
JEDBURGH plan.  In doing so the French found exactly the kind of problem 
Eisenhower feared.  The BCRA and General d’Astier supported the JEDBURGH 
concept and recognized its utility.  But, their concern was one of how to organize its 
command structure and they realized immediately that the way the British and 
Americans currently had it, would lead to confusion, unless the FFI and the 
JEDBURGHs reported to the same commander who was subordinate to Eisenhower.  
But instead of arguing with them, the French sent out a mission to help organize their 
circuits in France and prepare for their reception.  They also began recruiting soldiers 
to meet their commitment to it.  France had the largest burden to meet regarding 
officers and they intended on fulfilling it.  While they did so, the Americans and the 
British began assembling the JEDBURGHs.
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Chapter Four 
Milton Hall and the JEDBURGH Preparations 
Getting the most out of the French Maquis required well-trained JEDBURGHs.   
 
Frank Canfield had gone to the U. S. to recruit the American contingent but first, the 
men must be found who could operate behind enemy lines, speak French, parachute, 
and show the ability to operate independently.  Every team needed a parachute 
qualified radio operator showing great skill at Morse code.   A 1 September 1943 
OSS London memo asked OSS Washington for forty-four staff officers, fifty officers 
fluent in French, and fifty enlisted W/T operators.  Washington viewed recruiting 
JEDBURGHs as more important than any other requirement and refrained from 
recruiting for other units until they filled all JEDBURGH positions.  The OSS 
believed French speaking junior officers the most difficult qualification, so they 
focused their search on New York, New Orleans, and the Fort Benning paratrooper 
school where they believed more qualified officers existed.  The OSS posted signs at 
Fort Benning asking for French speaking officers willing to operate behind enemy 
lines and by the end of November, OSS filled the requirement.1 
Getting qualified candidates released from their current duties often proved 
exceedingly difficult and bureaucratic.  The candidate who became the senior 
JEDBURGH, Horace “Hod” Fuller had served in the French Army from May to July 
of 1940, joined the U. S. Marines in 1941 and commanded a machine gun company in 
                                                
1 United States War Department, Strategic Services Unit, History Project, Vol. 1, The War Report of 
the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), with a new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York: 
Walker and Co., 1976) p. 210. 
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action on Guadalcanal in 1942.  Initially requesting his transfer from instructor duty 
at Quantico, Virginia to the OSS in May, Fuller finally got the word of his 
reassignment to OSS in September.   The son of a Harvard archeologist and a well-
connected man, Fuller pulled out all the stops to get reassigned to OSS and to go to 
the European theater.  The Marine Corps posted him to instructor duty at Quantico 
after he had sustained an injury in the Pacific.  Fuller described it as “a fate worse 
than death.”2  President Roosevelt’s son James, Fuller’s Naval ROTC classmate at 
Harvard, wrote to General Donovan urging Donovan to write directly to the Marine 
Corps to “shake him loose.”3  Once in the OSS, Frank Canfield worked to get him 
assigned to the JEDBURGH project where his French skills and combat experience 
afforded him a great deal of respect among most of the JEDBURGH candidates who 
had little military experience and no combat experience.  After the war, one of the 
JEDBURGHs wrote that Fuller, “most typified the JEDBURGH.”4  
     Fifty-five American JEDBURGH candidates left New York on the Queen 
 
Mary and arrived in Glasgow, Scotland on 23 December 1943, after zigzagging 
across the North Atlantic evading U-Boot patrols.  Once back on dry land, they 
traveled to Arisaig, Scotland, for further training and evaluation.  The instructors took 
trainees on cross-country hikes in the rugged Scottish hills, small arms training, hand-
to-hand combat as well as going down to Stodham Park, in three, one-week cycles for 
more psychological testing.  After the mental tests determined how the subject 
                                                
2 FOIA Request to CIA, Ref F-2007-01590, Letter from Fuller to E. C. Huntington, Jr., 19 
May, 1943. 
3 Ibid., Letter from James Roosevelt to William J. Donovan, July 26, 1943.  
4 “The Jedburgher,” Christmas issue, 1989.  Courtesy of Steven Kippax. 
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handled stress and emotional stain, the instructors told him he failed.  By observing 
how the man handled rejection, and the other aspects of the test, examiners measured 
his strength of character and will power.5  One British candidate was asked when had 
he stopped wetting the bed?  Without missing a beat the Welsh officer replied, “When 
my father took me to see a psychologist!”  He passed the test.6  
Those who made it past the evaluations proceeded to Milton Hall for final 
 
training and team selection.  The large Milton Hall estate, four miles north of  
 
Peterborough, England, became the main JEDBURGH training and holding area.  A 
large country manor with many rooms for billets and offices, Her Majesty’s 
government acquired the estate and scheduled it for use by 1 January 1944.  The W/T 
operators joined the officers after three weeks radio training at Henley-on-Thames, 
west of London.  Almost all the JEDBURGHs were at Milton Hall by 1 February, and 
started more training in demolition, map reading and field craft, German and Allied 
small arms, guerrilla tactics, German tactics, reception committee work, anti-tank 
mines, street fighting, motor cycle and car driving, German Army vehicle and 
equipment recognition, and more physical training.  JEDBURGH commanders and 
seconds-in-command received a general history of resistance movements in north-
west Europe, ways to utilize the Résistance, functions of JEDBURGHs, first-aid, 
                                                
5 Wyman W. Irwin, “A Special Force:  Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in 
Support of Operation OVERLORD,” MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General 
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practical wireless training, French geography, and observation and memory training.  
SFHQ scheduled training to be completed by 1 April.7 
Unfortunately, Milton Hall was not ready for the officers so temporary 
training sites were found at Fairford, Gumley Hall, and Walsingham.  All 
JEDBURGHs visited one final training school at Altrincham, Manchester prior to 
going to their designated home.  Even the men already parachute qualified attended 
the training as jumping out of the B-24 “Joe hole” varied enough to require more 
familiarization.  The school scheduled three jumps; the first two would be daylight 
jumps from a balloon at 700 feet and the third jump would be a night jump from 500 
feet.  For the seventeen-year-old Prince Michel de Bourbon-Parme, parachute training 
proved trying.  While waiting for the proper command before parachuting from the 
balloon American W/T operator Sergeant Bill Thompson and French Michel de 
Bourbon-Parme, and the British instructor lost their balance from unexpected winds 
causing the Prince to fall out.  Descending toward the earth, the Prince yelled to his 
instructor, “I’m sorry!” and the British officer calmly replied, “That’s all right chap, 
don’t bother to come back.”8 
Milton Hall finally became available for JEDBURGH use the first week in 
 
February 1944.  The British modified the old mansion for classrooms, offices, and  
 
billets and set up temporary buildings for NCO housing.  Beginning in late January  
 
the French soldiers arrived, but they were not all there until early April.  OSS and  
 
SOE recruiters made a concerted recruiting effort through North Africa, the Middle  
                                                
7 OSS/SO London microfilm, Vol. 12, 42-3. 
8 Irwin, 124; and Thompson interview. 
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East, the United States; and one French JEDBURGH even came from Guatemala.   
 
The 70 French Jeds began to mix with the rest, and curiously politics were rarely  
 
discussed.  The factions gripping French society and crippling French unified action  
 
failed to have any impact on these soldiers.  One French JEDBURGH remarked,  
 
“they were professional soldiers and didn’t think much about politics.”  Apparently,  
 
de Gaulle knew about the French Jeds but never visited Milton Hall, nor did any of  
 
his generals.9  In a brief interview with one of the Frenchmen, who as circumstances  
 
had it, served in the U. S. Army, de Gaulle said to him, “Oh, you are going off with  
 
those people?  Fine.”10 
 
     However, a Washington OSS civilian did visit Milton Hall late on a Friday  
 
afternoon forcing delay of their weekend pass.  The British commandant of Milton  
 
Hall, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Spooner, was an unpopular man and the  
 
JEDBURGHs felt no obligation not to embarrass him in front of the distinguished  
 
visitor.  Prior to the visit the American Jeds started a tradition showing when they  
 
believed superiors ordered them to do something stupid.  An officer arrived late to a 
formation and the British NCO asked the officer to drop and do fifty pushups.  The 
officer counted them off in front of the formation and getting to punishment’s end 
counted, “48, 49, 50,” got on his feet and said, “some shit!”  The group laughed and 
in short order it became a sign of JEDBURGH indignation where one in a group 
                                                
9 Irwin, 124; and Joseph de Francesco, telephone conversation with author, 3 March, 1999.  My 
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10 Michel de Bourbon-Parme, Interview, 22 September 2007. 
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would yell, “48!” another chimed in “49!” a third “50!” and all yelled, “Some Shit!”  
The surprised Washington visitor heard such a cheer and dropped his speech on the 
platform.  Lieutenant Colonel Spooner let out a characteristic snort in shock and 
disappointment.  Spooner also had been under investigation for some unpaid bills and 
perhaps Gubbins and Mockler-Ferryman were somewhat exasperated with him.  The 
Rhodesian Lieutenant Colonel G. Richard Musgrave replaced him shortly 
afterward.11 The JEDBURGHs were an unconventional unit, not afraid to speak their 
minds and unafraid of normal military punishment when they did so. 
One more thing remained prior to deployment, the teams had to be put  
 
together.  SFHQ allowed them to “get married,” in other words they would chose  
 
their own team mates.  Over the remaining time before D-Day, the JEDBURGH  
 
officers paired up and then selected their W/T operator.  Training together gave  
 
many of them had the opportunity to form friendships and learn who they could  
 
trust.12  Soon they would be in combat, and despite the rigorous training, none knew  
 
what to expect.  Choosing their teammates then came down to personality traits  
 
each JEDBURGH thought to be most crucial.  Since there was a French officer on  
 
each team, they had a certain amount of say over who they “married.”  Paul Moniez  
 
had wanted to go back to France with an American, but impressed with the French  
 
                                                
11 Dreux, 58-59; and Thompson interview.  Michel de Bourbon de Parme recalls that 8th Air 
Force Commander, General James Doolittle got the same treatment when he promised to 
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12 Thompson interview; de Francesco telephone conversation; Daphne Friele, telephone 
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speaking abilities of British Captain James O’Brien-Tear, he opted to pair up with  
 
him. “I thought it was a very important skill,” Moniez told me very sternly.  Speaking  
 
sixty-three Septembers after his deployment to France, one could still see his great  
 
despair over the French defeat in 1940.  He wanted to make sure they did well and so  
 
he wanted to go into combat with the best team mate he could find.13   
 
 Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman and Colonel Haskell also wanted the 
JEDBURGHs to do as well as possible.  On 24 February they went up to Milton Hall 
and broke the details to the JEDBURGHs about what they would be doing in 
occupied Europe.  Most of them were going to France while others would go to 
Belgium and The Netherlands.  Their function was strategic, the Brigadier told them, 
and they would work with the Résistance on three main missions:  liaison, 
organization, and leadership.  Liaison meant representing SHAEF and General 
Eisenhower to the local Maquis, using their Wireless transmitter for the necessary 
communications, act as advisors on methods and tactics, and supplying weapons via 
clandestine air-drops.  Organization meant designing their Maquis groups along the 
lines required by the group’s task or function.  And if the group had lost its leadership 
due to German efforts, they must be prepared to step into that role.  Noting that each 
team’s situation would vary greatly from the next, Mockler-Ferryman emphasized 
that whichever the three missions they did, “liaison was the most important one of 
all.”14  When asked from the audience, “how many Germans were in France?”  The 
                                                
13 Paul Moniez, Interview, 17 September 2007. 
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Brigadier replied “not many over half a million.”  After a silence, one of them said, 
“Oh, that’s all?” and the room erupted in laughter.15 
 
Air Special Operations picks up the pace 
  General de Gaulle took every opportunity, both publicly in press conferences 
and privately with Winston Churchill, to get the RAF and SOE to do more to equip 
the interior resistance groups.  De Gaulle met with Churchill in Marrakech in January 
1944 while the Prime Minister was traveling back to London from Cairo.  When 
Churchill returned to London, he met with Minister Seaborne, and the Commander of 
Bomber Command, General Harris and Air Minister Sir Charles Portal on 27 January 
and pressed them to do more.  He sought to make southeast France similar to 
Yugoslavia in its effective partisan bands.  His prodding resulted in a raising of the 
priority of the Maquis’ needs to second only to the strategic bombing effort and 
making it more important than SOE’s own circuits, attacks on German V Rocket 
installations, and sea-mining.  It also resulted in more monthly sorties:  120 more 
sorties from the Mediterranean, 60 more sorties from the RAF transport group No. 38.  
As Crémieux-Brilhac remarked, “for the first time, in the course of the first three 
months of the year, the BCRA networks were better supplied than the Allied 
circuits.”16  Furthermore, they agreed to help train up the American bomber crews 
                                                                                                                                      
OVERLORD. 
15 Alsop and Braden, Sub Rosa; the O.-S.-S. And American Espionage. p. 144. 
16 Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre:  De L'appel Du 18 Juin Á La Libération, Tome II. p. 
1142. 
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just now coming into the effort of Special Operations air missions.  If the number of 
sorties held, it would mean 16000 more men could be armed each month.17 
The Americans decided to get their air power involved in late 1943.  Colonel  
 
C. S. Vanderblue, commander of the European Theater, Office of Strategic Services  
 
sent a letter proposing the creation of two squadrons to supply European resistance  
 
groups.  Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the United States Army,  
 
European Theater of Operations, approved the concept within a week, but it took  
 
more than two months before 8th Air Force’s commanding officer General Ira C.  
 
Eaker, designated two squadrons and created the “Carpetbagger” project.  A memo  
 
dated 30 December 1943 gave OSS operational control of the aircraft, but 8th Air  
 
Force retained a measure of administrative control.  That meant that missions would  
 
be determined by the OSS SO London requirements, but the aircraft and people  
 
retained their US Army Air Forces status for all other matters.  SOE/SO, later SFHQ,  
 
set out missions each moon period and 8th Bomber Command detailed a liaison  
 
officer to approve them.18 
 
     Lieutenant Colonel Clifford Heflin commanded the 801st Bomb Group or  
 
“Carpetbaggers.”  When their squadron’s mission of flying anti-submarine missions 
from the Azores was discontinued, Heflin and other officers were reassigned to fly 
their modified B-24 bombers into occupied territory.  Heflin joined the Army 
immediately after graduating from Fresno State University in 1939 and received his 
                                                
17 Mackenzie, The Secret History of S. O. E.:  Special Operations Executive 1940-1945. pp. 
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commission the same year.  With the onset of war he won quick promotions and at 
Twenty-nine, he took command of two squadrons each maintaining 16 aircraft.19 
When Eaker took command of the 15th Air Force in the Mediterranean theater he 
found the OSS air capability in a shambles.  The unit that was airlifting supplies to 
the Maquis in France and the resistance groups in the Balkans was poorly equipped 
and trained.  After three months of asking and arguing with General Arnold in 
Washington for the authority to reorganize what he had in the theater in order to do 
the task at hand, he finally got permission.  It did not come without a lot of support 
however.  On Eaker’s side was General Eisenhower, General Devers, General 
Donovan and British RAF Air Marshal Charles Portal, among others.  After several 
weeks of back and forth, General Marshall and the JCS decided to grant Eaker the 
authority to create a special operations squadron at Blida, near Algiers with three B-
17s and 15 B-24s and the required crews and support personnel.  By May 1944, the 
new unit flew eighty-eight missions.  In what became the 885th Bombardment 
Squadron (Heavy)(Special), commanded by Colonel Monro MacCloskey, the 
Americans contributed to the special operations airlift to France from the 
Mediterranean Theater.20 
But organization was one thing, flying effective missions proved to be quite 
another.  The crews, unfamiliar with the correct flying procedures, had to spend a 
month flying with British crews.  Moreover, the required facilities were not ready at 
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RAF Alconbury, nor did Alconbury possess adequate room so the Carpetbaggers 
moved to RAF Harrington in Northamptonshire.21 Also the B-24s required several 
changes to make them OSS mission ready.  The two waist gun positions were 
eliminated saving weight, and the aircraft painted black to elude searchlights.  
Mechanics removed the bottom machine gun turret and converted the space to a “Joe 
hole” covered by a round plywood center hinged door.  They placed reinforced static 
line points above the “Joe hole” with a static line long enough for eight parachutists.  
The bombardier and navigator required more room to work, so they removed all 
unnecessary equipment.  Next, the Carpetbaggers installed green and red jump signal 
lights, and static lines in the bomb bay for dropping cargo.  To aid navigation, crews 
trained in celestial, dead-reckoning, pilotage, and radio navigation.  The bombardier 
became a second navigator, a waist gunner became the “Joe” dispatcher, and the pilot, 
co-pilot, engineer, radio operator, and tail gunner filled out the rest, for a total of 
eight.  Crews trained to drop “joes” at an altitude of 600 feet traveling 125 to 135 
miles per hour.  Any higher and the person would land off target, any lower and the 
chute would not have time to deploy.22 
     Rigging and packing all the weapons, fuel, ammunition, leaflets, radios, and  
 
personnel chutes required a special facility close to Harrington.  Approximately one  
 
hundred men worked at the facility and during the first quarter of 1944 they packed  
 
2,348 containers and the second quarter they packed 13,071 containers and 8,323  
 
personnel chutes.  By D-Day, the French Résistance received 7,404 containers filled  
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with explosives, light machine guns, pistols, carbines, anti-tank weapons, and  
 
grenades.23 The standard drop consisted of twelve containers with the following  
 
supplies:  six Brens with 1,000 rounds, 36 rifles with 150 rounds, twenty seven Stens  
 
with 300 rounds per gun, five pistols with 50 rounds per weapon, fifty-two grenades  
 
with eighteen pounds of plastic explosives, 156 field dressings, 6,600 9mm rounds,  
 
3,168 .303 rounds, and 40 empty magazines.  If more containers were dropped to the  
 
same drop zone, they contained more ammunition, not weapons.24 
 
     Not satisfied with merely a two-squadron effort, SHAEF sought more aircraft.   
 
In January 1944, the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces received a strongly worded  
 
letter complaining about the lack of support.25  Both Churchill and Roosevelt became  
 
concerned about the possible poor perception caused by lagging arms deliveries.   
 
Anxious, General Donovan believed if the French Résistance regarded the United  
 
States and Britain poorly, the Allied missions to France like the JEDBURGHs’ 
viability would suffer.26  On 11 February 1944, Eisenhower signed a Donovan drafted 
cable to Eaker saying, “Believe it extremely important from viewpoint our 
government that United States participate as fully as possible this program and that 
anything you can do to expedite delivery of modified planes necessary for this 
purpose will be of great assistance.”27 A phone call between Major General Bull, 
Director of Operations for SHAEF, and General Spaatz, 8th Air Force Commander, 
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resulted in no more American aircraft devoted to SOE/SO.  General Spaatz refused to 
degrade the strategic bombing effort so the two discussed the possibility of having 
planes perform conventional bombing missions during the non-moon period and then 
make them available for special operations sorties.  However, the time and effort 
required to convert the bombers to special operations and back to bombing, made it 
impractical.28  The OSS received no more than their already assigned two squadrons. 
     But while the higher headquarters tried to solve a problem of too little support  
 
to the Résistance, the Carpetbaggers and their British counterparts apparently  
 
delivered more than current circuits could hide.  The SOE/SO March report to  
 
SHAEF related if deliveries increased, the Allied French Résistance groups had to  
 
absorb most of the additional supplies.  Up to March, the parachutages concentrated  
 
on areas under the control of  F section and the British supplied Résistance.   
 
However by the May report, little difference existed as the F and RF sections appear  
 
to be receiving supplies based on the health of their circuit, not political alignment.   
 
The next month, the airdrop reports no longer distinguish tonnage by their SOE  
 
affiliation.29  The fusing of the two categories may also be an effect of the command  
 
arrangements Eisenhower worked out with General Koenig by the beginning of June.   
 
By June, 1944 the British and American efforts delivered 1,549 tons of weapons and 
supplies in 3,468 sorties.  More than half of the total sorties flown were between 
April and June, 1944.30  Losses totaled 41 British and American aircraft due to enemy 
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action and accidents.31  Now up to the task, the air forces could deploy and re-supply 
the JEDBURGH led Résistance, at least along the assumptions SHAEF and SFHQ 
held in early June regarding Maquis numbers and related needs. 
 
The Politics Running into D-Day 
 FDR’s confrontational approach with de Gaulle was ineffective and perilous 
and Prime Minister Churchill began to come around to the same conclusion.  In April 
and May, while FDR enjoyed some vacation time at what is now Camp David, a draft 
policy letter on how to guide SHAEF’s relationship with the French painstakingly 
made its way though the War Department, the British Cabinet, and the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff.  Churchill wanted FDR to hash out the issue with de Gaulle in 
Washington but FDR would not invite him and wanted de Gaulle’s representatives to 
request a visit.  Only then would he agree to see him and by that time it would be the 
middle of May with only two or three weeks of time for Eisenhower to coordinate 
plans with the Forces Français l’Interior (FFI).  De Gaulle, still in the dark as to 
when OVERLORD would launch, had returned to Algiers to stew over the AMGOT 
issue.  When he found out that SHAEF would be the sole authority for French 
currency as well as other civil matters he fumed all the more.  But he was no longer 
the lone crusader of 1940, casting about for men and equipment.  He now had them 
and the Prime Minister felt the need to remind his friend of it.  “He commands 
considerable forces,” he telegraphed Roosevelt, “including naval forces…he presides 
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over a vast empire, all the strategic points of which are at our disposal.”32    
Furthermore, in an intelligence report forwarded to the President on 3 April by OSS 
Director Donovan, more information arrived confirming the interior Résistance’s 
allegiance to de Gaulle.  Not only that, it ominously stated the Résistance’s 
disillusionment with the Americans in particular, and its increasing bewilderment at 
Roosevelt’s delay in recognizing the CFLN.  All of France knew, according to the 
OSS source, of the Soviet Army’s Eastern front successes and its high casualty rate.  
They knew the British were dropping tons of weapons and ammunition to the Maquis 
in France.  In comparison the U. S. presence in the war, seemed suspiciously weak.33   
 Such attitudes were punctuated by what the Germans did to a large Résistance 
encampment near Glières, France.  On the same day Donovan passed the report to the 
President in Washington, General d’Astier in London reported to the SHAEF Chief of 
Staff, General Bedell Smith, that 700 Résistance fighters had been “annihilated by the 
troops of occupation, without receiving the aid they had asked of us.”  Repeated 
requests for RAF strikes only resulted in a meeting fifteen days after their deaths 
explaining that such a location was too far and the danger too great for the RAF.  
Pointing out that there were “no known” anti-aircraft batteries in the region, d’Astier 
pointedly wrote to Eisenhower, “The Forces of the French Résistance have the honor 
of being amongst the first troops engaged in combat against the common enemy in 
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the theater of operations under your command.”34  After Vichy forces failed at 
negotiating with the Maquis, then made a faint attempt at fighting them, a task force 
comprised of elements of the Wehrmacht’s 157th Reserve Infantry Division attacked 
the redoubt in the French Alps.  They made a concentrated and well coordinated 
attack and defeated the Maquis in a three day effort.35  Churchill’s desire to get more 
arms to that part of France was succeeding, but he had not thought through the 
implications and results of such actions.  The next few weeks and into May, while the 
political problem festered, SHAEF pressed ahead with planning on what it wanted the 
hoped controlled Résistance to do once the Allies landed. 
A 23 March 1944 SHAEF Operations Directive ordered SOE/SO London to 
have seventy JEDBURGH teams trained for D-Day.  Eisenhower gave SOE/SO total 
control of Résistance groups, who were as yet not clearly, SHAEF thought, united 
behind any one person, and directed the Résistance to concentrate efforts against 
German air forces, lower the morale of German forces by sabotage, inflict damage on 
the German war effort in general, and prepare for the return of Allied Forces to the 
continent.  It seems SHAEF expected the JEDBURGHs would deploy well ahead of 
the conventional invasion force, despite SOE and OSS planning that the 
JEDBURGHs were a reserve and a back up for their clandestine networks that were 
assumed to be endangered when OVERLORD commenced.  Although JEDBURGHs 
and Operational Groups (American commando teams deployed for the specific 
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purpose of destroying specified targets) were to be ready by 1 April, SHAEF insisted 
that no invasion plan details, especially the date, should be conveyed to any resistance 
group.36 
 What targets did SHAEF want the Résistance to attack?  In a dispatch sent to 
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, General Maitland Wilson, Eisenhower 
stated his priorities.  The railroad from Montauban-Limoges-Vierzon on D + 1 
through D + 3 was first, then the railroads from Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours on D + 4 to 
D + 7.  The cable listed other railroads as well as roads, indicating Germans moving 
north should be impeded as much as possible.  Significantly the JEDBURGHs were 
not to enter France sooner than 10 days before D-Day.  Eisenhower thought it too 
risky and a security hazard to have anyone in France with OVERLORD plans.37 As 
D-Day neared, SHAEF passed even more restrictive orders to Special Forces 
Headquarters.  The JEDBURGHs could not deploy to France prior to the night of D-
Day - 1.  SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, warned of the need to 
do everything possible to safeguard OVERLORD, and feared that dropping 
JEDBURGHs into enemy territory risked compromise, with doubtful gain.38 It is 
unclear whether the security concern was a cover story being used by Eisenhower and 
Smith to conceal the political disagreements from SHAEF staff officers.  And while 
later SOE and OSS official histories write that the intent for the JEDBURGHs was to 
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use them after D-Day, the contemporaneous SHAEF documents and indeed some of 
the JEDBURGH memories reinforce what may have been the original plan:  to go 
into France sometime between 1 April 1944, and D-Day.39   
 The actions described above are based upon the BCRA plan Vert, which by 
now had become SFHQ’s plan.  Plan Tortue, and later when more regions were added 
it was called BIBENDUM, focused on German military road traffic and armored 
columns.  But SFHQ planners were uncertain about its viability due to the arrest of its 
BCRA organizer in May of 1944; the last word from him was that he was far short of 
the armed teams required to put it into full effect.  Plans Jaune, Noire, and Rouge 
were plans for small-scale guerilla attacks against enemy munitions dumps, German 
military command posts and major headquarters, and fuel storage depots respectively.  
Their effectiveness was also in doubt as planning had not passed its initial stages 
when Maquis units began to grow and new challenges arose as to how to organize 
more and more units into the guerilla warfare plans.  BCRA cancelled those plans on 
2 March but SOE put in their place a merged plan that was to be carried out by region 
or area as required.  There were other plans, not sufficiently accepted by SFHQ and 
SOE planners.  One that even the BCRA cast a doubtful eye upon was the Grenouille 
plan that involved French railway workers of the Société Nationale des Chemins de 
Fer (SNCF) who plotted to misroute trains and discreetly but effectively sabotage key 
machinery and signals when ordered.  But the most controversial plan was Vidal, the 
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plan for widespread ‘national insurrection.’  Few, outside of France advocated this 
kind of widespread action and Gubbins, Mockler-Ferryman, and Haskell believed that 
it bore little relation to the landings or support to the regular forces.  In their 
estimation it would have little benefit while risking brutal reprisals upon the civilian 
population.  They had no issue on this point with senior French leadership, with the 
exception of some of the interior Résistance, often the communists, who saw Vidal 
effort as key to the experience of liberation.40 
 General de Gaulle, who by now had clearly learned how to use the people for 
their greatest effectiveness, appointed the Commander of the French victor at Bir 
Heichem to replace General d’Astier.  General Marie-Pierre Koenig arrived in 
London at the end of March and assumed his duties on the 1 April.  The rank and file 
Maquis loved Koenig, if the underground newspapers are any guide, and other Allied 
generals found him to be professional, eager to get along, and effective.  Even the 
acerbic General Lord Alan Brooke thought him to be, “quite pleasant and ready to 
cooperate.”41  Eisenhower met with Koenig after his arrival and believed he could be 
trusted with the invasion month; however he did not want the information leaked to 
the French commanders in Algeria.42  Indeed, one of the results of Churchill and 
Roosevelt’s distrust of the Free French was their insistence that no messages be sent 
from their liaison officers in London to Algiers for fear of leaks.  OVERLORD’s 
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greatest asset and most closely guarded secret was the unknown location of the initial 
attack and the date.  Keeping the Germans guessing forced them to keep their forces 
spread thin and reserves would have to be further back from the coast to allow greater 
flexibility in moving them toward the front line when that was known.  Eisenhower 
guarded the location beaches, time of attack, and kind of forces with an elaborate 
deception campaign on an immense scale.  A leak from a collaborator to the Germans 
would be disastrous.  However, just as in North Africa he was caught between 
working with the French to achieve his military aim and waiting for clearance from 
FDR on proceeding with the CFLN.  Nevertheless, he was willing to share details of 
the plan with the right person.   
 Assuming command of what had grown from the small number of émigrés 
and adrift soldiers in June of 1940, the France Libre organization had more staff, and 
now working toward placing a Division under Eisenhower’s command for 
OVERLORD.  Koenig served as the commander of all French forces in the U. K. and 
as the senior military liaison to SHAEF and the British General Staff.  However, 
Koenig’s other title was that of the Commander of the l’Etat Major Forces Français 
l’Interieur, (EMFFI).43   In other words, General Koenig would be “commanding” the 
Résistance and in that capacity, he was the perfect person for Eisenhower to 
cooperate with.   On 19 April Koenig met with General Walter Bedell Smith, 
Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff who told him that Ike intended to bring him into the 
SHAEF organization and that in effect he would become a subordinate commander of 
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forces similar to the American, British, and Canadian commanders who led forces in 
combat.  Furthermore, Ike told Koenig he intended to bring Koenig in on the planning  
“well in advance to their being committed to these operations.”44  
 But while Eisenhower and Koenig may have made some progress on getting 
their respective efforts to mesh, de Gaulle kept doing things that upset the White 
House.  In Algiers on 25 April de Gaulle had a press conference in which he 
reiterated a list of his war aims and made it clear that France would “accept no 
administration that is not French.”   In a charitable moment he praised allied efforts to 
arm the Maquis over the past 3 months and probably recalling his own conversation 
with Churchill in January he added the words, “thanks to the British.”  On FDR’s 
copy of the description of de Gaulle’s press conference, this slight to the U. S. effort, 
despite two more squadrons and tons of materiel, elicited more disgust.  Then 
reinforcing FDR’s fear about post war colonialism, de Gaulle also expressed French 
concern of the Pacific war and that “France did not yield rights to any Pacific 
possessions.”45  With that press conference, de Gaulle succeeded at confirming 
FDR’s fears regarding post-war French aims and de Gaulle’s lack of appreciation for 
the increased American efforts to arm the Maquis. 
 The first meeting between relevant SHAEF officials and Koenig and his staff 
occurred on 28 April.  It consisted largely of some polite statements, introductions of 
staff members, and a statement of each side’s aims.  SHAEF made the statement up 
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front to General Koenig that they had no problem with members of the French side 
being comprised of civilians, since many of their issues concerned civil affairs.  
Perhaps this venue could provide them some room to maneuver while still staying 
within the President’s and Prime Minister’s guidance to avoid any hint of recognizing 
the CFLN.  They closed the meeting by dividing up issues to be worked and created 
sub-committees to handle the various tasks.  Present at the meeting was Colonel 
André Dewavrin, who of course knew the inner workings of the resistance and who 
had probably participated in recruiting the French members of the JEDBURGHs.  But 
there seems to be no indication that the French realized their planning time was short 
and indeed, Koenig and his staff were still not aware of the invasion date.46   But this 
level of effort, was not going to suffice and it had become alarming to Eisenhower 
and more clear to Churchill. 
 On 1 May the British and American special operations traded in the name 
SOE/SO for Special Force Headquarters and pressed ahead with integrating the 
French, as far as possible, while they finalized their own D-Day plans.  On the 8th 
SHAEF approved the Annex to OVERLORD regarding the use of the Résistance.    
Added to the main OVERLORD plan several days after the rest had been completed, 
SHAEF formalized that SFHQ was to direct the Maquis in  
“widespread, pre-arranged and to a certain extent controlled, -- acts of 
sabotage will be carried out against specific types of targets, principally 
railway and telecommunications.  Action will also be taken to delay the road 
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movements of ENEMY reserves, especially armored units.  In addition, wide-
spread guerilla activity by small bands of lightly armed FRENCHMEN 
operating in the ENEMY’s back areas will undoubtedly take place.  This 
activity will be organized and coordinated to the fullest extent possible by 
SOE/SO Headquarters, LONDON through BRITISH, FRENCH and 
AMERICAN officers already in the field and by others who will be 
dispatched before and after the invasion.”   
 
The directive concluded its first paragraph with the low expectation that, “guerrilla 
warfare may reach a scale approaching that of minor military diversions.” 
The lessons of exercise SPARTAN the previous year resonated in the directive.   
 SHAEF made the provision for Special Force Detachments to be created in 
the 21st Army Group, and its subordinate Armies in order to enable coordination with 
the main forces.  It also reiterated that the effect of the Résistance was thought to be 
strategic and not tactical, in other words the cumulative effect of widespread, small 
scale attacks might have an impact.  It also highlighted the two main kinds of 
resistance groups – those “Allied French” meaning the groups that had been taking 
direction from the BCRA since the unification of the movements with de Gaulle’s 
Free French, and the “SOE/SO directly controlled groups” that the British and to 
some extent the Americans had been running without French coordination.47  If the 
“Allied French” failed to act, at least the others might.  SHAEF and SFHQ also could 
direct the Maquis groups, by using the BCRA plans, without informing the BCRA. 
 On the same day the Director of SHAEF Operations, Major General Harold 
Bull signed a directive telling SFHQ to arrange with the BBC the broadcast of the 
warning messages on Y Day and Y + 1, and then the action messages at H Hour 
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minus 7.5 hours.  Y Day and Y + 1 meant 1 and 2 June while H Hour minus 7.5 
meant seven and a half hours before the first landings commenced on the Normandy 
beaches codenamed UTAH, OMAHA, JUNO, GOLD, and SWORD.  Mockler-
Ferryman then had to coordinate with the BBC for more broadcast time as the 
increased number of messages went beyond their normal allotment time.48  
Furthermore, it meant doing this around General Koenig as no details could be related 
to the French, even when Eisenhower and made it plain to Koenig that he would do 
so.  FDR’s running argument with de Gaulle made it impossible for Ike to keep that 
promise.  It also put into question whether the orders, if broadcast without Koenig’s 
concurrence and participation, would be carried out.  Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Bull, 
Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell would have to sort out the timing of telling Koenig 
and have the tact to do it.   
 Also on 8 May the Capetown Castle arrived at the port of Mers el- Kébir and 
14 JEDBURGH teams stepped off the ship.  The forty-two JEDBURGHs, including 
Major “Hod” Fuller, transferred their gear onto a train for Algiers and the SOE/OSS 
Massingham base.49  These teams would be inserted into southern France from North 
Africa because the night was not affording enough time for aircraft to reach southern 
locations and make it back to Britain.  Prior to their departure, the JEDBURGHs who 
had grown to be friends and their competitive nature was often a measure of their 
friendship.  With the 14 teams departing Milton Hall, American Bill Colby proposed 
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a contest to see who could make it through one of their obstacle courses first.  Then a 
little betting occurred with Colby’s money on French Lieutenant Paul Aussaresses.  
Aussaresses came in third and Dutch Captain Arie Berstebreurtje won the race, while 
Colby lost his money.50  The JEDBURGHs, now considered trained for their missions 
by Colonel Musgrave, also had a chance to enjoy some leave in London.  “It was a 
wonderful time,” recalled Michel de Bourbon-Parme.  “If you were in uniform you 
could not pay for anything in a restaurant or night club.  It was absolutely fantastic. 
I’ll never forget it.  ….  All the nationalities were there…We were all there together, 
Poles, French,  . . . everybody.  All united…. All wanting to go to Germany to kick 
the Germans . . . in . . . the . . .butt.”51   
 Unfortunately for Eisenhower, SHAEF, Special Force Headquarters, and the 
Résistance, Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle were not so unified.  Several issues 
remained in contention, particularly occupational civil affairs as D-Day neared.  The 
political leaders’ inability to work out details of occupation policies, including 
whether Allied currency or only French printed notes would be used, caused 
Eisenhower great embarrassment.  On 11 May, he cabled Washington asking Chief of 
Staff General George C. Marshall for further guidance.  “The limitations under which 
we are operating in dealing with the French are becoming very embarrassing and are 
producing a situation which is potentially dangerous.”52  Until the leaders reached an 
agreement, Roosevelt would not sanction de Gaulle as the legitimate French leader.  
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With no one for Eisenhower to communicate an active Résistance plan to, a valuable 
asset would be squandered.  Would de Gaulle countermand the BBC action 
messages?  Would Eisenhower be forced to invade France without aid from the FFI? 
 Perhaps it would all come to nothing as some SFHQ planners feared.  The 
larger number of “message personnels” that the SOE asked to be broadcast would 
certainly draw attention from the Germans.  Few arguments between the British SOE 
and certain French leaders had a longer history.  The British sought a decentralized 
resistance organization for security purposes, but some of the French leaders wanted a 
centralized French resistance organization inside France.  Their efforts to go against 
the British seemed to have often been effectively stopped by the Gestapo with arrest 
after arrest of senior Résistance leaders.  There was even debate about General 
Koenig parachuting into France, but that never got serious consideration.53  In any 
event, the Plan Vidal was not intended to be brought about by the BBC action 
messages broadcast on D-1, but due to the way in which they were broadcast, some 
Maquis units got that impression. 
 The debate with the CFLN and its constituent elements on this point was a 
long and continuing conversation.   What did it mean to espouse a “national 
insurrection” from a political point of view?  What would its utility be to the military 
effort?  The British and later the Americans only sought Maquis activity that 
supported the Allied landings and subsequent operations.  Many French leaders, 
including de Gaulle, Koenig, and the BCRA staff officers agreed with this, but 
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various communications, broadcasts, and their official newspapers parachuted into 
France used language that could be read the other way.  For instance during the 
Glières battle, the French language accounts about the battle on the BBC contained 
vivid descriptions and were a source of inspiration to other like minded Maquis.   De 
Gaulle’s own language often elevated the issue and he failed to clearly dissuade those 
résistants from pursuing such a course of action, if they wished.54  Churchill’s supply 
of weapons and ammunition further reinforced the wrong message.  SHAEF’s 
decision to broadcast all the action messages for Plans Vert, Tortue, the aggregated 
Guerrilla war plans, and the telecommunication plans to all the French regions as well 
as the SOE circuit leaders could be construed as Plan Vidal.  But this was not 
SHAEF’s or General Koenig’s intent.  
 Progress was clearly achieved however in a long and substantial meeting 
between Koenig’s Chief of Staff Colonel Henry Zeigler, BCRA planners, and the 
SFHQ planners on 20 May at Finchampstead west of London.  SFHQ had scheduled 
the meeting with detailed discussions about the military effectiveness and estimates 
of various regions and sought BCRA’s advice.  Done so that the invasion area was 
not divulged, it nevertheless resulted in some detailed planning and some guidance 
from Koenig on regions of France that should received SFHQ’s attention with aerial 
re-supply, JEDBURGH team deployments, and SAS missions.  The purpose was to, 
“provide agreed upon recommendations to the Supreme Allied Commander” for 
activities after D-Day.  Furthermore the icing was melting regarding a single 
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command under Koenig.  The British representatives noted that it was Eisenhower’s 
wish and that Ike also wanted command exercised from London.  With all in 
agreement, the discussion turned to what assets would be deployed to what area 
inside France.  The group discussed the Vosges, central France, the Morvan, and 
Brittany.  With the recent arrest of the DMR in Brittany, the BCRA had selected a 
replacement to deploy as soon as the British could arrange it.  They noted that they 
had to notify their agents in eastern France that the summer moons prohibited flights 
there for at leas two cycles.  In the Drôme, and the Grenoble area, Massingham was 
to prepare re-supply of ammunition and that the Maquis there were not to attack the 
enemy installation in Grenoble until directed.  When Koenig was later briefed on all 
these issues, he concurred but overruled one thing.  The Morvan should be raised in 
priority and be classified a réduit, or protected place from which raids could be staged 
against enemy lines of communications.55  SFHQ accepted this idea and assigned a 
mission to that area led by the former RF Section Chief, Lt Col James Hutchison.56 
 But while SHAEF and its Special Forces were making progress with the 
French, no word came from FDR regarding an agreement or a way forward with de 
Gaulle.  Realizing the gravity of the situation now, Churchill sent a cable to FDR on 
26 May taking up the cause.  He tried to make clear that de Gaulle was becoming 
more and more important, the situation was becoming more and more dire, and that 
the press, parliament, and political considerations were forcing their hand.  Churchill 
believed that if their disagreement caused unavoidable casualties, the cost could be a 
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political one as well.  In what can only be describe as obvious, Churchill bluntly 
reminded the President, “after all it is very difficult to cut the French out of the 
liberation of France.”57   
 Carrying on, SFHQ did achieve some progress at lower levels when it 
succeeded at merging their Algiers brothers with them for operations in France.  In 
April AFHQ had agreed to take direction regarding their activities with the French 
Résistance and on 23 May, the Special Projects Office Command (SPOC) stood up 
under General Maitland Wilson’s Allied Force Headquarters, which governed Allied 
military operations in the Mediterranean.   General Wilson now had SOE and OSS 
personnel in his theater working together on French issues and SHAEF agreements 
with AFHQ regarding each Headquarters’ role in OVERLORD and the hoped for 
Operation DRAGOON could not be conducted on a more equal footing in that both 
headquarters had an entity conducting Allied unconventional war in France.58  
Furthermore, the first JEDBURGH team orders were finalized on the 27th and the 28th 
of May.  JEDBURGH Team HUGH was ordered to deploy near Châteauroux in 
central France with some elements of the 1st SAS Battalion comprised of British 
commandos.  HUGH’s mission was to “act as a liaison between the SAS troops and 
such Résistance as may be available in the area.”  The SAS unit was to assess the 
feasibility of establishing a base of operations from which it could conduct raids on 
the enemy’s lines of communications.  SFHQ gave F Section responsibility for 
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running the operation and would arrange the SAS and Team HUGH’s reception and 
drop zone.  Remaining compartmentalized however, it also directed that the BCRA 
“will not be consulted during preparation.”  Team Harry’s mission was similar in that 
it was going in with elements of the 1st SAS Battalion and to be conducted under the 
auspices of F Section with no notice given to BCRA during the planning.  SFHQ 
directed HARRY to be parachuted into the Morvan area approximately 200 
kilometers east of HUGH.59   
 Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith met with General 
Koenig on 30 May, five short days to the launch of OVERLORD, to discuss 
command arrangements and integrating the French into SHAEF’s structure.  Bedell 
Smith, reiterated Ike’s long held desire, told Koenig, “those dropped with the role of 
making contact with Résistance groups should be under your command.”  In all 
practical terms this would mean JEDBURGH teams, SAS units, and all other 
missions sent to the Maquis would be commanded by General Koenig and his 
London staff element.60   
 Evidence suggests that Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman and the OSS London 
chief Colonel Bruce also met with General Koenig, late on the 30th to tell him that the 
warning messages were going to be sent out on 1 and 2 June.61  The meeting was a 
courtesy as SHAEF had directed them to be sent, not only to the Anglo-American 
circuits in France, but also to the resistance regions controlled by the BCRA.  How 
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firmly they were controlled in this case by SHAEF, is demonstrated in the fact that 
SHAEF bypassed the FFI’s own commander to direct his forces to prepare to 
accomplish their part of Plan Vert, Tortue, conduct Guerrilla war, and attack enemy’s 
telecommunications in accordance with the BCRA plans, which had now become 
SHAEF operations.  After the conversation, Colonel Bruce took a train to meet up 
with General Donovan who had arrived from Washington.  Together they boarded the 
USS Tuscaloosa and were on board it as it participated in the maritime operations 
supporting the landings on D-Day.  Bruce did not return to London until 10 June.62 
  The Prime Minister’s patience with the President seemed to have evaporated 
so that when he still had not heard from FDR about inviting de Gaulle to Washington, 
he decided to handle the matter himself.  He wrote to Eisenhower that he believed, “it 
essential that the French Committee should be told before the operation starts and the 
only safe place to tell them is here where we have them under our influence.”  
Agreeing quickly, Eisenhower wrote back to Churchill that “it would be of the 
greatest possible value” to have de Gaulle make a broadcast along with the other 
heads of exile governments.63  Churchill invited him and made a plane available for 
him and a small group to bring him from Algiers to London.   
 Koenig now awaited de Gaulle’s arrival knowing that the BBC messages had 
been broadcast on the 1st but he did not know that on the next day SFHQ drafted up 
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another set of orders for JEDBURGH teams FREDERICK and GEORGE to go to 
Brittany with elements of a French SAS Battalion.  SFHQ also directed this French 
SAS unit to establish a base from which they could raid in south central Brittany 
while other French SAS would establish a base further to the west.  Both GEORGE 
and FREDERICK were to “arrange such assistance from the Résistance” as the SAS 
needed.  The JEDBURGH teams were in effect working for the SAS and were to 
arrange local Résistance support for whatever the French SAS commander may 
desire.  The London BCRA office was not to be informed of the use of French forces 
in combat until after they had departed.64   But certainly Koenig knew the great event 
was near.  The time between the broadcast of the warning messages and the broadcast 
of the action messages could not be more than a week, probably even less. 
 Around 6 p. m. on the 3rd, de Gaulle landed on English soil and received a 
note from Churchill inviting him to lunch the following day.  The Prime Minister 
asked to meet him near Portsmith where he was inspecting the invasion 
preparations.65  The result of the meeting was important for Eisenhower as he wrote 
in his diary, “We have direct means of communication with the Résistance groups of 
France but all our information leads us to believe that the only authority these 
Résistance groups desire to recognize is that of de Gaulle and his committee.  
However, since de Gaulle is apparently willing to cooperate only on the basis of our 
dealing with him exclusively, the whole thing falls into a rather sorry mess.”66  But of 
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course he had more to see to than only the French Maquis.  The magnitude and level 
of effort regarding OVERLORD was staggering.  It involved over 7000 ships, 11,590 
aircraft, carrying and supporting 150,000 soldiers across the English Channel onto the 
Normandy beaches and northern France.67   
 Around 9:30 that same evening Eisenhower assembled his senior staff and 
commanders to hear the last details.  For the invasion machinery to effect the 
operations on the intended day of 5 June, Ike had to confirm the go order by the 
morning of the 4th giving the amphibious landings, the airborne landings, the air 
support, the maritime activity, and the deception operations enough time to get to 
their final assembly points.  Thousands of soldiers had to board ships and aircraft 
which took hours.  The RAF meteorologist gave a pessimistic report, and Ike 
determined to see what the weather looked like in a few hours and requested the same 
group to reassemble at 4:30 the next morning.  If the weather prohibited the landings 
on the 5th, they would still have time to postpone.68    
 Before dawn on Sunday, 4 June the same group was back at SHAEF Advance, 
near Portsmith only to learn the weather was not improving for tomorrow morning.  
They decided to postpone for 24 hours.  Ike, who had not been feeling well, returned 
to his bunk.  Around 6 a.m. General Bull called to speak with Ike, and when his aid 
told him Eisenhower was sleeping, Bull passed along the bad news that the press 
office had mistakenly sent the teletype message that Allied forces had landed in 
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Europe.  The story was immediately cancelled, but the Soviets, Germans, and some of 
the wire services in the U. S. had the story.  Butcher also exclaimed in his diary, 
“Cripes, even de Gaulle coming to this camp today, to see Ike of course.”69  Ike’s 
SHAEF Advance headquarters was a popular and exciting place. 
 As news arrived of the Allied victory and the fall of Rome, staff cars brought 
Generals de Gaulle and Koenig and other French officials to meet Churchill along 
with his ministers Bevin, Eden, and his Generals Ismay and Smuts of the Imperial 
General Staff.  Both Ismay and Smuts, a South African, had a great deal of experience 
in unconventional warfare with Smuts participating in the Boer War forty years 
before when Churchill was an enemy lieutenant on the British side.  For Churchill, it 
seems, experience in Guerrilla war was a cause for befriending someone, it did not 
matter what side they had been on.  De Gaulle and Churchill discussed the invasion 
and Churchill informed him that the time was imminent.  De Gaulle responded that he 
thought so, since the sudden increase in BBC messages led many in Algiers to 
conclude it must be near.  After lunch the subject turned to politics.  The Prime 
Minister tried to get de Gaulle to concur about the American and British occupation 
policies.  With such an agreement that day, Churchill indicated that he could arrange 
for de Gaulle to go to the White House for a cordial and fruitful meeting with FDR.  
Now deeply suspicious, de Gaulle wondered how sincere the Americans and British 
governments were in this matter since he had attempted to do meet with them and 
discuss these issues nine months before.  After a long list of affronts, that had, until 
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now, been reined in, he ended by raising the currency issue and registered his 
complaint about the Allies printing French money without his consent.  The 
discussion degenerated into a shouting match culminating with Churchill exclaiming, 
“Between Europe and the deep blue sea, I should always choose the sea.  Each time 
that you force me to choose between Roosevelt and you, I will always choose 
Roosevelt!” Labour Minister Ernest Bevin quietly commented that Churchill’s views 
were not those of the entire cabinet.  With the air somewhat tense, Churchill proposed 
a toast and de Gaulle answered the toast with, “To England, To Victory, to Europe.” 
Like de Gaulle’s final decision on Mers el-Kébir nearly four years before, he knew 
France’s future still depended upon British victory.70   
 At 4:30 the meeting adjourned and they made their way to Eisenhower’s 
headquarters where they were greeted with an honor guard.  Eisenhower briefed de 
Gaulle and the other French leaders on the amphibious assault portion of 
OVERLORD and de Gaulle, very much impressed with all the preparations, 
congratulated Ike on the efforts. Then Ike discussed things alone with de Gaulle on 
the path outside where de Gaulle would have room to “to wave his arms and talk.”71   
Their discussion centered on the task at hand, specifically the broadcast de Gaulle had 
agreed to make.  Eisenhower handed de Gaulle a version he had written, saying it was 
a draft.  De Gaulle agreed to review it, but did not like the tone and the content 
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regarding inferences that Eisenhower was the chief authority in France.72 General 
Koenig promised to bring back a copy of a completed draft on the next day for 
review.  If done in time SHAEF’s chief of psychological operations Brigadier 
General Robert McClure could complete the recording for use during D-Day.73  With 
that tenuous agreement done, de Gaulle would make the broadcast, Eisenhower 
returned to his tent and after supper grunted when given the false Associated Press 
release.74  Between that mistake, the high volume of BBC messages, and everything 
else that might tip off the Germans, it seemed a trifle at that point. 
The next day, with the weather still causing great concern, Bedell Smith informed 
Captain Butcher that de Gaulle refused to broadcast, and Butcher thought it was due 
to the words regarding civil control of France belonging to Eisenhower.   When 
Butcher informed his boss of this, Eisenhower replied, “to hell with him….if he 
doesn’t come through we’ll deal with someone else.”75   Of course there was no one 
else.  That evening, beginning at 9:15 p.m. the BBC broadcast one hundred and 
eighty-five action messages requiring 15 minutes of air-time.76   
 Most of them were nonsense, such as “the duck’s wings are still busy.”  
But others were inspired.  The SOE code writers, in this very fitting moment also 
used a line from Cyrano de Bergerac, “A la fin de l’envoi, je touche.”77  But how 
sharp was this sword, so hotly contested, doubted, and long prepared?  And how 
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many swords were there?  SFHQ gave SHAEF a fairly sanguine estimate that it 
believed 577 targets would be attacked in the Railway plan, 30 roads would be cut, 
and 32 telecommunications sites would be sabotaged.  Additionally, SFHQ backed up 
those efforts with the Guerilla plan and sent the message for Guerilla warfare to 
engage in maximum interference with road, rail, and telecommunications at the same 
time.  More targets could be attacked, but the Maquis still lacked arms.78  A 
somewhat pessimistic account came from a British planner in SOE to his American 
counterpart when asked that same question.  The SOE planner revealed that the plans 
all together started with 100 men rising on D + 1 and culminated four days later with 
100,000 having participated in operations at some point during that time.  But he 
warned the figures were only estimates not to be used for planning any other 
operation that required their support.  After all, the Résistance was, “an entirely 
unpredictable and nebulous force.”79 
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Chapter FIVE 
 
 
Included in Prime Minister Churchill’s daily read file shortly after the 
invasion was the following message from France: “The task of the French Résistance 
organization are… 1) In the landing area, direct guerilla support, 2) in the hinterland 
demolitions and minor harassing operations, 3) In the interior mobilization zones – 
organization for major operations.”  Continuing on, this intercepted Wehrmacht 
message to its army units in France warned that the Allies intended to parachute 
detachments of uniformed officers, “along with a considerable increase in weapon 
dropping” to accomplish the missions above during the weeks of 28 May to 9 June 
when the moon provided the required illumination for night operations.
1
 German 
assessments of Allied intentions for the Résistance proved to be largely accurate.  
Furthermore, their information on the intentions of the Forces Françaises de 
l’Intérieur was substantial.  Their persistent arrests provided a great deal of fidelity 
regarding the directives from London and Algiers to the interior.  For example, on 22
 
April 1944 the MBF distributed a translated copy of the directive from the Savoie’s 
regional FFI leader to his department leaders.  The Germans acquired the document in 
its entirety, translated it, and sent it throughout France.
2
  
But the MBF, the Wehrmacht’s senior element in France Oberbefehlshaber 
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West (OB West), and the Vichy authority’s Milice and Gendarmes were often at a 
loss to effectively stop Allied actions with the Résistance.  Perhaps the greatest 
challenge for the Germans was caused simply by the wide variety of forces the Allies 
and the CFLN inserted into occupied France over the course of the next four months. 
The multiplicity of the kinds of special units and intelligence agents parachuted into 
France before and after the invasion signal the wide variety of tasks, as well as the 
necessity for redundancy SHAEF, SFHQ, and the BCRA thought were necessary to 
harness the Maquis.  Besides the JEDBURGH teams, the Allies parachuted in British 
and French SAS teams and American Operational Groups (OGs) in order to attack 
specific targets or to defend key assets such as bridges or power plants. The Allies 
also inserted SUSSEX, BRISSEX, and OSSEX teams to observe enemy troop 
movements and radio that information back to Britain.  The SOE, OSS, and BCRA all 
had networks of spies attempting to store explosives and ammunition for D-Day and 
subsequent operations.  More recently, at Finchampstead on 20 May, the three nations 
also conceived of Inter-Allied Teams comprised of military officers directed to 
represent Allied political aims to various Réduits, or centers of guerilla activity where 
relatively large Maquis formations would probably rally and where Allied leadership 
would be needed.3  
But probably the most important and long-term asset of all the various kinds of 
clandestine people deployed to occupied France were the previously discussed 
Délégués Militare Régionales, charged with consolidating the CFLN’s authority in 
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that region.  Many of the DMRs had been parachuted into France in late 1943 or early 
1944 and the ones who had survived to the Allied invasion on 6 June began to 
consolidate the CFLN’s authority as the various FTP, AS, ORA, and other assorted 
Maquis units drew more and more men and boys into their ranks.  The seventeen men 
in the twelve regions who attempted to perform this key duty were charged by de 
Gaulle to unify the military effort under the authority of the CFLN.  Or as Clausewitz 
might say, they were responsible for bringing military action in line with the CFLN’s 
political aims.  Specifically, that meant France’s liberation from Germany, the 
punishment of the collaborators, and the avoidance of an Allied Military Government 
of Occupation.  Waiting in the wings, the CFLN had regional liberation committees in 
Algiers or in France expecting to take the reins of civil power before the Allies could. 
Their mission then was to unify the Résistance at the regional level, mirroring what 
de Gaulle had achieved at the national level.
4
  Toward that end, the support of the 
JEDBURGH teams, working for General Koenig, as did the DMRs, meant an 
increased chance in their political unity translating into effective military effort.  
But to many, that day was far off and to the Germans, the specter of defeat 
had not yet settled upon them.  Leading German combat operations in France was 
Oberbefehlshaber West Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt headquartered in Paris. He 
took orders from Adolph Hitler in Berlin supported by his overall German Army staff 
headquarters, Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht (OKW).  The Luftwaffe and 
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Kriegsmarine headquarters in Berlin, in actual practice, commanded their air and 
naval forces in France so not only did von Rundstedt not have the authority over 
much of the MBF’s occupation forces, but he did not command the air and naval 
forces in France.  OKW and von Rundstedt had organized his forces into two army 
groups, Heersgruppe B commanded by Erwin Rommel and Heersgruppe G 
commanded by Johannes Blaskowitz. Rommel then commanded two armies, the 15th 
Armee headquartered in Belgium that had the task of defending the Channel coast-
line from Belgium to the Seine River and 7th Armee at Le Mans covering Normandy 
and Brittany and back to the Loire River.  Blaskowitz’s forces covered southern 
France with the 1st Armee in Bordeaux and the 19th Armee in Avignon.  In addition 
to active forces covering France’s perimeter, numerous reserve divisions were 
stationed around the interior, training and awaiting the arrival of more replacement 
soldiers and equipment in order to become fully mission capable.
5
  The Wehrmacht 
unit already discussed at Glières, the 157th Reserve Infantry Division, was one of 
these units.  Another was the 2
nd
 SS Panzer “Das Reich” Division undergoing refit in 
the southern French town of Montauban.  SHAEF wanted the transportation routes 
cut so this very powerful division could not participate in Normandy combat.  
In the opening days of the invasion, Eisenhower’s objective for SFHQ and the 
Résistance was for them to assist in the first phase of OVERLORD, meaning the 
assault and establishment of the beach head in Normandy, and the second phase 
which entailed assisting in the enlargement of Allied territory “west of the Seine and 
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north of the Loire” rivers.
6
  The sixteen JEDBURGH Teams deployed during this first 
phase of operation will be described in this chapter.   Their tasks were to ensure 
certain railroads and roads were cut making it difficult for the Wehrmacht to bring up 
reserves, and that communication lines were sabotaged making it hard for the enemy 
to coordinate a coherent defense, and to liaise with the local Maquis in order to train 
them for appropriate guerilla activities when directed by SHAEF.   In Koenig’s first 
order to the FFI he declared their mission was to fight. But he was careful to remind 
his forces to fight in a prudent and effective manner.   Those who were armed were to 
remain available as directed and those unarmed were to remain in contact with their 
commanders in order to receive weapons and training when arms arrived.  In other 
words, they were directed to wait until they could fight.
7
  Koenig and his British and 
American counterparts at SFHQ prepared JEDBURGH teams to deploy to France 
along with SAS parties and were drafting orders, briefing teams and over the course 
of the first and second phases of OVERLORD would send in sixteen JEDBURGH 
teams to liaise with the FFI and train their Maquis units.  The following chapter 
describes the activities of some of those teams and their experiences in France as 
Eisenhower’s direct means of communication to the Maquis.  
 
Team HUGH  
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Just after 11 p. m. on 5 June, an RAF Halifax bomber took off from 
Tempsford air base with JEDBURGH Team HUGH. After getting through “quite a 
bit of FLAK” from German anti-aircraft guns along the route, the team parachuted 
into the French darkness, north of the small town of Saint-Gaultier in the department 
of L’Indre.  Along with them were two of the officers of the British Special Air 
Service (SAS) mission, codenamed BULBASKET. French Captain Louis 
L’Helgouach, using the nom-de-guerre Louis Legrand, led the JEDBURGH team.
8
  
The second officer was British Captain William Crawshay and the radio operator was 
the French non-commissioned officer Rene Meyer, using the name Rene Mersiol.  
L’Helgouach had been recruited out of the Colonial Spahi Regiments in North Africa 
for JEDBURGH duty.
9
  Crawshay found his way into the SOE via a very circuitous 
route.  When the war started, he was a student at the University of Poitiers in 
southwestern France. His step-grandfather was Ambassador to France and he had 
spent a great deal of his childhood in Paris.
10
  When available for service in the 
British Army, he was too young to serve in his home regiment of the Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers and so volunteered for the 5
th Battalion, Kings African Rifles training Masai 
and Sawili soldiers in Somalia.  While serving in that unit, he was mistakenly strafed 
and wounded by a South African Fokker-Wolfe fighter. That wound and a subsequent 
severe case of malaria sidelined him in Mombassa, Kenya for over a year.  After 
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being placed back on active service he volunteered for the British Military Mission as 
a liaison officer to the Free French Brigade in Egypt where he met General Koenig 
just after his successful defense of Bir Heichem.  “I see that you have chosen a good 
regiment,” said Koenig, meaning to insult the English while at the same time being 
kind to the young Welsh officer.
11
  After watching, and missing, the battle of El 
Alamein from the heights above, he sought out more exciting work than he believed 
his current posting would provide.  A friend arranged for Crawshay to meet with 
General Gubbins in Cairo and during that discussion Gubbins agreed to take 
Crawshay into the SOE and sent him off to the JEDBURGH program, without 
revealing to Crawshay what the duties were.  The Welshman returned to the UK in 
November 1943 with orders to report to Milton Hall for training.  Comments in his 
records are not that hopeful however, with one of his superior officers, American  
instructor Lieutenant Bill Dreux remarking that Crawshay was “inept in many phases 
of military training.”
12
  Crawshay must have improved however, as Colonel 
Musgrave allowed him to be on the first team into France.  
Crawshay was familiar with this part of France having studied in Poitiers, just 
south west of his drop zone, and knew the region to be comprised of many small 
villages and farms. The 1936 census counted the population of L’Indre at 245,622 
with a population density of 36 people per square kilometer, making it one of the least 
populated departments in France.  Châteauroux was the largest town with a 
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population of no more than 6000 people.  Most people lived in small villages or on 
farms. There were large swaths of wooded areas in the south side of the department 
and the terrain rose into what emerges as the Massif Central south of L’Indre.  The 
department is defined by rivers with the Creuse River on the southwest, the Indre 
River running through the department’s center, and the Cher River running past the 
town of Issoudon on the east side, all flowing into the Loire River to the north. The 
farmland, woods, and vacant buildings all were conducive to hiding weapons and 
small bands of men. Other than agriculture, a small aircraft engine factory, two small 
automobile factories in Châteauroux and a bicycle factory in La Chatre contributed to 
the department’s economy.  On l’Indre’s southern edge was one of France’s principle 
hydroelectric plants along with the requisite high-tension power lines leading to 
Normandy and the Paris region.  Further increasing the area’s strategic value were the 
rail lines that transited the department. A national north-south line running from Paris 
to Toulouse bisected L’Indre while the east west rail line serving Nantes and Lyon 
also ran through L’Indre.
13
  In the 1936 elections, the last real indication of political 
sentiments, the Popular Front won 57.5% of the votes and 64% of the seats in the 
National Assembly with the PCF winning just under 10% of the vote.  Therefore the 
department could be described as center left.
14
  But the railroads were SHAEF’s 
primary concern and with Plan Vert in operation, they were receiving a great deal of 
                                                
13 Jouanneau, Michel. L'organisation De La Résistance Dans L'indre:  Juin 1940-Juin 1944. 
Versailles, France: Le Impremerie Aubert S. A., 1975.pp. 25 – 29.  
14 Cole, Alistair, and Peter Campbell. French Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789. 
Aldershot, Hants., England ; Brookfield, VT, USA: Gower, 1989, p. 69.  
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attention from the local Maquis.  
The area’s attributes were well known to the SOE as its present circuits in the 
area were the inheritors of the first successful insertion of an SOE agent in France in 
1941.
15
  Maurice Southgate’s arrest mentioned above had left the department in the 
hands of his two assistants, René Maingard and radio operator Pearl Witherington. 
They made the decision to divide up Southgate’s network of contacts and associated 
Maquis with Maingard planning to move off to the east into the Vienne Department 
while Witherington remained in northern L’Indre. These two ran the F Section 
circuits HUGH had been ordered to contact and whose Maquis HUGH was to train 
for guerilla work.  
Recognizing the incongruent tasks between their SAS colleagues and their 
own JEDBURGH work, the members of HUGH and the BULBASKET mission all 
agreed to ignore their SFHQ orders and separate.  Maingard concurred with this and 
after receiving more weapons and gear in a parachute drop on 6 June, inspecting the 
department’s Maquis units on 7 June, and receiving more of the SAS team members 
on the June 9, team HUGH and the SAS parted company.
16
  On 7 and 8
 
June HUGH’s 
messages back to SFHQ signal their certainty at keeping the rail line from Toulouse 
cut, and noting that the population was enthusiastic, declared that the “existing 
Maquis groups were doubling in 48 hours” and they asked for more equipment, 
radios, arms, and another JEDBURGH team to help with more work than they could 
                                                
15 Foot, M. R. D. Soe in France:  An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations 
Executive in France, 1940-1944. First ed. London, UK: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 
1966, p. 147 – 148.  
16 HS 6/526, pp. 1-2 of the French version of the report. BNA, Kew, UK. 
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accomplish.  SFHQ responded that their first priority was keeping the rail line cut, in 
order to keep units like the 2
nd
 SS Panzer from coming north, but also tempering 
Legrand’s and Crawshay’s enthusiasm somewhat by warning them to “keep out the 
undesirables” and limit the growth of the Maquis to those they could arm and train 
due to loss of mobility and inadequate supplies.  Radio operator Meyer signaled back, 
“Impossible to limit the numbers joining the Résistance owing to spontaneous 
uprising,” and he confirmed their need of the second JEDBURGH team.
17
  
The spontaneous uprising of the Maquis occurred in more than just HUGH’s 
area.  SFHQ received reports from other places in central France, in Brittany, and in 
the southeast between the Rhône River and the Italian border.  Such a rising was not 
what SFHQ wanted and neither did Koenig.  Only four days after the invasion, the 
situation compelled Koenig to send an order to the DMRs, and Bureau d’Opérations 
Aériennes (BOA) the Free French organization running the drop zones, to limit their 
actions.  For many reasons, Koenig did not want widespread action and feared its 
chaotic results.  Koenig’s order came to the DMRs in clipped telegraph language, 
“CURRENTLY IMPOSSIBLE PREDICT NORMAL SUPPLY WEAPONS AND 
AMMUNITION YOU LIMIT TO A SIMMER ALL GUERILLA ACTION STOP 
WHEN POSSIBLE BREAK CONTACT EVERYWHERE WHILE WAITING FOR 
PHASE OF REORGANISATION STOP . . . THIS IS A FORMAL ORDER STOP 
CONSTITUTE SMALL GROUPS RATHER THAN LARGE GATHERINGS STOP 
                                                
17 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, book 4, HUGH’s radio messages. pp. 21-22.  
 187 
GOODBYE"18  Having broadcast the order for general guerrilla warfare on 5 June, 
SHAEF did not now like the surprise it had on its hands.  The “unpredictable and 
nebulous force” that all believed would fail to rise in significant numbers, had 
exceeded SHAEF’s expectations considerably.  As one of the senior BCRA leaders in 
France at the time later wrote, the order, but more importantly the slowing down of 
the aerial resupply of arms, “effectively contributed to the avoidance of the useless 
sacrifice of the French population.”19  Koenig had a tenuous command structure in 
place that could not operate in the open, therefore, if SHAEF did not want the Maquis 
to do anything, it simply would not authorize aerial resupply of weapons.  The flights 
now became a blunt instrument for Eisenhower to control the Résistance. 
Nevertheless, having an increasing number of JEDBURGH teams in France 
would be a more effective way of controlling the Maquis so their deployment kept 
pace.  A “Carpetbagger” B-24 took off from RAF Harrington with Team HAMISH 
and their 12 containers of equipment and weapons at 10:32 pm on 12 June.  The 8-
man crew, commanded by Major Robert W. Fish, flew their aircraft to the drop zone 
with no enemy opposition and good weather.  HAMISH and its 12 containers of 
equipment departed the aircraft over the drop zone at 2:08 am, and in keeping with 
the procedure to avoid detection, dropped the men and equipment from only 580 feet 
above the ground. After dropping off the JEDBURGHs, the crew circled back around 
to drop off one container that got hung up, and then flew a route dropping propaganda 
                                                
18 “Telegrams à ELLIPSE,” 10 JUIN 1944, 3 AG 2 562, AN, Paris, France. 
19 Pichard, Michel. L'Espoir des Ténèbres:  Parachutages sous l'Occupation: Paris, Editeur, 1990. p. 
254. 
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leaflets over three towns in France.  Fish and his crew arrived safely back at their 
base a little after 5:00 am.
20
  Team HAMISH, comprised of American Lieutenant 
Robert Anstett, French Lt René Schmitt, using the nom de guerre Lucien Blacere, and 
American Sergeant Lee Watters had arrived, fulfilling HUGH’s request for more 
help, and just in time. German combat units were organizing themselves and activity 
in the region was beginning.
21
  SOE agent Pearl Witherington was nearly caught on 
11 June and her organization was momentarily scattered.  HUGH and HAMISH 
could now fulfill the long intended use of JEDBURGH teams as a reserve force 
taking the place of arrested or disestablished F Section agents.
22
  
Over the course of the next two weeks, these two teams moved around the 
region splitting the work load and coordinating their activities not only with each 
other, to the degree possible given the German ability to intercept radio 
communications, but also with the F Section agents and the FFI leadership.  So 
instead of replacing, JEDBURGH teams often augmented them.  They received at 
least three more night parachute re-supply missions and attempted to organize the 
Maquis in manageable groups defined by their ability to arm, train, and equip them. 
HAMISH radioed SFHQ on the 24
th
 reporting that, “RAILROAD AND 
                                                
20 Mission Report of Drop – Fish Crew- 0629, 13 June 1944, Carpetbagger Archive, 
http://home.comcast.net/~801492bg.historian/Index.html.  This Web site is run by the son of a 
former “Carpetbagger.”  Over the course of the last 20 years, Mr. Tom Ensmigner, Lt Col J. W. 
Bradbury, USAF (Ret.) and and many others have taken documents from the national archives 
regarding Carpetbagger operations and placed them on the web site.  Mr. Ensminger’s work 
supporting this endeavor is a marvel. 
21 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Book IV, pp. 22 and 46.  
22 (Witherington), Pearl Cornioley, Report by F/O Pearl Cornioley (nee Witherington), 23 November 
1944, HS 6/587, British National Archives, Kew, UK.  
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TELEPHONE FINISHED, ROADS DIFFICULT IMPOSSIBLE STOP BOCHE 
BUT CAN SLOW DOWN BY AMBUSH  FOR THIS NEED MINES AND BOOBY 
TRAPS. …. BEEN PLAYING GAMES WITH BOCHE PATROLS ITS FUN”
 23
  
But what was not “fun” was the multiplicity of French units, many unaware of 
the others, beginning to impede coordinated action.  The Maquis in the area, 
comprised of FTP, AS, and an ORA unit were unable to coordinate actions at this 
point forcing the JEDBURGH teams to consider evacuating the area and head south 
since the Germans were conducting such strong actions in Indre. Making the issue 
more complicated was the belief in the region, true or not, that the British had favored 
the FTP in their policy of arming the local groups, leaving the AS and the ORA not 
only bereft of weapons, but suspicious of any link to the Free French and SHAEF in 
London. On 20
 
June, JEDBURGHs Crawshay and Legrand met with Colonel 
Raymond Chomel who was the commander of the ORA in the department.
24
  Chomel 
used the pseudonym “Charles Martel” which recalled France’s successful defense of 
Christendom from the Muslims near Poitiers in 732 A.D.  A regular Army officer, he 
commanded a unit comprised of regular infantry and was “horrified” that he might 
have to take orders from Theogene Briant, pseudo Alex, who was the FTP’s leader in 
that part of L’Indre.
25
  During two meetings they began to defrost the local groups 
incompatibility, aided by the BCRA’s Operations officer for the region, Georges 
Heritier, pseudo CROC, who had parachuted into the region in January.  Heritier was 
                                                
23 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Target 1, Vol V, Book I, p. 52. The term “Boche” is a pejorative 
often used by WWII soldiers, especially the French, referring to the Germans.  
24 HS 6/526, BNA, Kew, UK. p. 4. 
25 Ibid, p. 4 and Crawshay sound file 12521, reel 2, IWM.  
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captured in April but escaped and now served as the Assistant DMR.
26
  But their 
meetings were halted on two occasions due to raiding parties of Germans.  In one 
instance, they all had a narrow escape with Merisol having to hide in pile of coal and 
Crawshay in a basement closet across from a wine cellar. The Gestapo officer, seeing 
the wine cellar and not wanting his men to get into it, ordered them all to leave the 
basement where the JEDBURGHs hid.
27
  
Nevertheless, they again attempted negotiations and overcame the 
disagreements when Legrand and Crawshay agreed to pass orders to the ORA, the AS, 
and the FTP, on the guise that those orders were coming from Eisenhower through 
Koenig.  Chomel agreed to take orders from SURCOUF, the commander of the AS in 
the region.  Chomel would command “mobile” units, and they also created sector 
chiefs for static troops.  Moreover they agreed to leave many in reserve since they did 
not have arms for all.
28
  On 25
 
and 26 June, they managed a two-day discussion at 
HUGH’s command post without being hunted by Germans.  Not only was Chomel, 
Heritier, and other FTP leaders there, but the DMR Eugene Dechelette arrived and led 
the discussions.  Dechelette had been in France since February, a few days after 
marrying a British woman in London.  The BCRA then arranged for Dechelette to 
parachute into France but his jump was not as fortunate as the JEDBURGHs’ had 
been since he broke his ankle upon landing.
29
  But by June his leg had healed and 
                                                
26 “Biographical file, George Hertier, HS 8/1001, BNA, Kew, UK  
27 Crawshay sound file 12521, reel 2, IWM.  
28 HS 6/526, BNA, Kew, UK. pp. 4 and 5.  
29 “Telegrams de ELLIPSE” 10 Feb 44, 3 AG 2 561, AN, Paris, France. 
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now he was attempting to assert the authority of the CFLN in the R5 Region.  
Crawshay and Legrand wrote later that during his two-day discussion with all the 
leaders, Dechelette approved of their previous arrangements but wanted to undertake 
more action against the Germans. The Jeds disagreed. They believed, and London 
concurred, that few of the Maquis units were ready for major action against the 
Germans. But impressed with Dechelette, the JEDBURGHSs later commented that 
he, “was most clear headed” and “completely dominated the situation” during this 
key meeting that settled command of the Indre, the northern most department in R5, 
with the FTP and AS Résistance firmly under the control of Koenig.
30
  
But in all this, Team HUGH seem not to recognize that Dechelette also 
reported to General Koenig, and that Dechelette’s own radio messages were also 
informing SFHQ and Koenig of what was occurring.  Koenig seemed to take more 
notice when contacted by Dechelette and often gave personal direction to DMRs few 
JEDBURGH teams received. In this case, the Allied JEDBURGHs, with more tactical 
liaison duties, seem to be regarded as a reinforcing mechanism for DMR actions.  In 
telegrams to Dechelette on 24 and 25 June, while the meeting was being conducted at 
Team HUGH’s headquarters, EMFFI told Dechelette, we “WARMLY THANK YOU 
FOR THIS VERY PRECIOUS INFORMATION” and furthermore relayed to 
Dechelette that Koenig was glad that he had conferred with Bourgès-Maunoury who 
was serving as the southern zones Délégué Militaire and Dechelette’s superior.  
Koenig also “CONFIRM[ED] THE COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 
                                                
30  HS 6/526, p. 6. BNA, Kew.  
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DECISIONS”
31
 in a message to Dechelette, that he and HUGH had made.  While the 
JEDBURGH team’s report comes off sounding like HUGH acted in the absence of 
coherent direction from SFHQ and Koenig, in the military hierarchy, there is little 
reason to see why Koenig would send a message to a junior team of JEDBURGHs 
when he had related his wishes and congratulations to Dechelette, the senior man on 
the scene.  While growing more fused, the Allied and FFI certainly had redundant 
ways to liaise with localities all over France with F Section agents, RF Section agents, 
DMRs, Inter-Allied Teams, and JEDBURGH teams.  General Koenig, SHAEF’s 
commander for the Résistance was deferring to his senior person while retaining the 
ability and prerogative to communicate directly to anyone of his assets in France he 
wished to.  Therefore, it may look, and indeed be, a confusing array to control the FFI 
inside France, but Koenig was leading the effort to get the Résistance to come 
together.  
 
Organizing the Résistance in the MORVAN  
For instance, in the Morvan, Koenig’s late May direction to his staff to 
consider sending liaison capability to this region resulted in the deployment of nearly 
all types of teams to the area.  Teams ISAAC and HARRY, the SAS HOUNDSORTH 
mission, and the Inter-Allied or political mission codenamed VERVEINE all 
deployed there in early June. Lieutenant Colonel Hutchison, mentioned above who 
had been the director of the RF Section and later requested assignment to the 
                                                
31 “Telegrams à ELLIPSE,” 25 JUIN 1944, 3 AG 2 562, AN, Paris, France. 
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JEDBURGH teams, was chosen to lead both team ISAAC and the political mission 
VERVEINE. A French officer, Ferdinand Viat who used the pseudonym, 
Commandant Dubac, would later deploy to take command but in the meantime, 
Hutchison and his radio operator were to deploy and establish the initial base while 
attempting to ascertain the efficacy of Maquis activity in the region.
32
  
Alerted by Musgrave to prepare to depart from Milton Hall to London, 
Hutchison and his W/T, Sergeant John Sharp were briefed in a London flat SOE used 
to brief agents prior to their deployment. They looked at and studied maps of the area 
with the briefing officer in order to familiarize themselves with the departments of 
Nièvre, where he was to go, and the surrounding departments of Yonne, Côte D’Or, 
Cher, Allier, Loire, and Saône et Loire southeast of Paris and directly east of where 
HUGH was also being prepared to deploy.  Hutchison realized, as General Koenig 
had two weeks before, that the confluence of roads, railroads, and rivers all winding 
through the forests made it, “a part of France which the enemy was likely to use, as 
he hurried troops towards Normandy through the Vosges or as he made his way south 
to the Mediterranean.”
33
 Not only that, but later the Germans could be harassed going 
the other direction as well, for in their movement east, they would find the Maquis 
perhaps better ready to deal with them.  In either case, Koenig’s selection of this 
region and ranking it higher in priority seemed wise, but when Koenig had suggested 
on 20 May, that the area may become a réduit, and making it high on SFHQ’s list of 
                                                
32 “Team ISAAC,” HS 6/366, BNA, Kew, UK, p. 1.  
33 Hutchison, That Drug Danger. p. 104.  
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regions to cultivate, there now seemed to be no shift from sending ISAAC there to 
provoke action rather than tamp it down.  Specifically, as it stated in Team HARRY’s 
orders, the JEDBURGHs were warned against pre-mature Maquis operations due to 
the fact that the distance from Britain and the phases of the moon made flying to this 
part of France prohibitive after 9 June. With no way to get weapons to the Maquis, 
Hutchison’s duties were to be confined to relaying directions from London and 
finding out the nature of the local Maquis groups.  But Hutchison never realized the 
implications of his orders, nor how desperate he would be in the months of June and 
July. 
Hutchison’s and Sharp’s cohorts on team HARRY were supposed to depart 
with their elements of a British SAS mission on 4 June, but weather delayed them 
until 6 June.  While boarding the plane, British Captain Duncan Guthrie, HARRY’s 
team leader received a copy of ISAAC’s orders telling him at the last moment, that he 
would be under the combined mission of ISAAC/VERVEINE once in the field.  
HARRY was to liaise with any Maquis that may come to work with the SAS in order 
to conduct raids on enemy lines of communications, keep SFHQ informed regarding 
Résistance strength in the area while being careful not to “encourage any mass rising 
by resistance unless ordered to by SFHQ.”
34
 The difficulty this presented to the 
JEDBURGHs proved to be substantial. They could relay orders and send information 
back, but being reduced to passing messages from SHAEF to Maquis incapable of 
much action, went against the very nature of their training and what the JEDBURGHs 
                                                
34 “Order No. 3,” Odres des EMFFI, 3 AG 2 473, p. 2.  
 195 
believed their mission was to be.  Furthermore, it de-legitimated their authority in the 
eyes of the Maquis when they arrived and promised weapons and then failed to keep 
those promises.  
But the subtle shift in mission was only one aspect for which the Jeds had not 
been prepared.  Hutchison later complained that this merging of his JEDBURGH 
mission with the political mission of VERVEINE, compounded by the late arrival of 
his commander only served to increase his confusion regarding his mission’s intent 
and his role in the local resistance organizations.  Hutchison also complained that 
Viat and other French personnel were not coming to the field until the following 
moon cycle, “For reasons which were never explained to me.” Perhaps it was because 
the French personnel could not be released without the knowledge of the BCRA and 
General Koenig as SFHQ directed that the planning for this mission be done without 
informing the French.  However, Hutchison and Viat had lunch at the Cavalry Club 
prior to Hutchison’s departure and they discussed their mission and agreed on their 
methods and general philosophy about issues.35  It is curious that if Viat could not 
deploy until later, and if the French could not be informed, it seems against orders to 
have met at all.  
Once there, ISAAC and HARRY linked up with each other and began their 
work with the DMR for areas P1 and P2, André Rondenay, who went under the code 
name LEMINSCATE and his assistant for drop zones, Alain Grout de Beaufort who 
used the pseudonym PAIR.  PAIR’s duties of controlling drop zones meant that he 
                                                
35 Hutchison, That Drug Danger. p. 107-108.  
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controlled who was given weapons and was therefore a major player in regional or 
local Maquis.  Having heard the BBC messages on 1 and 5 June, the two met in Paris 
with their group and with a few vehicles and arms, made their way out of the capital 
toward the Morvan where they were to implement their portion of plans Vert and 
Tortue, the attack on the rail ways and on the roads thought to be used by German 
armored units reinforcing the front.  However, since their plan had been designed 
believing that the invasion would occur north of them at the Pas de Calais instead of 
further west at Normandy, the German traffic through the region was not as heavy as 
they expected.
36
  Rondenay, who was a railway employee and engineer, had also 
studied the best tactics for stopping and delaying armored columns.  Knowing how 
they operated, “it was essential to make the charges explode only to the immediate 
contact of the armored columns, after the passage of the motor cycles” that escorted 
the columns.  Surprise was essential to get the desired log jam of traffic and avoid the 
motorcyclists diverting the column or calling for support.
37
  Having managed to carry 
out many of their Plan Vert actions, Rondenay met up with JEDBURGHs of team 
HARRY on 10 June.  On 14
 
June Team ISAAC was directed to them in their small 
forest village of Lormes, 260 kilometers southeast of Paris.
38
  
Together they began to select the Maquis units that all agreed were worthy of 
maintaining and began the process to train them and receive weapons via air drops. 
                                                
36 Noguères, Degliame-Fouché, and Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 Á 1945. pp. 
86-89.  
37 Ibid., p. 89.  
38  HS 6/522, Team HARRY, p. 1 and Team ISAAC, HS 6/366, p. 3. BNA, Kew, UK. 
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But due to the distance from Britain, the shortened nighttime hours, and the moon 
phase no supplies would be sent.  Hutchison, who protested this situation on the 21
st
, 
evidently was not informed of this key issue prior to his departure on the 10
th
 even 
though team HARRY was briefed about this prior to its departure.  Also on the 21
st
 a 
row began over the command of the region’s Maquis.  Arriving to see Hutchison was 
Colonel Dupin who claimed to be their new commander.  Buttressing his claim was a 
letter of appointment from the COMAC.  Here we see the influence of the Comité 
d’action militaire du CNR or COMAC, the committee created by the interior 
Résistance charged with overseeing military actions.  One can also see the struggles 
then within the Résistance and the Allies as to the control of the Maquis’ actions.  
The COMAC has often been referred to as the voice of the communists and it 
represented probably the most consolidated influence they had upon the Libération.  
But their role was redundant with Koenig’s role in London as both entities claimed 
command of the FFI.  Both de Gaulle and Koenig agreed to their creation and 
existence largely due to the COMAC’s limited geographical influence and the need 
for their participation.  As historian Julian Jackson remarked quite accurately, 
“COMAC controlled less of France than the early Capetians.”39   So while the 
communists may have controlled COMAC, COMAC itself proved unable to control 
more than even Koenig did.  Furthermore, de Gaulle and Koenig participated in 
choosing COMAC’s members, furthering Koenig’s influence and creating a 
sponsorship role for him over the committee.  However, from Hutchison’s as well as 
                                                
39 Jackson, France:  The Dark Years, p. 549. 
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Rondenay’s point of view, Dupin’s arrival only sowed seeds of discord and 
confusion.  In an usually long message, Hutchison updated SFHQ on many things, 
requested arms, more JEDBURGH teams for the region, and stated that COMAC’s 
Colonel Dupin had arrived to command in the region but would recognize Koenig’s 
and SHAEF’s authority.
40
  While Hutchison believed this kind of arrangement to be 
essential, since those in France were better able to command in France, the question 
then became, what exactly was Rondenay’s role as DMR?  On 3 July Hutchison 
received instructions from SFHQ that he was “to treat no further with Colonel Dupin” 
to which Hutchison protested only to be directed to not compete with Rondenay.  
Hutchison was now completely mystified. It was “a gratuitous piece of advice that 
showed that London was not conversant” with his original orders or mission and he 
chaffed now under the reality of having to wait for weapons as well as Colonel Viat, 
who had yet to be deployed and assume command of VERVEINE.
41
  
But while Hutchison and Dupin dealt with command issues, HARRY and the 
SAS kept organizing hit and run ambushes with some of the Maquis units when arms 
permitted. Their ability to conduct railway cuts and run ambushes was modestly 
successful and infuriated the Germans who pressed the hunt to find the Maquis 
groups and the Allied units.  Due to an ambush done by the village Maquis units, the 
Wehrmacht “completely burnt” the village of Montsauche “as a reprisal.”
42
  Fifteen 
villagers were killed the next day as well as another severe reprisal conducted on the 
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41 “Team ISAAC,” pp. 6 – 7.  
42 “Team HARRY,” p. 3.  
 199 
village of Dun le Places, north of Montsauche.  Instead of effectively discouraging 
further actions, this only inspired and infuriated the local French Maquis.  The only 
restraint the JEDBURGHs could maintain on the Maquis was the ever-diminishing 
supply of weapons.  As one of the first air supply missions to reach them was closing 
in on the drop zone, the RAF aircraft struck a USAAF B-24 in the mid air darkness.
43
 
All the British and American airmen were killed and Captain Guthrie feared the 
Germans would discover the drop zone.  He worked quickly with some of the local 
villagers and Maquis to bury the bodies and cart off pieces of one of the aircraft so 
the Germans would incorrectly assume that only one aircraft had crashed due to 
FLAK instead of finding two and deducing the crash site was an active drop zone. 
Guthrie’s plan succeeded and “the Germans never realized anything more than one 
place crashed.”
44
  
While HARRY and ISAAC in the Morvan and HUGH and HAMISH in 
L’Indre struggled to create unity of action in their regions, the same struggles were 
continuing at the national level between the United States and de Gaulle’s CFLN.  In 
the mind of FDR, D-Day seemed to change nothing regarding American recognition 
of de Gaulle’s leadership and the CFLN.  Two days before D-Day, the OSS sent maps 
with overlays and other briefing papers to the President.  The materials demonstrated 
the Maquis groups were in various states of organization and readiness, that the 
British and Americans had links with some groups but not others, and that the French 
                                                
43 Ibid., p. 4 and OSS London Microfilm, Air Operations, Reel 9, Frame 0928.  
44 “Team Harry,” p. 4. 
 200 
had their own, and much larger, Maquis independent of the Maquis that the British 
had fostered beginning in 1941. The Résistance Regions were all precisely shown and 
included the DMRs’ code names, their assistants and operations officers as of the 
latest information.  The OSS also provided the estimate that their aggregate strength 
of the Résistance in France was 313,180.  In raw numbers, this translates into the 
equivalent of nearly twenty-one American Army infantry divisions. Of course, as the 
OSS made clear to Roosevelt, only a mere 6,630 of the Allied French Maquis, 
meaning the Maquis unequipped or connected with the SOE or OSS, were considered 
“well armed” while 18,200 were considered armed who were in contact with SOE or 
OSS circuits.
45
 Furthermore, these numbers were best guesses and in many ways 
irrelevant.  The questions most animating Roosevelt had to do with de Gaulle’s 
actions now that the invasion had begun.  
On 8 June, the American ambassador to the Court of St. James, John Winant 
telegrammed Secretary of State Hull and related the frustration the British 
government had toward de Gaulle’s actions since his arrival.  De Gaulle had made the 
D-Day broadcast, but not without consternation and only in de Gaulle’s words later in 
the day so he would not appear to be last among all the exiled European governments. 
But now that the broadcast was done, the currency and French liaison officer issues 
needed attention in order to aid Division and Brigade commanders dealing directly 
with the French population near the combat zone.  De Gaulle had blocked both, but 
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Winant now told Hull that the French had released some of the liaison officers for 
duties with American and British units.  The currency was another matter and as of 
yet, unresolved.  De Gaulle believed that it was indicative of “France was being 
treated in this respect precisely like Italy” and was grating upon French fears of an 
AMGOT.  The Allied proclamation regarding the currency would be broadcast at 
mid-night, when it would not receive much attention since it did not have de Gaulle’s 
consent.  Furthermore, Winant hinted that British popular sentiments, as Churchill 
had warned FDR about in May, were beginning to coalesce around de Gaulle and the 
CFLN and that the Parliament and press believed de Gaulle “was not being given 
proper consideration.”  Winant went on to suggest that as leader of the CFLN, de 
Gaulle could be invited to Washington to “agree to the plans which have been worked 
out for the civil administration of France.”
46
  A tactful urging to Hull and the 
President that something must be done or relations with France would sour post-war 
relations with the United States.  However, this was lost on the President.  Admiral 
Leahy drafted a reply which FDR approved on the 13
th
 stating that he looked forward 
to de Gaulle’s visit where he would “direct his attention to our war effort toward the 
liberation of France.”
47
 In other words, FDR believed that de Gaulle should do what 
the United States wished simply because of American actions to free France from 
German occupation while de Gaulle saw too much evidence that the Allies sought to 
govern France and separate it from its colonies.  
                                                
46 Telegram Winant to Hull, 8 June 1944. Box 11, Franklin D. Roosevelt-John D. Winant, 1944, MAP 
ROOM FILES, FDR Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY.  
47 “OPNAV to ALUSNA London, 13.6.44,” Box 11, Franklin D. Roosevelt-John D. Winant, 1944, 
MAP ROOM FILES, FDR Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY.  
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But de Gaulle had his supporters in the US government and they were finally 
gaining some ground on the State Department and FDR.  The day after FDR replied 
to Winant’s telegram, Secretary of War Stimson spoke with his Deputy John J. 
McCloy about the issues with France.  Stimson was very concerned that American 
soldiers would not be able to purchase needed supplies and materials from the French 
population if they refused to accept the Allied currency.  Several weeks of progress in  
and work regarding the matter before the invasion seemed to be vanishing. 
Furthermore, the liaison officer issue had found its way into the press, probably due 
to McCloy feeding it to reporter, Stimson believed while General Marshall had 
“dressed down” two of de Gaulle’s “chief lieutenants” during his recent visit to 
London.  Stimson could see that Eisenhower was in a very poor position regarding de 
Gaulle and grew frustrated with Secretary of State Hull who “hates de Gaulle with 
such fierce feeling that he rambles into incoherence whenever we talk about him.”
48
  
Stimson was arguably the most experienced person regarding foreign affairs 
in FDR’s cabinet.  He had served as the Secretary of War for President Taft, then as a 
Colonel in the artillery in France during WWI.  He had successfully mediated a civil 
dispute in Nicaragua for President Coolidge and later became his Governor General 
of the Philippines.  President Hoover appointed him Secretary of State and in that 
capacity he had overseen the American negotiations of the London Naval Treaty, a 
major accomplishment in interwar disarmament.  Now in his second stint as Secretary 
of War, for a President of the other party, he was overseeing the largest ever 
                                                
48 Henry L. Stimson et al., The Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries in the Yale University Library (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Library, 1973), Microfilm.  See entries for 14 and 16 June, 1944.  
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expansion of American military might and the arming, training, and equipping of over 
eight million men and women.  All that experience served him well and he could 
understand Eisenhower’s embarrassment and desire for the United States and Great 
Britain to get together with de Gaulle on the issue.  FDR’s draft policy remained in 
London unsigned due to Eden and other members of the cabinet staying Churchill’s 
pen.  Stimson distrusted de Gaulle, but realized that while FDR’s and Hull’s policy 
sounded good in theory, it was not working in practice.  France would not be treated 
like a minor nation that allowed the United States to show it how to run its own 
affairs.  In an hour-long phone conversation with FDR, Stimson tried to talk to him 
about all this and after hearing the President speak glowingly of how the Maquis were 
slowing down two divisions in France’s interior, he then said that General Donovan 
had told him there may be other options for French leadership.
49
  
Suspicious of this claim, Stimson and McCloy talked to Donovan the next day.  
Donovan backed off such a positive aspect of other possibilities.  In fact, he had 
written a memo to FDR based on his discussions with de Gaulle’s representatives in 
London and Washington, his recent trip to the invasion zone, and evidently was 
pressing FDR to fully recognize de Gaulle and the CFLN.  But after speaking with 
Secretary Stimson, Donovan tore it up.  Stimson and Donovan realized that FDR was 
                                                
49 Stimson diary, entry for 15 June, 1944. Donovan often sent raw intelligence to FDR and reports he 
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not going to change his mind, so they changed their tack hoping to make some 
progress.  Instead Donovan recommended to the President that Eisenhower recognize 
de Gaulle as a military leader and in that capacity, which was already being filled 
largely by Koenig in London and Cochet in Algiers, de Gaulle could be broached 
regarding French civil affairs concerning Allied operations.
50
  Such a plan seems 
completely unworkable from de Gaulle’s point of view and perhaps after discussions 
with Stimson, who also wished to push the matter and McCloy, who had been an 
advocate of de Gaulle’s for over a year, demonstrated that the three were no longer 
willing to continue to sing a tune the President refused to hear.  As FDR’s close 
advisor Harry Hopkins remarked, “One more crack from McCloy to the boss about de 
Gaulle and McCloy leaves town.”
51
 While they were Republicans, serving in a 
Democrat’s administration, Stimson and Donovan may never have felt the same 
pressure regarding a political future that McCloy and others would as Democrats, 
nevertheless, their advice still, at this late date, became self-muted by FDR’s and 
Hull’s feelings and fear of about de Gaulle’s intentions.  The issue of recognition that 
Stimson and Donovan sought to get behind them, continued to fester.  
But while the President and his senior officials still pondered how to 
recognize de Gaulle, Eisenhower’s efforts to bring in French military command of the 
Résistance was getting into gear.  However, it would not come without severe 
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reshuffling and dislocation of SFHQ at the very time they were now executing their 
long planned use of the Maquis.  Koenig had been officially recognized as the 
commander of the FFI on 6 June, but was not given the resources to execute his 
mission.  Obviously those resources already existed in the form of the SFHQ staff 
comprised of the British and American officers as well as his own Bloc Planning staff 
in what was now the Bureau Rensiegnements et d’Action Londres or BRAL, as the 
BCRA had shifted to Algiers with the rest of the French provisional government.  On 
9 June, Koenig informed Ike’s chief of Staff General Bedell Smith that he had 
received de Gaulle’s approval to form a tripartite command under SHAEF, that he 
was declaring the creation his headquarters element l’Etat Major Forces Françaises 
de l’Intérieur (EMFFI) and named his French Air Force officer Colonel Henri Zeigler 
who used the pseudonym “Colonel Vernon,” to be his Chief of Staff.  Koenig’s final 
statement to Bedell Smith was that he awaited Eisenhower’s directives regarding the 
activities he desired from the Résistance.
52
  
General Eisenhower’s directive established that the priorities were first to 
“foster[ing] active Résistance to the Bridgehead area and in Brittany” and to be ready 
at a later date for larger scale guerilla activity in Brittany.  The second priority was to 
delay the movement of German troops to the battle area by focusing on the railway 
lines linking Normandy to the rest of France.  Thirdly, Eisenhower directed EMFFI to 
attack the telecommunication system so the Germans and Vichy regime would 
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continue experiencing difficulties coordinating their own actions.  But the directive 
also reminded Koenig that since the primary means of supply came from aircraft, he 
should “bear in mind the limitations of airlift” such as weight, weather, moon periods, 
enemy anti-aircraft capability, and the numbers of aircraft available for such work.  
Eisenhower also coordinated these issues with General Wilson Commander-in-Chief 
of the Mediterranean so he could coordinate SPOC towards SHAEF priorities.
53
  
How much did SHFQ and its nascent parent for operations in France EMFFI, 
manage to deliver to the Maquis in June and what were the results?  Sixty short tons 
of explosives, 9937 Sten light machine guns, 8800 pistols, 5677 rifles, 5505 Carbines, 
2110 Marlins, 932 Bazookas, 70 anti-tank mines, 2142 Light machine guns, and 
64,618 grenades.  Accompanied with the weapons were over eight million rounds of 
9mm ammunition, over 6 million rounds of .303 caliber rifle ammunition, 13,048 
rockets for the bazookas, nearly two million rounds of Carbine ammunition, and 288 
shoulder fired anti-tank PIATs.
54
 These arms and the weapons supplied previously 
had enabled the Maquis to make, as SHAEF touted somewhat gleefully, 500 railroad 
cuts in France due to FFI’s planning with the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer 
Français (SNCF) and the efforts around Plan Vert.  Post war inquiries into this have 
demonstrated the SNCF, the FFI, and Plan Vert were indeed effective with, for 
instance, 171 sabotage attempts in the eastern region – between Paris and the Belgium 
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border – that produced 136 successfully cut tracks.
55
  “The results achieved by the 
FFI have far surpassed the results generally expected” believed SFHQ but “in spite of 
warnings, Résistance groups have been taking premature overt action before they 
were fully armed.” Ominously now the FFI and the civilian population suffered from 
reprisals “at the hands of superior German troops.” Nevertheless SFHQ believed 
those enemy forces conducting the reprisals were then delayed from coming to the 
invasion area, seemingly failing to understand the reprisals were often carried out by 
soldiers under the MBF or reserve forces that were never going to be ordered to the 
front.  But SHAEF no longer believed the number of aircraft available to supply the 
Résistance was the limiting factor. Instead, the limiting factors were those aspects 
regarding planning air operations described above such as weather, moon phases and 
enemy action; two of the three SHAEF and its forces could do nothing about.  As the 
factors limiting the Maquis it was “the lack of arms, stores, funds, and trained 
leaders.”  Furthermore, the report advised SHAEF that, “SFHQ’s original estimate of 
future supply requirements will be entirely inadequate.”
56
 The numbers of Maquis 
flocking to join Allied efforts against the Germans and Vichy overwhelmed SHAEF’s 
ability to supply them, but not due to lack of aircraft, instead meteorology and moon 
phases were the limiting factors.  
But SHAEF’s growing faith in the use of the Résistance brought a greater 
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awareness of its ordeals, risks, and along with an obligation to supply more weapons.   
SHAEF directed the US Air Force to make up to 300 aircraft available for a single 
daylight operation codenamed ZEBRA.  On 18
 
June, SFHQ received confirmation 
from SHAEF of the aircraft, logistical support from the British War Office, and it 
promulgated its own orders to have all the containers ready for a massive mission on 
the 24
th
.  SFHQ representatives met with the US 8
th Air Force planners to sort out the 
vast details of this complicated operation attempting to supply weapons to the Maquis 
of four separate SOE Circuits:  MARKSMAN, DIRECTOR, SALESMAN, and 
TRAINER.  SFHQ made arrangements to distribute the containers from five different 
depots to nine different 8th Air Force bases and also devised BBC messages for 
broadcast on the day before the aircraft departed.  Weather forced a delay of a day, 
but on the 25
th
, the same day HUGH met with Dechelette and the Maquis leaders in 
L’Indre, one hundred and ninety seven B-17s entered French airspace and flew to 
four different drop zones.  One hundred and seventy six aircraft dropped their 
containers on their assigned drop zones while two aircraft were lost due to enemy 
action. The aircraft that turned back did so due to the lack of a good confirming signal 
from the ground.  The Maquis and SFHQ personnel on the ground were relieved to 
get the weapons.
57
  One American agent on the ground working in the R5 and R6 
regions signaled, “MAQUIS THANKS TO U S AIR FORCE FOR DAMNED GOOD 
SHOW. WHEN IS THE NEXT?”  However, that same agent painted a much bleaker 
picture upon his return.  Lieutenant Jean Claude Guiet, of the US Army, preferred to 
                                                
57 OSS London Microfilm, Roll 10, Vol. 13, book II, Miscellaneous, pp. 15 – 38.  
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receive weapons from the British because American air drops became infamous for 
an apparent lack of concern about the rigging’s quality.  When the Americans 
dropped weapons, “we had to run all over the country to find the containers” and 
during the daylight operations 359 of the 1296 containers suffered nearly a complete 
loss when their chutes failed to open. “The impression we got,” stated this American 
officer, “was that the Americans did not care where they dropped the stuff or how 
they dropped it.”
58
  But Operation ZEBRA was not done by the American 
“Carpetbaggers,” who had by this time gained proficiency in their work.  Instead, it 
was a first ever drop for bomber crews, the aircrews had little time to learn the 
tradecraft of flying at low altitude and dropping equipment rigged with parachutes, 
instead of their usual load of bombs from high altitude. The fact that seventy-five 
percent of SALESMAN’s containers actually survived intact is fairly remarkable 
given the short planning time and the complexity of such an operation.  
One of the other targets for the 8th Air Force and SFHQ’s efforts with 
ZEBRA was the Vercors and the growing numbers of Maquis now gathering on this 
rugged terrain east of the Rhone River about 100 kilometers south-south east of Lyon. 
At this drop zone, the 35 aircraft dropped 450 containers.  SFHQ received the signal 
from the Vercors organizers that they were “able to arm another 1500 men.”
59
  The F 
Section agent here was Francis Cammaerts who used the pseudonym ROGER.  A 
pacifist who joined SOE after his brother had been killed in action, he established the 
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JOCKEY circuit in March of 1943.  He left France later that year but returned during 
a harrowing stormy night when the aircraft he was to parachute from caught fire 250 
miles from his intended drop zone.  He and the crew all parachuted from an altitude 
of 10,000 feet while watching their aircraft burn and descend through the darkness, 
fog, and rain.
60
  Despite the harrowing experience, he reestablished and matured his 
circuit, and the Résistance in the region had come to rely on him for his 
resourcefulness, courage, and imagination.  On 6 June, the Allies designated him 
second in command to the regional leader and ORA Colonel Zeller, who used the 
pseudo FAISEAU or sometimes, Colonel JOSEPH.  In the rapidly shifting leadership 
roles of the interior Résistance, Zeller had been appointed to take command of the 
FFI for both R1 and R2 by the CFLN in Algiers.  They had lost their DMR, Laurent 
Burdet, code named CIRCONFERENCE, to arrest soon after D-Day and he remained 
imprisoned until around 25 June.
61
  
The loss of the DMR was only the beginning of the confusion.  Having 
received the orders from London over the BBC for guerilla warfare, the Region’s FFI 
headquarters Chief of Staff, Colonel Descour interpreted it to mean all out guerrilla 
warfare.  The F Section leader Cammaerts had to plead complete ignorance of a 
regional redoubt in the Vercors and the Guerilla actions of Plan Rouge as well as 
argue against the commonly held belief among the Maquis that the Allies were going 
to conduct a major Airborne operation on the Vercors plateau.  As June wore on it 
brought the deployment of JEDBURGH teams VEGANIN, CHLOROFORM, and the 
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subsequent inter-allied teams and an American Operational Group to the Vercors 
area.   All this activity served to reinforce the mistaken but nevertheless hardening 
belief that the Allies were going to mount a major operation and that they should hold 
out.
62
  
The team members of VEGANIN came up to the Vercors separately and from 
that point on remained apart.  British Major Neil Marten had gone up to meet 
Cammaerts and the other Maquis leaders prior to the ZEBRA parachuting of supplies. 
The day after ZEBRA, French Captain Gaston Vuchot, using the nom de guerre C. L. 
Noir climbed up to the growing and now fairly well armed Maquis camp. 
VEGANIN’s orders were to “harass to the maximum German communications” in 
the Rhone Valley with small groups of Maquis.  The team had departed Algiers on 
the evening of 8 June with radio man Sergeant D. Gardner.  But during the jump, 
Sergeant Gardner’s static line failed and he was killed.  After burying him with 
honors, the team spent the next two weeks meeting and assessing the situation in the 
region near the town of Beaupaire, north of Vercors.  Before they arrived, the BBC 
messages provoked the local Maquis to attack various German installations for which 
the Germans called for air support.  The Luftwaffe responded with great effect and 
elements of other ground units hunted for the “Terrorists” in the villages.  Failing to 
find any, they burned them and raped instead.
63
  The reprisals gripped the local 
residents in fear and they wished the Résistance would stop any more attacks. The 
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FTP units, who had not participated in any of these attacks, then used local 
sentiments against their AS rivals, and VEGANIN, now just parachuting into this 
cauldron of revenge and hatred, had to rally the demoralized AS Maquis while Vuchot 
tried to organize the local Maquis units, including the FTP, but found the latter 
lacking in more than weapons, equipment, and know how.  The FTP lacked any sense 
of appreciation for military authority, but more dangerously, had made their way in 
life prior to VEGANIN’s arrival largely thieving and bartering for food while 
showing no interest whatsoever in fighting.  Vuchot commented that their reputation 
in the region was poor and their sense of honor completely absent.
64
  But having 
nothing else to work with, he tried to convince them of their new mission given by 
the Allied command. Additionally, he believed the two leaders of the various units 
had great courage and showed potential.  Referring to one of his leaders at the end of 
VEGANIN’s mission, Vuchot wrote with a dark sense of irony, “Malboux was 
remarkable brave and audacious … [but] was without scruple . . . He died heroically 
at the very moment when I was planning to have him arrested.”
65
  The other local 
Maquis commander was called “Bozambo” and had a reputation in the region for 
running a good Maquis, one that could attract men to join it, but he was out for his 
own interests and Vuchot rarely got him to understand his part in the war.
66
 Vuchot, a 
French soldier imbued with a deep sense of honor forced himself to cajole, persuade, 
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and plead with these two while he attempted to achieve his mission.  
Notified of Gardner’s death, SPOC deployed a replacement JEDBURGH 
Team DODGE to reinforce VEGANIN with a W/T operator; they also sent American 
Captain Cyrus Manierre.  A West Point graduate and boxing coach, Manierre had 
served as an instructor prior to becoming a JEDBURGH.  Canadian L. Durocher 
served as VEGANIN’s new radio operator.  DODGE parachuted in and met up with 
Vuchot on the 24
th
 and accompanied him up into the Vercors.  Vuchot had been told 
of the plans to make Vercors a Maquis stronghold and not only disagreed with this 
course of action, but wished to inform the Maquis leaders on the plateau that it was 
counter to Allied orders.  Taking Manierre and Durocher with him, they hiked the 50 
miles up into the region and were reunited with VEGANIN’s commander Major Neil 
Marten as well as Cammaerts. But up on the Vercors plateau, with a fresh supply of 
weapons for more than one thousand Maquis the attitude was different regarding the 
possibilities of Maquis action when compared to the Maquis Vuchot had to the north. 
When they arrived to discuss things with Cammaerts, and the local FFI Commander 
for the region, Colonel François Huet who went by Colonel Hervieux, Vuchot could 
not persuade them to disperse. Unlike VEGANIN’s original orders, they were 
convinced their orders were valid, had a higher priority than VEGANIN’s and that 
they needed VEGANIN’s Maquis to join them on the plateau.  Huet sought to create a 
redoubt capable of staging raids along the Rhône valley on large enemy units. 
Cammaerts informed Vuchot that the Allied Command in Algiers had made 
Cammaerts the senior Allied officer and that all the JEDBURGH teams reported to 
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him.  That was not so much an issue, but then he proceeded to confirm the plans 
about the redoubt orders, that it took a higher priority than team VEGANIN’s orders, 
and that he was to send the Maquis groups he had been in contact with up to him. 
Vuchot could not see the wisdom of any of this and looked to his British teammate 
for confirmation that Algiers had indeed altered VEGANIN’s orders.
67
  
But more was occurring than Vuchot could understand.  Marten mysteriously 
said nothing to support his teammate and Cammaerts was firm and persuasive.  In the 
end they compromised and Vuchot was allowed to keep two Maquis units, but lost 
the argument about the validity of congregating at the Vercors as well as his radio 
operator, Sergeant Durocher. “With rage in my heart, I descended to the valley.”
68
 
Now with no full time communications link to Algiers or London, Vuchot and 
Manierre attempted to manage their FTP Maquis groups toward persistent harassment 
of the enemy.  
They focused on sabotage, which Manierre specialized in having been 
directed to focus his attention on the electrical plant at Beaumont-Monteux in the 
Isère department. By taking the plant out of action, they could deny the Germans the 
electrical power they would need in the region. Within the Maquis was a former  
electrical plant employee.  Using his inside knowledge, they devised a plan and with 
about 25 men, approached the plant at night, killing the guards as silently as possible 
and then entered it.  Manierre placed 30 kilos of explosives on the control panel and 
set the timer for 45 seconds and ran out of the area with his Maquis fleeing with him. 
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When the charges exploded, not only was the control room destroyed, so was the roof 
and there were numerous secondary explosions, large electrical hums and pops 
reflected and arced around the standing lines and the shock of it all shattered windows 
of the nearby homes. “We felt we had succeeded,” stated Manierre dryly.
69
  
Manierre spent the month of July conducting more sabotage and insisted on 
being part of the actions or leading them, even when Vuchot wanted him to remain 
behind. But Manierre insisted and often succeeded in his work, sabotaging troop 
trains, electrical facilities, and ambushing the enemy.  He established relations with 
some of the local Armée Secrète Maquis and they proved to be very effective.  But 
the banditry continued.  Manierre and Vuchot’s greatest trouble was with a small 
group of FTP who called themselves the “equipe speciale” or “special team.”  Their 
job was to procure supplies for the rest of the area’s Maquis.  To them, this meant a 
license to steal, bribe, and vandalize.  Having had enough, and with the persistent 
complaints of the local people, Manierre gathered a group who found them hiding out 
in a home. They refused to come out and a “brisk fire fight ensued, reminiscent of 
prohibition days in Chicago.”  The rifle fire and grenades killed them all, including 
the 2 women inside the house.
70
  
With the Maquis swelling in the region to “six to seven thousand men” 
Vuchot and Manierre, now rejoined by Durocher, requested more JEDBURGHs to 
help them arm and train them.  Manierre continued with his sabotage work and went 
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everywhere in civilian clothes.  EMFFI organized another major daylight drop of 
weapons to the Vercors as well as several other drop zones.  Operation CADILLAC, 
similar in scope to ZEBRA, occurred on 14 July, further infuriating the Germans.  
VEGANIN however, was conducting their own operations and fortunately for them, 
were not on the plateau during the long battle that occurred from 21 July until 6 
August.  However, the day before the Wehrmacht succeeded at sweeping the Maquis 
off the Vercors plateau, Captain Manierre’s luck ran out. Stopped at a road block in 
what he believed to be a different Maquis group, he got out of his truck only to be 
handcuffed.  While Manierre still believed it was all a mistake, the group found his 
US Army dog tags and their leader came up to him and chillingly said, “You Yankees 
must understand that there is one boss in France and that is Marshal Pétain.” Captain 
Manierre now realized that he “was in the hands of the Milice.”71  It was 5 August, 
ten days before the Allies would begin their second invasion of France with 
Operation DRAGOON.  
 
Teams IAN and ANDY  
As F Section agent Rene Maingard left Team HUGH in L’Indre, he arrived in 
Vienne and asked for a JEDBURGH team for that area.   On 14 June SFHQ drew up 
the team’s orders to deploy to Vienne and work with Maingard.  Together they were 
to make sure that “the general uprising must not take place” as well as make it clear 
there would be no supplies for such efforts.  Instead, IAN was to shut down the 
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Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours and Bordeaux-Niort-Saumur railway lines in SHAEF’s 
effort to block enemy reinforcements.  The orders also stated that IAN should radio 
back to SFHQ about the possibility of controlling a large enough area to support 
daylight drops.  With planning underway for ZEBRA, they wanted to get an 
assessment of doing something similar for IAN when it could be arranged.
72
  On 18 
June 1944, the Carpetbaggers attempted to take Team IAN to France; however the 
aircrew could not find the drop zone and refused to parachute IAN blind.  They 
attempted it again taking off at 10:39 p.m. on 20 June.  This time the crew 
experienced good weather all the way to the drop zone and clearly saw the bon fires 
and code letters from the ground and dropped the team and their equipment in two 
passes.
73
  But for one of the JEDBURGHs, the drop went poorly.  W/T operator 
American First Sergeant Lucien Bourgoin’s parachute opened late and at an altitude 
of 400 to 500 feet, every moment was critical.  Fortunately, Bourgoin landed safely; 
however he found his radios severely damaged.  Team leader American Major John 
Gildee and second-in-command French Captain Alex Desfarges, using the nom-de-
guerre Yves Delormes, arrived in fine shape.  Maingard’s reception team met IAN, 
collected its equipment, and drove the team to a farm serving as Maingard’s 
headquarters.  The team got off to a very slow start organizing the local Maquis as 
their damaged radios hindered the effort.  Bourgoin did partially fix one of the W/T 
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sets, but for nearly ten days the only communication was via Maingard’s radio.
74
  
SFHQ dropped ninety containers of arms prior to IAN’s arrival, and Samuel  
related information to SFHQ concerning the area’s Maquis.  SFHQ briefed IAN prior 
to departure of three groups numbering “150 highly disciplined men,” another 1500 
man group in the former unoccupied zone, and a third 2000 man group in the former  
occupied zone.  IAN was to train and organize these men into an effective force while  
also keeping the Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours and the Bordeaux-Niort-Saumur railroads  
cut.  IAN deployed with a modified JEDBURGH kit with fewer Brens and carbines 
and took more special rail charges to enable more sabotage, and enable guerrilla 
activity.   Samuel hoped to send them toward Chatellerault in northern Vienne giving 
them an area adjacent to HUGH, but unfortunately, heavy German activity caused 
Samuel to change his mind, and instead he sent them to southern Vienne and northern 
Charente.
75
  
On 22 June, SFHQ sent a message to IAN warning them, “German Infantry  
Division moving north Toulouse - Normandy. Keep us posted movement. Attack  
wherever possible.” Unfortunately, IAN’s damaged radios failed to receive the  
message and IAN spent the next week attempting to get a strong reception from their  
W/T.  Nevertheless, IAN organized the sabotage of the Bordeaux - Paris railroad and 
kept it cut until 26 June.   The JEDBURGHs also arranged to sabotage charcoal 
factories vital for German vehicles and attacked locomotive supply pumps along the 
railroad to Paris. When the Germans quickly repaired the railway damage, IAN asked 
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SFHQ to bomb it.
76
  
While pursuing minor operations, IAN conducted regional  
reconnaissance and attempted to arm and train the swelling Maquis ranks.  As they 
traveled from village to village they found groups and leaders willing to rally and 
recognize IAN’s role as a command link to SHAEF and de Gaulle.  Working an 
approximately one hundred square mile area south of Poitiers, IAN placed a nucleus 
of Maquis in villages encircling the area.  Using seven villages on cross roads, IAN 
created what they hoped would be a safe perimeter where they could train more 
Maquis and run drop zones.  Another group of Maquis specialized in demolition and 
sabotage, called “Sape,” they ran their own drop zone, keeping themselves supplied.  
Major Gildee, possessed great organizational skills and set training schedules, 
controlled supplies, and managed the drop zones. French Captain Desfarges made a 
point to show the French people his presence and “spoke to the assembled 
populations to encourage them and request their aid for future actions.”
77
  
As Maquis units received arms and trained and the sabotage unit became  
ready, they struck out to attack.  From 20 July on, they turned their perimeter into a 
“fortified bastion” with tree barricades, masonry, and mined bridges.  IAN also put 
officers and NCOs from the French regular and reserve army into their four 
battalions, which swelled to six thousand men, freeing IAN to oversee the entire 
effort. The team soon became a “regimental commander,” directing operations while 
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77 Ibid., p. 308-310 and Gauthier Interview, 6 March 1999. 
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leaving supply, discipline, and administration up to the separate Maquis “battalions.” 
IAN arranged communications with telephone lines, motorcycle couriers, and carrier 
pigeons. Short of money required to carry on operations, IAN arranged a no-interest 
twelve million Franc loan through the Free French from the Bank of Algiers. Also, 
some of the local French gendarmeries worked with the Maquis to set up police in 
their communities.  Moreover, IAN recruited four doctors, set up two hospitals, and 
arranged for SFHQ to send medical supplies.  All these events increasingly 
eliminated Vichy authority as well as Germany’s.
78
  
On 20 July, an estimated eight hundred Germans broke through the defenses  
and lodged themselves in Champagne-Mouton, a village the Maquis had retaken.  The 
enemy set up barbed-wire, ditches, and fortified their positions. Taking numerous 
hostages, the Germans threatened to shoot hostages and burn the town if attacked. 
From Champagne-Mouton, they sent out patrols for five days and attempted to 
reconnoiter Maquis positions.  Enemy columns probed the perimeter at other 
locations, but when met with strong organized Résistance, the Germans disengaged. 
However, the Germans managed to cut IAN’s telephone network, causing other 
sectors to lose communications and slowing reinforcements, making a Maquis 
counterattack impossible.  On 26 July, Germany launched a 400 soldier attack near 
Ambernac, but as local Maquis were not yet fully armed they withdrew several 
                                                
78 OSS/London Microfilm, Roll 8, Vol 4, Book II, p. 302, 311-312.  Indeed it is clear that Vichy had 
little authority at all even before IAN arrived.  For a discussion on the Vichy’s authority in France 
after the Allied invasion of North Africa see Sweets, Choices in Vichy France, or Kedward, In 
Search of the Maquis which has several detailed discussions on localties in southern France and 
how the Maquis groups worked to assert local authority from Vichy. 
 221 
kilometers leaving the village to the enemy.  The Germans pillaged the town and shot 
civilians, but soon IAN arrived with reinforcements and forced the enemy back to 
Confolens.  Over the next few days, more forceful attacks continued and IAN 
considered a withdrawal to Dordogne as their entire position “was at stake.” 
Nevertheless, the enthused and spirited young Maquis fought extremely hard and 
despite little training and having only small arms, managed to use the blown bridges 
over the Vienne, woods, and other natural defenses to bog down the enemy 
offensive.
79
  
On 1 August , IAN reported “FOUR DAYS FIGHTING NEAR 
CHAMPAGNE ROUTED GERMANS,” and they claimed the action cost “30 
GERMANS KILLED AND 3 PRISONERS. 2 MAQUIS KILLED AND 10 
WOUNDED.”  News of a larger battle followed the next day and IAN requested 
more weapons, ammunition, and “SHOES AND SOCKS.” The Germans finally 
retreated toward the south, but the attack killed an estimated 100 Maquis and an 
estimated 200 Germans.  However, the determined Wehrmacht tried again on 2 
August to penetrate the French perimeter.  Team IAN hoped to spring a trap near the 
village of Champagne-Mouton but instead, IAN drove into an ambush.
80
  
Captain Desfarges drove the team along with Louis Mondinaud, and 
information agent André Very of the Maquis group Bir Hacheim. In their four-door 
Citroen they carried around 1,800,000 Francs, their radios, and the BBC code phrases 
for their upcoming parachute drops. As they arrived in the village on this warm day, 
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they heard a woman yell, “Malheureux, les Boches!” It was “too late!” as Desfarges 
later wrote, for as they rounded a curve and tried to stop, a German column opened 
fire with automatic weapons and small arms.  Desfarges, wounded in the cheek, put 
the car in a maneuver protecting the passengers and everyone attempted to return fire. 
But the car was now immobilized and Mondinaud severely wounded.  Everyone left 
the vehicle darting into available cover behind a house and in alleys.  Desfarges, 
Gildee, and Very made an escape through a barn adjacent to the street.  Captain 
Desfarges found a window at the other end of the barn and went through.  Major 
Gildee, a bigger man, needed to be pulled from one side and pushed from the other to 
squeeze through. Sergeant Bourgoin realized the codes, money, radio, and radio 
crystals remained in the Citroen and returned to get them. But the Germans cut him 
down before he escaped a second time.  The three survivors made it to a farm outside 
the village and found twenty Maquis, then made their way back to the truck to 
retrieve their equipment and find out where their comrades were. “10 meters from the 
car we were again spotted by the Germans” and they retreated into a wooded area, 
covering themselves with dirt and debris.  Fortunately the Germans had no dogs and 
they came out of hiding after the Wehrmacht left twenty-three hours later.
81
  
Bourgouin’s body remained near the trees he attempted to enter for cover,  
while the Germans looked for the others.  Unable to run, Mondinaud could not get 
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away fast enough and a German soldier struck him in the head delivering a fatal blow. 
After the German troops left to look for the others, a Pleuville woman walked over to  
Bourgoin’s body and covered his face with a handkerchief and other local men came  
and moved the bodies into the church. The two were buried the next day in the church 
cemetery.  Gildee and Desfarges, failing to retrieve their radio and other equipment, 
attempted to pull their operation back together, but were bereft of their comrade and 
vital communication with London.  Years later, Desfarges remarked, “I never saw 
Gildee show any emotion, but when the Sergeant was killed I thought he’d never stop 
crying.”  Unable to radio London for six days, the team finally found their wireless 
set at a farm of a former French Mercantile Marine radio officer and sent, “Our 
automobile attacked by column of 400 Germans at Poeuvill [sic].  Bourgoin and 
chauffeur killed.” The message also explained the loss of all their gear, requested an 
air drop to replace the missing equipment, money, and gasoline and an additional 
arms for one thousand men.
82
  
  
Southwestern France  
One of SHAEF’s major interests was in the 2
nd SS Panzer “Das Reich” 
Division.  The unit was in southern France reconstituting, training replacement 
soldiers, and resting after years of murderously difficult combat against the Red 
Army in the east.  On 6 June, this armored division of roughly 19,000 soldiers was 
located in Montauban, France 50 kilometers north of Toulouse and approximately 
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800 kilometers from Normandy.83  Another of the armored units in southern France 
was the 11
th
 Panzer Division located near Bordeaux.  But both of these units were 
under their normal strength.  In fact, the influx of new soldiers and the shortages of 
replacements in soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers make it 
questionable how much of a quality unit they were, given the lack of experience of a 
majority of their soldiers. The 11
th
 Panzer Division had no more than 50 percent of its 
soldiers and approximately 45 percent of its officers and NCOs when it arrived in 
Bordeaux in April of 1944.  The 2
nd
 SS Panzer “Das Reich” Division suffered from 
similar issues and had to integrate a high number of Alsatian soldiers into their ranks.  
These two armored Divisions, while feared by SHAEF planners, and certainly 
capable of action, were not the units they had been.  Nevertheless, the 2
nd
 SS Panzer 
Division’s Commander, Heinz Lammerding, received orders to move to Normandy 
on 8 June and directed his command to smash the “gangs” and assert the authority of 
Germany and the Vichy government.
84
  
In an effort to delay and impede their movements, SPOC deployed 
JEDBURGH teams QUININE on 8 June, AMMONIA on 10 June and BUGATTI on 
20
 
June.  Team QUININE, comprised of British Major Sir Tommy MacPherson, 
Frenchman (but in the U. S. Army) Michel de Bourbon de Parme who used the nom 
de guerre Michel Bourdon, and British radio operator Oliver Brown, arrived to great 
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celebration at their drop zone.  Since MacPherson parachuted into combat wearing his 
highlander kilt, one résistant called out to his comrades that there is a French officer 
here, and he’s brought his wife!”
85
 But MacPherson, who had been in the war for 3 
years now and had experience behind the lines and as a POW, found that few in this 
Maquis were really eager to fight against the Germans.  Determined to do something, 
QUININE set about sabotaging whatever they believed would do some damage to the 
Germans while demonstrating to the locals that the Allies were present and were 
fighting.  SPOC directed MacPherson to contact DROITE, the DMR for the region 
whose real name was Bernard Schlumberger.  However, no one MacPherson spoke to 
had ever heard of him.
86
  
Instead the teams worked with F Section agents such as George Starr and 
Philippe Liewers, a.k.a. Geoffrey Staunton, who were running circuits in the region, 
had built up groups of Maquis and operatives they could trust, and had organized to 
execute Plan Vert, Tortue and the others when given the signal on 5 June.  Since the 
JEDBURGHs were not inserted until D-Day and after, and since it took time to 
establish a team’s operations due to smashed radios, injured or dead JEDBURGHs, 
independent Maquis leaders and groups, and being pursued by Milice, Gendarmes, 
Wehrmacht, and Gestapo, it all became too much to overcome in such a short time. 
But then, since the JEDBURGHs were always designed as an operational reserve, 
asking them to literally jump into the situation, ignorant of that locality’s ability to 
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conduct operations, makes AMMONIA’s primary mission of the immediate 
“destruction of communication and harassing troop movements between Brive and 
Montauban” seem unrealistic.  For instance, on 13 June, Sergeant Jack Berlin of 
AMMONIA radioed to SPOC that, “2 SS IS BETWEEN PERIGEUX – BRIVE. 
RESISTANCE GROUPS ATTACKING. NEED SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION 
URGENTLY.”
87
 Ambushing and delaying the 2
nd
 SS “Das Reich” Division was 
accomplished, and AMMONIA and QUININE participated in the effort, but more 
than likely it would have happened whether they had been there or not.  The 
multiplicity of commands, both Allied and French, both exterior and interior stymied 
unity of action until JEDBURGH teams, DMRs, and FFI commanders on the scene 
could agree on who would be issuing orders and who would be taking them.  But in 
the mean time the individual teams, often acting under the aegis of one of the BCRA 
Plans, were what provoked the first few days of Maquis operations.   
As AMMONIA’s commander American Captain Benton Austin had Berlin 
radio back to SPOC, “LOCAL ORGANIZATION GOOD BUT REGIONAL BAD. 
TOO MANY CHIEFS.”  Too many chiefs were indeed an issue and the regional 
DMR structure was for this part of France in complete disarray.  Schlumbarger had 
been appointed as DMR for R3 and R4 and was sending messages to EMFFI from the 
Lot wishing to get help from Koenig to publicly assert his authority in the region.  In 
other messages he described attacks on Germans during the first week of June and his 
hope of liberating the area before the Allies arrived.  However his area was large and 
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he had to play catch up with others who had been there longer.  In many cases the F 
Section agent, such as George Starr who had been there for over a year, or even Pearl 
Witherington, to the north, who had to recreate a circuit upon the remains of her 
arrested boss’ foundation, had a far easier time than EMFFI’s own man who had just  
parachuted in days before the invasion with little regional knowledge.
88
  
All three JEDBURGH teams foundered to some degree attempting to harass 
these major German armored divisions, but arrived too late to measurably impact or 
improve upon what the Maquis would have done without them.  While the 2
nd
 SS 
“Das Reich” Division did take longer to arrive in Normandy than it would have had 
the Résistance not interfered, it is difficult, if not impossible to credit JEDBURGH 
operations for slowing it down.  Instead, as Max Hastings and Peter Lieb have shown, 
the decision by the Germans themselves to deal with the Maquis along the way was 
essential and to some degree self-imposed.  That decision was provoked due to 
Maquis, or as the Germans called them, “terrorists” actions prior to D-Day.  The 
provocations that continued to occur after D-Day only heightened the SS Division’s 
NAZI ideological sensitivities regarding Maquis’ communists and the FTP’s 
sloganeering.  Such activities drew in the SS who did not like such taunting. The 
ideologically minded Germans could not allow them to continue.
89
    
Therefore, having not yet received orders to proceed to Normandy, 
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Lammerding dispatched one of his Battalions to strike “immediately and brutally” 
against the terrorist bands.”  They sought to make the local population too afraid to 
support the Maquis.  In the village of Oradour-sur-Glane on the 10th about 22 
kilometers from Limoges, the SS arrived searching for the Maquis who had killed one 
of their comrades.  Finding none, they shot all the men in the village and with the 
women and children in the village church, burned the structure to the ground.  To 
make sure they met their death, they threw grenades into the burning church and fired 
at whomever escaped the inferno.  Within four hours, 642 villagers were massacred.90    
de Facto Recognition  
In Washington, Donovan had shifted again from his previous position in his 
15 June memo where he recommended that de Gaulle be treated as a senior military 
official only.  On 4 July, with de Gaulle’s visit finally scheduled later in the week, 
Donovan sent Harvard French Literature Professor, now serving in Algiers, Ramon 
Guthrie’s assessment on France and the looming problems regarding recognition and 
the costs of continuing on the current policy.  Guthrie argued that the situation called 
for a clear statement from FDR on what the United States sought to achieve because 
the press reports, speculation, and rumors were persisting and doing real damage to 
Franco-US relations.  Also, Guthrie noted that most of the French in Algiers, “fail to 
see the validity of the American contention that the Committee does not represent 
French opinion.”  He pointed out that the committee may be the fairest embodiment 
                                                
90 Bruno Leroux, “10 juin 1944:  le massacre d’Oradour-sur-Glane” Dictionnaire Historique de la 
Resistance, p. 634. 
 229 
of French public opinion and sentiments in its history.
91
   Furthermore, the FFI’s 
impact and American operations such as ZEBRA were having an effect beyond 
French drop zones.  When Colonel Haskell’s report of the event got to Donovan, the 
OSS Director showed it off to the Joint Chiefs and sent a copy to the President.  It 
included all the detailed planning information, the locations of the drops, weapons 
provided to the French, and even dramatic photos that may have been taken by 
Haskell himself.
92
  But Donovan, Marshall, and Roosevelt received a first hand 
account as well due to the fact that Colonel Haskell came to Washington, evidently to 
bring his report personally.  On Thursday 6 July General Donovan and Haskell appear 
on the President’s appointment calendar, apparently as last minute additions to the 
President’s schedule.  It is not recorded what they discussed, but with only 15 minutes 
allotted to them, it could not have been a detailed conversation.
93
   It was a fairly busy 
day for FDR with de Gaulle arriving for the first time later that afternoon.  OSS Bern 
had also recently sent some of the first reports of the 2
nd
 SS “Das Reich” Division’s 
atrocities and Donovan also sent those on to FDR.  However, none of it brought FDR 
any further toward recognizing the CFLN or de Gaulle.   The meeting would be about 
less concrete issues.  
                                                
91 William J. Donovan and OSS Washington Office, OSS Washington Director's Office Administrative 
Files, 1941 - 1945 (M1642) (Washington, DC: United States Government, 1998), Microfilm. Reel 
50, Frames 450 – 458.  
92 Robert Lester et al., President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Office Files, 1933-1945 (Bethesda, 
MD: University Publications of America, 1990), microfilm reels. Part 4, Reel 27, Frames 
1-36.  
93 7/6/1944, FDR:  Day by Day – The Pare Lorentz Chronology, Grace Tully’s Appointment 
Book, FDR Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY.  
 230 
But while FDR treated it as something less than a state visit, de Gaulle, with a 
great deal of public support and sympathy, maintained a schedule that had all the 
trappings of a visiting head of state.  He paid a visit to General John J. Pershing in his 
Walter Reid hospital room and their discussion of Germany’s future made the papers. 
He paid his respects to George Washington at Mount Vernon and the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery.  He arrived at the White House at 4:30, 
three and a half hours after Donovan and Haskell met with FDR.  Photos were taken 
and the next day he arrived for a formal luncheon after a one-hour discussion and 
working session with the President.
94
  
Their discussions that day and during the following day were not focused on 
civil administration in France and other matters of immediate concern as Stimson had 
hoped, but rather on the fruits of victory and the international system Roosevelt hoped 
to achieve. “It was by light touches that he sketched in his notions, and so skillfully 
that it was difficult to contradict this artist, this seducer, in any categorical way.”
95
 
Indeed de Gaulle wrote how the still unwinding Allied victory, which he fully 
realized had been brought about by the United States and Great Britain, fueled FDR’s 
and America’s dangerous optimism.  The continuing and assured successes created a 
rising optimism on the belief in America that the nation must be involved in the 
world, instead of isolated as it had remained in the past.  De Gaulle believed it meant 
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that, the United States would now pass “from one extreme to the other, it was a 
permanent system of intervention that [FDR] intended to institute by international 
law.”
96
  
After a trip to New York, and a stop in Canada, de Gaulle headed back to 
Algiers where it was apparent to all that the CFLN was indeed the legitimate 
authority in France in territories controlled by Allied Armies.  For at the local and 
regional levels, the provisional government’s organization was planned and in most 
instances the personnel named.  Since the summer of 1943, the CFLN had worked on 
a structure to seize power from Vichy at the moment of liberation.  Each department 
in France would be governed by a committee comprised of local resistance leaders 
and notables overseen at the regional level by a kind of super-prefect.  Most of the 
appointed leaders of the Committees Departmental de la Libération (CDL) and the 
commissaries de la République were from the Résistance.
97
  Of course this had all 
happened while FDR and the State Department insisted on participating in how and 
who within the Résistance would participate in the process and when they could not 
do that, they hindered it at every opportunity.  The resisters all agreed that this was an 
issue for the French - alone. As combat operations continued through June and July, 
and the first localities saw the implementation of the CDLs and the emergence of the 
Regional Commissaires, US and British Civil Affairs soldiers realized their work was 
going to be far lighter than originally planned. The Résistance however continued to 
be perplexed by America’s policy toward it. The underground newspaper Libération 
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had an short article on the bottom of the last page in its edition immediately after de 
Gaulle’s visit. The article scoffed at FDR’s announcement of the CFLN as the “de 
Facto authority” in liberated France.   Such terms were confusing given the 
circumstances the article’s author believed.  Searching for the reason why, the writer 
attributed FDR’s persistent confusion on the matter to Camille Chautemps and Alexis 
Leger, discussed above, for influencing him far too much.  But more importantly, it 
stated in muted glee, “Adieu, therefore to the shadow of this AMGOT which did not 
have time to approach our shores.”
98
 The Résistance had long worked for its 
Revolution and recently coalesced on how to achieve it.  At that moment in France it 
sought, via the Maquis to fight for it, and through the CDLs to begin the political path 
toward their France. The Allies, no matter how much they had done and were doing, 
were not to be a part of such an intimate matter.  
 
Conclusion  
The halting military progress the JEDBURGHs made toward Eisenhower’s 
aim of harassing the movement of German reinforcements to Normandy was a 
manifestation of more than battlefield confusion and difficulty.  Enemy action, 
Gestapo arrests, lack of resources and airlift, and the physical limitations such as the 
weather and the moon’s phases all played a role.  But the political ambiguity had its 
impact too.  FDR’s delay and “de Facto recognition” at the Allied level reflected 
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down at the military level in the still consolidating and not yet fully formed EMFFI, 
and at the local level with the JEDBURGHs striving for local unity of action among 
markedly different Maquis groups.  Where there were competing local objectives or 
groups, Eugene Dechelette’s successes in R5 began to mollify them.  Teams HUGH, 
HAMISH, and IAN were unfortunately parachuted into this chasm of political 
ambiguity, but would assist in sewing the gaps together.  What they found was greater 
enthusiasm embodied in more Maquisards than they could train and equip, but now 
that they had arrived and face to face with those wishing to fight, the teams 
immediately sought to do so, even when their orders were to discourage such 
widespread guerrilla operations.  Ambiguity afflicted clarity of action and purpose at 
each plane of political expression and each node from the strategic to the tactical.  
While the American, British and French allied staff officers continued to plan and 
while their comrades in operational units worked to execute missions along these 
seams of sovereignty, their clarity of action was brought into stark focus by the 
presence and effects of the Wehrmacht, Gestapo, and Milice.  
The unexpected and overwhelming numbers in the Maquis proved the SOE 
planner correct when he remarked that the Résistance was a unpredictable and 
nebulous force, but he believed it would be low, not the high and swelling numbers 
that materialized after 6 June.  Not wishing to have this occur and getting constant 
reports of reprisals, Eisenhower and EMFFI were forced to spend a great deal of their 
message traffic dampening enthusiasm, directing JEDBURGHs and others in France 
to refrain from anything other than sabotage and small scale hit and run activities. 
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Therefore, the liaison the JEDBURGHs thought they would be doing, specifically 
exhorting the people to join the Allied cause became instead trying to control the 
growing numbers, keep a check on their passions, while not dampening their morale 
so much they would not contribute when needed.  
As July ended, Allied forces had painfully and slowly established themselves 
in Normandy, and now American General Omar Bradley was planning his next move. 
Becoming the Commander of the 12th Army Group on 1 August he had to take the 
ports on the Brittany peninsula that were required to sustain the Allied armies.  He 
also had the task of preparing to move east toward Germany. On the western wing of 
the Allied line, he sought to punch a hole through the portions of the German 2
nd
 SS 
Division, 352
nd
 Infantry Division, and the 3
rd
 Parachute Division directly on his front.  
This “Breakout” began around 25 July.  It would be reinforced by General George S. 
Patton’s newly constituted 3
rd
 U. S. Army that shifted from its deception mission, 
fooling Hitler into fearing an attack on the northeastern coast of France at the Pas de 
Calais, into one of very real combat. Embedded in 3rd Army was a Special Forces 
Detachment led by Lt Col Robert I. “RIP” Powell.  His unit’s role was to coordinate 
Patton’s actions with the Résistance directly behind the enemy it faced.  But 
Koenig’s, Powell’s, and all those within the EMFFI sphere’s highest priority was the 
liberation of Brittany and the advancement of Patton’s forces to the Atlantic ports.  
That mission had been developing since D-Day and is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
The Battle for Brittany and the resolution of the FFI within SHAEF 
 
 The same night that HUGH left for L’Indre and HARRY deployed to Morvan, 
two JEDBURGH teams were to depart for Brittany.  Eisenhower made Brittany a 
high priority and SFHQ and General Koenig focused a great deal of their attention on 
the peninsula over the months of June, July, and into August when it was finally 
liberated.  Winning Brittany back from the Wehrmacht would protect the Allies’ 
western flank and provide them the vital ports they needed in order to sustain their 
forces in France.  Furthermore, taking those ports away from Germany meant denying 
the Kriegsmarine direct access to the Atlantic further hobbling its ability to sink 
Allied shipping.  For the same reason, Brittany was vital to Germany and Hitler had 
directed that the ports be made into fortresses, or Festungs, so that they could hold 
out indefinitely.  Therefore the pulling of the Wehrmacht forces toward the two ends 
of Brittany to repel the invasion coming from the east and to hold the ports in the 
west, often clogged the roads with moving troops.  The relative closeness of Allied 
airfields in Britain compared to central or eastern France, allowed air power to have a 
greater operational influence with both daylight close air support and the night time 
re-supply air drops.  Also due to its proximity, SHAEF never had to be concerned 
with handing off portions of Brittany to AFHQ and therefore SFHQ never contended 
with SPOC for directing the Résistance there.   But SFHQ was blinded by the 
Gestapo’s ability to continually break up the SOE’s and BCRA’s networks so that 
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there was no operational contact in Brittany on D-Day.  However, the SFHQ and 
BCRA planners did benefit, in a way, from the fact that there was, with rare 
exception, one resistance organization in Brittany and it was the FTP.  While 
Libération-Nord and the others had a presence and some leadership, they had very 
few armed Maquis groups.  Therefore the JEDBURGHs in Brittany rarely had to 
contend with politics and polemics as they attempted to organize the Maquis into 
tactical operations.  Lastly, the distinct culture and history of Brittany played a role as 
many of the villagers and farmers did not speak French, but instead used their Breton 
language and so the French JEDBURGHs who came from the region proved critical, 
as did educated Breton school teachers and professionals who spoke French well.  All 
these issues determined the nature of the war in Brittany and shaped it in different 
ways from the other parts of France. 
 The Wehrmacht’s presence in Brittany was largely in the form of the XXV 
Armee Korps commanded by Lieutenant General Wilhelm Fahrmbacher in Pontivy.  
His command reported to the 7th Armee OberKommando commanded by General 
Oberst Friedrich Dollmann in Le Mans.1  When the Allied invasion occurred in 
Normandy, General Dollman’s forces shared the weight of the attack along with the 
15th Armee OberKommando in Lille as the dividing line for the two forces fell nearly 
in the middle of the Normandy invasion beaches.  Both these commanders reported to 
Armee Gruppe B commanded by General Feld Marshal Erwin Rommel who reported 
to General Feld Marshal Gerhardt von Rundstedt commander of OB West in Paris.  
                                                
1  RH 24-25-75 and Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West 
and East Asia 1943-1944/5. p. 517. 
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Forced to pull combat forces from Brittany at the onset of the Allied invasion, 
Dollman left Fahrmbacher largely responsible for the defense of the peninsula along 
with the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD at Rennes commanded by 
Obersturmbannführer Hartmut Pulmer.2  Both Fahrmbacher and Pulmer had been 
involved in Germany’s eastern campaigns with Pulmer conducting Einsatzkommando 
actions in Poland.3  These two had their views of how to deal with irregular forces 
and they believed the law and justice required the harshest of measures.  But so did 
OKW and on 4 March it declared partisans involved in sabotage or irregular warfare 
were not to be taken prisoner.4  The implication of what to do with them was clear. 
 Fahrmbacher’s combat forces remaining for Brittany were largely comprised 
of the 266th, 343rd, 265th Infantrie Divisions with the 2nd Fallschirmjäger Division in 
reserve.5  The 2nd Fallschirmjäger Division was reconstituting and not yet at full 
strength and its commander, Lieutenant General Ramcke, had not yet arrived.  
Accordingly, it was placed at Landerviseau at the peninsula’s extreme western edge.  
The readiness and combat capability of all these units was similar to others in France 
in that they lacked men and equipment that would, under different circumstances 
make their consideration for combat use questionable.  The 265th Division for 
example reported only 221 Officers, 1651 NCOs and 7513 soldiers along with their 
                                                
2 Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?:  Kriegführung Und 
Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44. p. 525. The infamous Geheim Staatspolizei, 
often referred to as the Gestapo, had by this time subsumed this into their organization and so 
the JEDBURGHs often refer to the region’s KdS agents and soldiers as the Gestapo. 
3 Ibid. pp. 65 and 536. 
4 “OKW Nr. 002143/44 g.K./WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1) Bekämpfung von Terroristen-
Gerichsbarkeit” 4.3.44, RW 35-551, BA-MA.  
5 “Kriegsgliederungen 44. Juni” 24/25-256, BA-MA. 
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allotment of foreign soldiers of 341 for a total of 9726 and its commander rated his 
Division suitable for defense only.  Not only was Berlin unable to supply the 
necessary strength in men to their divisions, but pre-invasion combat had also taken a 
toll.  During the month of May the 265th Division suffered 8 killed, 2 wounded, and 1 
missing due to “energetic action against the terrorists.”  The 343rd Division 
commander did not make any comments limiting his capabilities as he was not in as 
weakened state, but did note 8 killed, 4 wounded, and 3 missing due to enemy action 
while being short a total of 110 soldiers at the end of May.6   But in addition to these 
somewhat weakened Wehrmacht divisions, Fahrmbacher could call on Pulmer’s 
Gestapo and the Feldgendarmerie units scattered around Brittany at St Malo, Brest, 
Lorient and St. Nazaire. 
 SFHQ’s plan for Brittany had been thought out before D-Day and it consisted 
of dividing the peninsula into a northern and southern half.  Each zone would have a 
detachment of the 4th French Parachute Brigade which was now a part of the Special 
Air Service (SAS).  Commanded by French Lieutenant Colonel Bourgoin, this unit 
was to parachute into Brittany and establish operating bases for the Maquis to  create 
a focal point for the region’s Résistance.  Bourgoin was about 45 years old and a 
veteran who had lost an arm in combat.  With only one arm, special arrangements had 
to be made with four of his soldiers jumping with him in order to break his fall.7  One 
JEDBURGH team was to accompany each detachment and serve as a liaison with the 
                                                
6 Anlage 4 zum, K. T. B. 6.6.44 – 30.6.44, XXV AK., RH 24-25/76, BA-MA. 
7 Robert Kehoe, "Jed Team Frederick, 1944:  An Allied Team with the French Resistance," Studies in 
Intelligence, no. Winter 1998-1999 (1999). p. 12.  
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area’s Maquis, however they would report to Bourgoin in the field while having their 
own radio and command link back to SFHQ for airlift allocations and orders.  Since 
the SAS reported to SHAEF and later General Koenig when working with the 
Résistance, the problems inherent in a bifurcated arrangement like this may not have 
seemed all too difficult for the SFHQ planners, but the teams tasked with this mission 
struggled with the problem straight away.  Team GEORGE, consisting of American 
Captain Paul Cyr, French Captain Philippe Rageneau using the name Philippe Erard, 
and French radioman Pierre Gay who used the nom de guerre Christien Lejeune were 
directed to accompany the SAS and the DMRs for Regions M3 and M4 Alain Willk 
(FONCTION) and Maurice Barthélemy (HAUTEUR) and establish base DINGSON.  
In their orders they were told of the other JEDBURGH team, that they could call for 
an additional three more teams, and where the boundaries were between their 
southern zone and Brittany’s northern zone.  The orders make it clear that this was an 
F Section operation and that BRAL was not to be notified.8  
Captain Cyr could not understand who SAS reported to, for it appeared to him 
they were their own private army.  Fortunately, Ragueneau had worked with the SAS 
commander previously and their initial troubles were cleared up enabling them to 
come to a working arrangement.  On 8 June, Cyr’s 22nd birthday, the team boarded 
the aircraft around 11:30 pm with sixteen others and when over the drop zone jumped 
differently than their Milton Hall training.  Cyr complained upon returning to 
                                                
8 For the Brittany command structure see ETOUSA FFI History, “Region M Command Structure” p. 
636.   For decoding the DMR’s I used Henri Noguères, Marcel Degliame-Fouché, and Jean Louis 
Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 Á 1945, I - V vols., vol. V (Paris,: R. 
Laffont, 1967), pp. 922 and 892.  
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England, “We all stood up and ran down towards the tail of the plane, jumping out in 
a very unorthodox manner.”  Fifteen to twenty French met them and immediately 
“pounced” with joy at their arrival.  They pulled them up, gathered the gear and made 
such a noise, Cyr thought they would certainly attract too much attention.  
Confirming his fear the Maquis told him the Germans were only two kilometers 
away.  The Maquis brought Team GEORGE and the SAS soldiers to a farm, which 
then became the SAS base DINGSON.9 
The welcome given to GEORGE and the SAS party was a grand one.  Cyr,  
Ragueneau, and Gay wrote when they returned England, “Women, children and men  
were laughing and crying with joy.  At 3:00 in the morning girls came running out  
kissing us and giving us flowers and wine.  The men between the ages of 12 to 75  
were ready that night to march on the German garrison. . . .”  In the morning, all went  
out to assemble and organize their gear.  The JEDBURGHs discovered their W/T sets  
were not among the rest of the equipment.  Later that afternoon, a farmer arrived with  
them in his cart.  According to the farmer, the equipment parachuted into his field  
about 9 a.m. approximately 2 to 3 kilometers from the drop zone.  But to make  
matters worse, the Germans immediately jammed the frequency, forcing Sergeant 
Gay to broadcast on their secondary frequency.  Soon the Germans jammed the 
secondary frequency, forcing GEORGE to broadcast sparingly on their emergency 
channel and ask SFHQ for a new primary channel.  Estimating the need to arm 4000 
men, GEORGE asked for arms, and related which reception ground should be used.  
                                                
9 Team GEORGE Report in Mendelsohn, p. 157-158. 
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They also asked for one million francs adding, “PLEASE WE BEG YOU SEND 
EQUIPMENT IMMEDIATELY.”10 
Rather than building and maturing an SOE circuit as HUGH did, GEORGE 
worked with the SAS to destroy bridges, cut rail roads, and arm the French.  Camp 
DINGSON became a base of operations for SAS nightly patrols out to a target and a 
rallying point for Maquisards.  For the first few days, while the communications to 
SFHQ was intermittent, five to ten planes came each night dropping arms, fuel, and 
supplies.  The SAS and GEORGE began organizing and arming the Maquis, re-
established contacts between the Résistance groups, and tried to keep London 
informed.  Initially, a great deal of confusion clouded the situation concerning who 
was who in the Maquis.  Thick with recriminations, some pointed to others as spies 
and double agents forcing GEORGE to question almost every piece of information 
until verified by others they trusted or until they grew to respect the man or woman 
through their own experiences.11 
Communications became worse as GEORGE continued pressing SFHQ for a 
new frequency and new W/T sets.  SFHQ never granted their request because they 
grew dubious about GEORGE’s security and suspected the Gestapo sent the 
messages.  Using poor security practices, GEORGE repeatedly failed to authenticate 
its messages properly, causing SFHQ to grow more and more suspicious.  
Headquarters’ fears were unknown to the JEDBURGH team and they continued their 
                                                
10 Ibid., pp. 43 and 158-160. 
11 Ibid., p. 161-162. 
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mission but lamented in their final report, “Our radio communications were very, 
very poor and we sweat blood on them.”12 
As more and more arms and men came into the camp, DINGSON attracted  
considerable attention from the Wehrmacht and it was only a matter of time before 
Fahrmbacher’s XXV Korps attacked.  Maquis, poorly controlled and amateurishly 
led, made several attacks on German garrisons and depots provoking the Germans to 
do something about it.  Moreover, Frenchmen came from as far as one hundred 
kilometers to receive weapons, then returned to their homes and farms spreading the 
word to others.  With 5000 men armed and another 5000 men soon to be armed, 
GEORGE discussed their role with the SAS Commander Bourgoin who decided to 
detail them to the Loire Inferieure area, southeast of their present position.  GEORGE 
considered the Maquis there to be “the worst department in Brittany” and also 
concluded along with the SAS commander that the region was too vital to ignore.  
GEORGE made preparations to leave and selected local men to guide them.13 
Unfortunately, GEORGE stayed too long.   Awakened by exploding grenades 
and machine gun fire on 18 June, the team began a desperate fight along with the  
remaining SAS and approximately 600 to 1000 Maquis.  Noticing the persistent 
supply drops and parachutes, the Germans organized a task force comprised of some 
of the 2nd Fallschirmjägers, Infantry and Feldgendarmes.  Bringing in forces from the 
west and north, the Germans were impressed with the size of the base and estimated it 
at 500 men.  The phone calls back to their headquarters noted that the partisans and 
                                                
12 Ibid., p. 164. 
13 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
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SAS fought “skillfully behind hedges, walls, and trees.”14  The Jeds burned 
documents, hid their code books, and made arrangements on rendezvous points in 
case they became separated. When the German attack met more resistance than 
expected, it ceased for about an hour, but restarted after more enemy troops came into 
the fray.  The SAS radioed for air strikes and the RAF strafed the Wehrmacht around 
4 p.m.  But the air support was ineffective, as the Germans found cover in nearby 
trees.  After sunset, Cyr and Ragueneau took command of two Maquis companies and 
led counter attacks hoping to stifle German momentum and force the enemy further 
away from the camp’s headquarters.  Meanwhile, the SAS unit sustained several 
casualties and the commander ordered all wounded loaded on trucks and the supplies 
they could not bring with them were to be destroyed.  A great deal of arms meant for 
the Résistance went up in flames.15 
Ordered to break through the German lines and carry on guerrilla operations, 
the GEORGE teammates found each other and decided to take six British airmen with 
them.  The airman had parachuted out of crippled aircraft and found their way to the 
SAS camp days before.  Forcing their way through the lines with a Maquis group, 
GEORGE soon found itself slowed down by the pilots unfamiliar with small unit 
tactics.  After getting through the lines and dodging numerous patrols, GEORGE and 
the airmen traveled approximately ten miles when nearly thrown to the ground by an 
explosion lighting up the night sky.  The SAS and Maquis arms depot finally blew up 
                                                
14 “Fernspuch:  Ia/Ia Feld-Kdtr. Vannes Oberstlt. Maser” 11 – 20 Juni, 1944, K. T. B. RH 24-25/74, 
BA-MA.  The log books also note the presence of women among the Maquis. 
15 Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
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in a tremendous explosion.  Laden with their packs and radios the Jeds spent the rest 
of the night avoiding fire fights.  Getting a few hours sleep in a wheat field, the team 
found its way to the rendezvous point meeting the SAS Commander, the remainder of 
his SAS team, and some of the Maquis leaders.  French women and girls cared for the 
wounded doing the best they could with inadequate supplies.  GEORGE then teamed 
up with Willk and Barthelémy, and split off from SAS toward their area of Loire 
Inferieure.16  SFHQ had prepared to send another JEDBURGH Team to DINGSON, 
and prepared the orders on the 16th but when the attack forced DINGSON to scatter, 
Team GREGORY was scrubbed.  Scheduled to deploy on the very day the Germans 
attacked DINGSON, French Jed Albert de Schonen, and British Jeds K. D. Bennett 
and Ron Brierley were cancelled and instead sent on 8 July as Team DANIEL into 
Côtes du Nord.17  Had they been sent as planned, SFHQ could have easily lost the 
three JEDBURGHs.  
Starting from a point twenty-five miles from base DINGSON, GEORGE 
made its way slowly, relying on local men and women as guides.  Taking nearly a 
week to make their way carefully past enemy patrols, they traveled through several 
small villages on back roads and finally to the Maquis camp near the village of Saffre.  
Now nearly 35 miles north of Nantes, Gay radioed London, “Arrived safely ‘Alarme’ 
ground, Loire Inferieure.  Begin tomorrow 28 dropping for 2,000 in slices of 500.  
Reception committee standing by every night from 28th.”   Hoping to impress the 
local Maquis with the team’s ability to make arms appear from the sky, the team lost 
                                                
16 Ibid., pp. 171-173. 
17 Operations Order No. 10, 16 June, Ordres d’EMFFI, 3 AG 2 473, AN. Paris, France. 
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a great deal of respect night after night when no planes appeared.  On 30 June, SFHQ 
requested GEORGE to pass the word to Barthelémy and his aide to “Go to safe place 
and lie low for a few days.  Keep in contact and await any instructions.”  Evidently, 
London wanted to see if it could salvage their agents from what it assumed was a 
Gestapo penetrated JEDBURGH team.  They gave no instructions, causing 
Ragueneau, Cyr, and Gay great concern and undercutting their validity with the 
Maquis.18 
     To add to the terrible luck, a double agent betrayed the Maquis camp’s defensive 
positions to the enemy.  When GEORGE arrived, they found the defenses inadequate,  
fired the camp commander, and rearranged the defenses just in time.  As Sergeant  
Gay decoded messages on the morning of the 28th, the Germans attacked and the 
W/T set had to be packed up “while the Jerries could be heard only 100 to 200 yards  
away.”  Miraculously making their way past two machine gun positions, GEORGE 
hid with Barthelémy in a clump of bushes so thick that the Germans could not 
find them and grenades tossed into them exploded harmlessly.  The Germans 
used dogs, but they proved useless as so many people tracked around the area and the  
dogs could not pinpoint any particular person.  After the Germans had given up and 
departed the area, the group made their way to a wheat field and then decided to split, 
not telling others their destination.   Team GEORGE lamented its sorry state and later 
                                                
18 Ibid., pp. 45 and 177. 
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described its condition bereft of nearly all equipment and possessing only “one radio, 
one battery, a few weapons and our clothes” as it made its way toward Ancenis.19 
While GEORGE’s operations in Brittany were sliding into disaster, Team 
FREDERICK was not faring much better.  It deployed with an SAS element of the 
same unit as at DINGSON and arrived near the Duault Forest southwest of Guincamp 
on 10 June.  This team was led by British Major Adrian Wise with French Captain 
Paul Bloch-Auroch using the nom de guerre Paul Aguriec, and American Sergeant 
Robert Kehoe.  RF Section and SAS was to control this mission, but again BRAL was 
not to be informed until after D-Day.20  The team arrived to similar fanfare that 
GEORGE had experienced but lost one of the SAS men during the jump.  The dead 
man had wrapped primer cord around his legs for some reason and it had accidentally 
ignited killing him before he hit the ground.  Also alarming to Kehoe was the loud 
and excited people who had come up to meet them at their rendezvous point, the fires 
set to signal the aircraft were still burning, and his recollection of a German 
headquarters near their location.  There seemed to be no security practices whatsoever 
and he feared the Germans would discover them immediately.21     
 The Jeds were transported off to a farmer’s home, provided with breakfast and 
met up with the rest of the SAS team that had arrived with them but slightly scattered 
during the parachuting.  French Captain Le Blanc of the 4th Parachute Battalion 
commanded the SAS base SAMWEST.  He and some of the leading elements of the 
                                                
19 Ibid., pp. 179-183. 
20 Order No. 6, 2 June 1944, Team FREDERICK, 3 AG 2 463, AN, Paris, France.  
21 Kehoe, "Jed Team Frederick, 1944:  An Allied Team with the French Resistance." p. 14. 
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SAS party had arrived the day before and distributed weapons among the Maquis 
who had been with the reception committee.  They also held some “spies” prisoner 
and the local Breton Maquis and French SAS had beaten them regularly and finally 
executed them.   Wise seemed disgusted with his first impression of the Résistance 
and wrote, “in my opinion subsequent brutal treatment of SAS prisoners may have 
had something to do with this.”22   As the JEDBURGH team was making its way to 
SAMWEST, a German officer stopped by a home in the near by village of Carhaix to 
ask directions.  The answer he received was Sten fire from one of those who had been 
at the drop zone the day before.  The untrained and uncontrolled Maquis were already 
drawing too much of the wrong kind of attention with their passionate desire to kill 
Germans.   
Wise, Bloch-Auroch, and Kehoe did not successfully transmit their message 
on the first day and discovered they got better reception at higher ground.  On the 11th 
Kehoe managed to transmit their confirmation message to SFHQ saying, “Arrived 
safely with all containers and equipment.  Have contacted local groups.  Great 
possibilities Cotes du Nord area.  Send Jed team and arms for them.  Advise soonest 
possible dropping ground.”23  However this would be his last message as the 
unprovoked attack on the 2nd Fallschirmjäger officer from the day before brought the 
Division into the area hunting them. The German soldiers returned to the farm where 
the German officer had been killed the previous day and shot those they found and 
                                                
22 "Report on Team FREDERICK (By Major Wise)," undated, FREDERICK Team, HS 6/509, British 
National Archives, Kew, UK. p. 1-2. 
23 United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm] (Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1985), Microfilm. Reel 8, Vol. IV, Book I, p. 36. 
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burned down the farm house and the out buildings.  After a brief fire fight between 
the Germans at the farm and the nearest SAS check point, the SAS commander gave 
the order to move south to DINGSON, which was still operating at this time.  The 
Jeds moved east a few miles accompanied by an RAF pilot who had bailed out a few 
days previously.  The move was so rapid that Wise lamented they, “lost nearly all of 
our kit in the process.”24  The total SAMWEST group, now numbering over 100 of 
the French SAS and the Jeds, moved out in small groups attempting to avoid a 
pitched battle in what had grown from an attack of approximately 40 Germans into a 
“an estimated 400” methodically working through the area.25   
Since D-Day the 266th Infantrie Division commanded by Lieutenant General 
Karl Spang had received all kinds of warnings and indications of paratroopers landing 
in north-west Brittany.   One report claimed that 300 enemy parachutists had landed 
near the coast.  The Allied use of dummies, as well as the nighttime bombardments, 
and obvious fatigue and fear by the German soldiers is evident in their logbooks.26  
They quickly constituted a task force comprised of elements of Spang’s division and 
elements of the 2nd Fallschirmjägers to conduct a repression column through the area.   
 Having hidden one radio and planning to take their other with them the Jed 
team started moving out on the 12th.  But the nearby shooting seemed to heighten 
their fear of capture and they decided to hide the remaining radio as well.  Also with 
them was an RAF officer who had come in with the SAS and who decided not to go 
                                                
24 HS 6/509, p. 2. 
25 Kehoe, "Jed Team Frederick, 1944:  An Allied Team with the French Resistance." p. 15 – 16. 
26 K. T. B. 6.6.44 – 7.6.44, RH 26-266, BA-MA.   
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with them on to Camp DINGSON.  Wise thought they should bring him along with 
them, but not being used to or fit for long nighttime journeys laden with gear, the tall 
man in his forties slowed the Jeds down.  But Kehoe noted that, “conventional 
military forces prefer to work in units and fear being isolated or surrounded.”  That 
gave the Jeds an advantage in speed and flexibility while the Wehrmacht worked 
methodically through the forest.27 
 Working to get as far from the forest as they could, they risked it and kept 
moving during daylight.  Again, Brittany’s proximity to British airfields and the RAF 
patrols paid off as they were only seconds from coming upon a German patrol.  
Instead, they heard the fighter overhead and its strafing attack on something 
immediately in front of them.  When the aircraft had flown off, they looked up to see 
the frightened enemy motorcyclists fleeing in the other direction.  Determined now to 
stay off the roads, the team hid for the night and next day in a ditch next to a farm 
house but realized that they could not ask for help from the locals as it would mean 
death to those who aided them should the Germans ever discover it.  But the next 
morning, wet, exhausted, and starving, Bloch-Aroch went to the farmhouse to ask for 
food.  The Breton speaking woman scared him as he did not understand what she was 
saying and feared she was German.  Realizing his mistake he was relieved when her 
daughter, a school teacher who spoke French agreed to help them.28 
 Their luck was beginning to change.  Not only did the women provide them a 
wonderful breakfast, but the meeting led to more contact with the Côtes du Nord 
                                                
27 Kehoe, "Jed Team Frederick, 1944:  An Allied Team with the French Resistance." p. 17. 
28 Ibid., p. 18.  
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Résistance.  Over the next few days, they moved again, established a command post 
and began planning their operations.  The women, Simone Le Göeffic and Louise 
Quennec, proved remarkably able to bicycle around the region passing messages to 
the nearby Front National and FFI leadership who ultimately made their way to the 
farmhouse. With the arrival of Yves Le Hegarat, using the nom de guerre Marceau, 
they met the leader of the Côtes du Nord’s FFI.  Le Hegarat who had come to the fore 
in the Maquis leadership of the FTP, had become the departmental leader of the FFI 
as he successfully convinced the members of the Libération-Nord movement to 
merge just prior to D-Day.  He successfully convinced them they would all work to 
achieve military aims and so they made him the FFI leader and agreed to share the 
weapons that the Allies supplied.29  Now the JEDBURGHs had someone with whom 
they could work, supply, and train.    They decided to stay in the region and not make 
their way south to Camp DINGSON.  Another reason called them to remain for the 
women had taken in some of the wounded SAS soldiers.  Wise believed they should 
remain and help them while the women arranged for a surgeon from Guincamp to 
come and see what he could do.  In the end, the doctor saved the lives of the soldiers 
by performing an operation and provided enough care to allow them to survive.30 
 Now with trusted contacts and their decision to remain in the region the team 
needed their radio to operate.  Kehoe would have to recover it from its hidden spot in 
the forest where had had buried it and was worried about how quickly he could make 
                                                
29 Noguères, Degliame-Fouché, and Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 Á 1945.  p. 
78. 
30 HS 6/509, pp. 3-4.  
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the trip bringing back the 40 pound radio.  But he was surprised to be offered a car.  
Over the years of occupation, one of their new contacts had stored a vehicle, hid the 
wheels, and had snuck enough fuel over time to have several gallons for a vital 
moment such as now.  With two of their new Maquis and one of the SAS Sergeants, 
Kehoe took the car and traveled in the darkness to search for his team’s means of 
communication with SFHQ.  With no radio, they were just three uniformed men but 
with it they were SFHQ’s and Koenig’s liaison.  A lot rode on Kehoe’s night-time 
search.  They arrived back in the forest and found the area.  Kehoe had buried the 
radio next to a very distinctive boulder, but now every boulder looked alike.  While 
the SAS Sergeant went in search of his own equipment, and the two Maquis stood 
guard with the car, Kehoe went from boulder to boulder searching.  Finally, just as 
dawn was breaking, Kehoe had dug at the right spot and found it.  Lugging it back to 
the car, his relieved comrades loaded it into the car and jubilantly drove back to their 
new hide out.  Kehoe later wrote, “This was to be the rebirth of Team 
FREDERICK.”31   
 It was just in time, the same day the 2nd Fallschirmjägers attacked the former 
Camp SAMWEST with an impressive and concentrated force.  Unlike the SAS at 
DINGSON, they had taken the opportunity to disperse so the Germans came in 
expecting a difficult fight, but instead only found pockets of Maquis and a few of the 
uniformed SAS – but no JEDBURGHs or their valuable radio.  But while the Jeds 
had found their radio, OB West was now gaining more and more information on 
                                                
31 Kehoe. “Jed Team Frederick”, p. 20 – 21. 
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Allied actions with the interior Résistance.   The 2nd Fallschirmjägers claimed that 
during the two battles, they had killed an estimated 50 of the enemy.  The intelligence 
report about the actions against the Maquis concentrations in Brittany resulted in the 
discovery of French uniformed parachutists and the understanding that they were 
SAS and then had obvious links to the Allies in London.32  But there is no guess as to 
their overall mission.  Were these parachutists an advance force indicating larger 
airborne operations?  The German commanders were left to wonder and to make 
preparations throughout the interior zone. 
 FREDERICK spent the next two weeks in one place, a luxury considering 
they were only 10 kilometers from the Foret de Duault.  Now back in business with 
their radio they sent London, “SAS ATTACKED MONDAY AND DISPERSED.  
JEDS OKAY.  HAVE CONTACTED GUERRILLA LEADERS.  PARIS-BREST 
UNDERGROUND CABLE CUT BY US…”  Due to Kehoe’s use of the correct 
security procedure to omit certain pre-determined letter groups, London was quickly 
satisfied that FREDERICK was indeed back up and the team’s request for air dropped 
supplies was quickly answered.  After two weeks there, they moved to another 
location in order to arm another Maquis group.  Newly located about 34 kilometers 
due south of Guincamp, they remained only a few days and had to move again when 
a German patrol noticed their radio antenna and investigated.  Shots fired at their 
farmhouse provoked them to grab their codes and crystals and run into the woods.  
After hiding out during the day, they managed to escape, now for a third time, and 
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make their way north.  At this location, near St. Nicolas du Pelem, the team 
eventually coordinated the reception of two more JEDBURGH Teams.33   
 FREDERICK’s ability to survive re-energized General Koenig and the SFHQ 
staff.  The GILES mission was back on for Finistère, east of FREDERICK and as a 
part of a larger plan, so were 6 other teams.  After being delayed for weather and on 
another night for lack of a confirmed drop zone signal, Team GILES arrived to much 
the same fanfare as the other teams.  Choosing the location based on Team 
GEORGE’s and FERNAND’s recommendation, SFHQ began pondering how to 
deploy a more sophisticated command and control mission.34  GILES was to be the 
first team in among the broader plan.  They believed there were 9600 Wehrmacht 
along with the 5000 Paratroopers of the 2nd Fallschirmjäger and 9000 naval, marine, 
and anti-aircraft or FLAK troops for a total of 37,000 in Finistère alone. But 
Barthélemy’s most recent cable led them to believe there were 30,000 men waiting to 
join the Maquis.  Such information, along with the imperative from SHAEF to control 
Brittany provoked EMFFI to now begin a more comprehensive plan that they then 
attempted to put in motion.  It consisted of sending more JEDBURGH Teams to 
FREDERICK, and ended with sending in an inter allied command and control 
element led by Colonel Albert Eon, and seconded by none other than Colonel 
Dewavrin.35  However, American Captain Bernard Knox and French Captain Paul 
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Grall of the Team GILES seem to be oblivious to this part of the puzzle.  Probably 
left out of the broader plan for security reasons, GILES’ ignorance proved costly.   
 Specifically their point of confusion seemed to center around SFHQ’s 
directive to not take “offensive action” until directed to do so.36  By the end of June, 
with 13 teams in France, and reports of sabotage, spectacular numbers of people 
joining the Résistance, and the belief that armored divisions such as the 2nd SS “Das 
Reich” had been effectively delayed, they began to believe in their effectiveness.  
Certainly getting 8th Air Force to provide the 3rd Air Division on 25 June indicates 
that even SHAEF had begun to believe in what was happening.  But as the scale 
began to tip and as numbers in the Maquis grew throughout France, their enthusiasm 
and passion altered the role of the JEDBURGHs.  Instead of inspiring, provoking, and 
leading the Maquis to action, now the teams’ presence was to dampen and pass along 
the directive to wait.  Instead of providing the fuel, they had to put on the brake.  The 
JEDBURGHs who had been in France before the end of June had experiences and 
matured along with their Maquis and could temper the Maquis’ passions better than 
new teams, such as GILES now parachuting in, who did not have enough time to 
establish a report with the groups they met.   
 
Team GILES Deploys 
 
American Captain Bernard M. Knox, French Captain Paul Grall using the 
nom-de-guerre Paul Lebel, and British Sergeant Gordon H. Tack comprised the 
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seventh team dispatched from Britain to France.  On 16 June, SFHQ alerted and 
briefed GILES its mission to deploy to the Finistère region of eastern Brittany and 
organize and arm Résistance forces.  SFHQ knew very little about the region’s 
Maquis and prior to departing General Koenig himself briefed the team and 
emphasized the region’s importance and how vital it was to learn more about the 
Maquis’ potential for combat.  Also, Koenig sternly warned Knox to act like a 
gentleman and behave himself as a good guest of France should.  Evidently, he 
thought Americans chased women too much and would be parachuting into France 
with stockings and chocolates.37  Immediately prior to the team’s departure, Captain 
Grall went back to London to agree on the BBC signal for the Brittany large-scale 
attack.  Grall suggested and SFHQ agreed the signal would be “Le Chapeau de 
Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec?”  (“Is Napoleon’s hat still at Perros-
Guirec?”).  After an unsuccessful attempt on 4 July, GILES finally parachuted into 
the French night on 8/9 July from a Carpetbagger B-24.47  Their mission flew in on a 
night that saw 15 sorties, from two airfields, to four drop zones now under the control 
of Maquis who were coordinating with Team FREDERICK.38 
     Captain Knox parachuted first out the “Joe hole.”  Born in England and 
educated in languages at St. John’s College, Cambridge, Knox had joined the  
International Brigade and fought in the Spanish Civil War.  After he was wounded, he  
left Spain for Paris and fell in love with an American writer.  They moved to  
                                                
37 Bernard Knox, Interview, 8 June 2001. 
47 Ibid., 338-9 and Knox, letter.  Napolean’s Hat is the name of a rock formation off the coast of France 
near the town of Perros-Guirec. 
38 “FREDERICK, June Moon through August non-Moon,” HS 8/148, BNA. 
 256 
Connecticut, and Knox became a naturalized citizen in 1943.  When Pearl Harbor 
occurred he joined the U. S. Army that mindlessly trained him as an air defense 
officer.  At the beginning of 1944 he was serving in England and when he heard 
about the OSS and he volunteered hoping to see some action.  He served as an 
explosives and French instructor a Milton Hall and after some parachute training, was 
put in the mix to deploy on a team.    Twenty-nine year-old Knox acted as GILES’ 
team commander.  Captain Paul Grall joined the JEDBURGHs from the North Africa  
recruiting drive.  The Germans had captured Grall in 1940 and held him as a POW in  
Poland.  He escaped and somehow got to Morocco.  A member of the French  
Colonial Army, Grall was a well-built man with a large scar down his cheek from an  
automobile accident.  Sergeant Tack served as W/T operator and Captain Knox  
considered him a first class radio operator.  Tack followed Knox down the “Joe hole”  
with Grall exiting last.48 
The drop went well with Knox and Tack landing close together, they found  
Captain Grall within two or three minutes.  Excited young Frenchmen welcomed  
them almost immediately, greeting them with kisses. The reception party gathered up  
their gear and much to the JEDBURGHs’ delight, had vehicles to transport them to a  
safe area.   Riding in cars and a truck carrying their equipment, GILES hoped to make 
it to its base before dawn.  But due to the distance the team did not make it there until  
daylight.  There it found not quite fifty men whose leader was in Côtes-du-Nord, 
FREDERICK’s area, attempting to acquire weapons.  Captain Grall organized the 
                                                
48 Ibid., 339 and 623; de Francesco telephone conversation; Bernard Knox to author, April 2, 1999, 
Knox interview, June 2001. 
 257 
defenses and distributed the weapons giving instruction as he went along. Later that 
afternoon, the team heard the BBC message informing them of another drop on the 
same ground as the previous night.  Leary of making the trip back to the drop zone, 
GILES decided to risk it in order to get the weapons.  They also sent word to London 
relating the different Résistance situation than they had been briefed since Gestapo 
and Milice had recently arrested and shot many local leaders.  GILES lamented, 
“situation at Finistere is not as informed,” requested three more JEDBURGH teams to 
work other parts of the region, and an additional one million francs.49 
GILES retrieved their supplies from the drop zone just in time.  They 
discovered the next afternoon, that the 2nd Fallschirmjägers had an estimated 300  
troops going through farms searching for Résistance forces.  The suspicious  
Germans heard the aircraft and arrived on the drop zone just five minutes after team  
GILES’ and their reception team left.  After the near miss, GILES distributed the  
arms to another Maquis group and met the returning Maquis leader, Yues Legal, who  
led the most active Brittany group, the communist FTP.   Team GILES and Legal  
quickly came to an agreement on dropping grounds and the strategy that GILES  
should remain in Brittany’s center while letting the follow-on JEDBURGH teams 
work the coastal areas.50 
The night of 9/10 July, two more JEDBURGH teams parachuted onto one of 
GILES’ drop zones without its knowledge and the next day SFHQ radioed GILES 
informing it of Teams FRANCIS and GILBERT’s arrival.  These two teams 
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proceeded to the villages Quimper and Quimperlé and by the time the ground 
received a drop of weapons for GILES’ Maquis four days later, the ground was 
“blown.”  Hearing the noise four nights previously, the Germans suspected something 
was going on in the area and attacked the Maquis as they finished their work at the 
drop zone.  However, the Maquis put up stiff Résistance surprising the Wehrmacht 
and Captain Knox thought the casualties the Germans sustained were not worth their 
effort.51 
The FTP sent their men from Finistère to GILES’ camp to receive training, 
weapons, and organized Résistance activities for the region.  GILES worked to  
coordinate every supply drop in an effort to control the Maquis and keep the materials  
out of German hands.  GILES and the FTP selected seven drop zones and informed  
London of their location while training numerous Maquis on reception ground  
procedures.  On 12 July, the Free French (FFI) chief, Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud  
visited GILES’ command post and discussed Résistance operations.  GILES and  
Berthaud established a professional relationship at first and related their respective 
goals agreeing to stay in contact with each other via Legal.  Unfortunately, Berthaud, 
whose real name was Bourrières, and who had taken over from the recently arrested 
Libération-Nord leader in the area just before the GILES’ arrival, lacked the quality 
and quantity of the organization enjoyed by the FTP.  While meeting with  
him, one of the Maquis recognized a man in Bourrières’ car as a spy and GILES’  
report coldly stated, “we had to shoot one of the men in his car, who was a known  
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Gestapo agent.”  Due to fears Bourrières organization had been compromised,  
GILES avoided working with him.52 
     The fears proved true when the next day the mayor of the nearby village told 
 
GILES that “large German forces were in the area looking for us,” using a map with  
 
“red marks against the name of the farm where we were taking our meals.”  GILES  
 
packed up camp and moved that night with its 100 man company.  Traveling by  
 
foot for the next two nights, they arrived at a high plateau near St. Thors.  GILES set  
 
up operations and managed to stay for a week.  While at St. Thors, they met with  
 
more FTP departmental chiefs anxious to begin offensive actions.  Ordered by  
 
Koenig to avoid open warfare until directed, GILES worked to convince them the  
 
Maquis that they fell under the orders of SHAEF and their orders were to wait until 
the correct time.  After a long discussion the FTP chiefs agreed they would follow the 
Allied orders.   
Unfortunately, Colonel Bourrières became jealous and complained to London  
 
concerning the FTP’s influence with GILES.  Radioing London in response GILES  
 
stated the assertions were, “true enough because in our region Résistance is mostly  
 
Maquis FTP.”  The message went on to remind London that the “arrangement was  
 
made at an interview between us and Berthaud.”  GILES appeared tired of  
 
Bourrières’ complaining and London agreed with GILES and its arrangements with  
 
the region’s FTP.53 
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53 Ibid., 328-29 and 343-44. 
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     Meanwhile, GILES received teams HORACE and HILARY and three other 
French parachutists at one of its drop zones.  GILES arranged for them to take up  
positions on the north Brittany coast and sent them off to their areas.  To add  
to the confusion one of the suspected Milice prisoners escaped forcing GILES to  
relocate again.  The JEDBURGH team crossed the Aulne canal and set up camp in a  
valley three kilometers from the village of Lennon.  GILES increased their number by  
one with Canadian Flight Lieutenant Brown.  Shot down over Brest, Brown wandered  
into the team’s area and remained with them as the normal escape routes ceased when  
the Allies invaded Normandy.  Brown spent nearly three weeks with the team helping  
Sergeant Tack handle the radio traffic.  At this point, five teams worked in Finistère  
but the Fallschirmjägers still controlled major roads and aggressively sought to ferret 
out the Maquis.54 
     GILES also met with Major Colin Ogden-Smith and Captain Guy Leborgne of  
 
team FRANCIS and clarified each team’s operating area.  They discussed policy  
 
regarding the Résistance and Brittany’s political groups.  Unfortunately the details of  
 
the discussion are not noted but they presumably delineated each team’s  
 
operating area and drop zones and exchanged information on the FTP and Bourrières.   
 
Agreeing on every point, they parted and Knox lamented, “This was the last time I  
 
ever saw Colin.”55  FRANCIS had parachuted near Quimperlé on 10 July.  Leborgne, 
who used the nom de guerre Guy Le Zachmeur, and radio man British Sergeant A. J. 
Dallow landed on their drop zone at approximately 2:30 in he morning.  The team 
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leader, Ogden-Smith was nowhere to be found.  Leborgne met up with the Maquis 
leader in the region and Colonel Bourrières and reported no problems with his 
organization but seemed to work well with their FTP, who were again the most 
numerous in the area.  Having dropped right near a town that was, “the center of 
counter-terrorist” activity for the Wehrmacht, they feared for their missing colleague 
and sent out some of the Maquis to search for him while they established links with 
the region’s groups, arranged more weapons drops, and organized arms among them.  
Fortunately, on the 14th they found Ogden-Smith who had been hiding out the last 
four days.  Their pre-arranged rendezvous point proved to be the town with the 
region’s Wehrmacht garrison making life difficult then for the team to find each 
other.  Together now, they met with GILES on the 16th and again on the 19th, while 
both were evading the enemy.  But having had modest success in finding and 
equipping Maquis, by the 24th they claimed to have armed 500 men near Carhaix, 
another 500 near Scear and 300 near Guisgriff.  Establishing a company near the 
coast presented a problem  as their were fewer men there and the density of the 
enemy greater, nevertheless they claimed to have armed approximately 200.  They 
had also been joined by one of the stray SAS soldiers, Sergeant Maurice Myodon.  As 
to the overall plan for Brittany, Team FRANCIS seems to have understood the overall 
nature of the Allied aims in the region for they wrote how they were storing up arms 
for later operations and worked to coordinate their operating areas and share 
communications not only with GILES but Team GILBERT.39    
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 Ogden-Smith was an experienced commando, having participated in the 
British Small Scale Raiding Force and had served in North Africa.  Returning to the 
U. K. he was reassigned within the SOE to the JEDBURGH program and did very 
well in training.  He befriended Knox while at Milton Hall and they had spent time 
discussing their mutual interests and their separate experiences, each curious about 
the others combat time.  Ogden-Smith told Knox how he was jealous of his ability to 
have gone to college and expressed an interest in getting back to university after the 
war.40  He had been recently married and his wife lived in London.  His pre-war 
occupation was working in the family business manufacturing and selling fishing 
tackle and fly rods.41     
Having survived the separation from his team immediately upon arrival and 
one close call on the 19th, Ogden-Smith now led the augmented team of Leborgne, 
Dallow, Myoden, and two Maquis that helped keep watch and operate the radio.  
They made their headquarters at a farm in the village of Querrien, 12 kilometers north 
of the small port of Quimperlé.  On 29 July, they found themselves surrounded by 
“approximately 100 Feldgendarmes,” led directly to their location by a neighbor.  A 
burst of machine gun fire and a grenade was their first warning that Germans were 
near by.  Unfortunately, Ogden-Smith and Myoden were wounded immediately while 
Leborgne fired back and by chance killed the officer leading the operation.  In the 
confusion that followed, Leborgne was able to escape.  Sergeant Dallow, who had 
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been about a hundred yards away, grabbed his carbine and some of the radio 
equipment and ran toward the house where his teammates were exchanging fire.  As 
he was climbing up out of the ditch, he fell into some bushes and could not get out of 
them.  Laying there unable to move, but unseen by the enemy he watched helpless as 
the firefight ensued.  Ogden-Smith lay wounded but managed to give himself 
morphine and fire his weapon at the enemy putting down some of the Germans.  
Myoden, wounded from the grenade, defended himself exhausting four clips of 
rounds before calling out, “you need not be afraid, I have got no more ammunition.”  
Laying there in the open firing at the Germans he had enabled Leborgne and the two 
Maquis to escape.  The Germans carefully approached and then shot Ogden-Smith 
dead.  Another Feldgendarme walked up to Myoden warily, but killed him with a 
burst of machine gun fire and finally a bullet to the temple.  Dallow remained in the 
bush the entire time with nothing but his pistol and unable to help.  After two hours, 
with the Germans gone, he managed to climb out and departed the area.42   
 Informed of Major Ogden-Smith’s death by radio message from GILES, 
SFHQ related the news to Major General Gubbins, on or about 3 August.  Gubbins 
had taken special interest in the JEDBURGHs and had interviewed Ogden–Smith 
personally for SOE.  Now he wished to know more of the details about his death and 
the first reports were not enough.  His son Michael Gubbins had been killed at Anzio 
in February. Having been informed of his own son’s death by finding the War Office 
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message in his morning in box, Gubbins sought something more in order to write a 
meaningful letter to Ogden-Smith’s family.43  But that was not the only thing he was 
searching for.  The French were now fully involved in the operations in France and 
SOE’s influence in France was beginning to wane. 
 
General Koenig takes over guerilla warfare in France 
On 23 June, Eisenhower announced to his superiors and subordinates that 
General Koenig was now equivalent to any Allied commander serving under him in 
the Allied Expeditionary Forces.44  In Washington, General Marshall greeted this 
news with the directive that it should be publicly announced at once.45  But saying it 
was so and actually making it so proved to be two different issues.  Bureaucratic 
loyalties, diminished egos, ignorance of the implications, firm opinions on the matter 
and a lack of resources in war weary London hampered the quick creation of the 
headquarters staff of the FFI.  Koenig wished to stand up his machinery in order to 
control the quickly expanding FFI inside France.  Doing so required offices, vehicles, 
phones, and accreditations for his planning staff in order to get to work managing the 
SAS, the OGs, the Inter-Allied Missions, the DMRs, as well as the JEDBURGHS.   
Much of it already existed in the French Desk of the Anglo-American SFHQ.  Still he 
had his own ideas, outranked the SFHQ co-directors Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman 
and Colonel Haskell and indeed outranked the head of the SOE and the OSS.  
                                                
43 Joan Bright Astley and Peter Wilkinson, Gubbins & SOE, p. 168 – 169, HS 9/1377/2. 
44 “Designation of the Commander of the FRENCH Forces of the Interior,” 23 June 1944, Command 
and Control of French Forces of Interior, SHAEF SGS, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. 
45 Ibid., AGWAR FROM MARSHALL to ETOUSA. 
 265 
Furthermore, he had Eisenhower’s backing on the matter and used that trump card 
with the SHAEF staff or anyone else involved at every opportunity.  In the end, he 
won every argument, but opponents appeared frequently and came from many 
corners. 
 While it seems he could simply become the commander of the SFHQ with an 
addition of some French officers, it was more complicated than that.  SFHQ’s 
portfolio was grander than just France as it ran guerrilla warfare in every country in 
SHAEF’s theater and it would not be wise to place a French General in charge of 
every nation’s Résistance.   The compromise finally crafted was that the staff section 
from SFHQ running French operations would be chopped, so to speak, to EMFFI and 
General Koenig while the rest of SFHQ continued with their work in the other 
nations.  Therefore, Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell would now have three jobs.  Each 
was his nation’s senior irregular warfare officer for the theater.  Each of the men were 
also Co-Directors of SFHQ.  While these positions may sound like the same job, they 
can be quite different.  For instance, Haskell was responsible to Col Bruce and 
General Donovan in Washington for requesting and justifying his personnel needs, 
equipment, and the funds that kept his operation going.  He also, with his British 
colleague, approved of operations and assessed how well their activities were being 
conducted and what may need to be done next.46  Together these two tasks can be a 
burden, but when Eisenhower added the third task of being the US or UK Deputy to 
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the French Commander of the FFI, it brought about too much incongruence for 
Mockler-Ferryman.   
While Mockler-Ferryman got along well with Haskell, the same could not be 
said for Koenig.  The specific issue can not be determined from their written 
communication that survives in the various archives, but the tone of the letters and 
their habit of having to clarify what was said during meetings with follow up 
memorandums indicates their relationship was professional but strained.  With the 
British Brigadier and the American Colonel on the verge of taking on another Deputy 
job title for EMFFI, while maintaining their Anglo-American Co-Director position 
for SFHQ and their national responsibilities as well, they found themselves having to 
develop methods for solving Résistance issues for France by doing it the way Koenig 
wanted it while continuing with their agreed upon procedures for their Anglo-
American SFHQ for Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, and Germany.   
Therefore, there were to be two methods for doing things, one for France and another 
for the rest of the theater.   
Eisenhower seems to have anticipated this as his meeting with de Gaulle in 
December of 1943 indicated.  However, Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s delay in coming 
to an understanding with de Gaulle meant that organizational agreements would not 
be agreed upon until events forced them to be.  That time had now come.  On 2 June 
while Mockler-Ferryman was working with Koenig on the BBC messages, it appears 
he and perhaps Haskell, were working under the assumption that they would soon be, 
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“bringing them [the French] into our headquarters.”47   But instead, Koenig believed 
he would be bringing applicable portions of SFHQ into his.  Since he was the senior 
officer, with the directive from Eisenhower, Koenig’s belief is understandable.  By 12 
June, the disagreement must have continued however because now Gubbins and 
senior staff at SHAEF are involved in the matter.  British Major General J. F. M. 
Whiteley who was deputy Chief of Staff to Bedell Smith, wrote Gubbins that 
Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell will contribute to SHAEF’s operational planning and 
requirements but would not have access to them for France.  Instead, their role in 
EMFFI would be that of securing logistical capability such as air lift and weapons 
stores for France as the French were not conversant in that machinery nor was it 
acceptable to anyone in SHAEF that officers of one nation have so much control over 
foreign assets.  The reason boiled down to, as Whiteley wrote, “As the smooth 
running of the whole affair must depend on mutual trust and confidence, there must 
be no occasion for a suspicion to arise in General Koenig’s mind that Mockler-
Ferryman and Haskell can approach SHAEF behind his back.”48 
Furthermore, Koenig’s view on what the JEDBURGHs were to do was very 
clear.  They were a liaison element.  Koenig had DMRs, and regional and 
departmental FFI commanders for commanding the Résistance, the JEDBURGHs’ 
role was to communicate and equip, not to lead.  As described in Chapter 4, Mockler-
Ferryman would apparently concur, since during his speech at Milton Hall he 
emphasized that the JEDBURGHs, whatever else they might do, their mission would 
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always be of one of liaison.  However, since so much planning from the beginning of 
the JEDBURGH program had anticipated that the Jeds would replace arrested F 
Section cadres, Mockler-Ferryman and perhaps all the SOE and OSS planners were 
operating under the assumption that the SHAEF’s means of controlling the Résistance 
would be via the JEDBURGH teams and messages sent to them from SHAEF.  But 
with SHAEF’s long sought after French General reporting to it, who had been 
accredited by the Provisional Government for commanding the Résistance, Koenig 
could direct the Maquis via his own machinery.  The JEDBURGHs were viewed by 
Koenig and his planners in BRAL as merely a means to reach more Maquis units, 
assess their needs, communicate them back to EMFFI, who would then decide 
whether to fulfill it or not depending upon their priorities as they understood their 
directives from Eisenhower.  Koenig’s differentiation of the JEDBURGH mission 
still served Eisenhower, while it left SFHQ, with a somewhat diminished operational 
role, and often perplexed the JEDBURGHs in the field.  Lt Col Hutchinson’s and 
Major MacPherson’s frustrations in the previous chapter are an example of this.   
Mockler-Ferryman however saw it happening first hand, and as operations 
progressed he grew more and more frustrated with his lack of influence.  Memos 
went back and forth between him and Koenig about how EMFFI should be structured 
and finally Koenig had enough.  Reviewing the paperwork on the matter, General 
Bedell Smith wrote in the margins of one that he did “not like the tone” of Mockler-
Ferryman’s letter.  “Let’s not have a childish squabble.”49  With SHAEF bearing 
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down on the matter in order to resolve the issue without any further delay, Bedell 
Smith called a meeting to make it clear.  On 10 July, two days after Roosevelt 
announced his recognition that de Gaulle and the CFLN would be the “de facto 
authority” for France, Bedell Smith again emphasized Eisenhower’s views on the 
matter and backed up Koenig.50  Keeping up his efforts to get his headquarters going, 
Koenig asked for Haskell to stay on but instead wished to have Major General Robert 
Laycock as his British Deputy.  Laycock was one of the most experienced and well 
respected British commando officers and perhaps more importantly, was not SOE.  
The British did not release him from being their Chief of Combined Operations, a 
tame name for their Headquarters of their commando forces.   But the Americans 
granted Haskell to the coalescing EMFFI as long as he could remain in his other two 
roles.  Haskell’s ingratiating style backed up by his ability to pull off air operations 
like ZEBRA and CADILLAC impressed Koenig.  Mockler-Ferryman however saw 
the writing on the wall and tendered his resignation to Gubbins on 27 July.  Stating 
that he understood Eisenhower’s reasoning on the matter, but that every French 
officer viewed him with suspicion, something Whiteley had warned he did not want 
to see happen, Mockler-Ferryman believed resigning was his only option.  Gubbins 
saw no other way out either and accepted it on the same day that Ogden-Smith was 
killed near Querrien.51  But this did not mean Mockler-Ferryman was leaving SOE, 
nor even SFHQ.  He simply left EMFFI and therefore SFHQ’s French operations.  
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Retaining his other positions clouded the whole incident and has evidently led M. R. 
D. Foot and William McKenzie to miss the whole affair.52  In his place, the British 
sent Major General Harold H. Redman, a man with little to no experience running 
special operations.  He was not an SOE officer but was a French speaker serving on 
the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C.53 
The American OSS did not put up such resistance, but General Donovan did 
fear the incapacitation of his London station’s ability to continue its effort in Europe, 
just as OSS planning was beginning against Germany.  Knowing that he would need 
agents and teams in central Europe and expecting that OSS London would run them, 
he feared that much of his machinery was being turned over to the French.  In a 
response to Haskell’s description of how the reorganization was progressing and what 
SFHQ assets would come under Koenig’s command, Donovan fired off a message to 
Eisenhower claiming that, “by tearing out certain vital tissues of our organization in 
your theater, compels me to ask for a reconsideration as to these matters.”54  Donovan 
went on to hint that he might be forced to take what was left of the Allied SFHQ and 
present OSS capabilities to SHAEF without the British.   
But it was too late.  Eisenhower had striven since January to empower such an 
organization and while he admired and appreciated Donovan and the OSS, he was not 
going to reconsider, nor slow the progress that was finally taking place.  Furthermore, 
he was not going to let an Allied organization charged with working with the 
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resistance in the other countries of his theater be broken up.  He liked SFHQ and 
since the other exiled governments in occupied Europe were being comparatively 
pliant, he was going to run them as he saw fit.  On the 9th Eisenhower told Donovan 
and Marshall that he disapproved of anything that dissolved SFHQ, “for any countries 
except France.”  If Donovan needed OSS assets for issues in Central Europe, that was 
not Eisenhower’s concern and he reminded Donovan that it was not SFHQ’s either 
since it was a SHAEF organization.  Bruce and Haskell followed the theater 
commander’s telegram with a message that quite accurately reminded Donovan that 
Eisenhower had no responsibility for Central Europe and it was expecting a lot for 
Eisenhower to give up personnel for missions outside his theater.  By sending the 
message to Marshall, Eisenhower was making sure that his superior understood his 
point of view.55  Assuming Donovan was not willing to go to the President on the 
matter, Ike called his bluff. 
 General Koenig and his Chief of Staff Colonel Vernon had not waited for 
final resolution on the matter, but had been, since mid-June or so, taking over 
operations in France that related to the Résistance.  Koenig focused his resources 
largely on Brittany and since the BCRA and SOE contacts had been arrested, they 
now relied on the JEDBURGH teams to make use of the growing Maquis.  Their one 
functioning DMR for Brittany had been sending messages since his arrival with Team 
GEORGE and the SAS at DINGSON.  On 18 June Maurice Barthélemy who used the 
code name HAUTEUR, radioed he was meeting with the Region’s principle Maquis 
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group leaders and they were agreeing to the overall plan for their organization.56  But 
that was the same day as the attack on DINGSON, and was his preliminary 
assessment, significantly altered by the enemy’s actions.  The scattering of 
DINGSON and SAMWEST had forced SFHQ and EMFFI to reassess their timing of 
their next steps.  Fulfilling their orders meant more than deploying several 
JEDBURGH teams, and EMFFI began putting together a French led Inter-Allied 
mission that would serve as the overall command element for Brittany.  SHAEF 
allotted 35 air sorties a night for Koenig’s SAS and EMFFI forces, less than what was 
possible due to the concern of indicating too much to the enemy about how important 
Brittany was to the Allies.  Eisenhower’s orders to Koenig were clear, “The whole 
object of FFI planning and operations in BRITTANY is to give as much help as 
possible to enable the AMERICANS to capture BREST in the shortest possible 
time.”57  The US forces approaching Brittany now required FFI support and Koenig 
believed he needed to send a command element to Brittany to coordinate the effort. 
The mission was commanded by a French Army Colonel Albert Eon and his 
second in command would be Dewavrin.  EMFFI gave it the codename of ALOES 
and put them on standby to be ready to go when the time was judged right to go over 
to open guerrilla warfare.  In the meantime, military command remained with the 
SAS commander Commandant Bourgoin and the JEDBURGH Teams were reminded 
of that in messages.58   ALOES planning included working with the 21st Army 
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operations staff as it progressed west, increasing the parachuting of arms to the 
region, and Eon traveled to Milton Hall to brief the teams alerted for work in 
Brittany.  ALOES planning began in early July, just as GILES departed for France 
and their planning continued on through to the very day of their deployment on the 
night of 4 August.59  Team GILES missed all of this as their departure put them into 
combat prior to being informed of the tactical planning considerations.   
 Knox, Grall, and Tack were suffering from this as well as suffering under the 
Gestapo’s control of Brittany.  Under the threat of being found, the team moved 
again.  Striking out north across the Pleyben-Chateauneuf road, GILES marched until 
4 a.m.  The team hoped to settle there, but by the next day it learned the Germans had 
captured one of Sergeant Tack’s former radio assistants.  Knowing they must keep 
moving, they decided to go back across the canal toward Kernoux that night.   While 
on the move, they saw German signal flares and sent part of their company ahead to 
investigate.  They failed to return and GILES decided to strike out on their own, but 
the remaining men and boys were now without their own cadre and simply could not 
sustain a long forced march.  Forced to take to roads, rather than going across country 
due to the weary men, GILES reconnoitered a small village and could not believe its 
luck when they found an unguarded canal bridge.  Just as they were all across 
machine gun fire inspired GILES’ men to keep going as long as possible, but by 7:30 
the next morning only eight men remained with the team.60  
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However, during their movements they happened upon a great opportunity.  
GILES discovered the German main position in the region and hoped to capitalize on  
the information.  The Germans had commandeered a chateau situated on the area’s 
predominant hill.  With such a position they could view a great deal of the 
surrounding area, but GILES informed London of the position and asked for the RAF 
to strike.  On 30 July, three dive-bombers rolled in on the target filled with hung over 
German soldiers still groggy from a party the previous evening.  GILES radioed 
SFHQ and gleefully exclaimed the air strike “Couldn’t have been better.”61 
By late July, the FTP Maquis and especially the FTP leadership sought to take 
the fight to the Germans, but the direction to do so still had not arrived.  GILES 
informed London of some uncontrollable groups and complained, “FTP getting very 
hard to control and we may not be able to do it much longer. . . .FTP are reaching 
boiling point and explosion may occur if Boche continues to hunt them.”  But 
apparently GILES, and perhaps other JEDBURGHs teams, mis-understood a key 
aspect of their orders.  SFHQ wanted the Maquis to refrain from general open 
activity, but not systematic and persistent guerrilla activity.  In other words small 
scale harassment and well planned guerrilla attacks were fine.  But GILES, believing 
all such activity was off limits worked hard to convince the Maquis to refrain from 
any type of engagement while London wished only to stop open warfare.  In their 
exchange of messages GILES and EMFFI seem to be talking past one another to the 
extent that Grall and Knox responded to it all in their longest messages yet saying,  
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“You (EMFFI) did not answer our question at all.  We are not thinking of 
our own skins but of success of operation.  We repeat in words of one 
syllable, if Boche attacks Maquis in this area, no power on earth can stop a 
general explosion.  They can only attack if they have precise information.  
They can only get precise information through Feldgendarmerie.  It may be 
already too late.  Information this morning Boche about to install 25 
companies between Callac and Chateauneuf.  At least 500 at Chateauneuf.  
Our liaison is being completely cut by action of Feldgendarmerie.  
Messengers are arrested, tortured and shot every day.  In these 
circumstances our work is becoming almost impossible.  Central Finistère a 
powder magazine which needs only a spark and the Boche is going to 
provide the spark.  As for moving when we are in danger, we have moved 
five times since our arrival.  But 15 armed companies in the center.  Cannot 
keep moving all the time.  We have managed to keep Maquis quiet until 
now but if they are attacked, nothing can stop open fighting in Finistère.”62 
 
London radioed GILES on 30 July saying, “We quite agree about action by small 
groups against field gendarmerie.  Only mistake in interpretation made you interrupt 
all operations.  Must keep enemy in danger everywhere ceaselessly by guerilla [sic] 
action, that is to say, generalized mobile offensive action by surprise and refusing 
large scale battle.”  Aggressively continuing the weapon supply drops, GILES kept 
warning London they needed the message about Napoleon’s hat, otherwise they 
would not be able to control the FTP.  Now, London gave them a way to relieve the 
pressure caused by the misunderstanding but they still seemed not to understand the 
nuances of their mission.58 
      Moving for the last time on 31 July, GILES found its last headquarters back 
 
in its first headquarters, the village of Plessis.  They carried out reconnaissance on the  
 
chateau recently attacked by the RAF.  Piles of rubble and the odor of decaying  
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bodies greeted them and they reported killing 17 more Germans.  The Germans  
 
evacuated the ruins the next day and GILES intensified the drop zone activity hoping  
 
the wait would not be long until given the order.  On 2 August team FRANCIS  
 
radioed GILES with the news of Ogden-Smith’s death and GILES radioed London  
 
that all FRANCIS’ drop zones were blown as Ogden-Smith had the locations on him  
 
when he died.63 
      
     But on the evening of 2 August, the BBC transmitted the desired 
message “Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec,” and team 
GILES quickly set up an attack on columns of Germans moving east.   As the 2nd 
Fallschirmjägers moved toward the Allied forces now around Dinan in eastern 
Brittany, GILES brought the guerrillas to bear while sending London the message, 
“Lack arms and ammo.  Going over to offensive tonight.”  GILES and the Maquis 
could press the fighting, but they continued to require more arms.  The next day 
London obliged and the Maquis received four loads on one drop zone and one load on 
another.  GILES succeeded at getting the orders and arms to the northern part of their 
sector and also succeeded at penning in the Germans by blowing up a bridge on the 
main east-bound road while running ambushes on the roads to the east where the 
Germans were attempting to head toward the front.  The Germans, now forced to 
travel cross country rather than by road, slowed down considerably and took out their 
frustration on the French villages and farms by burning, looting, and other vicious 
actions.  FREDERICK radioed that it had 2000 men ready for work along the road to 
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be used by the Americans as they came toward Brest.64  Their work made the 
progress of the American tanks along the road from Dinan to Brest much quicker in 
that now they worked to preserve bridges while staging hit and run attacks on the 
Germans as they fled the advance of Middleton’s armored units.  In all the chaos, 
GILES and the Maquis captured enemy prisoners and Captain Knox questioned them 
and reported that, “all of them were Hitlerites to a man.  They admitted to the 
atrocities they had committed, refused to believe that the Americans had taken 
Rennes, refused to discuss the Hitler regime and refused to explain whey they had 
French jewelry, money, and identity cards on them.”  Knox added, that the prisoners 
amounted to a, “considerable number. . .” and “were all subsequently shot by the 
FFI.”65  The JEDBURGHs could not stop the Maquis from killing the prisoners even 
had they tried, due to the tremendous pent up hostility over the four-year occupation 
punctuated by the recent wave of repression and reprisals. 
 JEDBURGH Teams FELIX, GUY, and GAVIN in eastern Brittany received 
orders to preserve bridges the 1st U. S. Army needed to advance and relay information 
on the Maquis that could perform reconnaissance for leading elements of the 
conventional forces.  FELIX radioed the SF Detachment assigned to the 1st U. S. 
Army that it believed it had 4 to 6 thousand men partially armed and organized just 
ahead of their front and provided their location to the American operations planners. 
By 4 August The SF Detachment in General Patton’s 3rd Army radioed EMFFI that 
they had also contacted FELIX and that the JEDBURGHs had organized the 
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protection of the bridges and roads they intended to use from Dinan all the way to 
Guincamp and Morlaix in western Brittany.  They also confirmed contact with the 
Inter-Allied mission led by Colonel Eon and Dewavrin on 7 August. 66  Team FELIX 
had parachuted into Brittany east of Team FREDERICK and consisted of French 
Major Jean Souquat who used the nom de guerre Jean Kernevel, British Captain John 
Marchant and British W/T operator P. Calvin.  Having had less than a month to 
establish themselves, they were probably at their most effective in explaining the FFI 
to the conventional forces who were abysmally ignorant of key issues.  “In fact,” 
Marchant wrote in his final report, “we met one Civil Affairs Captain at Dinan who 
did not know the name of General Koenig or what the initials FFI stood for.  
However we found him very cooperative.”67 
     On the same night the action messages went out EMFFI deployed the ALOES 
mission from England to act as the leading element of General Koenig’s command.   
Colonel Eon’s men numbered about 30 as they deployed into Brittany to set up their 
headquarters.  With them was a JEDBURGH liaison officer who hoped to build a 
healthy liaison between ALOES and the area’s JEDBURGHs teams.  On 6 August, 
SFHQ notified GILES about ALOES, and directed GILES to contact  
them and placed GILES under their command as it was doing with all the other 
JEDBURGH teams.  Because GILES was in a central position, ALOES appointed 
them to be their main liaison to the Maquis throughout Finistère.  Captain Grall 
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concentrated on this new mission putting him in a key position regarding Brittany’s 
Résistance.  Captain Knox also made reconnaissance trips with the ALOES 
commander and organized mopping up operations as the German army clung to 
scattered positions.  Knox also met up with American commanders entering the area, 
advised them on local conditions, and assigned French scouts to their headquarters.68 
With the arrival of American conventional troops, led by Major General Troy 
Middleton’s VIII Armored Corps, the teams’ role shifted to liaison work assisting the 
conventional forces.  Crozon, a town on the end of the Brittany peninsula, served as 
the last German hold out in GILES’ area.  OB West had directed Ramcke’s 2nd 
Fallschirmjägers to hold on to the port of Brest and he and General Fahrmbacher’s 
XXV Armee Korps had been preparing for such a mission for weeks.  GILES aided 
the 17th and 15th Cavalry Squadrons’ attack on the approaches to Crozon by 
coordinating actions with the FFI and in the words of the Team GILES report, the 
Americans and French “cooperated magnificently.”69  EMFFI brought GILES back to 
England by sea prior to the final reduction of Crozon.70 
                                                
68 Ibid., 336 and 353; Claude E. Boillot,  U. S. Representative, Suez Canal Company (Compagnie 
Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez), 1952-78.  Papers, 1924 - 1984, Eisenhower Library.  4; 
and Foot, 407-408. 
69 HS 6/515, BNA, Kew, UK.  This is the SOE version of the OSS copy of the report used above for all 
my sourcing regarding GILES.  The difference between the two reports is only in their format.  
However, in January of 1945, Captain Grall read the final version of what he and Knox had written.  
He was disappointed that the translation into English and some of the recrafting of the report by the 
SOE translater and Knox after Grall departed the UK.  He believed they made it appear to the 
reader that Knox had been the team’s leader.  He did not agree with that, but amically wished to 
emphasize their team’s good relationship was one of cooperation.  Furthermore, Knox’s views on 
the ALOES mission was not Grall’s and he provided more context on what Eon, Dewavrin, and the 
mission was attempting to do.  In sum, he thought ALOES performed well in the operations against 
the German fortifications around Brest.  Furthermore, he wished to go on another mission with 
Knox and Tack.  GILES was placed on reserve for a second mission in the east of France, but was 
not deployed.    
70 Operations, The French Forces of the Interior. p. 867. 
 280 
 
Team GEORGE evades and attempts to reorganize the Loire-Inferieure 
Team GEORGE had reconstituted their mission after nearly three weeks of 
evading German patrols.  Still working with the DMR Barthélemy they finally gained 
sound footing with a Maquis network to the north-east of Nantes.   Once there and 
meeting in the home of a friendly local leader they discussed how to get something 
going in their new area.  Barthélemy, acting in his capacity as the DMR, prevailed 
upon the French JEDBURGH Captain Rageneau to become the DM for the 
Department of Loire-Inferieure.  Rageneau protested since he believed this was 
beyond the scope of his mission.  But since Barthélemy had no one else to do it, he 
agreed.  So team GEORGE became the de facto DMD for the department on 4 July.  
As they attempted to create a guerrilla force capable of operating against the Germans 
they discovered that this department had a wider variety of Résistance groups than the 
singularity enjoyed by the FTP in most of Brittany.  Those differences complicated 
their efforts.  “The political situation was a nightmare,” Cyr and Rageneau later 
wrote.  In their view, the groups fell into four kinds:  “political groups interested in 
resistance, resistance groups interested in politics, political groups pretending to be 
interested in the Résistance but only really interested in politics, and resistance groups 
not interested in politics (these being the angels.)”  Noting there may be more than 
one group for each category, they had their work cut out for them attempting to 
ascertain who could do what mission and whom they could trust.  The Jeds believed 
that the Front National leaders were in the first group and the ORA fell in the angelic 
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last group.  However, the ORA was not without fault as numbers reported in their 
Battalions were often barely enough to fill a company.  Realizing that the lack of 
weapons depressed Maquis numbers, GEORGE attempted to get more arms but never 
did as EMFFI suspected their transmissions to be a Gestapo deception and therefore 
sent them nothing.71  They spent the month of July and into August working to 
consolidate groups they believed would actually conduct sabotage and raids.  Having 
prevailed upon the local groups to unite behind them to fight the Germans, they 
succeeded in establishing some sense of unity.  They even met and were on excellent 
terms with Yves Lemoan who was the regional delegate for the Comité de Libération.  
But they also had to maintain their freedom against German infiltration of their 
growing organization, and in many ways had become more like underground agents 
than soldiers behind the lines.  They were in civilian clothes and had blended into the 
local scenery so cleverly that they often had lunch in their local bistro with the same 
Gestapo officer occupying the table next to them.72 
But as the U. S. 3rd Army approached and their operations became more 
important to Eisenhower’s operations, Team GEORGE found little success.  EMFFI’s 
disbelief in GEORGE’s radio transmissions for weapons deliveries resulted in 
nothing and their reputation with the local Résistance groups dropped considerably 
after spending weeks establishing it.  “We were desolated and felt that our credit and 
authority could not stand much longer on mere good words and promises,” the team 
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wrote after their return.   Upon hearing the BBC message declaring open guerrilla 
warfare, “we cried like kids considering our useless set, our useless work and all the 
dangers the patriots of the Loire Inferieure had gone through to get that point, 
remembering how many guys in prison or under the earth had paid for their trouble 
they had looking for useless grounds and organizing useless reception committees for 
planes which never came.”73  Their department’s Maquis, which they estimated at 
around 4000 men, lacked the weapons that would make them a part of the Allied 
effort.  EMFFI did not believe GEORGE was actually who they said they were until 
10 August when Cyr and Rageneau infiltrated Allied lines and presented themselves 
and some captured documents regarding the St. Nazaire port fortifications to the 3rd 
Army’s intelligence director.  Next they ran into Lt Col Powell.  He recognized them 
by their OSS jackets and finally now Team GEORGE could get weapons for their 
Maquis.  They went back across the lines and in the end equipped their Maquis for 
the action against the German FESTUNG at St. Nazaire and to help protect the 3rd 
Army’s southern flank.74 
 
Brittany Conclusion 
M. R. D. Foot, writing the official history of SOE activities in France 
considered the ALOES mission to be a “striking success.”75  However, Knox believed 
differently and thought their presence irrelevant.  Given his French teammate’s 
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opinion, perhaps it would be fair to say that ALOES was too late to effect the guerilla 
warfare of July and early August, but that its presence served to support Major 
General Middleton very well when the Germans retreated into their defenses around 
Brest.76  Relations with ALOES was certainly strained as Knox’s language describing 
Eon’s mission is heavy with sarcasm due to his disagreement regarding how GILES 
should be employed.  Dewavrin reacted unkindly toward the American Captain Knox 
and told him that, “the sight of my uniform made him feel ill.”77  By arriving so late 
the ALOES mission became superfluous.  According to Knox, he left Colonel Eon, 
“and his useless staff alone.”78  But the command of Brittany’s Maquis, was largely 
performed by the SAS commander Bourgoin operating in concert with the DMRs.  
Certainly, their ability to coordinate suffered due to the need to stay on the move and 
avoid arrest, but as a command element behind the lines, Bourgoin, Willk and 
Barthélemy and their JEDBURGH teams pulled off some successes.   The high 
density of German troops, the importance attached to the region by both the Allies 
and the Germans, and the relative political unity of the Maquis all created unique 
conditions in the region.  The JEDBURGH team deployments to Brittany exemplified 
the original operational concept the early SOE planners envisaged.   In all EMFFI 
deployed 12 JEDBURGH teams to the peninsula, several SAS missions with over 
300 soldiers, and coordinated 206 tons of weapons drops during the month of July 
resulting in Willk’s belief that they had armed 18,489 Breton Maquisards by the time 
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they gave the order to commence hostilities on 3 August.79  Recalling the early 
planning discussed in Chapter 1, the EMFFI deployed the JEDBURGHs to Brittany 
anticipating the widespread loss of their SOE and BCRA agents wanting the 
JEDBURGHs to act as their replacements.  However the creation of a French led 
organization, the EMFFI, running the whole operation was not foreseen by SOE nor 
did the SOE foresee the Gaullists eclipsing them as SHAEF’s primary means to 
command the Résistance.  Mockler-Ferryman was gone and there was, due to enemy 
successes and French assumption of control of the operations for France, no 
meaningful F Section presence in Brittany.  General Koenig had succeeded in gaining 
complete command of all the SOE and OSS assets as well as the Breton Maquis.  
Some scholars estimate that the FFI in Brittany numbered around 35,000 armed men.  
Luc Capdevila notes the problem with such an assessment given the nature of the 
“spontaneous mobilization.”80  However, the number the Allies believed they armed 
at the time largely comports with post war historians estimations of what was within 
the realm of the possible.  So, if they did indeed have nearly 20,000 FFI under their 
command at the beginning of August, how well did they utilize them? 
Due to a single Résistance group in Brittany, the JEDBURGH teams rarely 
had to mediate between political factions nor contemplate ramifications of supporting 
one group over the other.  Team GEORGE is the exception to this and its members 
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did have to negotiate their way through the local politics but once established, would 
have enjoyed some success had their communications not been suspect.  Either 
politics, poor communications, or lack of arms proved to be the source of 
JEDBURGH failures in France.  Bernard Knox believed the communist philosophy 
had very little hold on such a rural and religious area and with the FTP filled with 
non-idealistic young men who simply wanted to fight the Germans, Knox believed 
politics was “unimportant.”81  Since that was the case, and since EMFFI arranged for 
many of the drops that the JEDBURGHs, DMRs, and SAS requested, the Brittany 
FFI was largely successful during the first week of August in harassing the German 
forces as the American conventional units made their way into the region.  However, 
there was a great deal of murder and mayhem, in addition to the legitimate military 
action Eisenhower and his commanders sought.  German General Fahrmbacher’s 
policy of ruthless actions against anyone suspected of supporting the Résistance 
turned back against the Wehrmacht with the shooting of prisoners and spies as Knox, 
Grall, and Tack’s report makes clear.  But it seems a stretch to blame the 
JEDBURGH or SAS mere presence for provoking the shooting of prisoners.  Indeed, 
the presence of the JEDBURGHs and their work with the Maquis mitigated such 
actions and kept the FFI leashed to Eisenhower’s intent.  Indeed Bob Kehoe wrote 
after the war that while the headquarters staff may often “talk of ‘command and 
control’ our role was better described as ‘convince and induce’” when it came to the 
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Maquis.82  Such is the nature of partisan warfare and attempting to reign in the 
passion of the people, to use Clausewitz’s words.
                                                
82 Kehoe, p. 34. 
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Chapter Seven 
Setting the Trap 
 
 
 While Eisenhower and Koenig consolidated and reorganized French control 
over the FFI, Allied operations in France continued.  American Lieutenant General 
Omar Bradley’s 1st Army and British Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey’s 2nd Army 
had spent the days since D-Day attempting to capture the Cherbourg port and the city 
of Caen respectively.  Possessing Cherbourg would give the Allies one of the ports 
required to nourish their growing numbers while Caen sat astride key roads 
Eisenhower needed to drive to the east and south out of Normandy.   On 26 June the 
Germans surrendered Cherbourg and Caen finally fell on 8 July, the same day 
Bernard Knox, Paul Grall, and Gordon Tack of Team GILES landed in Brittany.  The 
Wehrmacht countered the Allies with most of their armored forces facing the 
Dempsey’s British and Canadians while the Wehrmacht forces that faced Bradley’s 
US forces were largely comprised of Infantry and Airborne units.  The 2nd SS “Das 
Reich” Division that had been ordered to stop its “clearing operations” in southern 
France as they were committing their deadly work in Oradour-sur-Glane, struggled 
mightily to pass through the Maquis and Allied fighter bomber harassment.  They 
finally arrived, regrouped, and began participating in the Normandy combat on 20  
June.1   Teams QUININE and AMMONIA had assisted in that delay, but the 
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infamous Division’s delayed arrival can also be attributed to F Section Agents and 
their networks, as well as the BCRA controlled networks such as those run by DMR 
Eugene Dechelette in R5 implementing their part of Plan Vert.  Additionally, as Max 
Hastings has pointed out, OB West did not issue the order for the Division to move 
north until 10 June.  Therefore, part of the credit for the delay should be given to 
Gerd von Rundstedt.2 
The Wehrmacht succeeded in slowing down Allied efforts in Normandy while 
they mistakenly waited for what they believed would be Lieutenant General George 
Patton’s First U. S. Army Group (FUSAG) to hit the beaches in the Pas de Calais in 
Northeastern France.  But Hitler’s suspicions were entrenched into firm belief by a 
sophisticated Allied deception campaign.  In reality, Patton’s force, the 3rd US Army, 
began to arrive in France in the middle of July and became officially active on 1 
August.3  With that force was Special Forces Detachment 11 commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert I. “Rip” Powell.  His role was to be a part of the 
operations staff, or G-3, in Patton’s Headquarters and enable cooperation with the FFI 
as the 3rd Army pressed the attack into France.  Each of the numbered Allied Armies 
had their own SF Detachment but not all used it as Patton did, nor did they have the 
need for FFI support.4  As Patton’s superior Lt Gen Bradley shifted his emphasis 
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south and east along the north side of the Loire River.  Patton wanted to race as fast 
as his tanks, fuel, and soldiers could go.   This necessitated aid from two different 
methods of warfare than the 3rd Army could summon with their own soldiers and 
vehicles.  To do it, Patton relied on the US Army Air Forces to provide close air 
support, but he also relied upon the irregular forces of the FFI to his south.  Patton’s 
fellow Army commanders to his north were not in a position that exposed their 
flanks, nor were they encouraged to race as far as they could, so for them FFI support 
was not as crucial. 
The Allied invasion of southern France was finally approved on 2 July.  Not 
knowing whether he would get the landing craft necessary for placing his forces 
ashore, Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch began final planning and rehearsals 
for what was called ANVIL and he was given the go ahead to land between Toulon 
and Nice on 15 August.  But Churchill, who had never favored an invasion of 
southern France and sought to use those forces for further landings in Italy or in the 
Balkans continued to argue against it.  He failed to convince Ike to call off the 
southern invasion, and Eisenhower told him that if it was a political issue, he would 
have to appeal to directly to Roosevelt.5  He did so in a message to the President’s 
close aid Harry Hopkins only a week before the invasion was to begin.  Opening up 
with compliments regarding American forces and their quick movement into Brittany 
as well as east into central France, the Prime Minister complained that, “I’m grieved 
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to find that not even splendid victories and widening opportunities do not bring us 
together on strategy.”  He went on for another five pages on the reasons for canceling 
or diverting what had now been renamed DRAGOON.6  Hopkins would have none of 
it and answering for the President who was at his Hyde Park home at the time, he 
replied to Churchill that it was far too late to shift things now, and that the way north 
“will be much more rapid than you anticipate.  They have nothing to stop us.”  He 
went on to add, “The French will rise and abyssiniate [sic] large numbers of Germans, 
including, I trust, Monsieur Laval.”7  While the word abyssiniate is not in the 
dictionary, Hopkins apparently meant to imply that the Wehrmacht would suffer the 
same fate as Italian Dictator Mussolini’s stalwart troops had in the Horn of Africa the 
year before.  While Hopkins’ hopes may have been more rhetorical than Eisenhower 
would have himself stated, the Allies did want Patch’s 7th Army to drive up the 
Rhone River valley and eventually link up with Eisenhower’s forces coming across 
France from the west.  Patch and Patton were to shut the door on fleeing German 
forces as quickly as possible.   If successful, the Allies could potentially trap 
thousands of German soldiers in France.  So while Patton wanted the FFI to protect 
his southern flank, Patch sought FFI intelligence for his forward movement and 
wanted Cochet’s and Koenig’s Maquis to harass the Germans along their routes to 
and from the battle area, cut their lines of communication, and sabotage enemy 
supplies and facilities.  Attempting to control this would be Special Forces Unit No. 4 
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commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William Bartlett.  Like his counterparts in 
SHAEF, Bartlett served within Patch’s operations division and had a liaison to his 
intelligence staff as well as his subordinate units.8 
Of course Hopkins was exaggerating quite a bit when he told the Prime 
Minister that the Germans had nothing to stop Allied troops.  The 11th Panzer 
Division and the portions of the 9th Panzer Division were still in the south, as well as 
several Reserve Infantry and Mountain Light Infantry Divisions.  Additionally, there 
were anti-aircraft or FLAK units, naval and marine forces in the port areas, the 
Feldgendarmes scattered around the main cities, and thousands of civilian 
administrators working for the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF).  But for the 
Allies, the focus of attention was the armored units, as they afforded the enemy an 
offensive combat force.  The location and combat status of the 9th and 11th Panzer 
Divisions and smaller mobile units were of great interest to the Allied commanders.  
Therefore as the Allies maneuvered through France, they sought to use the Maquis to 
stifle the enemy’s mobility and focused on these two Divisions where possible. 
As Patton’s 3rd Army began coming ashore in Normandy behind Lt General 
Bradley’s forces in the middle of July, the Allies, including Churchill and Roosevelt, 
began to see the utility of Maquis action and sought to bring more of it to bear.  De 
Gaulle’s views were more circumspect however and he appreciated the situation with 
greater sobriety.  He sought to emphasize what the French were doing for their 
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nation’s liberation but did not think things had gone smoothly.  Writing to General 
Wilson at Algiers, de Gaulle believed the Résistance in Brittany, the French Alps, and 
the Massif Central were having the desired effect, but believed that especially in the 
Vercors, “There is no doubt the opening of guerrilla activity was begun too soon” and 
that the supplies insufficient and too late.9  SHAEF staffers however seem to be 
amazed at what was occurring and viewed the German attacks on the Vercors as a 
strategic benefit.  SFHQ’s monthly report summed up the action as having diverted 
portions of the 11th Panzer Division, as well as infantry, artillery, and airborne troops 
estimated at 10,000 soldiers.  “The forces of the FFI thus were able to divert a 
considerable ENEMY force which might have been used elsewhere.”10    
Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Harry Butcher remarked that the “Résistance groups in 
France have stopped considerable rail traffic, out [sic] three main canals and have 
blown up 10,000 tons of ammunition and a depot.”  He also noted “severe fighting” 
in central and southern France and remarked that, “We are still dropping into France 
SAS troops, JEDBURGH teams, jeeps, armor and ammunition not only from 
England, but from North Africa.”11  SFHQ and its parent for France EMFFI sought to 
utilize the Maquis, but the swelling numbers necessitated careful selection of where 
to send those arms Butcher spoke of, and how quickly to deploy the Jeds.   
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With nearly 100 JEDBURGH Teams in reserve for France, as of 17 July only 
19 had been deployed and that demonstrated a hesitance based upon several factors.  
So far SFHQ had deployed the Jeds focusing on central France with teams HUGH, 
HAMISH, ANDY, and ISAAC, Southern France with team BUGATTI, AMMONIA 
and QUININE, the Rhone River valley with teams WILLYS, VEGANIN, DODGE, 
and CHLOROFORM, and Brittany with teams FREDERICK, GEORGE, GILES, 
HILARY, FRANCIS, GILBERT, GAVIN, and GUY.  When the Maquis swelled to 
uncontrollable numbers, the Allies went through a major re-assessment of how to use 
the JEDBURGH teams along with a careful evaluation on their ability to supply the 
FFI.  They also ascertained the available airlift with an appreciation for enemy 
interference, moon phases, and the certain delays from weather.  Their planning was 
based on new assumptions now learned from experience, but in many cases 
implemented by the new French staff officers as Koenig took over.  His control can 
clearly be seen as F Section requests for sending teams to France went through either 
Koenig or his Chief of Staff Colonel Henri Ziegler as a note of 28 July suggests.  F 
Section requested a JEDBURGH Team to be sent to various locations in France and 
the operations section of EMFFI considered them and approved of most, but did so 
with an appreciation of the DMRs views, inter-allied missions that were already in the 
area, and disapproved others based on the belief that uniformed teams were not yet 
appropriate to the region around Paris.  One thing the British, French, and American 
officers who now comprised EMFFI wished to do was to send JEDBURGHs to 
eastern France and the departments of Doubs, Haute Saône, Aisne, Cote d’Or and 
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Vosges.  The F Section officer, apparently Lt Col Buckmaster, did not object to any 
of Zeigler’s points as his notes in the margins agree with all of the comments.12  
Written the day after Mockler-Ferryman’s resignation, but a day before Gubbins 
approved of it, Buckmaster, who was now EMFFI’s British Deputy for Operations 
along with American Lt Col Paul van der Stricht, evidently understood Koenig’s 
growing role in France.       
While the Allies did not all agree or understand the effect the Maquis might 
actually be having on the enemy, the Germans suffered considerable consternation 
themselves.  Not only were they overwhelmed with enemy action, fuel shortages, 
sabotaged communications, and hit and run attacks throughout France, but the normal 
fog of war became increasingly thick when on 20 July elements inside the army 
nearly pulled off an assassination of Hitler and an Army coup against the Nazis.  In 
Paris on the 20th, the commander of the MBF, Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel received 
the first and incorrect report that Hitler was dead, and he began to arrest the Paris 
based SS officers and troops.  But when von Kluge, who had taken over from 
Rundstedt at OB West, refused to join the coups and everyone heard the truth of 
Hitler’s survival, the estimated 1200 SS who had been arrested were politely released 
the next day.  Stülpnagel’s days were numbered and he was recalled to Germany on 
the 21st.  His suicide attempt enroute to Berlin only landed him in a hospital and after 
a summary trial he was executed on 30 August.13 
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However, throughout it all the Wehrmacht was able to develop a fairly clear 
understanding of what the Allies were attempting to get the Maquis to do.  By the end 
of July the Germans turned their understanding into propaganda.  In the Pariser 
Zeitung of 29/30 July ran a long article claiming that the Allies were conducting an 
illegal war in France due to the use of “so-called regular armed forces of General 
Koenig which consist of the French Résistance organization formed under English 
leadership.  Englishmen, Americans, and de Gaullists form the framework and are 
parachuted in to try in vain to produce a rising of the people.”14  Clearly the Gestapo 
had succeeded in untangling the difference between the SAS or OG commando 
missions and what the JEDBURGHs were sent to do.  How did they know this?  By 
the end of July, the JEDBURGH reports of FREDERICK, GILES, as well as others 
discussed their discovery of security leaks and traitors in their Maquis.  The 
intelligence gained by these moles must have informed the Gestapo of the three-man 
Allied missions.  Moreover, William Savy had told the internal commander of the FFI 
of the JEDBURGH plan and it may have come up during General Dejussieu’s 
interrogation after his arrest in May.  So while no Jeds had yet been killed or taken 
prisoner, the Gestapo’s penetration of various Résistance groups aided German and 
Vichy efforts in understanding how the Allies were actively working with them 
against the Wehrmacht.  Furthermore, their propaganda, by basing its argument on 
what was legal to do within the framework of the Armistice Germany and France 
signed in 1940, was a point that the Allies and General Koenig were also concerned 
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about.  De Gaulle’s position had always been that because an armed enemy had 
invaded France, the Armistice of 1940 was null.  His legal view of the matter flowed 
from this belief while the Germans of course thought otherwise and believed instead 
that what the Allies were doing was inciting an illegal rebellion against the legal 
government of France.  While the Germans may have thought this way, they of 
course did not act like it since their occupation of the entirety of France demonstrated 
who Hitler believed was the real authority in France.  As for the JEDBURGHs doing 
the inciting of the Maquis violence, it is clear the German propagandist also 
misunderstood the source of the inciting.  It was German actions over the course of 
the long occupation that provoked the “Terroristen” as the Wehrmacht called them. 
Ironically the Jeds, in most circumstances, were asserting a break on the spasm of 
violence and, in theory at least, would be de Gaulle’s voice, through Eisenhower and 
Koenig, regarding what violence was legitimate and useful. 
Now too far along in the effort to reconsider or significantly alter course 
regarding the legality of the FFI, the Allies themselves groped for a way to present 
the FFI as a legally constituted force.  Before the invasion, on 20 May, General 
Koenig was given copies of the First World War’s Armistice agreement of November 
1918, the Geneva Convention of July 1929, and a copy of the German and Italian 
Armistice agreements with Pétain from June of 1940.15   He may have requested these 
documents to see how far he could use irregular forces and the nature of their rights in 
a treaty that Germany had signed.  Before D-Day SHAEF was also concerned about 
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irregular warfare and decided to support the issue of armbands to the FFI and 
parachute them in with the weapons and other supplies.  On 9 June, the Provisional 
Government of France officially adopted the FFI as an armed force under its 
authority.16   SFHQ arranged for 14,000 armbands to be dropped on 25 June during 
the daylight Operation BUICK.17  The Germans soon noticed the armbands on FFI 
and reports of them quickly began filtering in to OB West noting the presence of 
Maquis with the armbands by late June.18  Furthermore, EMFFI messages to the 
DMRs emphasized wearing the armbands and that the “Brassards” as the French 
called them, would be included in the equipment drops.  However, Colonel Zeigler 
radioed Dechelette that it was unclear to what extent the Germans would recognize 
this makeshift uniform.19   SHAEF staff did not know either and did not think the 
French Provisional Government’s proclamations, nor the armbands would be 
sufficient for the typical German soldier.  General Whiteley of Eisenhower’s staff 
requested General Koenig to work out how he could begin the process of enrolling 
the Maquis into the French Army and provide the Maquis with a service book “which 
while not bulky” due to airlift constraints, could be viewed by the Germans as a bone 
fide military document similar to what the Germans had done for their own 
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“Organisation Todt” members who were now being used as combatants.20  All of this 
was being done in a large-scale game of catch up due to the lack of ability to plan out 
such key elements prior to starting OVERLORD.  The argument between FDR and de 
Gaulle had deep ramifications. 
 
Setting the Trap 
Conventional Forces and coordinating with the Maquis 
On the same day that Operation CADILLAC occurred July 14, SHAEF 
wished to initiate a third such operation and EMFFI began organizing another 
daylight airdrop of weapons and supplies to the Maquis.  SHAEF and EMFFI gave 
the highest priority to The Vosges region of eastern France but after more than a 
week, EMFFI scrubbed that part of the operation due to, “enemy action there being 
too great to allow a daylight reception.”21  For the nearly two hundred B-17s to reach 
their targets using low altitude daylight runs, enemy antiaircraft concentration had to 
be light and the Vosges did not qualify.  After some reassessment, Operation BUICK 
was conducted on 1 August delivering 2,286 containers from 192 aircraft to four drop 
zones in southern and eastern France.  BUICK provided weapons to groups between 
Lyon and Dijon and to groups east of Lyon near the towns of Albertville and Annecy 
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in three different Departements.22  But this was not enough and did nothing for the 
high priority Vosges Maquis.  EMFFI began planning another daylight mission and 
more of the normal Special Operations nighttime missions would have to make up the 
difference.  
The day before BUICK, EMFFI made arrangements to make up for the fact 
that the Vosges would not be supplied during the next day’s operation.   EMFFI 
began planning a JEDBURGH and SAS mission for the region with the hope of 
sending Team JACOB “to arm up to a maximum of about 7000 men…and keep them 
supplied” for this key region.23  Indeed throughout the month of July, as EMFFI was 
organizing, SHAEF had instructed Koenig to arm “approximately 77,000” men by the 
first of August and to sustain them.  Doing so meant canceling a French proposed 
Airborne Operation code named “CAIMAN” that was intended to develop one of the 
Maquis concentrations into a more potent sore point behind the German lines.  But 
there was simply not enough airlift to mount it and so Eisenhower was forced to 
cancel it.24  SHAEF planners knew there was a shortage of parachutes as well as 
airlift sorties but believed that 77,000 men was a realistic number.  With Operation 
ANVIL given a firm go, the intent was for those airlift missions to support the 
Maquis who in turn would conduct widespread guerilla actions in support of General 
Patch’s invasion in the south, as well as Eisenhower’s progress east across France. 
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The southern theater’s rough equivalent of SFHQ, the Special Projects 
Operations Centre (SPOC) communicated their priorities to General Koenig that 
explained how they sought to use the Maquis.  The same day that Operation BUICK 
dropped weapons north and east of Lyon, SPOC drew up its planning on how to use 
its 15 JEDBURGH Teams.  SPOC wanted teams to deploy to the Aveyron, Savoie, 
Hautes Alpes, and the Basses Alpes departments and cut the roads and railroads while 
the last three teams would also foment guerrilla warfare.   Furthermore, two more 
teams would be sent to the Gard and a team to cover the Ariège and Pyrenées 
Orientales in order to cut roads and railroads out of Tarbes and Avignon while using 
the Maquis to block the Spanish border so Wehrmacht troops could not flee south into 
neutral Spain.  SPOC’s seven teams already in France were also to step up pressure 
on certain lines of communication, and in one instance, Team CHLOROFORM 
would be shifted from its present location in the Haute Alps near Italy to come back 
to the Rhone Valley in order to harass German troops behind the main invasion area.  
Team PACKARD, comprised of American Captain Aaron Bank, French Captain 
Henri Denis, and Canadian radio operator F. Montfort had departed Algiers the night 
before and were to cut the road Bozouls – Mende Pont d’Espret and the St. Flour to 
Campagnac railway.  One JEDBURGH team was held in reserve and Operational 
Groups and Inter-Allied Missions were also factored into SPOC’s planning for how it 
would get the Maquis to support General Patch’s invading forces for his D-Day on 15 
August.25  The effect of it all was to have the Maquis harass German forces as they 
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came to the invasion area down from the center of France through the Rhone River 
valley or from Toulouse and further west in France.  Primarily the planners were 
concerned about the 11th Panzer Division north of Toulouse at Montauban, as the 
largest threat to Patch’s invasion force; and if the Maquis could successfully sabotage 
rail roads, and conduct hit and run raids, they could buy the invasion forces some 
time.   
The planning and cooperation between the two Allied theaters now began in 
earnest.  On 1 August, Eisenhower directed EMFFI to equip 120,000 men into the 
FFI by the end of the year and use 400 sorties per month to do so.26  On 2 August, the 
day Sergeant Bourgoin was killed in Pleuville, EMFFI told SPOC that they were 
sending two JEDBURGH officers, British Major Osborne Grenfells and American 
Lieutenant Lucien Conien, to Algiers.   They would be leaving for Algiers on the 6th 
and take the communications equipment and supporting plans for six teams that 
would be controlled by London.  The teams had to deploy from Algiers due to aircraft 
range limitations.  General Koenig approved the deployment of Teams JEREMY, 
JOSEPH, JOHN, MARK, MILES, and MARTIN to various F Section agents in 
south-western France.  The message added that General Cochet could use the 
remaining four of the ten teams that had previously arrived in North Africa, for 
“whatever you think fit.”27  The same day SHAEF received the Mediterranean 
Theater’s Commander airlift priorities.  General Wilson directed that 55 missions 
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supply the Maquis in the Vercors hoping to sustain them now under a concentrated 
attack by elements of the 157th Infantry Division.   The Drôme, Haute Savoie, Savoie 
and Isère outside of Vercors were to get 30 sorties of weapons and supplies.  The 
Departement of Ardeche was to get 50 sorties, while Aveyron was to get 30, Lozere 
25 and Lot et Garonne, Tarn et Garonne 15 and Pyrenees et Gers was to get 15 and 
then after the invasion it was to get 70 airlift sorties.28  It appears AFHQ and SPOC 
planners were betting that the 11th Panzer Division would not leave their camps north 
of Toulouse until ANVIL began and the planners believed inserting the JEDBURGH 
teams just before the southern invasion’s first day would be sufficient time to impact 
the 11th Panzer Division’s attempt to reinforce German defenses.   
While the plans for the Allied invasion of southern France were beginning to 
crystallize, EMFFI’s plan on how to use the Maquis to support operations outside of 
Brittany seemed to get scant attention in early August.   General Patton’s 3rd Army 
officially came into being on 1 August with the schizophrenic mission of moving west 
to take Brest while moving south and east toward Rennes, Angers, and Le Mans.  
When German forces facing the northern Allied invasion withdrew to a line around 
Mortain in order to establish stronger defenses, it created a vacuum and Patton 
intended to fill it.   Here one can see how events began to unfold due to circumstances 
rather than any specific Allied intent.  In other words planning what you sought to 
achieve was easier than actually conducting operations due to their constantly 
changing nature. 
                                                
28 FX-78011, 2 August 1944, France Vol. II, French Resistance Groups, (Guerrilla Warfare), SHAEF, 
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Not only did operational planning for the use of new JEDBURGH teams have 
to keep pace, the JEDBURGH teams in the field had to be maintained and directed.  
Team HAMISH in Indre worked the region between Châteauroux and Bourges.  They 
had been there since 13 June and needed help organizing the Maquis just east of their 
area in the Cher south of Bourges.   They realized the need in the Cher and related it 
to SFHQ on 28 July saying, “500 men located southeast of Bourges without arms.  
Evidently could use Jed team.”  HAMISH offered to receive a team on one of their 
drop zones and help them move to the region to begin arming and training those 500 
men.  Here, as well as in most of France, getting men into the Maquis was also no 
problem as Hitler had released a “mobilization order sending our recruiting way 
up.”29  However, the problem was how to equip, train, and employ them all.    
EMFFI was probably aware of this issue, however offered no realistic solution 
for dealing with it.  Illuminating the increasing problem, Captain Anstett of HAMISH 
told SFHQ that organizing the Cher had just become easier as “We have found a 
French colonel who will take command… He has 12,000 men and all request arms.” 
EMFFI staff decided to fulfill HAMISH’s request for another team and on 3 August 
completed orders for Team IVOR.  The team was comprised of British Captain John 
Cox, French Lieutenant Robert Colin using the nom-de-guerre Yves Dantec and 
American Sergeant Robert Goddard.  The team was to deploy south of the village of 
St. Armand in the Cher, establish a relationship with the local FFI commander, 
                                                
29 United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm].  Roll 8, Target 2, Vol., 4, Book II, p. 267. 
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identify more drop zones, and to organize them into units of no more than 100 men.30  
On 6 August, SFHQ told HAMISH, “sending Jed team IVOR and 1 million in 
containers marked with white cross on ground Paris tonight.”  Looking forward to 
seeing his friends, American Sergeant Watters of HAMISH replied enthusiastically, 
“All set.  Tell the boys to bring some American cigarettes for us.”31   
However, the tone changed dramatically in the very next message following 
team IVOR’s arrival.  “Goddard killed.  Do not know how but he died instantly upon 
hitting ground.  Chute opened but not completely. … Burial tomorrow.  More later.”32  
The American W/T operator’s chute never opened properly and he and the radio 
equipment, did not survive.  Cox, Colin, and the Jeds of HAMISH along with some of 
their Maquis buried Goddard near Beddes, about 40 kilometers southwest of St. 
Armand-Montrond.  The Cher’s Maquis and Colonel Bertrand who was attempting to 
get organized and armed were now set back further until a replacement could be 
found for Goddard.  SFHQ knew that team ANDY’s officers suffered severe injuries 
on their parachute jump making it a non-operational team.  However the radioman, 
British Sergeant Glen Loosmore, was able to perform his duties so they made 
arrangements for Loosmore to travel to the Cher to replace Goddard and become 
IVOR’s W/T operator.  On the 13th Loosmore got there and then had to resolve the 
technical difficulties attempting to use his ANDY encoded radio while serving in 
                                                
30 “Operations Order No. 28,” 3 August, 1944, EMFFI Ordres, 3 AG 2 473, Archives National, Paris, 
France. 
31 United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm]. Roll 8, Target 2, Vol., 4, Book II, p. 271. 
32 Ibid. Roll 8, Target 2, Vol., 4, Book II, p. 271. 
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Team IVOR.33  For several days, EMFFI could not understand why ANDY was 
broadcasting when the team had been deactivated and Loosmore had to convince 
them he was now with IVOR in the Cher.34     
Not only did the situation on the ground alter their intentions forcing 
administrative and policy shifts, but the take over of operations by EMFFI led to a 
great deal of confusion.  Primarily the efficient routing of communications traffic 
became a source of failure within the staff.  Coordinating communications within 
EMFFI and their counterparts at SOE who managed the stations became so poor that 
by the end of August two teams had actually deployed to France without the 
knowledge of the communications section.35  That meant that when Team ALEC, 
which deployed on the 10th and Team BUNNY that was in France on 18 August 
broadcast on their appointed frequency at the appointed time, no one was listening.   
ALEC’s officers, never realizing what had occurred, later complained that, “shortly 
after our arrival [in France] it became evident that we were not going to receive much 
assistance from London.”36  Instead they coordinated as best they could with the local 
FFI and later the conventional forces that operated near their area.  Team 
ALEXANDER’s radio operator, Dick Franklin realized his messages would be 
answered and understood if sent in French, but not English.  In fact it was clear to 
him that EMFFI had completely ignored all his messages as EMFFI sent him his first 
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message, in French, after the team had been in France for some time.  Franklin 
realized that London still believed him to be in Creuse when the team had been in 
Charente for the last ten days.37   
Airlift also became something too great to manage among the EMFFI staff 
largely comprised of French officers unaccustomed to marshalling Allied capacity.   
Airlift estimates that the SFHQ had done in mid and late June demonstrate their 
understanding of airlift’s capability and how many FFI could be initially supplied and 
then maintained for continuous operations.  The Anglo-American planners had 
worked out that one plane load of 15 containers could arm 60 Maquis, and that 
another plane load of 15 containers packed with replacement arms and additional 
ammunition would re-supply 100 Maquis, the planners thought that their current force 
of 15,000 men would require 200-250 successful sorties to re-supply and that the 
78,000 unarmed volunteers would require 1300 successful airlift sorties each month 
just to give them their initial weapons and ammunition.38  Therefore, for SHAEF to 
arm this number, it would need more than 1500 successful missions each month.  
However, just before OVERLORD, SFHQ staff planners indicated that no more than 
575 successful airlift sorties per month could be expected from the 115 British and 
American clandestine aircraft available in the UK and North Africa due to enemy 
activity, maintenance issues, moon phases, weather, and reception parties.  Adding as 
they did the B-17s for the large-scale daylight missions contributed only an average 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 813, and Dick Franklin, "Jedburg,"  (2004).  p. 209; telephone interview 23 May, 2008. 
38 “Position in Zone Sud and Need for Arms,” undated (likely 15 to 25 June) Appendix A, HS 6/377, 
BNA, Kew, UK.  
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of 200 more sorties each month.∗   Therefore, when Ike directed EMFFI on 1 August 
to arm and maintain 120,000 FFI by the end of 1944 but only granted them 400 
sorties per month, he seemed to be setting them up for failure.  Re-supplying 120,000 
FFI would require 1800 successful sorties per month while 400 sorties re-supplied 
only an estimated 26,667 Maquis.   The situation became even more problematic 
when one considers the sortie success rate was expected to be around 50%.  For the 
Maquis this meant weapons would have to come from other sources and the FFI 
would never get enough from air drops. 
Such shortages mandated priorities be set and rigidly adhered to.  Noting that 
more than the 400 sorties were unlikely, as well as the shortage of parachute silk 
making things even more difficult, Eisenhower defined his priorities on 15 August as 
Operation DRAGOON’s forces worked their way ashore near St. Tropez.    Regions 
P1, P2, and P3 around Paris; C2 and C3 covering the Meuse and Moselle valleys and 
the Vosges; and A4 and A5 alongside the Belgium border were first priority.  
AFHQ’s missions in R1 discussed above were second priority and the rest of France 
was third.39  R5 and R6, the zones needed to protect the Eisenhower’s southern flank 
were last in priority as were Regions D1 and D2 which comprised the Jura, Doubs, 
Côtes d’Or and the Haute Marne Departements.  Furthermore, the same directive 
complained to General Koenig that Brittany had received far more of its allotment 
while his current airlift pace supporting General Wilson’s request in southern France 
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was not going to be met for August.40  So not only was the capability not enabling the 
requirement, but the sorties they did generate in the first half of August were not 
getting to the priority regions.  Mockler-Ferryman commented in his resignation letter 
on 27 July that he knew deliveries were “going to the wrong places” but was unable 
to direct corrections due to French suspicions of him.41  Clearly the swelling Maquis 
could not count on the Allies to re-supply them nor could they count on them for 
initial arms and equipment. 
Despite the paucity of weapons for the overwhelming numbers, EMFFI began 
the process to deploy more teams into southern France, an area that was the lowest 
priority.  In addition to Team IVOR, EMFFI confirmed plans to send Team ALEC to 
the northern section of Cher along with an SAS element.  The Team was to report to 
the F Section Circuit leader Philippe de Vomécourt and maintain a liaison between 
him and any Maquis groups they could establish contact with.  They were to organize 
them into groups of no more than 100 “and that as soon as equipment is available 
they should start guerilla activity but not repeat not open warfare.”42  The same day, 
Colonel Zeigler ordered three more teams and three small groups of French SAS were 
to deploy to central France.  JEDBURGH Teams JAMES was to go to the Correze, 
ALEXANDER to the Creuse, and LEE to Vienne and Zeigler directed them to 
“prevent enemy movements on the railway lines Perigeux-Limoges-Chateauroux and 
Toulouse-Limoges-Chateauroux.”  The presence of the 11th Panzer Division must 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
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42 "EMFFI Operation Order No. 30," 6 August 1944, Ordres d'Etat Major Forces Française l'Interieur, 
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have been what provoked the interest in those railway lines as the 11th now was 
placed just north of Toulouse.  The SAS and presumably the Jeds, were not to 
“encourage formation of large units by resistance and will confine themselves to 
guerilla actions, avoiding pitched battles and open warfare.”43  Teams ALEC and 
LEE deployed to France on the 10th, Team JAMES deployed on the 11th and Team 
ALEXANDER got off late not arriving until the 13th.  The 11th Panzer Division 
received orders from Hitler to move to east to Avignon on the 9th and started leaving 
on the 14th.44  Eisenhower need not worry about these tanks coming north because the 
11th Pz headed east to prepare to counter the expected Allied invasion somewhere on 
the southern coast.  The day after the Division began moving, that invasion became a 
reality. 
When ANVIL, now renamed DRAGOON, occurred on 15 August, Hitler and 
his commanders in France realized the nature of their situation had significantly 
changed and they began making different moves in order to save the German forces 
from being trapped.  Partisan operations, which had gained a certain regularity for 
teams like IAN, HUGH, HAMISH, and HARRY in July and early August now began 
to be more chaotic as the Germans decided to evacuate south- western France.  On 16 
August Hitler directed the Wehrmacht, Feldgendarmes, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe and 
all other German administrators to evacuate and they began making a concerted effort 
to leave resistance Regions B2, B1, R5, and R6.  The Wehrmacht’s 16th 
                                                
43 “Order No. 31” 6 August 1944. 3 AG 2 473, AN, Paris, France. 
44 Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 
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InfantrieDivision was to be the northern covering force using the Loire River as a 
screen to protect their comrades from the Eisenhower’s forces to their north.45  The 
16th InfantrieDivision was a new designation for the 158th Reserve Division.46  Its 
commander, Generalleutnant Ernst Häckel, a veteran of the eastern front in 1941 and 
42, was to organize the defense of the German forces and personnel while they 
attempted to flee France via Dijon, then on through the Belfort Gap in Alsace, and 
from there into Germany.47  Currently headquartered in a village south-east of Nantes, 
and just south of where Team GEORGE was beginning to finally succeed in 
organizing local resistance, the Division began to move east to defend bridges at key 
locations on the Loire River.48  Unknown to the Germans was the fact that their 
planned escape route lay in areas Eisenhower had made the lowest priority for 
arming.  The DMRs Eugene Dechelette (ELLIPSE) in R5, Alexandre de Courson de 
la Villeneuve (PYRAMIDE) in R6, Bernard Schlumberger (DROITE) in R4, Jacques 
Davout d’Auerstaet (OVALE) in D1 and Pierre Hanneton (LIGNE) in D2 along with 
their Maquis and JEDBURGH missions would have to perform their tasks with the 
weapons they currently possessed fortified only by the left over sorties that might 
come when other areas could not be serviced.  Evidently Eisenhower was more 
concerned with what lay directly in front of his forces, than what lay on his flanks. 
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The Résistance in R5 and R4 was a mix of nearly every southern group that 
had existed since the Armistice.  The Provisional Government’s Délégué Militaire 
Zone (DMZ) was Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury who went by the codename of 
POLYGONE.  A politically astute man who turned 30 on 19 August 1944, he had 
originally come to France as the DMR for R1, the Lyon and upper Rhone River 
valley area.  Due to persistent arrests he was promoted to DMZ for the southern Zone 
in February of 1944 and for a time was acting National Delegate who “reorganized 
regions C and D after mass arrests there in March of 1944 with extraordinary speed 
and efficiency.”  When Chaban-Delmas was named as the permanent DMN, Bourgès-
Maunoury then served as his assistant or adjoint, while maintaining his DMZ position 
for the southern zone.49  Upon his shoulders fell the task to create a unity of action on 
behalf of de Gaulle and the provisional government in Algiers for southern France.  
He had even known of the JEDBURGH plan as early as April when William Savy 
came to France on the ECLAIREUR Mission, and provided intelligence to Savy 
about the nature of the Maquis, their numbers, and possible drop zones for the 
JEDBURGH mission planners to use.50  He had worked tirelessly and clandestinely 
for the Résistance and maintained communication with BRAL and Koenig in London, 
the BCRA and Cochet in Algiers, his subordinate DMRs in the south like Dechelette, 
and the various FFI commanders in the ORA, AS, MUR, and FTP.  Few understood 
the organization and nature of the southern Résistance as well as he.  By late July and 
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August of 1944, the months of the Libération, he was continually working with 
myriad local leaders, striking deals, demanding unity, and succeeding in his efforts.  
For instance, in August he visited R5 at least twice working with Dechelette and 
almost always succeeded at gaining the agreement among the parties that military 
action was what was necessary and that political issues needed to wait.51  By their 
success, Bourgès-Maunoury, Chaban-Delmas, the DMRs and the Commissaires de la 
République, who took regional political control on behalf of the Provisional 
Government during the Libération, proved to be the ones laying the foundation for 
post-war French political institutions.  Their work was crucial. 
Teams BUGATTI and QUININE were now enjoying fits and starts of success 
in southern France and their work helped create the conditions that could slow down 
the 11th Panzer Division and capture as many other Germans as possible that were 
directed to evacuate on the 16th.  Still lacking arms Fuller and de la Roche of 
BUGATTI continually complained that, “we were greatly handicapped by our lack of 
arms and explosives in spite of our daily message to Algiers for the same.”52  
Nevertheless, when they received orders to begin “full scale guerilla warfare” on the 
14th, they succeeded in organizing ambushes along the road between Tarbes and 
Toulouse and on the 18th captured the commander of Hauptverbindungsstab or HVSt 
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626, Generalmajor Leo Mayr, commander of the occupation forces for the Tarbes 
region.  With the Germans now attempting to flee, the Jeds focused efforts on 
protecting the Spanish frontier hoping to prevent “the Boches” from escaping into 
neutral Spain.  With both Jed officers able to fly, the team managed to get 10 small 
aircraft and de la Roche used an aircraft to scout out the best way to march their 
estimated 1000 FFI up to Angoulême for operations against the Germans north of 
their area.  On 6 September they also met with General Cochet on his visit to the area 
and worked to get their Maquis back from Angoulême and muster them into the 
French regular army now standing up in the region.  Joining in on the Libération of 
Tarbes, Fuller was the Allied representative in the city’s ceremony.  But while, as one 
of the F Section assistants noted, BUGATTI “was a terrific morale lifter on their 
arrival…. the supplies they were promised and that they asked for were never sent 
and bit by bit disappointment followed enthusiasm.”53  While they achieved some 
successes in southwest of France, in the end BUGATTI was too far east to harass the 
11th Panzer Division and too poorly supplied to fully exploit the areas’ Maquis. 
But despite receiving nearly no weapons and poor communication, the 
JEDBURGHs in the region shifted their mission from what they were ordered to do to 
fit their changing circumstances.  MacPherson’s team QUININE immediately began 
blowing bridges and tunnels when they heard of the invasion in the south and the 
Germans started to move, as there was no point in doing it until ANVIL started.  
Tommy MacPherson believed the number of dropped bridges and tunnels to be 
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around a dozen in the Lot in the Massif Central, all attempting to prevent Germans 
from moving east, and the road from Aurillac to Saint Fleur received special 
attention.  In one instance they contrived an elaborate ambush to trap Germans and 
Vichy Miliciens in a tunnel and succeeded in killing and wounding several hundred 
enemy soldiers.54  Their success in cutting this road is greater when realizing what the 
teams north of them were also able to do. 
Teams JOHN, COLLODION, PACKARD, and MINARET were in perfect 
position to harass the 11th Panzer’s march from Montauban to Avignon.  However all 
of them ran into difficulties too great to surmount given the short time they had to 
work against the already moving 11th Panzer Division.  Team JOHN got to 
Montauban on the 22nd just in time to radio back that the Division’s former base was 
“liberated and department probably free of Boche.”55  Team COLLODIAN 
parachuted into the Lot, was met by MacPherson, and went into Aveyron as ordered 
to ambush Germans traveling through that department.  But the FTP and the other 
Maquis in the region were too concerned about each other and interested in using 
their weapons after the Germans had left.  The team did manage to get an arms drop, 
and coordinate some ambushes, between Montauban – Rode - Millar, but their 
mission in the Aveyron was largely ineffective and when there were no longer enemy 
units in the area they sought to take some Maquis east to harass the departing 
Germans.56  Team PACKARD had parachuted into the Lozere, on 1 August and thus 
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had some time to devise plans and implement sabotage on roads and bridges in the 
Department.  By 22 August the Team and the local FFI leader had achieved some 
measure of unity and set ambushes and booby traps on the road from Ales to Uzez, to 
the west of Avignon.57   But by that time, the 11th Panzer Division had already passed 
through the area and was in the Avignon area and preparing to cover the Wehrmacht’s 
retreat to the north.58  Team MINARET, that had been on alert for “nearly three 
weeks” finally deployed on 14 August to support PACKARD and concentrated on the 
road from Ganges to Alzon.  However, this also was to the west of where most of the 
11th Panzer was and thus these four teams were ineffective if SPOC’s intent was 
slowing down the 11th Panzer Division.  While the teams succeed with many 
ambushes, killing, wounding and delaying hundreds of the enemy from Montauban to 
Nimes, the Maquis only provided, as French historian Noguères noted in 1981, “a 
solid experience against guerillas,”59 for the Germans but not a firm block to their 
escape.  
SPOC sent Team CHRYSLER to the Ariège to work with the Fédération 
anarchiste ibérique (FAI), or the Federation of the Iberian Anarchists, a group that 
had been losers in the Spanish Civil War from 1938 and had taken up residence in 
France.  Many of the former Spanish Republicans were in Maquis groups in the 
region and the French Provisional Government dealt with them warily.  Team 
CHRYSLER, comprised of British Captain Cyril Sell, French Lieutenant Paul 
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Aussaresses, and British Sergeant Ronal Chatten arrived in the Pyrenees on 16 
August with the mission of working with the FAI to prevent German formations from 
escaping across the border into Spain.  Originally their mission was to have begun on 
the 13th, but when the pilot could not confirm the drop zone, he headed back to the 
airfield near Algiers.  The mission’s slip forced a shift in focus.  The team would not 
have a good opportunity now to work against the 11th Panzer Division so they 
focused on interrupting enemy lines of communication between Toulouse and 
Narbonne.  They spent the last half of August sabotaging the road between these two 
cities, working to block Germans escaping into Spain, and coordinating with SOE’s 
George Starr and fellow JEDBURGHs Fuller, MacPherson, and Sharpe.  By the end 
of the month they began to be more concerned about stopping reprisals and after 
meeting General Cochet on 1 September, the team began to work their Maquis into 
service further east and to do communication duties for General Cochet as required.  
They originally had tried to find the DMR Schlumberger, but even on 2 September 
noted that he was “unknown in the region.”60   
 
The Libération in R5 
When Team JAMES, comprised of American First Lieutenant John K. 
Singlaub, French Lieutenant Jacques de la Penguilly using the name Jacques le Bel, 
and American Sergeant A. J. Denneau parachuted into the Correze with an SAS 
element it began to cut the road running from Tulle-Ussel-Clermont-Ferrand.  
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Mission TILLUEL, an Inter-Allied mission commanded by Major Jacques Robert, 
one of the BCRA Bloc Planning officers; was also in the area.  Their mission had 
received air dropped weapons during July and they had given them to the FTP unit 
while one of the other AS units had received some and another AS unit had not.  R5’s 
Operations officer had partially armed some in the other AS units making about 8000 
armed of the total 12000 FTP and AS Maquis.  When JAMES arrived, the various 
units each surrounded a German garrison along Route National 89.  The Germans 
“did not come out, either because they were ordered to stay and hold or because they 
were afraid.”61  The team’s weapons and capability status would not improve during 
the course of its mission as JAMES “received absolutely nothing” while the SAS, 
OGs, and mission TILLUEL received their drops.  After they arrived they met the 
FTP and AS leadership and agreed to attack the German garrison at Egletons, which 
lay along that road.  Inexplicably, the FTP began the attack hours before the agreed 
upon time and the AS leader and Team JAMES were forced to join the attack.  Later 
that day, the BBC message came that every effort was to be made to attack German 
garrisons between the Loire and Garonne Rivers.62  “During the battle of Egletons, 
Jacques [de la Penguilly] and I made an effort to be seen in the combat area where the 
shooting was going on and do training right there.”  Singlaub later recalled his 
leadership example validated his teaching and combat credentials to the Maquis.  “It 
showed them what one guy could do, who had some knowledge of the weapons.”63   
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During the attack the rumor began to circulate that Wehrmacht columns were 
coming from the southwest, which proved untrue, and the northeast, which was true. 
The Maquis partially lifted the sieges of these villages and took some men to conduct 
ambushes.  But Singlaub and de la Penguilly believed they should completely 
abandon the sieges in order to have manpower to harass and ambush the traveling 
columns along Route 89.  Unable to convince the FTP commander to contribute 
forces for this new operation, JAMES and AS Maquis did what they could to ambush 
the enemy between Tulle and Egletons.  After the Wehrmacht column retreated back 
toward Clermont-Ferrand and the region quieted down, the Jeds spent the next few 
days instructing the FTP on operating their weapons.  When they believed that was 
complete, they decided to contact Dechelette in Limoges and arrange for a new 
mission.  By this time, 28 August, the Germans in the Gironde, Charente, and 
Dordogne were attempting to exit France via the route running roughly from 
Limoges-Angoulême-Châteauroux-Troyes and attempt to make Dijon where the 
major combat elements, led by the 11th Panzer Division, were already drawing a 
protective line.  They had to go this way due to the FFI’s success at harassing and 
ambushing the routes, such as Route 89, that would have been more direct.   
When JAMES found Dechelette, he had a mission for the team and the AS 
unit from the Correze.  He dispatched the AS unit to the Creuse and radioed London 
that he was sending Singlaub and de Penguilly back to Britain to get heavy weapons 
needed to handle the major German column now marching up from Bordeaux.  He 
wanted heavier weapons, 60 machine guns, 50 mortars with plenty of ammunition 
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and gasoline within he next 5 days.64  Time was critical and the two Jeds along with 
Major Robert of the TILLEUL mission departed via a C-47 on the 10th while 
Sergeant Danneau remained in Limoges.65  On the same day, Dechelette informed 
London that Team LEE’s work was done in Vienne but that he had another mission 
for them and requested them to remain in France.66  LEE had, along with British 
officer of an Inter-Allied mission named BERGAMOTTE worked with the FTP 
leader Georges Guingouin.  Dechelette had named Guingouin the head of the FFI for 
the Department of Haute Vienne and Captain Brown of team LEE estimated that he 
had around 5500 men.  They knew that they needed to create obstacles for the 
retreating German forces so set about doing it.  On the 14th they teamed up with some 
of the Operational Group members and blew a bridge on the only remaining railway 
line that exited the city to the east.  The next day EMFFI radioed them a message with 
the news that the “German 159th Division reported on move northwards to battle 
zone.  Make maximum effort prevent or hold them up.”67    
Dechelette’s Maquis need not to be told to do this.  The destruction of roads, 
bridges, railroads, and communication lines occurred non-stop all over the Region.68  
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Additionally, the JEDBURGHs requested air strikes when large groups of Germans 
could be expected to be moving on the roads.  Team LEE, ALEXANDER, JAMES, 
HUGH, HAMISH, JULIAN and IAN along with the SAS and Operational Group in 
the region all contributed to the chaos by leading or planning some of the sabotage 
and when the enemy troop concentrations invited it, wired messages back to EMFFI 
giving locations of where to conduct air strikes.   In the Vienne, Colonel Guingouin 
succeeded at getting the GMR to desert the Vichy side and join the Résistance.   With 
the city surrounded and the GMR no longer on their side, Generalmajor Walter 
Gleiniger, Kommandant des Verbindungsstabs 586 decided to surrender what was left 
of his 300-man occupation force in Limoges.  But Gleiniger was arrested by the 
“German police” when he informed them of the surrender and hustled out of the city,  
escaping all the Maquis ambushes. 69  He committed suicide on 21 August, not ever 
knowing that most of his command had succeeded in their escape back to Germany.70  
As the destruction of roads, bridges, and railroads continued it was clear the 159th 
Division was attempting to flee.  Divided into Marching Groups, over 20,000 
Germans from the coastal area were working their way through the region under the 
command of Generalmajor Botho Elster.   
Believing that Elster’s force of sailors, Luftwaffe, customs police, soldiers, and 
civilian administrators was the “159th Reserve Division,” provoked a response from 
3rd Army’s SF Detachment led by Lt Col Powell.  Since 2 August the 3rd Army and 
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the FFI had been coordinating their operations via Powell’s Special Forces 
Detachment.  On the 18th Colonel Haskell, Lt Col Paul van der Strict of the EMFFI 
staff and Lt Col Powell met with General Patton to discuss the role the FFI would 
play as the 3rd Army moved east.  Recalling that meeting, van der Stricht later noted 
the absence of British participation in the planning.  “No mention whatsoever was 
made of British participation or personnel in connection with the resistance matters 
discussed.  This would of course have been entirely unthinkable only eighteen months 
earlier . . .”  Van der Stricht also remarked that when Paris was liberated, “there was 
no sign of any British SOE officer.  Circumstances, and not any policy decision, had 
made the paramilitary operations of French Resistance a Franco-American affair.”71   
The Franco-American relationship continued when Generals Patton and 
Koenig met on the 24th and agreed in principle that the FFI could prove useful to 
Patton’s drive east.72  Their agreement then followed regular coordination between 3rd 
Army operations planners, and Powell’s small group of officers and local FFI 
commanders.73  As the 3rd Army aggressively pressed east, covering the 435 
kilometers from Rennes to Troyes in the next 7 days, they continued to work issues 
with the FFI in formal meetings and informal communications that occurred along the 
way.  On the 31st Powell met with F Section agent Philippe de Vomécourt and FFI 
commanders at Sens, 120 kilometers southeast of Paris.  Taking information from the 
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 322 
FFI commanders Powell plotted out what they told him onto a map in order to get a 
sense of who was where and how strong each unit claimed to be.  Third Army’s next 
objective was Troyes, 72 kilometers to the east, but its southern flank’s lines now ran 
from Nantes to Sens, a distance of 500 exposed kilometers.   With the reports from 
the FFI talking of tens of thousands of enemy troops on the move all corroborated by 
dozens of messages from JEDBURGH Teams south of the Loire, Powell and Patton 
may have had a cause to be concerned.  However, seeing the disposition of the FFI all 
along the river, and having coordinated with them over the past two weeks, Powell 
recognized a capability and sought to make it useful.   After the conference where he 
was informed as to the paucity of weapons the FFI possessed he knew he had get 
them arms in order to make their capability come to fruition.  Lt Col Powell sent a 
frantic message to EMFFI that evening requesting more JEDBURGH teams and 
weapons for the Maquis in the three departments soon to be on his southern flank.  At 
around 1 am on 1 September, SFHQ received Powell’s plea for arms for the area 
around the city of Dijon and Bourges, bluntly stating that “if Germans organize that 
area present drive may halt because of threat to flanks.”   Powell went on to request 
that JEDBURGH teams ALEC, BRUCE, CEDRIC, and HARRY needed to be given 
“top priority” for air dropped weapons, and ended with the following ominous 
warning, “IF THESE DEPARTMENTS DO NOT RECEIVE ARMS THIRD ARMY 
NOW FEW MILES FROM GERMANY MAY STOP.”74  Few in 3rd  Army wanted 
to tell General Patton to have to slow down, much less stop. 
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But Powell’s reaction may have been excessive considering the type of enemy 
column coming in his direction.  Generalmajor Botho Elster’s Marchgruppe Süd, as it 
called itself numbered just under 20,000 soldiers, marines, sailors, and assorted other 
kinds of personnel and was not looking for a fight, it was simply trying to make it to 
safety beyond Dijon and then on to Germany.  Until the middle of August, Elster was 
the Feldkommandatur at Mont-de-Marsan south of Bordeaux.  When OVERLORD 
started, he had attempted to quell the “terrorists” in his area with the “most ruthless 
and harshest means.”75   But now the tables were turned and he was fearful of similar 
methods being turned upon him by the very people he had directed such actions 
against.  Forced to move north due to the Maquis and Jeds cutting off routes through 
the Correze, Lot, and Cantal which would be a more direct route, his motley 
collection of troops now found themselves attempting to move north and then east 
through the Vienne, L’Indre, and the Cher and being harassed all the way by the FFI 
of R5.  Dechelette, one of the most successful DMRs in France had by the beginning 
of August succeeded in achieving a great deal of political unity.  For instance his 
negotiations brought in the FTP of the Colonel Georges Guingouin’s in the Vienne 
and Theogene Briant’s in L’Indre.  Additionally, L’Indre had a substantial 
Organisation de la Résistance l’Armee unit led by Colonel Raymond Chomel with 
around 2400 men.  Chomel’s ORA were not civilians who simply wanted to fight, but 
regular soldiers who had stayed in their homes as a result of the 1940 Armistice.  
They were light infantry, artillery, and paratroopers accustomed to organized military 
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operations.  Additionally there was as a substantial force of Armée Secrète and 
various other smaller Maquis groups.  Furthermore, one of Tommy MacPherson’s 
Maquis groups now organized as the “Schneider column” or “colonne Schneider” 
was across the Allier River firing artillery rounds at portions of Elster’s Marchgruppe 
Süd by 10 September, just as Chomel’s forces had achieved his surrender.76  The 
region Lt Col Powell urgently requested arms for, would never see these particular 
Germans as Dechelette’s combined groups or FFI, Allied Special Forces, SOE agents, 
the threat of the US Division to the north, and the ever present Allied bombing forced 
Elster to capitulate before they could get that far. 
The surrender of Generalmajor Elster’s Marchgruppe Süd proved to be a 
certainty, but was comprised of many steps in which many different people 
participated at different times, allowing the Germans to achieve a remarkably good 
deal.  Elster was the only person who participated in every step of the negotiations 
and used that as an advantage to gain as much as he could from the rolling 
negotiations that occurred from late August until completed around 16 September.   
During the process, three different JEDBURGH teams participated in those 
negotiations along with Colonel Chomel and officers from his FFI unit, intelligence 
officers from the 329th Infantry Battalion (US) and the commander of the American 
83rd Infantry Division, Major General Robert C. Macon.  Indirectly participating in 
the negotiations were F Section Agents Pearl Witherington and Philippe de 
Vomécourt; and the Allied Air Forces that persistently bombed the German forces on 
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their march through L’Indre.  Team HUGH was by now in full operational swing 
having been in the department since 6 June and they kept up constant pressure on 
Elster harassing and obstructing his movements and attempting to cut up his columns 
while radioing air strike locations.  However, HUGH was completely unaware of 
Elster’s willingness to surrender and took no part in the negotiations.  But despite 
Elster’s overall weakness up against such odds, Elster’s deal became progressively 
better as the negotiations progressed. 
Feelers between the FFI and Elster began on 29 August  when JEDBURGH 
JULIAN sent a message to SFHQ that a demand for Elster’s surrender had been sent 
to him and they awaited his reply.  The demand was made by the FFI in the region 
and JULIAN was merely informing EMFFI.77  On the 30th Chomel sent out a notice 
to the FFI in L’Indre that the manner of warfare remained guerilla warfare and that 
since large groups of Germans were expected to continue through the department, his 
Brigade and all the other formations were to coordinate their activities in order to 
harass the enemy.78  Next, JULIAN received a request from Colonel Chomel that the 
US forces north of the Loire River were going to send liaison agents to him and he 
wanted JULIAN to facilitate the meeting near the Loire River.  There was a great deal 
of confusion about when this would occur with a window of 1 to 14 September.  
Martel wanted to meet the 83rd Division and arranged to get mines and mortars in 
order to impress upon Elster the futility of his position.  SFHQ, perhaps encouraged 
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by Powell’s message also stepped up aerial delivery of weapons and dropped supplies 
on 1, 4, 8, and 9 September.  Additionally, Colonel Chomel’s efforts to contact the 
83rd Division directly paid off when JULIAN facilitated a meeting with the 83rd 
Division that arranged the transportation of 100 anti-tank landmines to Chomel’s 
brigade.79 
On the 8th representatives of Martel’s command met with Elster and the 
German General told them “When I meet with a real obstacle provided by the 
Americans then I will see what I have to do but not before.  I will not deliver my 
troops to the Maquis.”80  The discussions were short but they agreed to meet the next 
day while Martel’s men coordinated with JULIAN to get representatives of the 83rd 
Division to participate with them.  On the 9th, Allied efforts began to coalesce.  
Notified of a time and place to meet, General Elster met with Colonel Chislain, an 
officer in Chomel’s Brigade and perhaps Lieutenant Magill of the 83rd Division.81  
Elster agreed in principle on the terms of his surrender, but expressed his desire to 
surrender to the regulars.  He had good cause to be afraid of the FFI since members of 
his command had committed reprisals and shot civilians in Vienne at the end of 
August.82  Chomel considered his options and requested team JULIAN to represent 
the Allies at the next meeting set for 3 pm the following day.  On the same day 
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JULIAN noted a planeload of supplies but needing more told SFHQ, “If FFI this area 
still to operate against enemy troops further supplies essential.”83  On the 9th The 
French and the US Delegation met with Elster again where they agreed to call in a 
demonstration air strike so Elster’s soldiers could see what the nearly 300 kilometer 
walk to Dijon would be like if they chose to continue.  Elster seemed to need the 
exhibition in order to convince his soldiers to agree to surrender.  They agreed to 
meet again the next day at Issoudun where Elster had his headquarters.  After the  
discussion with Elster was finished on the 9th, JULIAN took Colonel Martel up to the 
Loire River bridge and introduced him to Major General Macon.  Macon agreed to 
participate in the discussions and on the 10th he represented the United States while 
English Major Arthur H. Clutton of JULIAN participated in the negotiations on 
behalf of the British.  Macon also brought along two Colonels of his staff for the 
discussions at the sous prefecture office.  Since Macon did not speak French, and 
Elster did not wish to speak French, they spoke in English forcing Chomel to 
continually ask what was being discussed.   Furthermore, “Elster showed himself to 
be a very skilled negotiator and he succeeded in converting the exceedingly 
unfavorable situation in which he found himself to one of relatively great 
advantage.”84  General Macon began the discussions agreeing with Clutton that the 
FFI and SAS could be useful in maintaining control of the Germans, but after hearing 
Elster’s tale of woe regarding how the FFI had been acting, Macon agreed to let 
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Elster’s soldiers retain their weapons until they crossed the Loire and could come 
under the protection of his Division.  By the end of the conversation, Macon was 
convinced and agreed in order to save the Germans from the “bloodthirsty” Maquis.  
But Macon also agreed that when the Germans handed their small arms over to the 
Americans, they would be given to the FFI.85   
Marching armed Germans through French countryside and expecting there to 
be no violence required a precise agreement and all sides with each soldier knowing 
there was to be no shooting.  On the 11th, Jeds John Cox from Team IVOR and 
MacPherson from QUININE took part in another discussion with Elster along with an 
American Colonel from the 83rd Division.  They worked out a procedure to place 
liaison officers along with the marching Germans, not to go through villages where 
possible, and to not purchase anything from the French population.  Elster was 
difficult but finally agreed.  Despite some violent incidents and one German killing a 
French civilian, Elster’s forces made it to American lines across the Loire at Orléans 
on the 15th successfully.86 
Macon’s promise to return French looted property and hand over German 
weapons to the FFI was not kept, and Major Clutton found himself arguing with 
SFHQ, and senior American officers in late September still attempting to enforce the 
deal.  Due to Macon’s unkept promise, the Americans kept the booty and allowed 
Elster to surrender with full military honors on 16 September after marching through 
Cher while the French fumed in humiliation.  Their people had been killed and their 
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property taken; their farms and villages looted and burned, but the 83rd Division was 
completely ignorant of this and forced Clutton to go to de Gaulle directly to get his 
approval for the return of the French property.  Not one to be put off, Clutton went to 
Paris, got de Gaulle’s signature and returned to Le Mans to pursue the matter further.  
But it was taking too long and EMFFI ordered team JULIAN back to London.87  The 
British Jeds and SOE agents involved in the matter could not stifle their frustration 
with the 83rd Division, General Macon, nor the Americans in general.  The stalwart F 
Section Agent Pearl Witherington who had been in France since September of 1943 
wrote, “The Americans went so far as to ask the Maquis to lend lorries for the 
transportation of those “gentlemen,” which was promptly refused.  When the 
Germans arrived on the Loire they were received by the American Red Cross with 
cigarettes, chocolates and oranges (things unknown to French civilians for the past 
five years), and were soon to walk arm in arm in French towns.  This capitulation was 
a heavy blow to FFI pride, and totally underserved, when it is considered that no 
Americans were anywhere near our circuit or further south.”88 
The surrender of General Elster is one of the fables of the Résistance but it has 
also been claimed by the 83rd Division and in one account made to look as if 
Lieutenant Magill stood down Elster all by himself.  Press accounts in American 
newspapers at the time all pumped this strange story and credited Magill and Macon 
with the entire affair barely mentioning the FFI.  Since Clutton, Cox, MacPherson, 
and Witherington were clandestine and their work classified, they avoided the 
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questions from the press.  Therefore the link they provided between the FFI and 
American regular forces remained unknown in English language publications until 
Colin Beavan revealed more about the surrender in his book in 2006.89  Even the US 
Army Air Force General attached to 3rd Army, Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland 
believed he was the one responsible for Elster’s surrender and at least one author 
agrees, writing that, “For the first time in history airplanes, unaided by ground troops, 
had forced the surrender of a large enemy force.”90  Such hyperbole is completely out 
of touch with the causes of Elster’s surrender and reinforces dangerous beliefs many 
are all too willing to grasp onto.  The truth of the matter is that the FFI, in this case 
largely comprised of French Regular officers and soldiers armed with weapons 
supplied through clandestine Allied air drops, surrounded a large German formation 
comprised mostly of non-combat troops being pounded by Allied bombing and weary 
from their long march.  Unfortunately, French Colonel Chomel’s only fault was 
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believing in General Macon who seemed to prefer to take the word of the enemy 
Major General as if he were a peer, instead of the word of Colonel Chomel and Major 
Clutton who were telling him otherwise.  The insult is particularly harsh when 
L’Indre’s Maquis suffered casualties of 368 killed and 547 wounded between 1943 to 
1945.91  Chomel’s unit, often referred to as the “Charles Martel Brigade” suffered 73 
killed and 66 wounded.92   
Chaos still reigned within the command and control structures in various 
regions however, and Lt Colonel Hutchison of Team ISAAC still had to contend with 
various notables coming to him and his French colleague attempting to assert 
authority.  The commander of the FFI for the Region P, Claude Monod, wished to 
stage an attack on Dijon while 3rd Army, most likely in the form of Powell’s SF 
Detachment had requested the Maquis guard Patton’s right flank.  With not enough 
weapons to do both, ISAAC disagreed with Monod.  But Hutchison had to get written 
approval from General Koenig in order to enforce this mission instead of the head on 
attack on the Germans.   
By 11 September Hutchison had also made contact with General De Lattre de 
Tassigny’s forces moving up from the south and he agreed to get the FFI to cover 
their left or western flank.  “This task fitted in perfectly with the protection of the 3rd 
U. S. Army’s right flank and all F.F.I. companies and Battalions were ordered to 
thicken the number of ambushes and harry the enemy wherever they could find 
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him.”93  The FFI successfully formed a blocking line from Decize – Cercy-la-Tour – 
Luzy – Autun to prevent the Germans from making it to Dijon, and enabling the link 
up of Patton’s and Patch’s Armies’ on the 11th, 30 kilometers west of Dijon.  But 
Hutchison was not exceedingly cheery about their accomplishments and blamed 
London.  His repeated “forlorn request for PIATs and Bazookas so urgently needed 
… while we were able to report something on the order of fifty small [engagements] 
were taking place, it was a swan song which produced no result.”  Not only could his 
team not get the weapons they requested, but orders from London often were not in 
accordance with local reality.  In one case, 3rd Army wanted the Loire Bridges blown, 
but EMFFI ordered everything to be preserved.  By the time EMFFI changed its 
mind, the Germans destroyed the bridges provoking Hutchison to remark acerbically, 
“thereby presumably satisfying everyone.”94  But now the OVERLORD forces and 
the ANVIL forces had linked up with the FFI’s poorly supplied forces killing or 
capturing approximately 79,000 Germans.95  While this is probably more than 
Eisenhower would have thought possible on 6 June, it was less than what could have 
been done.  Elster’s Marchgruppe Süd was 25% of the prize.  But the ineffective use 
of the Maquis against the 11th Panzer Division, both on its march to reinforce the 
invasion area, and then while it led the German 19th Army to the Dijon area is 
disappointing when considering what the FFI might have done if organized more 
coherently and armed more effectively.   The completely unexpected numbers 
                                                
93 "Report of ISAAC/VERVEINE," 1944, Team ISAAC, HS 6/366, British National Archives, Kew, 
UK. “Team ISAAC Report,” HS 6/366, BNA, Kew, UK. p. 10-11. 
94 Ibid. p. 11. 
95 Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 
1943-1944/5. p. 661 
 333 
swelling the Maquis caught SHAEF and AFHQ by surprise.  Had they been ready for 
them, their trap could have had a quicker bite. 
Why did some regions or areas succeed while others faltered?  Understanding 
what worked and what did not is important but one should understand the 
complicated series of events and actors as well to see how it all came to together.  
Regarding Elster, not one of the people involved can honestly lay claim to Elster’s 
surrender on their own.   However, it is no coincidence that this event occurred in 
Dechelette’s region.  Since his recovery from his broken bone after parachuting into 
France in January, he had hammered out agreements to create one of the most unified 
FFI-FTP in nearly every department.   For instance in L’Indre, the ORA’s Colonel 
Raymond Chomel was the commander of the FFI while in Vienne, Colonel Georges 
Guingouin of the FTP was the commander of the FFI.   While all was not completely 
harmonious, there was a strong sense of political unity that brought about more 
effective military action.  Furthermore, R5 was last in the priority list making the 
accomplishment all that much more surprising.  The same could not be said of 
Regions 3 and 4.  They suffered from less effective DMRs, a higher density of enemy 
troops, a significant Maquis population of Spanish all tenuously woven together by 
the British SOE agents the most notable of which was George Starr.  Complicating 
matters even more for R4 and R3 was that FFI military operations were externally 
commanded and administered by SFHQ that evolved into EMFFI, but other times 
during the summer they were led by SPOC that changed locations and later evolved 
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into Special Force Unit 4.96  The timing of those changes depended upon military and 
political necessities that had nothing to do with Regional issues.  Sorting out who was 
in charge during the months of June, July, and August depended completely upon 
when, where, and who you asked.  In R4 and R3 there were many seams working to 
define how French sovereignty was knit together.  But in R5, all the evidence points 
to the wide acknowledgement that Eugene Dechelette was the man in charge and he 
reported to General Koenig.  And by 25 August Koenig was no longer in London, but 
in Paris where he was also the Military Governor of the city.  Sovereignty was 
beginning to come home.   
 
 
                                                
96 Kloman Telephone Interview, 21 August 2005. 
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Chapter Eight 
The fog of war in eastern France 
 
 
 
Once the Allied armies from the two invasion areas linked up near Dijon the 
nature of the war in France changed again.  The first three phases:  OVERLORD’s 
initial landing; followed by the breakout of the Allies toward the end of July; and the 
southern landings on 15 August and subsequent decision by Hitler to retreat; all 
created slightly different conditions for the Maquis and how EMFFI could use them.  
When the Germans retreated to a defensive line running from the Swiss border east of 
Besançon to the Belgian town of Bruges on about 15 September, the nature of the war 
changed again and EMFFI may have tried to lay the groundwork for the last phase of 
irregular combat for the war in France since early August.  That is to say, their actions 
of inserting teams into eastern France could have paid great dividends, but other 
circumstances slowed these preparations and largely diminished their ability to render 
the Maquis as a coherent force for Eisenhower.  Prior to the link up of Patton and 
Patch in the middle of September, EMFFI deployed nineteen JEDBURGH teams into 
eastern France.  These teams experienced a far different mission than teams such as 
BUGATTI, HUGH, or FREDERICK who had gone to areas early, contended with 
relatively few enemy, and had time to get to know the Maquis in their area.  Such a 
luxury was not afforded to Teams such as AUGUSTUS, JACOB, or BENJAMIN.  As 
EMFFI attempted to support Eisenhower with Maquis in this region, a region 
Eisenhower made his greatest priority as described in chapter 7, EMFFI did not grasp 
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the shift in the nature of the fighting, but since it differed so greatly from their 
planning and recent operational experience, the staff of EMFFI failed to conduct a 
coherent operation.   
 The speed with which the Allied advance had developed from 1 August to the 
middle of September had many senior officers and staff planners mired in 
complacency and many convinced that the Germans were about ready to buckle.  The 
coup attempt against Hitler, the quick retreats, the continuous shuffle and recreations 
of German units, little to no air cover from the Luftwaffe, and the paucity of fuel for 
enemy Panzers were all signs that the Germans were about ready to completely 
collapse.  Reading the OB West’s message traffic provided by ULTRA gave the 
Allies a skewed window into the German commanders’ sense of frustration and their 
long list of difficulties.  But one does not get the sense of fighting determination 
exhibited by their soldiers largely unaware of their nation’s desperate state.  
JEDBURGHs who interrogated prisoners captured in France were often shocked the 
POWs did not know that various towns had been captured, or that their entire army 
was suffering as much as they were.1  The typical German soldier’s belief in an 
eventual victory enabled Hitler to continue the war despite his dwindling ability to do 
so.  The exception to this stalwart belief in the Nazi war effort came from the soldiers 
captured around Dijon in the middle of September.2 
                                                
1 See Team report of GILES HS 6/515 and LEE HS 6/538. BNA, Kew, UK. 
2 Compare Team GILES comments of interrogation with Team MAURICE’s.  The latter found 
Germans exhausted from a long march, many of whom were not front line combat troops.  GILES 
found prisoners unwilling to believe that Rennes had fallen and that Allied troops were that far into 
France. 
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 But between the middle of August and the middle of September, there appears 
to be two contending mindsets governing EMFFI’s actions and the dispatch of 
JEDBURGH teams.  First was the desire to get them into France while they could still 
have an effect on operations.  JEDBURGH teams were gaining a reputation for 
making a significant impact since the Résistance was doing much more than 
expected.  Perhaps there was some chauvinism at work since most at SHAEF believed 
before D-Day that the Maquis would not have any meaningful affect.  After the D-
Day results began to come in, the doubters quickly became believers and credited the 
JEDBURGH plan, the SAS, and the Operational Groups with bringing it about.  
Donovan’s continued use of Maquis exploits with the President is an example that 
indicates what the Résistance was doing when tied to the SOE and OSS efforts.  The 
assumption one could easily make from the materials Donovan forwarded to the 
President was that it was all happening only with groups “stimulated” by SOE and 
OSS operations.  Instead of soberly evaluating the conditions of any given success, a 
great desire developed within SHAEF and EMFFI to override the initial plan to put 
them in when requested by those in the field, and insert them in as soon as possible.  
Such a desire now competed against the original notion that the JEDBURGHs were to 
be a reserve, replacing arrested agents to conduct open guerilla warfare when the time 
called for it.  But perhaps due to the fear that the pace of operations would continue 
leaving several unused teams in England, Maquis successes, which may or may not 
be due to the JEDBURGHs, began to take a life of its own and overrode the original 
plan of using them as uniformed back ups when the time was right.   
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The second factor that originally served as a brake on JEDBURGH 
deployments was a sense of reluctance brought about by fears that informed some of 
the original planning.  First was the fear that deploying too many teams, too quickly, 
would leave them no reserve if needed later.  Staff officers also feared sending them 
to areas thick with enemy troops and therefore, they considered sending them in 
civilian clothes.  But in the desire to play an active role, the original SOE planning 
that the JEDBURGHs were to be a reserve for arrested SOE agents and operate in 
uniform was hastily revised in the first and second week of August.  EMFFI’s 
persistent use of the teams to go into areas along with SAS parties or Operational 
Groups developed into the norm also that was completely new to the original SOE 
and OSS operational planning.  But since it had been done since D-Day with various 
success, it continued even though no modifications were instituted in the training of 
the JEDBURGHs, still in reserve at Milton Hall.3   By the end of July, it became 
standard practice within the EMFFI staff that JEDBURGH teams were sent in with 
SAS or OGs to be their liaison with any Maquis that might be in the area.  In other 
words, it appears that even the EMFFI did not want to rely on a Maquis unit to carry 
out a specific task when French, British, or American regular and well-trained troops 
were available to do it.   The Jeds could be a firm liaison with various groups, not 
only to London, but to other Allied commando units operating nearby.  JEDBURGH 
teams were then used explicitly as liaison between the SAS and Operational Groups, 
                                                
3 Singlaub. Interview with Author, 9 June 2001. 
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and their communication links facilitated working with the local Maquis, where their 
language skills could augment the special operations tasks of the SAS party or OG.   
EMFFI now began cueing up JEDBURGH Teams for supporting 
Eisenhower’s forces as they marched east toward Paris at the same time it began 
deploying teams to central France that could harass German forces that might come 
north toward Ike’s forces or go east and south toward the southern invasion beaches.   
Beginning in the middle of July, the staff had planned the deployment of 
JEDBURGH teams for the August moon period and wished to send 2 teams to the 
Vosges and 1 team each to the Ardennes, Oise, Seine et Marne, Marne, Meuse, 
Meurthe et Moselle, and Haute Marne Departements.  Colonel Ziegler, Koenig’s 
Chief of Staff, deleted the Oise, Seine et Marne, and Marne Departements from the 
approved regions because they, “do not appear to be ready” for uniformed 
JEDBURGH teams and reminded the SFHQ planners, that those in the field 
requesting the teams should be asked to give an evaluation of their regions readiness 
for uniformed teams.  Zeigler did approve the deployment of 2 teams each to the 
Doubs, Haute Saône, Aisne, and Côte d’Or, apparently anticipating the priorities 
EMFFI received from SHAEF’s on 15 August.4     
But the Vosges region in eastern France drew interest from General 
Montgomery’s 21st Army Group and its Special Air Service was tasked to send a 
mission to the area.  The idea of conducting an operation in the Vosges had begun in 
June but only coalesced into Operation LOYTON in early August.  21st Army Group 
                                                
4  FFI/214, 21st July 1944, Jedburgh Documents, 3 AG 2 462, Archive National, Paris, France. 
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tasked 2 SAS to send ten men as an initial reconnaissance party to attempt to harass 
German lines of communication from Paris east toward Saarbrucken and Strasbourg.  
A JEDBURGH team was to accompany the mission.  During the same days EMFFI 
was deep in the effort to get the ALOES mission organized for the command and 
control of the Brittany Résistance, it drafted the plans for team JACOB to accompany 
the 2 SAS on its mission to the Vosges.  SAS was to run the mission, but since part of 
the mission involved working with the local Maquis, who were, to quote the SAS 
order, “not fully organized,” EMFFI was interested in its conduct.  Team JACOB 
consisted of British Captain Victor Gough, French Lieutenant Maurice Boissarie, and 
British Sergeant Kenneth Seymour.  Gough was one of the British Jeds who had 
started the war as an Intelligence officer in the Auxiliaries that were to have fought 
behind the lines in England, should the Germans have succeeded in invading back in 
1940.  In November 1943 he was transferred from the Auxiliary Units to the 
JEDBURGHs as an instructor, and in the spring joined the regular list in order to 
deploy on a mission.  Divorced the January before his deployment, Gough listed the 
woman running the boarding house he resided in as the next of kin.  His French team 
mate Boissaire and he both left their belongings at that boarding house while at 
Milton Hall and deployed to France. He was educated as an engineer and his drawing 
skills were so good that he won the competition among the Jeds to decide their 
Special Force patch.5  
                                                
5 Emails and unpublished work by Colin Burbidge, nephew of Victor Gough, 18 May, 2008.  
Possession of author. 
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But Gough was not sent along with the SAS element to win drawing contests.  
They were to meet up with the DMR and train and equip his Maquis.  The Résistance 
in the area was led by Gilbert Grandval a man of great local prestige and a rare DMR 
who had not been sent by the BCRA, but instead had been appointed to the position 
after taking over the region’s military affairs for the Résistance group Ceux de la 
Résistance.  Nevertheless, he believed in the efforts of the centralized authority of de 
Gaulle, regarded General Koenig’s authority for military matters to be synonymous 
with de Gaulle’s, and viewed the politics around COMAC to be harmful to France.  
When Bourgès-Maunoury suggested him, the BCRA in London replied, “that he 
would work out perfectly.”6  When members of COMAC advocated that effective 
action could only be directed from inside France, Grandval did not believe it.  “They 
knew perfectly,” he wrote after the war, “that regarding the scandalous and stupid 
intention of the Americans entrusting the government to the AMGOT; what counted 
before all this was the unity of France and only de Gaulle could assume it.”7  
Grandval was just the kind of man they were looking for, loyal to de Gaulle, had 
knowledge of the local area, and possessed great leadership skills.  Gough, Boussarie, 
Seymour and the SAS parachuted from their aircraft to one of Grandval’s drop zones 
lit up and looking “like bonfires on Guy Fawkes night,” one of the SAS reflected after 
the war.8  The landing went well but Seymour broke his toe and it began to swell so 
badly he could not go as fast as the rest of them. Upon landing, the team quickly 
                                                
6 Noguères, Degliame-Fouché, and Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 Á 1945. p. 
545. 
7 Gilbert Grandval and A. Jean Collin, Libération De L'est De La France (Paris: Hachette, 1974). pp. 
13-20. 
8 John Hislop.  Anything but a Soldier as quoted in Burbidge Manuscript. 
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regrouped with the SAS and were met by one of Grandval’s assistants.  The Vosges, 
is rugged country with thick forests and steep hills rising up from the river Saône that 
runs to the southwest, and the Moselle which runs to the north into Germany.  The 
valleys and forest naturally channel the region’s roads and railroads into narrow 
valleys closeted with the thick trees.  The country is great for guerrilla tactics. 
The Maquis made their command post on the top of one of the mountains 
about 6 miles from their drop zone and they guided the newcomers back to it before 
the sun rose.   Over the next two days, they made their initial plans.9   Gough 
requested one of the SAS radio operators to send JACOB’s first message to London 
saying that Seymour had been injured on the jump but would be recovered within a 
week, and they believed they would be contacting Grandval soon.   Team JACOB 
also sent a message on the 15th and 16th with the briefest of details on the local 
Maquis, which numbered 800 men, of whom 50 were armed.  They had still not 
contacted Grandval, but expected to on that day.  For security reasons, they had to 
travel 5 miles from their command post in order to come up on the radio.10  Germans 
were thick in the area, and by this time, the enemy was evacuating France and the 
roads were crowded with moving vehicles going into Germany.  But the regional 
Gestapo was also aware of their presence and organizing an effort to catch them. 
On 17 August, two days after the landings in the south, one day after Hitler 
gave the order for much of the occupation forces in southern France to evacuate, and 
                                                
9 "Report on Team JACOB," 1945, Team JACOB, HS 6/529, British National Archives, Kew, UK. p. 
1. 
10 United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm]. Roll 8, Target 4, Volume 4, Book IV, pp. 
765-766.  
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at a time when Patton’s 3rd Army was still approximately 500 kilometers to the west, 
Team JACOB and their SAS comrades heard that the Germans were coming up the 
mountain toward them and took stock of their situation.  With the Jeds were 
approximately 100 men, inadequately armed with some weapons that had been 
dropped when they parachuted in, some of the weapons provided by previous drops, 
but mostly older rifles the Maquis had managed to hide after the armistice.  They 
decided to leave a small rear guard at their position while most would attempt to 
make their way down to escape the trap.  They set off around 4 pm with the SAS, 
Gough, and Boissarie up front and Sergeant Seymour in the middle of the column still 
hobbled by his injured toe.  Unfortunately, there were enemy troops on this side of 
the mountain too and when the shooting started Sergeant Seymour, “could not 
discover what was going on” after the group scattered into the trees and boulders to 
escape what was now a firmly closing trap.  The Maquis, according to Seymour 
dropped their weapons and moved off leaving him alone and unaware of what was 
happening to his fellow Jeds.  He took cover behind a large jutting boulder and fired 
at the enemy with his Bern gun, then when that ammunition was gone, fired at them 
with his carbine, and lastly shot at them with his pistol, expending every round.  
When a grenade landed near him, but did not go off, he breathed a sigh of relief but 
while they drew nearer, he burned his radio codes and cipher pads.  Realizing that he 
was alone and out of ammunition a German soldier shouted something at him 
Seymour assumed meant to come out and give himself up.  Left with little choice and 
not knowing what happened to the rest of his group, he surrendered.  He was marched 
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over to “the nearest tree and stood against it.  Two of the enemy were detailed as a 
firing party and were just preparing to take aim when a senior officer came rushing up 
to them.”  He wanted to interrogate Seymour instead of shoot him and after taking a 
walk down the mountain and a ride to an office at a nearby German camp, he was 
asked what he was doing and what his mission was.  Seymour replied that he was in a 
“recce party,” and that his S. F. badge meant that he was a paratrooper.  The 
interrogator seemed to be content with that and Seymour was moved to a prison at 
Schirmeck, France.  He did not know what had become of his teammates and did not 
know what would become of him.  But when later presented with some of the SAS 
team’s radio equipment and codebooks, he insisted he did not know whose they were 
or anything about them.11  Neither did EMFFI as they had no more messages from 
JACOB for several days.   
But word did reach them regarding the fate of Captain Cyrus Manierre of 
Team DODGE who had been captured on 3 August near Grenoble.  A telegram from 
SPOC to Colonel Haskell read that Manierre “HAS BEEN TAKEN TO VICHY” and 
went on to say that the same had been passed to the DMR in the area in the hope that 
he could affect some kind of escape.12  Hearing nothing more about it for two days, 
Haskell directed Paul Van der Stricht to let him know the status of SPOC’s attempt to 
get Manierre out of prison as the telegram from Algiers threw “some doubt on the 
question of whether everything possible” was being done to get him out of Gestapo 
custody.  Shortly thereafter, three men from Operational Group ALICE were directed 
                                                
11 Team JACOB Report, HS 6/529, BNA, Kew, UK. pp. 2-3. 
12 Telegram from SPOC to Haskell, 18 Aug 44, Dossier 1, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France. 
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to proceed to Vichy with the intent of snatching him.13  Their effort to free Manierre 
from the Gestapo was buoyed by the escape of Francis Cammaerts in the same area 
due to the quick thinking and cunning of one of his agents.  Christine Granville 
convinced Cammaerts’ captors to release him due to the eminent arrival of the Allied 
forces and they did so just three hours before he was to be executed.  Cammaerts “has 
been released through quick wits” of Granville, SPOC wrote Haskell on the 18th but 
went on to indicate that the Drôme’s FFI commander believed the “Americans were 
not interested” in what happened to Manierre.14  Nothing could have been further 
from the truth, with SPOC sending a team to retrieve him and JEDBURGH team 
MONOCLE reporting on the 20th that they believed Manierre was “in prison but 
alright.”15   
Unfortunately, the three members of Operational Group ALICE, who were 
tasked by SPOC to rescue Manierre were unable to do so before “the Allied invasion 
of Southern France and subsequent northward advance of the Allied armies persuaded 
the Germans to send Manierre back to Germany….”16  They had indeed.  After 
several days of suffering through beatings and interrogations, but divulging nothing 
of OSS, Manierre was greeted one morning by a new German Army officer 
wondering how an American had come into the Gestapo Prison.  Manierre convinced 
him that he was a downed flyer and had been caught with some Maquis.  This 
German “swallowed the story, hook, line, and sinker.”  A few days later the order to 
                                                
13 Haskell to Van der Stricht, 22 Aug 44, Dossier 1, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France. 
14 Rosell to Haskell, 22 Aug 44, Dossier 1, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Letter from OG ALICE member Francis Coleman, March 10, 1987 to Carter Manierre as quoted in 
Manierre and Manierre, "Pop's War." p. 79. 
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came to evacuate, and in the subsequent confusion, his new German guards sent him 
to Stalag Luft 1.  He arrived there and was questioned by a Luftwaffe officer who had 
records that he had graduated from West Point, was commissioned in the Cavalry, 
and had been known to have taken pilot training.  All this was true and very 
unnerving for Manierre, but the Luftwaffe did not know that he had failed in flight 
school and had joined the OSS.17   Omitted from their records was all of the 
information the Gestapo interrogators had gleaned, and as SPOC later became aware, 
that the Milice who had arrested Manierre knew what his mission was as they had an 
informant inside the Manierre’s Maquis group.  But while the Gestapo hoped to beat 
out more details after their evacuation from Lyon, those records and the interrogators 
who created them were killed in air strikes while being transported on trains out of 
Lyon.18 
 
Capturing Paris and supporting 12th Army Group 
Anticipating the SHAEF priority areas of eastern France EMFFI finished 
plans for, at least it thought, the last of the JEDBURGH missions for France.  On the 
8th the staff drew up the orders for the deployment of 25 teams to leave “as quickly as 
possible.”  These 25 teams were, in the main, finalizing the July requests described 
above.  Their mission was to:  assist in the organization of the FFI; provide additional 
means of delivering arms; and provide additional communications between London 
and the FFI groups.  The teams would be sent to the Délégués Militaire Regional 
                                                
17 Team Report of DODGE, HS 6/501, BNA, Kew, UK. 
18 Manierre and Manierre, "Pop's War." p. 79. 
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Grandval, Hanneton, and Davout d’Auerstaet; the CITRONELLE mission on the 
Belgian border; and the F Section Circuits SPIRITUALIST, PEDLAR, HISTORIAN, 
and DIGGER among others.  Clearly now little favoritism remained as EMFFI 
determined to send missions to all possible operatives in France.  The teams would be 
commanded by EMFFI unless the situation mandated them to be directed by those to 
whom they were being sent.  Their planned dates of deployment were to begin on the 
11th and continue until the 18th, going long beyond the August moon period.19   
But the rapid pace of Patton’s Third Army, forced a change.  On the same day 
that Le Mans and Angers, were retaken placing Allied forces less than 200 kilometers 
from Paris, Colonel Joseph Haskell requested that the staff consider deploying three 
teams to work a line from Paris-Orleans-Blois on 8 August but wanted to ensure it 
made sense to send them as they would be operating in uniform.  Two days later, this 
idea altered radically and had developed into an operations order from Koenig that 
eight teams should be deployed to support the Allied advance, working the area south 
and east of Paris.  The order itself is revealing as it shows how well, at least in theory, 
EMFFI sought to manage the JEDBURGH missions in a coordinated way with their 
Délégués Militaire Régionales.  In a complete shift, these eight teams were to be 
inserted in civilian clothes in order to work clandestinely with the local DMR, FFI 
commander, or circuit organizer and then send Maquis volunteers toward Allied lines 
with the goal of making it through to American or British intelligence officers.20  
                                                
19 “EMFFI Operation Order No. 34, 8 August 1944, Ordres d’Etat Major Forces Française l'Interieur, 3 
AG 2 473, Archives National, Paris, France. 
20 Ibid.  
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Such a mission was direct intelligence work for which others, such as F Section 
agents, or BCRA agents would be far more suited.  While there were such agents in 
Paris region such as the Spiritualist circuit, EMFFI’s action now shows a willingness 
to severely alter the JEDBURGH operational methods in order to get a capability to 
the Paris region in front of the swiftly moving Allied armies. Much of this meant a 
major change in how the teams were originally planning to operate.  In addition to 
deploying in civilian clothes, handwriting samples were hurriedly gathered in order to 
validate that the Maquis bringing messages from the JEDBURGH team commander 
to the Army intelligence staff were legitimate.  The JEDBURGHs who were still 
awaiting deployment must grant their consent about being inserted in civilian clothes.  
Not wanting to place undue pressure on them individually, Haskell directed that the 
Jeds be assembled by Milton Hall commander Lt Col Musgrave and asked of they 
would agree to becoming clandestine.  Haskell was clear on the matter and wrote that, 
“On no account should the various teams be approached individually with a request 
that they operate in civilian clothes.”  Everyone knew what Hitler directed the 
Wehrmacht to do with such people.  But the Jeds, itching to get to France supported 
the change and a staff officer replied back to Haskell on the 14th that their response 
was “almost unanimous” and that Musgrave had more than enough for the efforts east 
of Paris.21    
Paris lay in front of the Allies.   Eisenhower’s initial desire to by pass the city 
proved impossible to sustain in the face of de Gaulle’s clear desire to liberate it, and 
                                                
21 “From Major Cox to Col Haskell,” 14 August 1944, 3 AG 2 462, microfilm 171/178, AN, Paris, 
France. 
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the way events were playing out there.  12th Army Group’s rapid advance east, that 
spurred Haskell and SFHQ to suddenly consider sending civilian clothed 
JEDBURGHs there proved to be so quick that those missions to the area west and 
south of Paris never deployed.  Teams HENRY, GODFREY, FRANK, JIM, 
RAYMOND, QUENTIN, RODERICK, and STANLEY that were put on alert for the 
Paris area were then placed back in reserve status to await further requirements.22  
Here also may be some dissonance between the internal Résistance power structure 
and the external leadership of the FFI in London.  The Délégué Militaire National, 
Jacques Delmas, pseudo ARC or CHABAN, returned to France on 14 August at the 
same time the JEDBURGH teams for the region were cancelled.   Arriving at the 
newly liberated Le Mans airfield via an American aircraft, Delmas then traveled 
through the lines and arrived in Paris on the 16th.23  Chaban-Delmas, as he later came 
to be called, and the Comité d’action militaire or COMAC had sought to direct the 
Maquis from inside France instead of from London.∗  But after some time in London 
meeting with Koenig and others in EMFFI, he now realized the utility of cooperating 
under Koenig’s orders in order to cooperate with Eisenhower’s efforts.  He agreed 
that the unity that could only be provided by London was the best way to proceed.  
Two days after Chaban’s arrival in Paris, the city’s Résistance began labor strikes as 
well as shooting at German soldiers and taking over key parts of the city.  Paris’ 
                                                
22 Most of these teams bounce from one operations order to the next until the last teams are sent to 
France in mid-September.   
23 Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Mémoires Pour Demain (Paris: Flammarion, 1997). p. 83. 
∗ Lt Col Hutchison’s exasperation with SFHQ discussed in Chapters Six and Seven demonstrated one 
aspect of this tension between those who believed EMFFI London needed to direct the FFI while 
those in France, whether French, British or American, often believed that direction should be done 
from within the country.   
 350 
German commander, General Dietrich von Choltitz, who had only taken that post on 
the 9th following the failed coup of Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, now attempted to 
hold the city.  Hitler’s orders demanded Paris be held or given to the Allies as “a pile 
of rubble.”24 
While the rapid pace of Allied advance scuttled a comprehensive JEDBURGH 
plan for the Paris region, one team did deploy east of Paris.  Sent to the Seine-et-
Marne Department on 12 August, as a part of the planned employment of 25 teams, 
Team AUBREY had agreed to go into France in civilian clothes and was the first 
team to do so.  After parachuting to a drop zone south of the Seine, the Jeds were met 
by the leader of SPIRITUALIST, Frenchman René Dumont-Guillemet.  The team’s 
two officers bicycled into the Paris with members of the Spiritualist Circuit the next 
day. Over the course of the next week British Captain Godfrey Marchant gave lessons 
in sabotage in an auto mechanic’s garage, while French Jed Jean-Françoise 
Chaigneau traveled around Paris ascertaining who within the circuit might be able to 
do various tasks.  Sergeant Hooker remained in the village of Forfey ill with the 
measles, but still able to send and receive messages.  By the 21st with more and more 
violence erupting in Paris provoking the Germans to respond with reprisals, Marchant 
and Dumont-Guillemet left the city and headed back to join British Sergeant Ivor 
Hooker at their safe house near the village of Forfry.  Chaigneau arrived the next day 
with several other circuit members.  But the fleeing Germans had taken up residence 
in the villages and woods all around them and the team, along with the Spiritualist 
                                                
24 Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 
1943-1944/5. p. 614. 
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circuit became involved in at least two battles involving the Wehrmacht.  On the 27th 
of August, the JEDBURGHs and the men and women of the circuit became involved 
in a shoot out with tanks whose fire, “was like God’s thunder.”25  The tanks had 
driven into the part of the forest in which they were hiding and Dumont-Guillemet, 
Hooker, Marchant, and Chaigneau were forced to remain where they were as running 
would reveal their location.  While they and other members of Dumont-Guillemet’s 
group were able to fight back, doing so threatened their comrades hiding in trees 
around the German positions.  Many of their weapons were still on trucks packed up 
with the manufacturing grease still coating them.  Confusion reigned as some were 
hiding within the Wehrmacht’s position and the others were ineffectively using 
weapons they were not trained to use.  Very little went well and Chaigneau was killed 
by a round from an enemy tank while attempting to escape along a stream.26  As the 
SOE history of the JEDBURGHs stated, “As had been foreseen, the first overt action 
of this Résistance group resulted in its complete dispersal, and the death of the French 
Officer of the Team.”  Who actually had foreseen this was perhaps the British staff or 
the SOE planners who took the opportunity to make clear their disapproval of 
deploying AUBREY while the French leadership of EMFFI sent them anyway.  The 
British SOE staff that wrote the line above took the opportunity to make clear their 
reluctance to send in a team in civilian clothes to operate like spies in an area teeming 
with enemy troops. 
                                                
25 "Compte Rendu sur l`action deroulee le 27 Aout a Forfry," undated, Report of Spiritualist, HS 6/571, 
British National Archives, Kew, UK. 
26 Team AUBREY Report, HS 6/483, HS 7/18 & 19 section VI, and HS 9/288, BNA, Kew, UK; and 
Foot, SOE in France:  An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in 
France, 1940-1944. p.  411. 
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 But AUBREY was not the only one to deploy in this way.  Team 
AUGUSTUS, another of the teams included in the 8 August order, deployed on 15  
August to the northwest of the village of Colomfay in the Aisne Department.  After 
the confirmation from the A5 Region’s operations officer, the team was given the 
green light to depart.27  American Major John Bonsall led the team.  He was a 
Princeton graduate, who had received his commission through ROTC and planned to 
practice law like his father.  But he was called to active duty in August of 1941 and 
had subsequently joined the OSS.  The 25-year-old had just been promoted to Major 
in April.  The French member of the team was Jean Delviche who knew the region 
well having grown up ten kilometers north of Laon.  Few JEDBURGHs had greater 
knowledge of the area they worked than Delviche.  The radio operator was American 
Technical Sergeant Roger Cote.28  The team’s mission was to link up with the 
region’s operations officer, Pierre Marie Deshayes, who used the code name 
GRAMME, and support his efforts in the area to arm his Maquis.  Deshayes had 
parachuted into France in December 1942, the day before his 24th birthday and 
successfully rose through the ranks of the BCRA network sent to liaise with the 
movement La Voix du Nord. The Region’s DMR was Guy Chaumet who operated 
under the code name CISSOIDE and had taken part in the same movement as 
Deshayes.  Together they had helped establish the Bureau d’Opérations Aériennes 
                                                
27 Costeaux, Gaston, and Fortier Emile, “Rapport sur l'activite de la mission "AUGUSTE,"” WASH-
COMMO-OP-74, Box 2, Folder 23, Entry 103, RG 226, NARA II, College Park, MD. 
28 Samuel J. Lewis, "Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of 12th Army Group, August 1944." 
Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, United States Army, 1991. 
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(BOA) in this part of France.29 
 The team radioed to London on the 17th that all was well and, “reception 
perfect.”  The arrival of the team brought spirits high as they all “managed a grand 
life in their house with good food (French) good wine etc….”  Their next message on 
the 19th told EMFFI that they had met with Chaumet and expected to meet with other 
leaders soon.  They did so the next day and radioed back local Maquis strengths, 
general locations, and weapons requirements:  1100 men were trained and had arms 
while 4900 were not armed.30  By the 21st the team’s messages began discussing 
German movements through the department and providing locations for air strikes.   
They also acquired the German plans for the destruction of the port at Le Harve.  
Their work cutting the railroad lines soon became impossible due to the number of 
enemy troops.  “Essential RR line be cut by bombing,” the team told EMFFI on the 
22nd.  Two days later the bombing, the Maquis actions, and the high traffic on the 
roads all were getting to be too much for the enemy as Cote radioed that the Germans 
were, “completely disorganized.  Incapable of self defense against force.” But the 
team and the region’s FFI were having their own problems.  The team listed them on 
the 25th.  First the area was too thick with enemy troops.  Second, the region did not 
have areas to shelter or hide.  Third, they lacked arms.  Apparently they did arrange at 
                                                
29 Noguères, Henri, Marcel Degliame-Fouché, and Jean Louis Vigier. Histoire De La Résistance En 
France, De 1940 Á 1945. I - V vols. Vol. 3. Paris,: R. Laffont, 1972. p. 107.  Information on 
Chaumet is sparse with only a listing on his name of code names in HS 6/468 and an entry of his 
personnel file in SOE records.  The file is still closed to the public.  Neither Foot, Noguères, nor 
Dewavrin’s works mention him, but he is described briefly in Bruno Leroux’s entry on BOA in the 
Dictionnaire Historique de la Résistance on page 168. 
30 United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm]. Reel 8, Target 6, Vol IV, Book 4, pp. 23 – 24; 
and Costeaux, Gaston, and Fortier Emile, “Rapport sur l'activite de la mission "AUGUSTE,"” 
NARA II.   
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least one weapons drop as they continued on to say that when the arms arrived, they 
divided them up and split up into small bands and used guerilla tactics when the 
opportunity arose.  EMFFI did not respond.  On the 26th the team radioed that they 
saw the Germans were preparing defensive positions but not placing mines on the 
bridges.  That seems to have finally earned EMFFI’s attention and it radioed back on 
the 30th that the Allied Army commander had ordered the “FFI to take all possible 
steps to preserve” the region’s bridges from destruction and then specifically listed 
them.31 
 But there is no way of knowing if the team received that message.  By the end 
of the month, British forces had made their way into the area and the team had 
successfully made their way to Allied lines traveling with one of the Maquis 
companies.  At one point they were in several vehicles, but had become spread out as 
each one had to travel through German check points individually.  While waiting for 
AUGUSTUS to catch up, one of the FFI complained the JEDBURGHs slowed them 
down.  The FFI commander reflected and answered, “Perhaps they are good shots” 
and therefore worth a bit of a wait.  They arrived without incident within the Allied 
lines, secured some equipment and gear for themselves and passed on what they knew 
about the enemy in the area.  They decided to return back across the lines.  Captain 
Delviche, secured a car from a friend in the area and they drove back toward the lines 
at night in a torrential rain.  At a check point near the town of Barenton-sur-Serre the 
JEDBURGHs and some of their Maquis were stopped.  They may not have seen the 
                                                
31 Ibid. Reel 8, Target 6, Vol IV, Book 4, pp. 25. 
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soldiers initially due to the weather but as some enemy soldiers came out of the 
darkness, they may have attempted to bolt from their vehicle with their Maquis.  But 
despite their civilian clothes and fake identity cards, the Jeds may have known the 
game was up due to all their radio equipment with them in the car.  Two shots rang 
out killing Delviche and Bonsall, Cote must have attempted a run for it but as he did 
five more shots were heard in the rainy night.  Later that night the two officers were 
found in the car and Sergeant Cote was found face down in the mud about a dozen 
meters from the car, all had severe head wounds.  The German soldiers left the area 
without bothering to take anything.32  The next day, the FFI arranged for their burial 
and later told the US Army investigator that they made sure to have an honor guard 
and a military burial despite the continued presence Germans traveling through the 
area.33   Completely ignorant of what had happened to their team, EMFFI radioed 
AUGUSTUS on 16 September to say that their mission was ended and to return to 
London via Paris.34   
 
The Final Push – The JEDBURGHs rush in 
EMFFI’s lack of understanding of what occurred with AUGUSTUS is only 
one instance of a number of examples of EMFFI’s inability to know what was going 
on in France.  Their order to deploy the 25 teams had been implemented slowly due 
to an inability to generate airlift sorties and for the Maquis to identify secure drop 
                                                
32 Costeaux, Gaston, and Fortier Emile, “Rapport sur l'activite de la mission "AUGUSTE,"” NARA II, 
p. 6-7. 
33 United States. Office of Strategic Services., Oss/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm]. Reel 8, Target 6, Vol IV, Book 4, pp. 27.  
34 Ibid., p. 25. 
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zones.   These two factors provoked delay after delay for the alerted teams.  
Originally, the 25 teams were to all have been deployed by 18 August, a rate of 
deployment that Colonel Zeigler seemed to doubt would be possible.35  But while 
AUBREY deployed as scheduled, no other team did and the order went through 4 
Amendments attempting to keep up with the changes forced by the delays.36  But to 
the JEDBURGHs still cooling their heels at Milton Hall, it must have been difficult to 
see the war progressing merely left to wonder if it would ever involve them.  The day 
after Paris was liberated, Koenig’s British deputy, Major General Redman must have 
known their dissatisfaction with their situation and wrote a long letter to be read by 
all the JEDBURGHs awaiting deployment to France.   Vaguely, he wrote that the 
reasons for the delay “have been many,” but that “It has been necessary to keep a 
reserve to meet future eventualities.”  Continuing on he stated that, “the battle has 
moved much more quickly than had been anticipated.  Dispatch by air to the areas 
required has not always been possible.”  But still emphatic that the JEDBURGHs had 
a mission to do he went on to write, “Should the enemy take up defensive positions 
on the frontier, it would be necessary to organize intensive guerilla activity behind 
any such line taken up in order to reduce in so far as it may be possible his power to 
resist effectively the advance of the main armies.”  Noting that for the teams to be 
effective they would need to be inserted as early as possible, but “the rapid turn of 
                                                
35 In Zeigler’s hand writing on one of the planning documents is his list of teams by region and his 
math in the margins with the comment:  “4 par jours” noting the rate they would be deployed if 
the plan went as designed. The emphasis is Zeigler’s.  Not able to achieve that kind of pace on a 
regular basis, EMFFI did manage to deploy four teams on the 28th.   
36 Operations Order No. 34, 8 August 1944, Ordres d’Etat Major Forces Française l'Interieur, 3 AG  
473, Archives National, Paris, France; with amendments 1 – 4. 
 357 
events, unfortunately, has reduced considerably the time available, but we must make 
the best of the situation as it exists, and have confidence that most valuable work can 
be done by all now being sent in.”  Then seemingly contradicting himself as he had 
listed all the considerations regarding the methodical use of the teams General 
Redman finished by announcing that, “Orders have now been given for all 
JEDBURGH teams trained and available and now remaining in this country to be 
employed as soon as the necessary aircraft deliveries can be arranged.”37  With this 
sentence, the Deputy Commander of EMFFI notified the Jeds of the order that 
General Koenig approved on 24 August that all available teams were to deploy as 
soon as possible. 
But doing this proved incredibly difficult.  Not only had the rapid pace of 
conventional operations proven too quick for EMFFI to adjust to, but as they 
proceeded through their operations in August, EMFFI built more complexity into 
their war.   For example, the EMFFI operations bureau wanted to conduct another 
mission similar to ALOES, that had operated in Brittany in order to deploy a 
command staff to the regions in eastern France.  EMFFI began a planning effort to 
learn the lessons from ALOES and send as many as four similar missions to eastern 
France.  But realizing that ALOES’s mission suffered from a great many faults, they 
sought to eliminate the errors they made in late July and early August when they 
deployed ALOES too late via a very muddled process.  These new missions would 
take JEDBURGH teams as communication links and liaison units to the various 
                                                
37 “To:  All JEDBURGH teams for France still in England,” 26 August 1944, BCRA Documents – 
Jedburghs, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France. 
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Maquis units and operate in the regions along side the DMR and FFI commanders.  
Furthermore, each team would be able to talk to other teams directly, something that 
generally was not being done due to security and technical capacity.  If correctly 
conducted and supported with airlift and weapons, this effort could have proven to be 
very beneficial to the land forces as they made their way east.   
From the middle of August until the first day of September, EMFFI’s focus 
was on the area around Lyon and then north to Chalons-sur-Saône to Dijon and then 
blossoming out to an area from St. Dizier to Belfort and north to Verdun.  Their aim 
was to harass the escaping Germans as they attempted to establish a defensive line on 
the west of the Rhine River.  On the 15th ANTHONY deployed north of Chalons-sur-
Saône and JUDE deployed south of Lyon with an SAS team.  When JUDE arrived, it 
discovered more of a reception committee than they required.  The way the Maquis 
had interpreted the BBC message they thought there would be 40 aircraft arriving, 
instead of 40 people, and so they had 2000 people there with 100 vehicles in order to 
handled what would certainly have been a lot of weapons.38   On the 16th ANDREW 
deployed to join an inter-allied party near the Belgian border and Team AUGUSTUS 
left on its fateful mission to the Aisne.  On the 18th BRUCE, BUNNY, and TONY 
departed the UK for Yonne, Haute Marne, and the Vendee respectively.  TONY went 
to assist the effort now concentrating against the German garrison holding out at La 
Rochelle.  On the 19th Teams ARTHUR and PAUL left for Côte d’Or to the northeast 
and east of Dijon.  On the 21st Teams BENJAMIN and BERNARD deployed to the 
                                                
38 United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm]. Reel 8, Target 6, Vol IV, Book 4, p. 7. 
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Meuse with BENJAMIN going north of Verdun and BERNARD to the south of the 
city.  It was not until the 25th that any more teams left with ALFRED deploying north 
of Paris and ARNOLD deploying east of Paris in the Marne.  On the 26th Team 
CECIL landed south of Troyes, ARCHIBALD north of Nancy and BASIL managed 
to become the first team into the Belfort Gap, east of Besançon.  On the 28th a record 
four teams departed with ALASTAIR deployed to the Vosges, CEDRIC to the Haute 
Saône, NORMAN to the Doubs south of Team BASIL, and MAURICE was supposed 
to deploy and work with NORMAN, but their crew believed the signal lights from the 
drop zone were anti-aircraft search lights.  No amount of arguing between the Jeds 
who realized the other aircraft dropped their loads on the correct place could convince 
the aircraft commander that they should go around and try again.  Instead, the pilot 
returned to England and aborted the deployment.  MAURICE finally made it to 
France on 1 September, after many false starts, and successfully landed in Jura east of 
Chalons-sur-Saône.39   
Summing up the frustration felt by many of the teams, MAURICE’s officer in 
charge, American Captain Charles Carmen, began his report with this rebuke – 
perhaps inspired by how he was spending his time while waiting to get into the war.  
“By the time we arrived in France,” he wrote, “our state of mind was somewhat that 
of a woman whose lover has left without saying goodbye.”  He continued on bitterly, 
“We had been led to expect that we would be sent in well before D-Day.  
                                                
39 All the team deployment dates were taken from HS 7/19 maps.  BNA, Kew, UK.  Maurice’s 
deployment date is listen incorrectly on the map.  The argument with the crew is related in the 
Team’s report, HS 6/542, pp. 2-3. 
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Consequently, for three months we expected daily to be alerted.  And for two weeks 
after we were alerted, the operation was daily postponed.  Finally, on 28 August 
1944, we arrive at Harrington Aerodrome for the third time, donned our parachutes 
for the second time, and climbed into the plane for the first time.”40  His report went 
on to vividly describe the inept and inexperienced B-24 crewmen that took part in a 
four aircraft formation to insert two teams and the required arms for the area’s 
Maquis.  But when the reception party’s signal lights were incorrectly thought to be 
Anti-aircraft search lights, the crew decided to abort and return to England.  Carmen 
and his French teammate Hubert Dumesnil went up to the cockpit and argued with the 
pilot, but to no avail.  The B-24 returned to Harrington.  MAURICE waited for two 
more days and then left on 31 August in a British aircraft from Tempsford.  Finally in 
France they were enjoying life too much perhaps even though there were only “four 
kilometers away” from the Germans who were actively engaged with an FFI force.  
While Dumesnil developed their initial plans with the local FTP leader Lucien 
Chazeaux, Carmen and the radio man Technical Sergeant Francis Cole sent off their 
first message.41  Carmen, in keeping with his playful writing admitted that the two 
Jeds, “had to do it twice because of the Champagne.”42  MAURICE finally had 
arrived and linked up with the local FTP leaders who had just 16 days before merged 
                                                
40 "Team MAURICE," undated, MAURICE Report, HS 6/542, British National Archives, Kew, UK., 
p. 1. 
41 Marcot and Baud, La Résistance Dans Le Jura. p. 86. 
42 Ibid., p. 3. 
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under the FFI’s leadership and therefore the DMR.  The Jura’s Résistance had gained 
a measure of unity without any Allied pressure.43 
Also on 1 September teams PHILIP arrived east of Nancy, RODERICK 
deployed south of Belfort, and GREGORY parachuted on the eastern edge of Jura 
near the Swiss border.  GREGORY was the last of those that had originally been 
planned to deploy on 8 August and their on again, off again, alert posture was a 
function of them being a part of the command and control mission ORGEAT that will 
be discussed below.  Team NICHOLAS parachuted into the eastern Vosges on the 9th 
and Team HENRY arrived on the 10th to a very friendly reception.  In fact, it was 
nowhere near the German lines.  By the time they had arrived, the Americans 
controlled the region north of Belfort.  “YOU KNOW DONT YOU,” Team HENRY 
radioed to EMFFI,  “THAT THIS AREA WAS OVERRUN BEFORE WE 
ARRIVED,” meaning that they had parachuted into friendly territory.  Disappointed 
that their mission was entirely futile they continued on saying, “WE HAVE DONE 
NOTHING AT ALL  STOP  FUNNY WAR.”44  But HENRY was not the last of the 
Jeds into France, Team GODFREY arrived in Haut-Rhin on 12 September, and four 
days later Teams DOUGLAS II, TIMOTHY, and JIM arrived in Jura as well.  The 
French officer on JIM was none other than Lieutenant Joe de Francesco, 
Eisenhower’s driver in Algiers who wanted Darlan’s assassin to receive a medal.45  
Joe had finally gotten to France twenty-one long months after that discussion with 
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44 “Telegrams de Region D,” Fonds du Ziegler, 1 K 374, Carton 9, Fichier 3, SHT, Vincennes, France.  
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General Eisenhower.  Discussing how he felt about that many years later, Joe stated, 
“there were a lot of angry guys at Milton Hall.”46  Because, as Carmen stated above, 
they had been led to believe that they were going to be used before D-Day.  
According to de Francesco, the disappointment was especially sharp among the 
French officers. 
But while their deployment seemed to be done in such a scattershot manner, it 
was not planned that way.  Instead the process was a victim of circumstances brought 
about by the positive events due to the advancing front lines and the negative aspect 
of the fog, rain, and cloudy weather everyone contended with in late August and 
September of 1944.  The messages from the DMRs, as well as the Jeds continually 
scream for weapons, but when the aircraft can not deliver them due to the weather, 
there was not much that could be done.  EMFFI did consider another daylight drop 
and planned a large mission similar to the previous ones.   The planning for Operation 
BENTLEY began in the middle of August and the first of the written directives on it 
appeared on the 20th, long before the two invasion forces from the north and south 
linked up.  Originally planning to drop supplies to 8 drop zones in the 6 Departements 
of Ain, Doubs, Jura, Haute Savoie, Haute Marne, and Saône et Loire, the EMFFI 
planners believed there to be 27,000 FFI willing to join in the combat, but lacked the 
needed weapons.  They estimated that an approximately 13,000 were armed and 
believed to be in action.   But the effort was beleaguered by the strict requirements for 
there to be no enemy anti-aircraft capability within 20 kilometers of the drop zones.  
                                                
46 De Francesco telephone conversation with author, 3 March 1999. 
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That requirement alone, no matter the weather, would be hard for any JEDBURGH 
team, BCRA, or SOE agent to ensure given the constant traffic of German units 
moving through the region.  Furthermore, the order directed that, “In each case an 
assurance will be obtained from the Field that the ground situation provides adequate 
security, i.e. there must not be active enemy forces which might include light or 
heavy flak in the vicinity of the selected dropping point.”47  Given the thick 
population of Germans now crowding the region, such assurances would be hard to 
attain.  But that was EMFFI’s plan with Operation BENTLEY on 20 August. 
Then the changes began.  The very next day the drop zone area shifted to the 
south, striking the Jura and Doubs from the list and adding Ardeche and oddly 
enough the Vercors whose Maquis had been forced to flee the region and give up the 
ground to the concerted German offensive that had concluded on 6 August.48  With 
the DRAGOON operation proceeding north with good success, it did make sense to 
resupply those now engaged in fighting.  But on the 24th, a shortage of Bren guns and 
carbine rifles forced a shift in the weapons that could be sent and therefore the effort 
had to be reconfigured, meaning further delays.  On the 25th the progress of General 
Patch’s forces forced a new change, and the Vercors and Ardeche were taken off and 
the old list put back in the operation.  On the 27th the operation was completely 
reorganized from an American daylight operation to a British night time one and 
given the name BENTLEY.  On the 28th more Allied advances forced the striking of 
                                                
47  “Operations Order, 41,” 20 August 1944, Ordres d'Etat Major Forces Française l'Interieur, 3 AG 2 
473, Archives National, Paris, France. pp. 1-2. 
48 Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungs-krieg?:  Kriegführung und 
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the Haute Savoie from the DZ list.  The order also noted that SHAEF had yet to 
approve of the operation and without that, the RAF 38 Group, cued up for the effort 
remained waiting.49   
As were the Maquis leaders.  Apparently trying to get his weapons starved 
region on the list of drop zones for the operation, Gilbert Grandval, the DMR for the 
C Region radioed on 3 September that “NO FLAK PROXIMITY OF THE FIVE 
PROPOSED TERRAINS.”50  But for all the effort, BENTLEY never happened as the 
permission from SHAEF was slow to come.  On 6 September, Eisenhower sent a 
message to Major General Redman describing his reluctance to supply the Maquis too 
“lavishly.”   Ike highlighted his reservations regarding the possibility that there may 
be “too many armed Frenchmen when hostilities cease who are not subject to military 
discipline” and that the soldiers now enrolling in the French regular army would go 
without while the Résistance was still receiving arms.   Adding that it was Koenig’s 
decision, Eisenhower told Redman to discuss the matter with Koenig and “issue a 
categorical directive.”  Furthermore, Ike wanted Koenig to notify the groups who 
were not going to receive arms of that fact.51  Redman responded to the Supreme 
Allied Commander on the 11th, that Koenig had directed Haskell and Zeigler, who 
were visiting Paris, to focus on the areas both Eisenhower and Koenig agreed were 
still worthwhile but told Eisenhower that some latitude might be necessary.  The areas 
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around La Rochelle on the western coast were still firmly held by the enemy and it is 
unclear if Koenig knew Elster had surrendered in L’Indre.52  But by now the RAF’s 
38 Group was no longer available for BENTLEY.  On 1 September the unit was 
given to the British 1st Airborne Army for Operation MARKET GARDEN.53  This 
operation was the largest Allied airborne operation of the war and began on 14 
September.   Every aircraft suitable for paratroopers was required for it. 
Eisenhower’s fears of “lavishly” arming the Maquis seem completely 
incongruous with the views of Region D’s DMR Pierre Hanneton.  In a message to 
EMFFI on 26 August he decried as “deplorable” his ability to conduct operations 
“due to the total absence of any aerial operations for the last three months.” but 
despite this the FFI had “perfect confidence in the French organization.”54  Hanneton 
is overstating the situation, but not by much as the SFHQ reports to SHEAF bear out.  
Only three tons of arms had been parachuted to Region D since D-Day.55   
Attempting to operate in Eisenhower’s highest priority area, the Vosges, at the 
end of August JEDBURGH Team ALASTAIR found their mission impossible and 
asked the obvious question in a message to EMFFI on 5 September.  “IF YOU DID 
NOT INTEND TO GIVE US ANY SUPPORT WHY DID YOU SEND US” and the 
team, led by British Major Oliver Brown with French Captain Rene Karriere went on 
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to demand that EMFFI act and “FOR GODS SAKE DO SOMETHING.”56   London 
answered meekly stating that, “DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES AND REASONS 
BEYOND OUR CONTROL IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEND YOU OPERATIONS 
AT PRESENT.”  EMFFI went on to say that Grandval had been notified of this and 
that things were in the works but the timing of them was unknown.  Zeigler’s 
message back to ALASTAIR ended with, “SORRY.”   Shortly afterwards, a message 
arrived from EMFFI telling the Jeds that the daylight weapons delivery was cancelled 
because Grandval “had not complied with some of the conditions under which the 
operations would be undertaken.”57  Grandval however had been going back and forth 
with EMFFI over mounting a large daylight drop over several drop zones on the same 
day in Alsace and Vosges.  He protested saying that the enemy would make it 
impossible to perform and that he simply wanted all the weapons they were prepared 
to send on one drop zone in the Vosges for the moment and later they could see about 
it in Alsace when conditions might be more favorable.  Grandval pressed his case in 
messages to EMFFI in London as well as sending people to Paris to meet Koenig 
personally.58  But it was never worked out as it was impossible to expect the 
Wehrmacht to remain static which would allow the information regarding the drop 
zones to remain valid for as long as it took the staff and aircrews to generate the plans 
and then execute their missions. 
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Therefore, instead of the RAF conducting Operation BENTLEY and 
delivering some of the stores to the Vosges region, USAAF B-17s conducted 
Operation GRASSY to the Doubs only.  In keeping with American practice, the 
operation switched back to being a daylight drop.   On the 9 September, 68 aircraft 
succeeded in dropping supplies, but to only one drop zone southwest of Besançon.  
Tasked by SHAEF to deliver arms to the Vosges, EMFFI coordinated the USAAF 
effort that involved the drop zone being changed “four times before the operation was 
finally flown,” according to the Carpetbagger history of the effort.59  Furthermore, as 
the JEDBURGHs in the area could attest, the area south and west of Besançon was 
not really behind the lines at the time of the drop, but perhaps it was more accurate to 
say the area was in a state of flux.  The Germans were leaving the area so on any 
given day from 16 August to15 September, it was unpredictable what drop zones 
would be secure and which ones were not.  This condition persisted in Jura and 
Doubs until the Wehrmacht succeeded at establishing a fairly firm defensive line 
roughly half way between Besançon and Belfort on about 15 September.60  
Nevertheless, Albert de Schonen, of JEDBURGH Team GREGORY had Sergeant 
Ron Brierley radio to EMFFI that GRASSY was a great success for them and that, 
“OPERATION HUGE SUCCESS.”   Furthermore, he radioed that Colonel Ziegler 
should “CONSIDER THIS AREA ARMED.”  However, they asked that EMFFI, 
“TELL US WHERE OTHER DROPPINGS TOOK PLACE,” as if they expected 
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there to have been other drop zones serviced.  There were no others and GRASSY 
was the last large-scale operation in France.  
 Communications with the DMRs was a constant source of confusion.  While it 
was not the single greatest issue EMFFI and the DMRs faced, it seemed to be one that 
EMFFI believed it could solve and looked to the JEDBURGH teams to do it.  
Learning from their deployed headquarters experience for Brittany and the ALOES 
mission, the FFI’s leadership in London thought they would, “form, equip and 
despatch [sic] to Eastern France seven small mobile staffs to assist the local 
commanders of the F. F. I., particularly by the provision of communications both 
between groups in the field and between these groups and LONDON.”  Grandval 
would get three of these detachments, Hanneton was to receive three and one 
detachment was going to be sent to Ardennes.  The effort, which was easily the most 
complicated single mission EMFFI had yet designed, was to leave for France 
beginning on 4 September, “subject to the procurement of the necessary 
equipment.”61  It is clear from that statement as well as the flurry of paperwork, 
amendments, notes, and memos regarding the mission that they did not have the 
radios, codes, drop zones, air sorties, or JEDBURGH teams selected, nor did they 
even have the specific non-JEDBURGH mission members identified.   Over the 
course of the next three weeks, 10 amendments were published and portions of the 
effort were canceled resulting in only Teams GREGORY, JIM, DOUGLAS, and 
TIMOTHY deploying instead of the original effort to send 7 as a part of 7 
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independent headquarters elements.  Reasons were largely due to lack of capacity of 
communications, something that ironically enough was caused by a lack of 
communication between EMFFI’s communications and operations staffs.  The two 
parts of the staff rarely worked well together, as some of the examples discussed in 
previous chapters attest, nor did their relationship improve with the advancing 
complications and ambitions of the operations efforts.  
 By the end of August all of the JEDBURGH missions in eastern France were 
transitioning to becoming reconnaissance assets for the advancing Allied armies.  
Usually, within a few days after their arrival, if not immediately, they met up with the 
conventional forces and decided to go back behind the lines and coordinate the 
actions of the Maquis but with the specific guidance of the conventional forces in the 
area.  In many cases, they found the Special Forces Detachment and coordinated their 
activities with its planners.  Team BENJAMIN, comprised of British Major James 
O’Brien-Tear, French Lieutenant Paul Moniez and French radio operator Sous 
Lieutenant H. Kaminski, arrived west of Verdun at a very hastily arranged drop zone.  
The reception committee had only been notified, “a few day [sic] previously to find a 
DZ at all costs and had never received any detailed instructions” on how to run such 
an operation.  O’Brien-Tear and Moniez later wrote that, “the net result was that 2 
days and 3 nights were spent rounding up and collecting the stores and parachutes, 
most of which were elegantly draping the topmost branches of the highest trees.”  
Furthermore the Germans had recently moved some soldiers to within 350 yards of 
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the drop zone.62  Further complicating their pre-arrival plans, was their smashed radio 
and the injuries to Kaminski and the nearby team BERNARD’s French Captain 
Etienne Nasica.  Therefore the two teams decided to work together on the western 
side of the Meuse instead of the original plan for BENJAMIN to work the eastern 
Meuse while BERNARD worked the west of the department. But the local Maquis 
led by Grandval were in a great state of confusion as he was attempting to bring about 
the large drop for the Vosges described above and was not in the area.  Furthermore, 
the Gestapo and the local Milice succeeded in arresting many of the local group 
shortly after the Jeds arrived.63   Those arrests gave the Germans the locations of all 
the drop zones that group intended to use and “in effect,” the team wrote, “all our 
immediate contacts with the local FFI were severed in one swoop.”64  Left with few 
choices or means to arm the Maquis, the two teams moved west at the direction of 
EMFFI to link up and perform reconnaissance for the 3rd Army.  Moniez took some 
of the Maquis and conducted a patrol into Sainte-Menehould killing four Germans, 
but they had to depart when shelled by artillery and mortars by Wehrmacht 
reinforcing the village.  The teams continued similar activities for the next two days 
and in one action BERNARD’s Captain Nasica was wounded in the hip.65  
Meanwhile, the lead elements of the US 3rd Army were rapidly overtaking 
their region.  Finding the SF Detachment and Lt Col Powell on 3 September, the 
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teams were held with him for a new mission while Powell gave them a new radio to 
replace the one destroyed during their parachute jump nearly two weeks before.  He 
wanted to arrange for the teams to go south to the area between St. Dizier and 
Chaumont and assist the FFI’s effort to protect the 3rd Army’s southern flank.  The 
team arrived in on the 15th where they received their first and only aerial re-supply.  
By the later half of the month they were coordinating tasks the 3rd Army wanted the 
Maquis to do such as guarding captured enemy equipment and some tactical 
reconnaissance.  The team wrapped up that mission and EMFFI directed them to 
return to London, which they did on 2 October.  Pondering their mission’s 
effectiveness, O’Brien-Tear and Moniez believed the harm done to them by the 
arrests could have been mended but, “mending takes time in conditions where it takes 
3 days for a message to be sent 10 miles and 3 more days for an answer to be 
received.  And time is what we lacked.”66  Adding to the critique more than six 
decades later, Paul Moniez thought that his training did not emphasize adaptation or 
creative thinking enough.  Little in what they did was what they expected to do.  His 
role in using the Maquis for rear area duties, or organizing Maquisards to penetrate 
Allied lines to provide intelligence was not something he had been prepared to do.  
Furthermore, his lack of local knowledge, the very thing the Frenchman was to add to 
the operation, was also debilitating.  His complete unfamiliarity the Meuse was such 
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that, “By parachuting me into the Meuse was just as if they had parachuted me into 
Arizona.”67 
 
German counterinsurgency and the tragedy of Team JACOB 
Team JACOB’s relatively early arrival to the east of BENJAMIN did not 
make things easier for its members.  In fact, Gough, Boissarie, and Seymour were 
effectively destroyed as a team on 17 August while descending down into the 
Wehrmacht’s sweep of the area under a small task force hastily organized called 
Kommando Schoner.  That force succeeded in capturing Seymour and forcing the 
Maquis to disperse and sending the SAS and JEDBURGHs scattering into the Vosges 
woods.  The German task force commander Major Schoner, who had lived in New 
York before the war, stopped Seymour’s summary execution immediately after his 
capture, brought him to their command post and questioned him.68  “He spoke 
excellent English with an American accent,” Seymour noted.69   Seymour was 
questioned and according to testimony after the war gave the enemy enough 
information to spare his life and garner decent treatment.70  The next day the Germans 
moved Seymour to Schirmeck camp, “an ordinary slave jail,” as Seymour called it 
and part of the Natzweiler prison system where he remained for 10 days.71   
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But what happened to Captains Gough and Boissarie?  EMFFI had heard 
nothing of Team JACOB since 16 August, the day before Seymour’s capture.  The 
German counterinsurgency operations proved to be completely able to foil any 
coherent Résistance in Region C, but also able to capture and kill much of the 
Maquis, the British SAS, and the Allied JEDBURGHs sent to work with them.  But 
Gough and Boissarie had escaped the trap on the 17th and while they had no means to 
communicate to EMFFI themselves, Grandval’s message on 3 September reported 
only that he knew of the team, but did not give any details of what they were doing or 
indicate anything involving their present condition.72  Attempting to coordinate other 
things, it is clear that Grandval was merely repeating rumors back to EMFFI.  But on 
the 26th Captain Gough succeeded with the aid of one of the BCRA radio operators in 
the area to send word that he needed new equipment and a new team.  In a second 
message from a second operator he asked for “ARMS, AMMUNITION, 
GRENADES URGENTLY NEEDED FOR 600 MEN,” and that he needed a 
parachute drop of no more than 70 containers, and a radio.  It ended with, “AREA 
GETTING HOTTER DAILY.”73   However those messages probably did not get 
through as being from JACOB as they were sent from another radio operators 
equipment.  In an EMFFI status report of JEDBURGH teams done on 27 August it 
laments that no communication from JACOB had been received since the 16th.74  But 
on 5 September Gough managed to get off two more messages.  The first asked that 
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his equipment be sent via the SAS air drop to take place in a few days and that he 
could not receive arms before due to being attacked.  He needed money and remarked 
that getting food was difficult.  Also on the 15th he telegraphed that Seymour had 
been captured and he feared that the Germans had executed him.  He also stated that 
Boissarie was killed.  “I AM NOW SOLE MEMBER OF TEAM JACOB.  100 
MAQUIS KILLED 100 CAPTURED IN SAME BATTLE.  REST DISPERSED.”  
The next day his spirits seem to have been risen somewhat.  Gough apologized for 
such little communication, stated that his Maquis leader was under surveillance and 
therefore he could not operate but that he had rallied 200 Maquis and armed them 
with SAS provided weapons.  He signed off with the plucky remark, “CHINS UP.”  
Finally on the 19th EMFFI replied saying it was sending money.  On the 23rd EMFFI 
telegraphed Gough again requesting details as to the fate of Seymour and Boissarie.  
They received nothing back from Captain Gough.75 
Gough was EMFFI’s only man in the area Eisenhower had made a top priority 
and they now sought to utilize him.  On 27 September with Allied armies now 
approaching the Vosges and crossing the Meurthe River, Gough’s operations could 
prove very valuable.76  But it is unclear what messages Gough was receiving from 
London.  Reports of the SAS note that Gough was operating independently of them 
and working with a group known as Maquis de Reciproque in October.  But by early 
November he, like Seymour, had also been captured. 
                                                
75 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Target 4, Vol. 4, Book IV, p. 767. 
76 Clarke, Smith, and Center of Military History., Riviera to the Rhine. P. 260.   
 375 
The Gestapo had organized two operations in the area to defeat the insurgency 
after the Wehrmacht’s initial efforts in the middle of August failed to do so.  
Operations WALDFEST 1 and 2 began in September and were organized by the SS 
commander in Strasbourg, Dr. Eric Isselhorst, and his deputy Wilhelm Schneider.   
Isselhorst, had been a member of the Nazi party since 1932 and had worked his way 
up the party’s ladder in Gestapo offices in Berlin, Erfurt, Munich, and after 
participating and organizing Einsatzkommando detachments in Poland he became the 
head of the Strasbourg Gestapo in 1943.77  His effective actions had largely 
succeeded in rounding up all of the SAS of another mission codenamed PISTOL and 
nearly all of the SAS with LOYTON.  With the killing of Boissarie on or about 4 
September and the capture of Gough at the end of October, Team JACOB was also 
gone.  Gough and Seymour were still alive but while Gough was held at Schirmeck 
and later moved to a prison in Strasbourg, Seymour had been moved on into 
Germany.78  The camp was organized to place special prisoners such as these 
parachutists in their own cells.  So along with Gough were five SAS, four US Airmen 
who had parachuted out of disabled aircraft and three priests, and another Frenchmen.  
All were held there due to being taken while working with or being with the 
Résistance.79  Also with them was a German NCO who had thrown his sawn off shot 
gun in the river and ordered his soldiers to do the same.  His name was Werner 
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Helfen and he had been in the Schutz Polizei.  His unit was ordered to turn over their 
legal weapons to front line soldiers.  He told his men to throw their shotguns into the 
river due to the fear that if he were captured, the Allies would try him for having a 
weapon that was against the international conventions.  However, he had been caught 
by his own for destroying property of the Reich and brought to Schirmeck as a 
prisoner.  While there he was given light duties bringing him in contact with the other 
inmates.  He often did favors for them such as getting them medical attention, passing 
messages among them, and simply speaking kindly to them.80    
As the Allies advanced, the camp commander Karl Buck, received orders 
from Isselhorst to shoot any special prisoners that he might select, release the women 
and burn down the camp.  Buck did not carry out these orders because he “did not 
consider it wise to leave fresh mass graves behind, and secondly I considered the 
camp might have been useful to the Wehrmacht who were retreating.”  Instead, he 
arranged to transport the prisoners across the Rhine River to Germany and a prison at 
Gaggenau, on 21 November.  Having been told they were leaving, Gough made a 
present of his silk SOE escape map for the kindnesses Werner Helfen had shown him.  
The next day, while they were all on trucks, Helfen the only one of them that had 
been told of his death sentence, jumped from the truck and escaped.  The others 
arrived at the camp at Gaggenau, Germany on 23 November.  Witnesses after the war 
attested that they were all still at the camp at midday on the 25th but later that day the 
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SAS, the three priests, the four airmen, the French civilian, and Gough were put back 
into a truck with soldiers and shovels.81   
The truck drove through the town of Gaggenau and then into the Erlich Forest 
and pulled alongside a bomb crater.  The execution unit took three prisoners out of 
the truck at a time, marched them into the bomb crater, and shot each of them in the 
back of the head.  One of the priests attempted to flee, but was shot down by the three 
men of the execution squad as he stumbled and fell in the trees.   After killing them 
they stripped them of their clothing, set fire to the bodies and pilfered the best of the 
belongings from the pile of clothes, boots, and other meager possessions the prisoners 
had.82  After the war, despite the quagmire of Allied and judicial procedure and 
bureaucracies, Major Eric Barkworth of 2 SAS spent months attempting to uncover 
what had happened to the members of mission LOYTON and team JACOB.  His 
relentless efforts resulted in the prosecution and conviction of the three executioners, 
Isselhorst, and his deputy, Wilhelm Schneider who had conducted the WALDFEST 
operations.  The executioners received prison terms of no more then 10 years.  
Schneider, despite Sergeant Seymour testifying in his defense, was executed in 
January of 1947.  Isselhorst, who was tried for several other crimes, was finally shot 
by a French firing squad in February of 1948.   The Camp Schirmeck commander 
Karl Buck survived being punished for Gaggenau murders due to the sentence not 
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being legally confirmed under British law.  But he too had plenty to answer for and 
was finally sentenced to death in the 1950s.83   
That still leaves one JEDBURGH unaccounted for, American Captain Cyrus 
Manierre.  Sergeant Seymour who returned to the UK after being liberated from 
Stalag 9C near Frankfurt in April 1945 reported that he had seen Manierre while in a 
holding station awaiting further transportation.  He caught just a glimpse but was sure 
it was him.84  Manierre had successfully convinced his new interrogators in Lyon that 
he was an aircrew member and they turned him over to the Luftwaffe who took him 
into their system.  While at the transit camp where Seymour saw him, Manierre  
realized his brother was just a few feet away among the crowd of POWs.  William 
Manierre had been shot down with his bomber crew after flying his 31st mission one 
week after Cyrus had been captured.  When the brothers made a bit of a commotion 
and the Germans realized two brothers were in the same camp, they made a publicity 
event of it and due to their publicity the Red Cross was able to notify their mother of 
the two brothers’ fate.   Also making it somewhat easier Manierre recognized many 
of his West Point friends in the camp with him, which buoyed his morale a great deal.  
Having been promoted to Major, he served the rest of the war as the Adjutant to the 
Group Commander, Lt Col Francis S. Gabreski, the famous WWII Ace.  On 2 May 
1945, the Soviet Army liberated the camp and the last unaccounted for JEDBURGH 
was finally free to return home.85  
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Conclusion 
 EMFFI could not overcome the conditions that inhibited its ability to 
adequately support the Maquis in eastern France.  The constant churns of the staff, the 
rapidly progressing front lines, the intermittent information and muddled awareness 
of what occurred inside France, the bifurcated command arrangements with the 
southern forces, and the ambitious overconfidence to send teams without the ability to 
back them up with arms all were self inflicted problems.  EMFFI’s lead JEDBURGH 
planner, Lt Col Dudley Guy Lancelot Carleton-Smith must have been completely 
disgusted with the squabbling among the operations and communications planners 
and the lack of facilities in London needed to brief the teams when doing so many in 
such a short amount of time.  Furthermore, he and the other American and British 
officers on the EMFFI staff often had to chase down what went wrong when a Jed in 
the field chewed them out for doing so poorly.  One can only wonder how many of 
these issues could have been avoided had General Koenig been allowed to be fully 
integrated into SHAEF when Eisenhower wanted to in January.  The fear of letting 
the French in on the secret was a valid concern, but despite waiting to bring the FFI in 
on the planning and conduct of operations, it is clear the Germans knew nearly 
everything about what SHAEF wanted the Résistance to do and how it was going to 
do it.  But only in northeast France did they succeed and disabling the FFI.  The fates 
of team AUGUSTUS, the only team to be completely eliminated, and casualties and 
prisoners of teams AUBREY, JACOB, and the ineffectiveness of teams such as 
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MAURICE, BENJAMIN, and HENRY attest to the fruitlessness of the effort despite 
the number of teams deployed to the area.  
To arm the Résistance, EMFFI needed to have secure drop zones and 
favorable weather.  But more than that, it needed to have secure drop zones that 
would remain secure for nearly 2 days.  That was the time it took to make all the 
arrangements and fly the missions bringing supplies.  While such conditions may 
have existed in eastern France before D-Day, or even before the middle of August 
when Hitler ordered the forces in the south and southwest to evacuate, those 
conditions did not exist when Eisenhower and Koenig needed to have them.  The 
Wehrmacht’s persistent traffic and movement through the region meant that 
Grandval, Hanneton, the Jeds, the SAS and the Maquisards could not guarantee that 
the security of the area they identified would remain so when the Germans moved 
about as they wished.  Moreover, the Gestapo’s merciless actions against anyone 
found working with, as they called them, the Terroristen, proved to be extremely 
effective, if not ultimately illegal, at rolling up FFI networks.  Despite thousands of 
potential FFI, operating in excellent terrain for guerilla warfare and enjoying growing 
political support for the Libération, the effort never gained traction due to the 36 hour 
planning cycle needed to line up aircraft, chose the proper containers of weapons, 
transfer the loads from the marshalling area to the proper aerodrome, properly rig the 
aircraft, and then fly them through the foggy moonless nights to the reception 
committee among the bonfires in the rainy forests of France.   However, it was not for 
the lack of persistence and the “chins up” attitude displayed by many.   
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The Jeds did need more time to establish themselves with Grandval’s and Hanneton’s 
organizations.  But more than mere time on the ground, the teams would have had to 
had them armed and trained so that when the Wehrmacht’s combat units transited the 
area, the Maquis could successfully harass them with hit and run raids coupled with 
persistent sabotage of key roads and railways.   Of course these operations, had they 
been able to occur, would have also had to maintain secure drop zones amidst the 
retreating and reorganizing Wehrmacht and SS units.  A difficult prospect, no matter 
when the teams arrived in the area. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 During the course of France’s Libération, the Allies deployed 93 JEDBURGH 
teams to France.  Those teams were a part of EMFFI’s effort to guide the use of the 
arms delivered to France before and after they arrived.  From 1941 until 1944, the 
Allies delivered 594,010 kilograms of explosives, 197,480 Sten light machine guns, 
20,518 Bren heavy machine guns, 127,330 rifles, 57,849 pistols, 722,271 grenades, 
2,440 Bazookas, 285 mortars, 9,373 Carbines, and 1,893 Marlin machine guns.86  The 
number of armed FFI is elusive, but SHAEF estimated it to be 114,000 by late 
October of 1944, nearly beating Eisenhower’s goal of having 120,000 armed men by 
the end of the year.87   Within this atmosphere, we can examine JEDBURGH 
operations during the summer and early fall of 1944 in order to see why some teams 
failed while others succeeded in order to get at the wisdom of using the method of 
guerrilla warfare.  Furthermore it allows us to examine the idea of using irregular 
warfare by nation states, and in the case of the Fighting French, the emerging nation 
state making use of irregulars and how it dealt with the problems that arose.   
Along with the JEDBURGHs, SHAEF and AFHQ deployed over 18 SAS 
missions, 20 Operational Groups, and 26 inter-allied missions to France.  But of these 
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Special Operations efforts the JEDBURGH plan was the first, most rigorously 
thought out and exercised effort the Allies put together.  Not only were they 
specifically developed to liaise with another nation’s irregular forces, but also the 
JEDBURGHs were Allied units working for an Allied headquarters that reported to 
the Supreme Allied Commander.  Such an attribute is a rare thing to see in military 
units and so it is important to recognize how that came about and under what 
conditions it occurred.  Coalition warfare is an incredibly complex affair to manage, 
which is why Alliances tend to maintain their coalition character at the highest level.  
Doing so allows the operational level commanders and tactical units to operate more 
freely from political issues and maintain their own unique cultural cohesion allowing 
for clarity of thought and action.   Placing alliance politics down to the tactical level 
forces 23-year-old Captains, Lieutenants, and 19-year-old Sergeants to either be 
cognizant of international politics or suffer the consequences.   It is a rare occurrence 
that expresses a coalition’s nature at the tactical level.    
I do not suggest that the JEDBURGHs sought to become involved in the local 
politics; they always wished to avoid it in order to conduct their military mission.  But 
many were forced to deal with politics when there were competing groups in their 
locality.  When the enemy attacked, unity often appeared within the groups who 
earnestly sought to fight back.  But even in areas that had come together, Libération 
politics became more pronounced as the various political parties and groups vied for 
control in September or October as the Germans were defeated.  As Team HUGH, the 
first team into France wrote at the end of their mission, “Fighting was over, politics 
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began, HUGH left.”88  Major William Crawshay, Captain Louis L’Helgouach, and 
radio operator Rene Meyer operated in France from 6 June to the end of September 
performing various military tasks, but they could do very little without local political 
unity of action.  When that political unity was honed under L’Helgouach’s auspices 
locally with their team, regionally with the DMR Eugene Dechelette and nationally 
with General Koenig, then unified military action could occur and had a chance at 
being effective.  Furthermore, operating inside the political sovereignty of de Gaulle 
and the CFLN, the teams exercised the CFLN’s sovereignty along with Allied 
authority.  Therefore, what the JEDBURGHs did, was give the CFLN’s military 
commanders 93 more ways to reach the irregular forces scattered around France, 
assert some measure of control from EMFFI via the DMRs or other representatives, 
in an effort to, as Clausewitz might say, control the peoples’ passions. 
A nation’s will, expressed by its own sense of sovereign authority and the 
expression of its power contends with other nations whether they are at war or not.  
As we have seen above, those contentions are not only with enemies but also with 
Allies.  Free France’s desire to reassert what it believed was the proper authority 
made it an aim, first and foremost to allow no seams to its sovereignty.  Pétain had no 
choice, he believed, but to bargain with Nazi Germany for as much sovereignty as he 
could get, but found only political illegitimacy.  His fear of a communist led internal 
revolution so clouded his views on the matter that he would rather have collaboration 
with Fascist Germany than lose the France he sought.  De Gaulle on the other hand, 
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declared an outlaw in 1940, risked everything in order to liberate France of foreign 
powers, to include the United States and Britain.  He was so driven to do so in fact, 
that when he found SOE agents in France in September of 1944, he demanded that 
they leave immediately.  “We don’t need you here.”  He scolded one British SOE 
officer who had been working clandestinely in France for months, “It only remains 
for you to leave.  I have already told one ARISTIDE, who was indulging in politics, 
to get out.  Another that I have dispatched is HILAIRE in Toulouse. You too must go 
home.  Return, return quickly, . . . Au revoir.”89    
De Gaulle would have no more seams to French sovereignty.  The Germans 
were to be driven out with combat while the British SOE, in September of 1944 could 
be chased out with his scorn.  General Koenig’s easing the SOE out of the command 
and control of the French FFI via Mockler-Ferryman’s resignation at the end of July 
is a portent to all of this.   While on the one hand it seems obscenely ungracious and 
petty to lash out like de Gaulle did at the three SOE agents, since they had risked their 
lives for months.  Nevertheless, ever since de Gaulle discovered that SOE’s F Section 
was operating in France conducting British policy there as Britain saw fit, and not as 
a part of an alliance, it seems only natural that he would want them to go, since they 
were uninvited foreign intelligence and sabotage agents.   Interestingly, there is no 
                                                
89 “Report of Captain Lake, DIGGER Circuit,” 27 September 1944, HS 6/574, BNA, Kew, UK. p. 4.  
ARISTIDE’s real name was Roger Landes who directed Team AMMONIA while in Bordeaux but 
assumed that role, as EMFFI never gave him any authority there.  HILAIRE’s real name was 
George Starr, probably the most influential British subject in France at the time, who attempted to 
make Teams BUGATTI, QUININE, MARK, CHRYSLER, MILES, and MARTIN as effective and 
useful as possible and integrate their actions with his and SFHQ’s plans.  Starr’s own effectiveness 
may be the reason why the DMR could not gain any meaningful power in the region.  No historical 
work on the DMRs has been done to examine their effectiveness, so this is merely a guess.   
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record of him seeking the hasty departure of JEDBURGH teams who had the 
imprimatur of General Koenig in addition to having French officers on each team.  In 
this regard, Eisenhower succeeded at gaining French participation the moment 
OVERLORD began by seeking to place them in charge of France’s partisan warfare.  
He learned from his North African invasion experiences and improved markedly 
upon what occurred there. 
Given the strong evidence that suggests that partisan warfare in France was at 
its most effective when enemy troops were under strength, spread out, and forced to 
move through an environment where the population’s hatred of them brought out 
more guerrillas than the Allies could work into their overall plans, it seems 
incongruent to see why the method would be so popular as the twentieth century 
progressed.  It is difficult to see how it could be replicated later under other 
conditions.  But then there never was a thorough vetting of how well and under what 
conditions the JEDBURGHs or the French Résistance proved to be successful.   If all 
JEDBURGH teams had met the same fate as Team JACOB and AUGUSTUS, then 
perhaps the institutionalized memory within the British, French, and American 
intelligence services and Special Forces would have sought a useful and sober 
assessment of why it failed.   
Instead, the Vercors, Elster’s surrender, and the operations on the Brittany 
peninsula were touted as examples of what is possible to SHAEF and Eisenhower and 
many of the commanders at the time accepted it while never seeking to understand 
why it was a success.  But as shown above, these events were not what SFHQ 
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believed them to be.  The FFI view Vercors as a disaster while the Wehrmacht units 
used there would not have threatened Patton or Patch.  However the fact that the units 
employed by the Wehrmacht to conduct their anti-partisan actions in the south of 
France were units that never would have been moved to threaten main Allied forces 
in the first place never seems to have been appreciated by SFHQ, SPOC, or EMFFI.  
Vercors did nothing to divert those forces from being employed against Patton and 
the rest of Eisenhower’s forces because they were units that never would have moved 
against them.  The German 157th Infantrie Division, the main combat force at the 
Vercors, did fight against the Allied invasion force commanded by Patch, but only 
because Patch came to where they were.  Elster was a grand success, due to the 
characteristics of:  reliable re-supply, JEDBURGH teams with good communications 
and the ability to hide when combat was not wise, weakened enemy troops forced to 
travel, close air support, reliable intelligence, all operating in an environment of 
political unity.   The operations in Brittany utilized the same characteristics, with 
more even more teams and greater air support for supplies and air strikes.  These 
striking events, as well as the day to day sabotage and mayhem done to cut German 
lines of communications from D-Day through to the end of the Libération reinforced 
the efficacy of partisan warfare in their minds, even when the anatomy of the 
operations were not truly appreciated. 
Lt Col Robert Powell’s 31 August message requesting arms for the FFI on his 
southern flank make it clear he believed the FFI could play a serious role.  But it is 
also clear that the Wehrmacht to his south were only interested in securing their own 
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northern flank along the Loire River in order to allow them to escape through the 
Bourges – Dijon – Besançon – Belfort Gap corridor.  Lt Col Hutchison’s comment 
that the German destruction of the Loire River bridges “satisfied everyone” is 
absolutely correct.  Neither side wished to attack the other at the Loire River 
crossings; they merely sought to outrace each other to Germany.  Not even Hitler’s 
starry eyed confidence in the ability of his armies believed the newly re-designated 
16th Infantrie Division was up to the task of outflanking the US 3rd Army.  Instead, 
salvaging his forces from southwestern France was more important and the 16th 
Infantrie Division’s mission was to shield its comrades from any Allied forces that 
might seek to come in their direction.   But Patton, quite correctly, was far too 
interested in racing eastward and happy to leave the chore to the FFI.  Therefore, the 
success the FFI had there had more to do with Wehrmacht choices then it did with 
their own actions.  Given what the Germans faced and what their goals were after 
DRAGOON began 15 August 1944, they succeeded in establishing a defensive line, 
and successfully managed the escape of a significant portion of their forces.  Koenig, 
Redman, Mockler-Ferryman, Haskell, et al, would have served Eisenhower and 
Wilson better had they argued to make central and southern France the first priority 
instead of the last.  Had EMFFI succeeded in pouring arms into those regions by the 
day DRAGOON began, perhaps the Wehrmacht’s 19th Armee would have been 
destroyed.  Instead, the Herculean but ill fated effort to mount a coherent operation in 
eastern France in order to use the Maquis as a blocking force merely resulted in some 
successful advanced reconnaissance while costing the lives of SAS and 
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JEDBURGHs, Maquis, and reprisals against civilians.  The only JEDBURGH teams 
completely decimated, AUGUSTUS and JACOB, are a testament to the futility of 
EMFFI’s efforts in Eastern France.  Since the Germans traveling though eastern 
France were often battle experienced and well led mobile combat units operating with 
the benefit of interior lines, at a distance limiting aerial re-supply and combat air 
support, Allied efforts to use guerilla warfare there was ill considered.   
My intention is not to criticize Koenig, Redman, Mockler-Ferryman and 
Haskell, but rather to soberly assess their actions and to see why some of their efforts 
worked and while others did not.  Operations in Brittany did meet with success and 
were the best of the four operational phases described in chapters five through eight.  
Taking their mission from Eisenhower to assist the advance of Allied forces in 
capturing the Breton ports, SFHQ and EMFFI developed a coherent plan and put it 
into action, albeit with some self-inflicted organizational tribulations caused by the 
poor relationship between Roosevelt and de Gaulle.  Despite the lack of a solid long 
term DMR for the region, the replacement DMRs did manage to make an impact and 
Colonel Bourgouin’s role in commanding the area until ALOES arrived provided 
sufficient command and control for the region.  The singular nature of the region’s 
Maquis, largely FTP, meant little infighting and coupled with sufficient French 
leadership, unity of action characterized Brittany’s FFI operations.  But the greatest 
impact was the ability of the aerial re-supply to continue without any substantial 
German interruption.  Drop zones were certainly lost, but when SFHQ succeeded in 
arming over 18,000 men by 1 August, it indicates that the region was the best and 
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most reliably equipped of any in France.  This was especially true considering that 
Brittany received no major daylight re-supply operations such as CADILLAC.  
Furthermore, all the Wehrmacht units in Brittany were under strength and not 
equipped for rapid maneuver, an attribute that was required to chase down partisans 
and defend oneself from air attack.  Even the 2nd Fallschirmjäger Division, the 
fiercest and arguably best led of any division in the region, was harried and unable to 
stop the Maquis from conducting much of what it sought to do.  However, 
Eisenhower’s whole aim was to capture the port at Brest in a usable state.  But by the 
time German General Ramcke surrendered in mid September, the port’s facilities 
were so badly damaged that Ike’s aim was never achieved.    
It is no coincidence that the Elster surrender occurred in the region run by the 
arguably the most effective DMR.  Eugene Dechelette did all the things the 
JEDBURGHs wished they could have done.  He arrived in his region in early March, 
established a relationship with the various Maquis groups, learned the region’s 
geography, enemy make up, secured the BBC code words for the alert and action 
messages and had managed some drop zones.  By the time D-Day occurred, he had 
things organized and a small but capable organization that could operate 
independently should communications with him be cut.  After the Normandy landings 
occurred, and changed the nature of what the Germans were doing and what the 
Maquis could do, he successfully executed his BCRA plans, worked with 
JEDBURGH teams sent to him, requested more, and assigned them areas in which to 
work.  By the time the southern landings occurred and OB West ordered the German 
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forces in the region to retreat, changing the nature of things in his region again, he 
was ready to take advantage of the opportunity for guerilla warfare.  Over the course 
of the summer he had successfully united the Résistance within his region comprised 
of FTP, AS, and ORA.  Their effective unification mitigated his region falling to 
Eisenhower’s lowest priority area for arms after 1 August. 
Ike may have mis-prioritized which Regions to arm; and he and his staff may 
have dangerously underestimated the numbers of Maquis that would be pleading for 
weapons.  He also may have been too afraid of over arming some of them at one 
point, but he did make the correct judgment on one big thing.  He knew that for the 
Maquis to have any meaningful impact on Allied progress through France, a French 
commander had to lead it while being part and parcel of SHAEF.  Roosevelt and 
Churchill had visions of controlling France or aspects of its Résistance and its 
government in exile.  The SOE and OSS had designs on controlling the Maquis with 
hundreds of agents and JEDBURGH teams.  The former is too high a level and the 
latter is too complicated and diffuse.  But Eisenhower largely solved the dilemma 
when he brought General Koenig into SHAEF and treated him as one of his field 
commanders on par with Generals Montgomery, Bradley, Spaatz, and Admiral 
Ramsay.  Had he been able to do so immediately upon his arrival at SHAEF in 
January of 1944, the FFI would have had time to make their Plans Vert, Tortue, 
Rouge and BIBENDUM roll in stages, as they were needed.  Instead, fearful that not 
much would occur, Eisenhower decided to turn them all on full steam, only to have to 
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clamor to turn them off four short days later when he was stunned at what was 
occurring in France.    
One may argue that security reasons were valid enough to keep EMFFI from 
so closely coordinating their planning with SHAEF.  French communications, codes, 
and the BCRA were infamous for their lack of security.  However, even the leak of 
JEDBURGH information made no difference.  As described in Chapter Three, 
William Savy went to France on the ECLAIREUR mission, in order to scout out 
JEDBURGH safe houses and relate the nature of the missions to General Dejessieu 
the interior commander of the FFI.  Some of the DMRs and F Section agents were 
made aware of SFHQ’s and the BCRA intent regarding the JEDBURGH mission.  
The information was severely compromised with Dejessieu’s, Nearne’s, and 
Southgate’s arrest.  Certainly, as the Pariser Zeitung article makes clear, the Gestapo 
knew a great deal about the JEDBURGH plan.  But it made no difference.  They 
could not stop JEDBURGH operations everywhere and only had consistent success in 
eastern France due to reasons unrelated to any specific knowledge of what occurred at 
Milton Hall.  Indeed it seems that if Haskell or Mockler-Ferryman had fallen into 
Nazi hands, it would have no effect, as long as the date, location, and size of the 
invasion force for D-Day remained secret.  Therefore, more integrated planning with 
the BCRA, earlier in the process, could have paid off had Roosevelt and Churchill not 
been so upset with de Gaulle for asserting the sovereignty almost all the French in 
North Africa, nearly every resistance movement, General Donovan and his OSS 
 393 
analysts, General Eisenhower, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and American 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy knew him to have.   
Did the FDR-de Gaulle argument prevent the pre D-Day deployment of the 
JEDBURGHs or was that never the intention?  The record is mixed.  The SOE and 
OSS histories and all their pre D-Day planning documents seem consistent in that the 
JEDBURGHs were to be a reserve for post D-Day.  However, SHAEF direction to 
SFHQ appears that there was some consideration of sending them in before D-Day.  
SHAEF directed that they be ready by 1 April, even when D-Day was originally 
scheduled for May.  Later, as D-Day neared, General Smith directed SFHQ to not 
deploy them until D-Day minus ten, and then later directed that they not be sent in 
until D-Day minus one at the earliest.  If SFHQ never intended to deploy them until 
after D-Day, why would SHAEF have to tell them not to do so?   Furthermore, the 
Jeds who were told they would be in France before D-Day, adds to the consternation.  
That belief seems most evident with the French and the BCRA recruiters may have 
sincerely believed it at the time, but since the BCRA was locked out of planning until 
the end of May, they were making promises they could not keep.  Therefore, the Jed 
belief that they were to be in before D-Day may simply have been the result of 
exuberant recruiters saying something they believed would attract the kind of men 
they wanted.  Soldiers being soldiers, that promise to a few, became rumor, which 
then became their tri-partite reality. 
The availability and the relatively late decision to use Special Air Service 
missions in France also caught the JEDBURGH planners to be out of form.  The 
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decision to insert Jeds along with SAS and OG missions, who had a markedly 
different mission from them, was also costly.  Not only were there procedural issues 
that caused confusion, but the SAS mission of striking out at enemy targets despite 
the local Maquis’ readiness to join such ventures was harmful to the JEDBURGH’s 
mission of deploying, assessing the local groups capabilities, getting arms to them 
and training them, and then at the appropriate time taking manageable numbers into 
hit and run actions against carefully selected enemy targets.  The SAS wished to do 
its operations immediately and was supplied out of airlift sortie allocations separate 
from SFHQ’s.  Therefore, when Eisenhower ordered the Maquis to cease guerilla 
warfare and restricted air drops, the SAS continued to get their weapons, making the 
JEDBURGHs working in concert with the nearby Maquis look impotent and 
illegitimate.  While the Maquis in some regions were then forced to wait due to lack 
of weapons or a persuasive Jed officer telling them to, the SAS continued on their 
merry way making mayhem.  The swelling of DINGSON with hundreds of Maquis 
and their subsequent dispersal due to German attacks on 18 June was something 
Team GEORGE did not recover from until the beginning of August.  Team 
FREDERICK only avoided a tragic fate due to the help of some local Maquis and 
their decision to disperse before the 2nd Fallschirmjäger arrived in strength to hunt 
them.  Moreover, one can look at the map of France noting where the SAS were and 
then noting where the reprisals were and it is no coincidence that where there was an 
SAS mission, reprisals on French civilians often occurred nearby.  If Jeds had been 
sent in on their own, they could have called in SAS teams to do missions beyond the 
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ability of the local Maquis while being cognizant of local concerns.  Team HUGH’s 
decision to disobey its orders and split from the BULBASKET mission proved wise 
in light of the fact that the Germans mauled BULBASKET. 
Of the 265 JEDBURGHs deployed to France, 13 were killed in combat, two 
died when their parachutes failed to open, one was killed by accident from a 
Maquisard’s unintended discharge of his weapon, and two subsequently died of 
combat wounds. 13 were wounded in combat but recovered, while six were severely 
injured in their parachute jumps.  Two of three JEDBURGHs survived being taken 
prisoner. The casualty rate was far lower than many expected.  When Bernard Knox 
of Team GILES checked out his equipment prior to leaving for France in July, he was 
shocked when told he need not sign for his gear.  Assuming he would be killed in 
France, the supply officer did not expect to get it back.90  But as it turned out, 9 out of 
every 10 Jeds returned.  
Many of those who survived France became an influential force in the post 
WWII world.  But there was no serious taking stock of the JEDBURGH operations in 
France as Germany and Japan still remained undefeated.  After the JEDBURGH 
missions were wound up in France and Holland many of the Jeds volunteered for 
other operations as the war had another year to go before it ended.  American Lt 
Colonel Hod Fuller and French Lieutenant Paul Aussaresses deployed on Special 
Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force (SAARF) teams attempting to ensure the 
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return it.  His souvenirs of the war are indeed impressive and include an SS Colonel’s hat whom he 
conned into surrendering in April of 1945 in Italy.   
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Germans did not mistreat POWs in captivity during the waning days of the war.  
William Colby of Team BRUCE commanded an Operational Group to Norway, 
Bernard Knox went on an OSS mission to Italy and Tommy MacPherson also served 
in an SOE mission there.  Several served in China or Indo-China, 12 of whom were 
killed.  Michel de Bourbon-Parme, the French Jed on Team QUININE was taken 
prisoner by communist insurgents in Indo-China and held for nearly a year.  His third 
escape attempt finally succeeded.91  Team GEORGE’s American Captain Paul Cyr 
took in a Chinese Commando unit on Mission HOUND and blew up the Yellow 
River Bridge while a Japanese troop train passed over it on the same day Nagasaki 
was destroyed on 9 August 1945.92  But with the exception of the SAARF missions, 
the nations went their own way with their Special Forces and Allied unconventional 
warfare faded away. 
The British ran JEDBURGH teams into Austria with some anti-Nazi Germans 
and Austrians, but despite their perceived success in Western Europe, small Allied 
teams were not employed again during the Second World War.  The coalition politics 
that brought them into being had changed significantly by late 1944 and the senior 
SOE, OSS, and BCRA (which by 1945 became the Direction générale des services 
spéciales or DGSS) leaders seemed eager for less complications.  In October, 
President Roosevelt finally recognized the Gaullist Résistance as the provisional 
government of France.   But political recognition did not increase Franco-American 
understanding when fighting the Japanese in south East Asia in 1945.  Here American 
                                                
91 De Bourbon-Parme, interview September 22nd 2007. 
92 Telephone interview with Donna Cyr, 30 March 1999. 
 397 
policy remained similar to what it had been in France.  Specifically, this meant 
working with whomever could defeat the Japanese.  Consequently, the OSS 
supported Ho Chi Minh’s insurgents in order to defeat the Japanese, while the French 
fought both the Japanese and Ho Chi Minh in order to re-establish control of their 
colony.93   The former French American JEDBURGHs then worked at cross purposes 
and Americans Aaron Bank and Lucien Conein fell out of favor with their French 
colleagues who were determined to wrest control of their colony back from the 
American supported Ho Chi Minh.  American OSS officers and the Viet Minh 
insurgents who would became bitter adversaries in the 1960s and 70s literally stood 
together when Ho Chi Minh declared independence from Japan and France, on 13 
August 1945.94  Such declarations seemed fine with the United States, but France had 
other political aims with their colonies and worked hard, if unsuccessfully, to 
maintain its authority over Vietnam and later Algeria.  Its efforts in those two 
conflicts kept former French JEDBURGH’s employed at those tasks and using the 
lessons they had learned in conducting their own guerilla warfare.  Paul Aussaresses 
of Team CHRYSLER served as the chief of intelligence in Algeria and in that 
capacity tortured and murdered to get the information he needed.95  
France’s failed efforts in south east Asia were followed by American attempts 
as well.  Former JEDBURGH’s, William Colby and Lucien Conein got similar results 
                                                
93 See Dixiee R. Bartholomew-Feis, The OSS and Ho Chi Minh:  Unexpected Allies in the War Against 
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94 Bernard Fall.  Street Without Joy:  The French Debacle in Indochina. (Harrisburg, PA:  Stackpole 
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95 See General Paul Aussaresses.  The Battle of the Casbah:  Terrorism and Counterterrorism in 
Algeria 1955 – 1957.  (New York:  Enigma Books, 2004). 
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in their roles as CIA officers, and John Singlaub as commander of Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACVSOG) when they 
picked up the baton to run a counter insurgency against the communist North 
Vietnamese in the 1960s.96  President Kennedy, who was enthusiastic about 
unconventional warfare sought to not only defend against what communist 
movements were doing abroad, but to conduct an insurgency of his own against Ho 
Chi Minh’s communist North Vietnam.  In an interview granted in 1962 to journalist 
and former JEDBURGH, Stewart Alsop, President Kennedy stated that the way the 
world was at that time made it necessary for the United States to have choices in how 
it could respond to aggression abroad.  Finding himself in a situation similar to 
Churchill’s in 1940 when he grasped for options to go on the offensive and created 
the SOE, Kennedy sought more options than only nuclear weapons and told Alsop 
that he needed to develop choices.  Reacting to how the communists were conducting 
their approach to the problem he was heavily influenced by Chinese leader Mao Tse-
Tung.  “Guerillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which the fish swim,” 
Kennedy said quoting Mao.  Kennedy went on to tell this former Jed that, “the best 
way – perhaps in the long run the only way – to deal with the internal Communist-
guerrilla threat, is to “control the temperature of the water” emphasizing this meant a 
political effort.97  Such was the case in WWII France too, but as Kennedy’s 
                                                
96 See Richard H. Shultz, Jr.  The Secret War Against Hanoi:  Kennedy’s and Johnson’s use of Spies, 
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predecessor, the former Supreme Allied Commander, President Eisenhower could 
have pointed out to his successor, the French did their own controlling.    
Ultimately, American efforts against North Vietnam failed for the same 
reasons the French efforts did.  As Richard Shultz points out, there was little popular 
support for an insurgency against the Ho Chi Minh regime.  But President John F. 
Kennedy, buttressed by his faith in unconventional warfare, sought to use it against 
the communists everywhere but failed to think through the conditions required in 
order to make it work for American interests at the time.  The US sponsored 
insurgency against North Vietnam started under former JEDBURGH William Colby 
as a CIA effort.  Kennedy believed the CIA did not have the resources to do it with 
the vigor he wished so he gave the mission to the Defense Department.  The Army 
and the theater commanders then created MACVSOG and the Army’s relatively 
young Special Forces began to run it.  When asked what he thought of his efforts to 
oversee the insurgency against Ho Chi Minh, former JEDBURGH John Singlaub 
admitted that by the time he took command of MACVSOG in 1966 the insurgency 
against North Vietnam was doomed.   Indeed, he thought it was doomed long before 
his arrival due to the agreements made in 1954 that drew the dividing line between 
north and South Vietnam and allowed for those who wished to leave the communist 
north to do so.  All the Vietnamese who did not wish to live in the North went 
elsewhere deflating nearly all native political sentiments opposed to Ho Chi Minh’s 
version of nationalism.  All Colonel Singlaub could do was suspect that the saboteurs 
and agents MACVSOG had inserted were turned by the enemy and triple turn them.  
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In other words, all the effort was good for was attempting to trick North Vietnam into 
thinking that the United States did not know that North Vietnam knew of its 
operations and feed disinformation back to “his” agents behind enemy lines.98  He 
could not control the temperature of the water in which he sent fish to swim, and so 
he tried that tack instead of completely quitting and cutting bait. 
 For Eisenhower, who grasped the issues better than most, controlling the 
French Résistance was a matter of bringing them into SHAEF and then letting the 
French run it while supporting their efforts with air sorties, arms, money, and 
training.  The BCRA, with the Bloc Planning effort, organized the sabotage plans in 
France and worked with the SOE and OSS to arm, train, and equip their agents before 
D-Day and that effort is what succeeded in supporting the initial invasion in 
Normandy.  Frenchmen and women comprised the vast majority of “agents” sent into 
France by the SOE as well as the BCRA.  But more importantly, the French 
Résistance was not a creation of the British SOE, or the American OSS.  It sprang 
from France itself, reflected French traditions of political action, French notions of 
the state, and sought French political aims that expressed French will.   
Eisenhower may not have understood all of this as clearly in 1944, as he never 
expressed it in those terms, but his recognition that General de Gaulle was the single 
leader, and his stubborn insistence on working with General Koenig to make him a 
subordinate commander when Roosevelt, Churchill, Gubbins, Mockler-Ferryman, 
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and Donovan protested, demonstrate he understood the fundamentals of the situation 
more clearly than anyone.   
 As Peter Novick, Charles-Louis Foulon, John Sweets, Jean-Louis Crémieux-
Brilhac, and other historians have clearly demonstrated, the Résistance’s greatest 
achievement was the political overthrow of Vichy and the unified effort it pulled 
together to resist Germany and then govern post-war France.  It succeeded in offering 
an alternative to those people in France increasingly alienated from Pétain’s feckless 
government and German occupation.  There lies the difference between a failed 
insurgency and a successful revolution.  De Gaulle offered an alternative for enough 
of the French population weary of war and occupation while avoiding much of the 
chaos he feared as much as Pétain.  While terming what de Gaulle achieved as a 
revolution may be dubious since its immediate result was the Fourth Republic that 
was very similar to the Third, his actions generally worked to avoid the worst aspects 
of chaos an insurgency often brings when it works at dissolving the fabric of 
institutions, authority, and society in order to bring down a government.  De Gaulle 
successfully avoided these problems when he brought the bands of FFI into the 
regular French Army and convinced those who maintained weapons supplied by the 
Allies, to keep them discreetly in their homes or surrender them to the government.  
Historians before me have demonstrated all these issues. 
Where the JEDBURGHs succeeded, they did so because the Résistance 
created the conditions necessary for success.  The military conditions such as the 
operational objectives of the German and Allied forces and the effects that resulted 
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from them, the ability to secure drop zones, reliable communications, and the 
reliability of re-supply sorties all were crucial.  But they were not the hardest things to 
achieve as French political will could not be parachuted into France.  Nothing the 
British SOE or the American OSS could do, would achieve what the Résistance 
succeeded in achieving.  In this light, Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s persistent 
undercutting of de Gaulle in an effort to control France seems increasingly harmful to 
Allied objectives.  But then it is apparent that they, perhaps understandably, were not 
as concerned with France as the French themselves were.   General Koenig’s 
intermittent ability to control the Résistance then is a testament to him, the BCRA, the 
EMFFI staff, and the myriad movements all-determining for themselves to submit to 
his authority.  Therefore, the Allied desire to control the French Résistance did not 
come about because of JEDBURGH teams as SOE originally wished, but because 
Eisenhower made Koenig subordinate to his Allied Command.  That act was not 
something SOE foresaw when it first developed the JEDBURGH plan, but it was the 
greatest constructive step the Allies made toward freeing France. 
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Annex I 
 
Commando – Anglicized form of the Afrikaans word, Kommando, which means 
small unit or group of militia.  The word first appeared in English as a cross over 
during the Boer War around 1902.   Since the beginning of WWII, it has shifted to 
mean highly trained soldiers performing quick raids or strikes against a specific 
target. 
 
Counter-insurgency – an effort by a government to defeat an indigenous force 
seeking to overthrow it. 
 
Guerrilla Warfare – First entered the English language around 1809 during the 
Peninsular War when the Duke of Wellington’s troops fought Napoleon’s forces in 
Spain.  Guerrilla is a Spanish word that means “small war.”  The “Guerillas” were 
those indigenous Spanish that fought with the British to drive the French out. 
 
Insurgency – an effort by a group within a nation-state to either overthrow the 
constituted government or to separate a desired territory from that government’s 
control.   
 
Irregular Warfare – Non-professionally trained people who conduct violence 
against a government or another nation’s forces.  The legal status of these 
combatants, as they are often outside any sovereign nation’s authority is a source of 
great debate.  Are they criminals or fighting for a just cause? 
 
Partisan Warfare -  An Italian term for a kind of spear, it now has come to mean a 
member of a small band of irregulars, akin to guerrilla warfare.  Entered the English 
language with this connation around 1810. 
 
Small Wars or “Petite-Guerre” – defined in Diderot’s famous Encyclopedié, 
published in the 18th century, as tactics performed behind the lines or between the 
lines by professional forces of “detachment or parties, whose object is to scout out the 
enemy’s intent, to observe its movements, to harass it or badger it in all its operations, 
to surprise its convoyes, to establish commissary and sustainment, etc.”  
 
Unconventional War – a term widely used for nearly anything that does not involve 
the use of massed formations of troops or aircraft.  Many times, even nuclear warfare 
comes under this rubric, but normally it is meant to describe the use of non-
professional forces within the interior of the enemy’s territory.  Current United States 
doctrinal definition of this term describes the use of irregulars against an enemy. 
 
 
 - Source is the Oxford English Dictionary Online, or Diderot’s Encyclopedié, found 
in Spencer Library. 
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Final Jedburgh Team map from HS 7/16, BNA, Kew, UK. 
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AIR 20/8011, BNA, Kew, UK. 
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Source:  U. S. Army 
Europe, FFI History, 
Locations of DMRs  
Indicate the map was created 
In early August, 1944 
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Photographs 
 
Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, 3rd from left with General Pierre Koenig standing next to 
him.  Whitney Shepardson of OSS London is 2nd from left.  The rest of the 
individuals are members of the “Carpetbaggers.”   
September 1944, RAF Harrington, UK - Joseph F. Haskell Papers
  
408 
 
Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, HS 9/510/1, BNA. 
 
 
 
Lieutenant Paul Moniez and Major James O’Brien-Tear, officers of Team 
BENJAMIN, courtesy of General Moniez 
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Major Colin Ogden-Smith of Team 
FRANCIS               BNA HS 9/1377/2 
 
 
Captain Victor Gough of Team 
JACOB, courtesy of Colin Burbidge 
 
Lieutenant Paul Bloch-Auroch, MSgt Robert Kehoe, Major Adrian Wise, of Team 
FREDERICK, US National Archives 
  
410 
 
Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, DMZ- 
Sud, HS 8/1001, BNA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eugene Dechelette, DMR for R5 
HS 8/1001, BNA
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